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SCIENTIFIC PREDICTION IN NICHOLAS RESCHER’S CONCEPTION: 
PHILOSOPHICO-METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
Scientific prediction is a central problem in philosophy and methodology 
of science. This topic has been particularly relevant in Nicholas Rescher’s 
philosophy. On the one hand, scientific prediction appears as a key concept 
within his philosophical proposal, which is a system of pragmatic idealism; on 
the other, a number of his publications are devoted to the study of scientific 
prediction from different angles. De facto, he offers a rigorous and detailed 
conception of prediction in science. 
Within this context, this Ph.D. research has two main objectives, which 
are interrelated. First, the analysis of the philosophico-methodological 
characters of scientific prediction in Rescher’s conception is the focus of the 
attention. To do this, the research deals with different thematic realms: 
semantic, logical, epistemological, methodological, ontological, axiological, 
and ethical. These are grounded in the different components of science 
(language, structure, knowledge, processes, activity, ends, and values). 
Second, the critical reconstruction of Rescher’s philosophy of science is 
searched. His approach is a pragmatic idealism that is open to some 
important realist elements. This second line of research is developed in 
parallel with the first one, because his system of pragmatic idealism 
modulates the characters of scientific prediction. 
 
 
 
 
 
LA PREDICCIÓN CIENTÍFICA EN LA CONCEPCIÓN DE NICHOLAS RESCHER: 
ANÁLISIS FILOSÓFICO-METODOLÓGICO 
 
RESUMEN 
 
El problema de la predicción científica es un tema central para la 
Filosofía y Metodología de la Ciencia. Se trata de un tema especialmente 
relevante en la Filosofía de Nicholas Rescher. Por un lado, la predicción 
científica aparece como un concepto clave dentro de su propuesta filosófica, 
que es un sistema de idealismo pragmático. Por otro lado, tiene trabajos en 
los que analiza la predicción científica desde diversos ángulos. De facto, 
ofrece una concepción rigurosa y detallada de la predicción. 
Dentro de este marco, la presente Tesis Doctoral tiene dos objetivos 
fundamentales, que están interrelacionados. En primer lugar, el estudio se 
orienta a analizar los caracteres filosófico-metodológicos de la predicción 
científica en la concepción de Rescher. A tal efecto, la investigación se 
enfoca desde diversos ámbitos temáticos: semántico, lógico,  
epistemológico, metodológico, ontológico, axiológico y ético. Estos ámbitos 
temáticos se fundamentan en los diversos componentes de la Ciencia 
(lenguaje, estructura, conocimiento, procesos, actividad, fines y valores). 
En segundo término, la investigación se orienta a reconstruir 
críticamente la Filosofía de la Ciencia de Rescher. Su propuesta es un 
idealismo pragmático que está abierto a importantes elementos de realismo. 
Esta segunda línea se desarrolla de manera paralela a la primera, porque su 
sistema de idealismo pragmático modula los caracteres de la predicción 
científica.  
 
 
A PREDICIÓN CIENTÍFICA NA CONCEPCIÓN DE NICHOLAS RESCHER: ANÁLISE 
FILOSÓFICA-METODOLÓXICA 
 
RESUMO 
 
O problema da predición científica é un tema central para a Filosofía e 
Metodoloxía da Ciencia. Trátase dun tema especialmente relevante na 
Filosofía de Nicholas Rescher. Por un lado, a predición científica aparece 
como un concepto clave dentro da súa proposta filosófica, que é un sistema 
de idealismo pragmático. Por outro lado, ten traballos nos que analiza a 
predición científica desde diversos ángulos. De facto, ofrece unha 
concepción rigorosa da predicción, onde acada un gran nivel de detalle.  
Dentro deste marco, a presente Tese de Doutoramento ten dous 
obxectivos fundamentais, que están interrelacionados. En primeiro lugar, o 
estudo oriéntase a analizar os caracteres filosófico-metodolóxicos da 
predición científica na concepción de Rescher. A tal efecto, a investigación 
enfócase desde diversos ámbitos temáticos: semántico, lóxico,  
epistemolóxico, metodolóxico, ontolóxico, axiolóxico e ético. Estes ámbitos 
temáticos fundaméntanse nos diversos compoñentes da Ciencia (linguaxe, 
estrutura, coñecemento, procesos, actividade, fins e valores). 
En segundo termo, a investigación oriéntase a reconstruir críticamente 
a Filosofía da Ciencia de Rescher. A súa proposta é un idealismo pragmático 
que está aberto a importantes elementos de realismo. Esta segunda liña de 
análise desenvólvese en paralelo á primeira, porque o seu sistema de 
idealismo pragmático modula os caracteres da predición científica.  
 
 
 
i 
 
GENERAL INDEX 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 
I.  Thematic Context of the Research ................................................................... 1 
II. From the Problems to the Philosophico-Methodological Analysis ..................... 4 
III.  Acknowledgments .........................................................................................10 
  
PART I 
General Coordinates, Semantic Features,  
and Logical Components of Scientific Prediction 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Scientific Prediction in a System of Pragmatic Idealism ...................................14 
1.1.  Nicholas Rescher’s Philosophy: General Coordinates .................................15 
1.1.1.  Academic Training and Career ..............................................................16 
1.1.2.  A Kantian Pragmatism: The Primacy of Practice ...................................22 
1.2.  A Systematic Conception of Science and Philosophy ..................................27 
1.2.1.  The Role of Concepts in the Development of Knowledge......................28 
1.2.2.  Scientific Progress ................................................................................33 
1.3. The Main Philosophico-Methodological Elements of Prediction ....................44 
1.3.1. Semantic and Logical Features of Prediction ........................................46 
1.3.2. Prediction in the Epistemological and Methodological Realms ..............50 
1.3.3. Ontological Features of Prediction and the Realm of Values ................54 
1.4.  Pragmatic Idealism in the Contemporary Context ........................................58 
1.4.1.  A System Open to Realism without Eclecticism ....................................58 
1.4.2.  An Idealism with Distinctive Features ....................................................63 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Analysis of Scientific Prediction from Language ...............................................69 
2.1.  Characteristic Features of Meaning in Rescher ...........................................70 
2.1.1. Communication as Activity and Meaning with Cognitive Content ...........70 
2.1.2.  The Primacy of the Pragmatic Dimension .............................................74 
2.2.  Scientific Prediction in a Theory of Meaning ................................................81 
2.2.1.  Context of Use ......................................................................................82 
2.2.2.  Statement about Novel Facts ................................................................84 
ii 
 
2.3.  The Language of “Prediction” ......................................................................86 
2.3.1.  The Concept of “Prediction” ..................................................................87 
2.3.2.  Quantitative Prediction and Qualitative Prediction .................................90 
2.4.  Characterization of the Predictive Statements .............................................96 
2.4.1.  Prediction and Retrodiction ...................................................................96 
2.4.2.  Foresight, Prediction, Forecasting, and Planning ..................................99 
2.5.  Scientific Prediction and the Problem of Demarcation ............................... 103 
2.5.1.  Accommodation and Scientific Prediction ........................................... 104 
2.5.2.  The Pragmatic Alternative ................................................................... 110 
2.6. Limits of Language and Prediction:  
             “Not Predictable” and “Unpredictable” .................................................. 116 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Logical Features of Scientific Prediction .......................................................... 125 
3.1.  From Logical Symmetry to Asymmetry  
        between Explanation and Prediction.......................................................... 126 
3.1.1.  A Significant “Disanalogy”:  
           Explanation of Past and Prediction of Future ...................................... 127 
3.1.2.  Rescher’s Proposal on the Nexus  
           between Explanation and Prediction ................................................... 132 
3.2.  The Temporality Factor ............................................................................. 136 
3.2.1. Is There Just and Anisotropy between Explanation and Prediction? .... 137 
3.2.2.  Are Retrodiction and Prediction Logically Equivalent? ........................ 143 
3.3. The Role of Inductive Logic with Regard to Scientific Prediction ................. 149 
3.3.1.  The Problem of Induction as Scientific Procedure ............................... 150 
3.3.2.  Justification of Induction: The Pragmatic Preference ........................... 154 
3.4.  Importance of Induction for Scientific Prediction ........................................ 158 
3.4.1.  Role in the “Context of Discovery” ....................................................... 159 
3.4.2.  Task in the “Context of Justification” ................................................... 160 
3.5.  Possible Limits of Deductivism to Scientific Prediction .............................. 165 
 
PART II 
Predictive Knowledge and Predictive Processes  
in Rescher's Methodological Pragmatism 
 
iii 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
Epistemological Factors of Scientific Prediction ............................................. 175 
4.1.  A Holistic Theory of Rationality .................................................................. 176 
4.1.1.  The Realm of Rationality: Knowledge, Actions, and Values ................ 177 
4.1.2.  An Approach of Bounded Rationality................................................... 183 
4.1.3.  Practicable Rationality ........................................................................ 188 
4.2.  Scientific Prediction and the Main Types of Rationality .............................. 193 
4.2.1.  Cognitive Rationality ........................................................................... 194 
4.2.2.  Practical Rationality ............................................................................ 197 
4.2.3.  Evaluative Rationality .......................................................................... 201 
4.3.  Fallibilism and Predictive Knowledge ......................................................... 208 
4.3.1.  Scientific Prediction and the Problem of Truth ..................................... 209 
4.3.2.  Knowledge of the Variables of Prediction ............................................ 213 
4.4.  Epistemological Limits to Predictability ...................................................... 217 
4.4.1.  The Problem of Uncertainty ................................................................ 217 
4.4.2.  Prediction and Decision-Making .......................................................... 227 
4.5.  Rationality and the Problem of Risk ........................................................... 229 
4.5.1.  Cognitive Rationality and Risk: A Criticism of Skepticism .................... 230 
4.5.2.  Risk and Prediction ............................................................................. 235 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Conceptual Framework of the Methodology of Prediction  
and Preconditions for Rational Prediction ........................................................ 241 
5.1.  Methodological Pragmatism as a Framework for Scientific Prediction ....... 242 
5.1.1. Nicholas Rescher’s Characterization of Methodological Pragmatism ... 243 
5.1.2. Application of Methodological Pragmatism to Scientific Prediction ....... 252 
5.2.  The Roles of Prediction in Scientific Activity .............................................. 258 
5.2.1.  The Role of Prediction as Test in Basic Science ................................. 262 
5.2.2.  The Role of Prediction as a Guide in the Task of Applied Science ...... 267 
5.2.3. The Problem of the Application of Science: The Role of Prediction ...... 272 
5.3.  From the General Realm to the Special Level ........................................... 277 
5.3.1. Prediction in the Natural Sciences and in the Socieal Sciences ........... 278 
5.3.2.  The Artificial Realm: Prediction in the Design Sciences ...................... 284 
5.4.   Preconditions for Rational Prediction ........................................................ 290 
iv 
 
5.4.1.  Data Availability .................................................................................. 292 
5.4.2.  Pattern Discernability .......................................................................... 296 
5.4.3.  Pattern Stability ................................................................................... 303 
 
CHAPTER 6 
Methods of Prediction and Their Scientific Relevance .................................... 308 
6.1.  Estimative Procedures of Prediction .......................................................... 309 
6.1.2.  Procedures for Combining Predictions ................................................ 313 
6.1.3.  The Delphi Procedure ......................................................................... 315 
6.2.  Elementary Formalized Processes ............................................................ 323 
6.2.1.  Trend Extrapolation ............................................................................. 323 
6.2.2.  The Use of Analogies .......................................................................... 329 
6.3.  Formalized Scientific Methods ................................................................... 331 
6.3.1.  Correlation as a Predictive Indicator.................................................... 331 
6.3.2.  Inference from Laws ........................................................................... 337 
6.3.3.  Predictive Models................................................................................ 344 
6.4.  Assessment of the Predictive Procedures and Methods ............................ 350 
6.4.1.  Reliability and Characteristics of  
           Predictive Procedures and Methods ................................................... 351 
6.4.2.  Parsimonious Factors ......................................................................... 356 
 
PART III 
From Reality to Values: Ontological Features, Axiological Elements, 
and Ethical Aspects of Scientific Prediction 
 
CHAPTER 7 
Ontology of Scientific Prediction....................................................................... 360 
7.1.  Scientific Prediction and the Reality of Phenomena ................................... 361 
7.1.1.  Natural Phenomena ............................................................................ 362 
7.1.2.  The Social Realm................................................................................ 364 
7.1.3.  The Artificial Realm ............................................................................ 367 
7.2.  Characterization of the Future from an Entitative Perspective ................... 369 
7.2.1. The Reality of Future Phenomena ...................................................... 370 
7.2.2.  The Entitative Incidence of the Time Horizon ...................................... 372 
7.2.3. Scientific Prediction and the Control of Phenomena ........................... 375 
7.3.  Ontological Obstacles to Scientific Prediction ............................................ 378 
7.3.1.  Anarchy and Volatility ........................................................................ 378 
v 
 
7.3.2.  Chance, Chaos, and Arbitrary Choice ................................................. 381 
7.3.3. Creativity as an Obstacle to Prediction ............................................... 386 
7.3.4. Obstacles on Predictors ...................................................................... 390 
7.4.  Ontology of Prediction from the Perspective of Complexity ....................... 392 
7.4.1.  Varieties and Relevant Modes of Complexity ...................................... 393 
7.4.2. Ontological Modes of Complexity and Their Incidence on Prediction ... 397 
7.4.3.  Complexity and Historicity in the Social Sciences  
           and the Sciences of the Artificial ......................................................... 401 
 
CHAPTER 8 
Axiological Elements of Scientific Prediction................................................... 407 
8.1.  Nicholas Rescher’s Axiology as a System of Science and Values ............. 410 
8.1.1.  A Holistic View of Values as a Human Activity .................................... 411 
8.1.2. From the Internal Dimension to the External Aspect:  
          Importance of Evaluative Rationality and Relation to Technology ........ 414 
8.2.  Axiology of Scientific Research in the Pragmatic Idealism ......................... 418 
8.2.1.  Values as a System in the Case of Science:  
           The Primacy of the Internal Dimension ............................................... 418 
8.2.2.  Main Values: Epistemological and Methodological .............................. 424 
8.3.  Prediction as Value of Science: The Problem of Predictivism .................... 430 
8.3.1. Prediction as Value with Regard to the Aims of Science ..................... 431 
8.3.2. The Value of Prediction in Processes and Results.  
            The Discussion between Accommodation and Prediction .................. 435 
8.4.   From the Structural Perspective:  
         Values of Scientific Prediction in Rescher’s Proposal ............................... 439 
8.4.1. Criteria for the Evaluation of the Predictive Questions  
            and Values of Prediction as an Answer .............................................. 440 
8.4.2. Elements for the Evaluation of Predictors and Predictive Methods ..... 445 
8.5.  Values from the Dynamic Perspective: Prediction in Basic Science,  
        Applied Science, and the Application of Science ....................................... 448 
8.5.1.  Evaluation of Aims and Processes in the Three Cases ....................... 449 
8.5.2. Criteria for the Evaluation of the Results in the Three Realms ............. 454 
 
CHAPTER 9 
Analysis of Prediction from Ethics of Scientific Research .............................. 462 
9.1.  Pragmatic Idealism as the Framework of the Ethics of Science ................. 465 
9.1.1.  The Grounding of Moral in Mind: The Cognitive Basis  
            as a Support of the Ethical Dimension of Our Science ....................... 465 
vi 
 
9.1.2.  Science and Ethical Values in Rescher’s Approach ............................ 475 
9.2.  Two Levels of Ethical Analysis of Science:  
         The Endogenous Ethics and the Exogenous Ethics ................................. 484 
9.2.1.  Endogenous Ethical Values in Scientific Activity ................................. 484 
9.2.2.  Science and Exogenous Ethical Values: Science as Activity ............... 489 
9.3.  The Ethical Limits of Scientific Research:  
        Their Incidence for Scientific Prediction ..................................................... 496 
9.3.1.   Approaches to the Ethical Limits of Scientific Research:  
            Importance for Ends and Means ........................................................ 497 
9.3.2.  From the Internal Perspective to the External Dimension .................... 504 
9.4.   Prediction and Ethical Values from the Dynamic Perspective:  
         Evaluation of the Aims, Processes, and Results ....................................... 509 
9.4.1.  Ethical Values and Prediction in the Realm of Basic Science .............. 510 
9.4.2.  Ethical Elements of Prediction in Applied Science  
           and Repercussions on Scientific Prescription ...................................... 514 
9.4.3.  The Problem of the Application of Scientific Prediction:  
           The Variability of Contexts and the Adaptability of the Agents............. 520 
 
CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................... 526 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………….546 
I.  Sources ......................................................................................................... 546 
II.  Complementary Publications ........................................................................ 560 
III.  Secondary Bibliography............................................................................... 578 
 
ANEXO: 
Resumen de la Tesis Doctoral Scientific Prediction in Nicholas Rescher’s 
Conception: Philosophico-Methodological Analysis 
(La predicción científica en la concepción de Nicholas Rescher:  
Análisis filosófico-metodológico) ........................................................................... 584 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
INDEX OF VOLUME I 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 
I.  Thematic Context of the Research ................................................................... 1 
II. From the Problems to the Philosophico-Methodological Analysis ..................... 4 
III.  Acknowledgments .........................................................................................10 
  
PART I 
General Coordinates, Semantic Features,  
and Logical Components of Scientific Prediction 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Scientific Prediction in a System of Pragmatic Idealism ...................................14 
1.1.  Nicholas Rescher’s Philosophy: General Coordinates .................................15 
1.1.1.  Academic Training and Career ..............................................................16 
1.1.2.  A Kantian Pragmatism: The Primacy of Practice ...................................22 
1.2.  A Systematic Conception of Science and Philosophy ..................................27 
1.2.1.  The Role of Concepts in the Development of Knowledge......................28 
1.2.2.  Scientific Progress ................................................................................33 
1.3. The Main Philosophico-Methodological Elements of Prediction ....................44 
1.3.1. Semantic and Logical Features of Prediction ........................................46 
1.3.2. Prediction in the Epistemological and Methodological Realms ..............50 
1.3.3. Ontological Features of Prediction and the Realm of Values ................54 
1.4.  Pragmatic Idealism in the Contemporary Context ........................................58 
1.4.1.  A System Open to Realism without Eclecticism ....................................58 
1.4.2.  An Idealism with Distinctive Features ....................................................63 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Analysis of Scientific Prediction from Language ...............................................69 
2.1.  Characteristic Features of Meaning in Rescher ...........................................70 
2.1.1. Communication as Activity and Meaning with Cognitive Content ...........70 
2.1.2.  The Primacy of the Pragmatic Dimension .............................................74 
2.2.  Scientific Prediction in a Theory of Meaning ................................................81 
2.2.1.  Context of Use ......................................................................................82 
2.2.2.  Statement about Novel Facts ................................................................84 
2.3.  The Language of “Prediction” ......................................................................86 
viii 
 
2.3.1.  The Concept of “Prediction” ..................................................................87 
2.3.2.  Quantitative Prediction and Qualitative Prediction .................................90 
2.4.  Characterization of the Predictive Statements .............................................96 
2.4.1.  Prediction and Retrodiction ...................................................................96 
2.4.2.  Foresight, Prediction, Forecasting, and Planning ..................................99 
2.5.  Scientific Prediction and the Problem of Demarcation ............................... 103 
2.5.1.  Accommodation and Scientific Prediction ........................................... 104 
2.5.2.  The Pragmatic Alternative ................................................................... 110 
2.6. Limits of Language and Prediction:  
             “Not Predictable” and “Unpredictable” .................................................. 116 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Logical Features of Scientific Prediction .......................................................... 125 
3.1.  From Logical Symmetry to Asymmetry  
        between Explanation and Prediction.......................................................... 126 
3.1.1.  A Significant “Disanalogy”:  
           Explanation of Past and Prediction of Future ...................................... 127 
3.1.2.  Rescher’s Proposal on the Nexus  
           between Explanation and Prediction ................................................... 132 
3.2.  The Temporality Factor ............................................................................. 136 
3.2.1. Is There Just and Anisotropy between Explanation and Prediction? .... 137 
3.2.2.  Are Retrodiction and Prediction Logically Equivalent? ........................ 143 
3.3. The Role of Inductive Logic with Regard to Scientific Prediction ................. 149 
3.3.1.  The Problem of Induction as Scientific Procedure ............................... 150 
3.3.2.  Justification of Induction: The Pragmatic Preference ........................... 154 
3.4.  Importance of Induction for Scientific Prediction ........................................ 158 
3.4.1.  Role in the “Context of Discovery” ....................................................... 159 
3.4.2.  Task in the “Context of Justification” ................................................... 160 
3.5.  Possible Limits of Deductivism to Scientific Prediction .............................. 165 
 
 
PART II 
Predictive Knowledge and Predictive Processes  
in Rescher's Methodological Pragmatism 
 
 
ix 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
Epistemological Factors of Scientific Prediction ............................................. 175 
4.1.  A Holistic Theory of Rationality .................................................................. 176 
4.1.1.  The Realm of Rationality: Knowledge, Actions, and Values ................ 177 
4.1.2.  An Approach of Bounded Rationality................................................... 183 
4.1.3.  Practicable Rationality ........................................................................ 188 
4.2.  Scientific Prediction and the Main Types of Rationality .............................. 193 
4.2.1.  Cognitive Rationality ........................................................................... 194 
4.2.2.  Practical Rationality ............................................................................ 197 
4.2.3.  Evaluative Rationality .......................................................................... 201 
4.3.  Fallibilism and Predictive Knowledge ......................................................... 208 
4.3.1.  Scientific Prediction and the Problem of Truth ..................................... 209 
4.3.2.  Knowledge of the Variables of Prediction ............................................ 213 
4.4.  Epistemological Limits to Predictability ...................................................... 217 
4.4.1.  The Problem of Uncertainty ................................................................ 217 
4.4.2.  Prediction and Decision-Making .......................................................... 227 
4.5.  Rationality and the Problem of Risk ........................................................... 229 
4.5.1.  Cognitive Rationality and Risk: A Criticism of Skepticism .................... 230 
4.5.2.  Risk and Prediction ............................................................................. 235 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Conceptual Framework of the Methodology of Prediction  
and Preconditions for Rational Prediction ........................................................ 241 
5.1.  Methodological Pragmatism as a Framework for Scientific Prediction ....... 242 
5.1.1. Nicholas Rescher’s Characterization of Methodological Pragmatism ... 243 
5.1.2. Application of Methodological Pragmatism to Scientific Prediction ....... 252 
5.2.  The Roles of Prediction in Scientific Activity .............................................. 258 
5.2.1.  The Role of Prediction as Test in Basic Science ................................. 262 
5.2.2.  The Role of Prediction as a Guide in the Task of Applied Science ...... 267 
5.2.3. The Problem of the Application of Science: The Role of Prediction ...... 272 
5.3.  From the General Realm to the Special Level ........................................... 277 
5.3.1. Prediction in the Natural Sciences and in the Socieal Sciences ........... 278 
5.3.2.  The Artificial Realm: Prediction in the Design Sciences ...................... 284 
5.4.   Preconditions for Rational Prediction ........................................................ 290 
5.4.1.  Data Availability .................................................................................. 292 
x 
 
5.4.2.  Pattern Discernability .......................................................................... 296 
5.4.3.  Pattern Stability ................................................................................... 303 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The problem of scientific prediction is undoubtedly a central topic for the 
philosophy and methodology of science. This is because of its importance for 
scientific practice in the different empirical sciences (natural, social, and 
artificial), where prediction has several crucial roles. Thus, prediction can be 
a test for the scientific character of hypotheses and theories (basic science). 
It precedes the prescription oriented towards the solution of concrete 
problems (applied science), and it serves as a support for decision-making in 
practical contexts of acting (application of science). 
Furthermore, when the goals of scientific research are considered, it is 
usual to highlight two of these goals: the explanation of past phenomena and 
events and the prediction of future phenomena and happenings. However, 
the attention directed towards scientific prediction is, certainly, very little in 
comparison to the effort devoted to the study of scientific explanation. This 
feature can be seen in the number of publications in this regard, which is 
clearly higher in the case of scientific explanation. But it is also the case that 
prediction frequently appears as a key concept in the research into other 
issues of the philosophy and methodology of science, such as scientific 
progress, complexity, or the limits of science.  
 
I.  Thematic Context of the Research 
Certainly, Nicholas Rescher’s contribution to the philosophical reflection 
on the problem of prediction must be highlighted. Thus, on the one hand, 
scientific prediction appears as a key concept within his philosophy and 
methodology of science. In effect, his pragmatic idealism emphasizes the 
importance of scientific prediction as a topic of analysis in the philosophy of 
science. On the other hand, several of his publications are devoted to the 
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study of scientific prediction from different angles (above all, from the 
epistemological and methodological perspectives). In this way, he offers a 
rigorous conception of prediction, where the analysis achieves a great level 
of detail. 
These reflections highlight the pertinence of developing a philosophico-
methodological analysis of “scientific prediction” in Nicholas Rescher’s 
approach, since he is one of the authors who made the most contributions to 
the study of this topic, which is crucial for science and has been little 
considered in the philosophy of science (at least, in comparison with other 
problems, such as scientific explanation). This research is focused on the 
philosophy of science, where Rescher has developed his own proposal: a 
system of pragmatic idealism. Moreover, some of his contributions to 
philosophy, in general, receive attention to the extent that they are connected 
with his philosophy of science and can be relevant for the study of scientific 
prediction. 
 Nicholas Rescher was born in Germany in 1928. He settled in the 
United States when he was nine years old, and has produced an important 
philosophical contribution, where his analysis of scientific prediction can be 
emphasized. These contributions have been both theoretical — regarding a 
large number of problems — and practical, because he was one of the 
designers of the predictive procedure called Delphi. Within his theoretical 
contributions, his paper “On Prediction and Explanation” (1958) should be 
mentioned. In this paper, he calls into question the logical symmetry between 
prediction and explanation, which was the dominant thesis in that moment. 
His book Predicting the Future must be also highlighted, where a systematic 
philosophico-methodological analysis of scientific prediction is offered for the 
first time. This analysis is made from different relevant perspectives 
(especially, the epistemological, methodological, and ontological ones).  
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Besides the attention to the problem of scientific prediction in its 
different dimensions, Rescher has offered a system of thought; that is, he 
has provided his own conception of philosophy, in general, and philosophy of 
science, in particular. His proposal — pragmatic idealism — encompasses 
very influential contemporary elements, such as pragmatism, but his idealistic 
approach involves very different characteristics from naturalism, which has 
been frequent over the last decades. Very often, his approach has original 
features. 
Within this framework — a key philosophico-methodological topic in an 
influential contemporary philosopher — this Ph.D. research has two main 
objectives. Firstly, the study is oriented towards the analysis of the 
philosophico-methodological characteristics of scientific prediction in 
Rescher’s conception. To do this, the research is focused on different 
thematic realms: semantic, logical, epistemological, methodological, 
ontological, axiological, and ethical. These thematic realms of the analysis of 
scientific prediction are grounded in the different components of science 
(language, structure, knowledge, processes, activity, ends, and values), 
which can be oriented towards the future, so they are relevant for prediction. 
Secondly, the investigation is oriented towards offering a critical 
reconstruction of Rescher’s philosophy of science, which can be 
characterized as a pragmatic idealism that is open to some realist elements. 
This second line is developed in parallel with the first one, the philosophico-
methodological features of scientific prediction, since in his approach the 
pragmatic idealism modulates the characters of prediction. In effect, his 
philosophy of science is related to a system, so the thematic realms of the 
analysis of scientific prediction are interrelated within a system of thought. 
In order to develop those two axes of the investigation — the critical 
reconstruction of Rescher’s concept of “prediction” and his system of 
pragmatic idealism — in a way that the relations between them can be 
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noticed, the Ph.D. research is organized in three parts, according to a 
thematic criterion. These three parts are organized according to thematic 
criteria: I) General Coordinates, Semantic Features, and Logical Components 
of Scientific Prediction; II) Predictive Knowledge and Predictive Processes in 
Rescher’s Methodological Pragmatism; and III) From Reality to Values: 
Ontological Features, Axiological Elements, and Ethical Aspects of Scientific 
Prediction. 
As far as possible, each chapter has “autonomy” to some extent, since 
the angles of analysis are different (semantic, logical, epistemological, 
methodological, ontological, axiological, and ethical). However, the chapters 
are interconnected in two regards: the study of scientific prediction and the 
critical analysis of Rescher’s system of thought. Thus, in principle, each 
chapter seeks to provide all the keys in order to address the problems, 
although this feature can involve some repetitions, which are thought as a 
way of facilitating the unifying thread of the present research. 
 
II. From the Problems to the Philosophico-Methodological Analysis 
The first part of the research is devoted to three issues. First, the 
general framework offered by Rescher for the study of scientific prediction is 
analyzed. Second, the research in scientific prediction is developed from the 
perspective of the semantics of science. Third, the investigation is carried 
through from the logic of science. In the second part, the research in 
prediction is centered on the epistemology and the methodology of science, 
which are the realms where Rescher made most of his contributions to the 
analysis of scientific prediction. Finally, in the third part, the attention goes to 
the ontology of science and the realm of values, where scientific prediction is 
studied from the axiology of research and the ethics of science. 
Chapter 1 serves as a framework for the following chapters. Thus, on 
the one hand, the chapter tries to clarify the general coordinates of Rescher’s 
5 
 
system of pragmatic idealism; and, on the other, it seeks to offer a 
characterization of the philosophico-methodological elements of scientific 
prediction. I.e., it addresses the problem of the constituent factors of 
“scientific prediction.” This involves developing a study that has two 
dimensions: a historic component and a thematic perspective. Regarding the 
historic component, the relevance of Rescher’s academic training and career 
is considered, both for the articulation of his system of thought and for the 
development of his unequivocal interest regarding the problem of prediction. 
After this historical framework, the thematic perspective, which is 
Rescher’s pragmatic idealism, is researched. Two main aspects are 
considered in this regard: a) the role that he attributes to concepts in the 
articulation of knowledge, and b) his proposal about scientific progress, which 
is directly connected with the notion of “prediction.” This leads to completing 
the framework through the attention to the philosophico-methodological 
characters of prediction (which are developed in the following chapters) and 
the problems posed by them. Finally, the place of Rescher’s pragmatic 
idealism within the current context is analyzed. 
In chapter 2 the investigation into scientific prediction is addressed from 
the perspective of language, so the problem of how scientific prediction 
should be conceived from language is considered. This perspective leads to 
the reflection on the features of Rescher’s proposal about language, which is 
of a pragmatic character. In his approach to meaning, he considers that the 
use conditions have primacy over truth conditions. In this regard, the 
research in the repercussions that a pragmatic approach to language might 
have on the notion of “scientific prediction” is required  
It is possible then to go more deeply into the language of “prediction.” 
This path leads to addressing the problem of the concept of “scientific 
prediction” and its demarcation with respect to the notion of “non-scientific 
prediction.” Regarding this issue, the aim is to achieve a higher level of rigor 
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in the language used for prediction. This involves considering other 
distinctions as well, such as generic prediction and specific prediction, 
quantitative prediction and qualitative prediction, and the different possible 
types of scientific predictions according to their reliability or other 
characteristics. This issue is connected to the limits of prediction regarding 
the language, so the reflection on the duality “not-predictability” and 
“unpredictability” is also possible. 
After the research from the semantic perspective, in chapter 3 the 
analysis of scientific prediction is developed in the realm of the logic of 
science. This viewpoint involves addressing the problem of the logical 
relations between scientific explanation and prediction. Thus, the theses that 
have been maintained regarding this problem are taking into account: (i) the 
thesis of the logical symmetry between explanation and prediction; and (ii) 
the thesis of the logical asymmetry, which Rescher favors. The study of both 
theses leads to emphasizing the temporality factor, which poses other 
questions of a logical character. In this regard, the reflection on the notion of 
“retrodiction” is required, as well as its possible logical equivalence with 
respect to scientific explanation, firstly, and scientific prediction, secondly. 
There are other two problems that are especially important to consider 
in order to clarify the logical features of scientific prediction. The first one has 
to do with the nexus with induction, while the second one deals with the role 
of deductive logic. Regarding the first problem, the research considers two 
different (although connected) questions: a) the characterization of induction 
and b) the justification of induction. On this basis, the problem of the 
importance of induction for scientific prediction is considered, where its role in 
the context of discovery and the context of justification can be addressed. 
This leads to the second problem, which has to do with the role of deduction. 
On this issue, the possible limits of deductivism for scientific prediction are 
discussed. 
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Chapter 4 is oriented towards the investigation into the epistemological 
factors of scientific prediction in Rescher’s approach, so the research goes to 
the kind of cognitive content offered by prediction and the related problems. 
To do this, his epistemology can be related to his theory of rationality, where 
he gives primacy to practice. From this perspective, the research in scientific 
prediction can be undertaken according to the types of rationality that he 
expressly considers: cognitive rationality, practical rationality, and evaluative 
rationality. 
One crucial problem regarding the knowledge provided by predictions 
has to do with the reliability of the predictive statements. This focus of study 
leads to go more deeply into the fallibilism and its repercussions for 
prediction in basic science, applied science, and the application of science. 
The reliability of predictive knowledge is related to the epistemological limits 
to predictability. In this way, the attention goes also to problems such as 
uncertainty, which affects the kind of knowledge that can be achieved 
through prediction and has incidence in issues like risk management. 
Chapters 5 and 6 analyze in detail the methodological aspects of 
scientific prediction. The research into the methodology of prediction requires 
two chapters in this Ph.D. research, because it is the realm where many of 
Rescher’s contributions (and some of the most influential ones) to the 
problem of scientific prediction can be placed. Thus, chapter 5 has a more 
general orientation, so the research is devoted to clarifying the conceptual 
framework of Rescher’s methodology of scientific prediction. 
Insofar as Rescher addresses the problems from the primacy of 
practice, the study of his approach to methodological pragmatism is firstly 
developed. This leads the research to go more deeply in the roles of scientific 
prediction in the different types of scientific research (basic, applied, or of 
application) and in the empirical sciences (natural, social, or artificial). 
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Secondly, the research considers the preconditions for rational prediction, 
which are the necessary conditions for the predictive processes. 
Within the methodological characters of scientific prediction, the focus 
of research in chapter 6 has a more concrete character. The analysis of the 
different predictive procedures and methods and their scientific import is 
developed here. In this regard, the processes of prediction are researched 
from the framework offered by Rescher. There are differences between 
estimative procedures of prediction and discursive or formalized processes of 
prediction, which can be either elementary processes or scientific methods. 
In turn, this path leads the research to considering the reliability and 
characteristics of the predictive procedures and methods, within an approach 
that assumes de facto a methodological pluralism regarding prediction. 
The third part of the research starts with the investigation into the issues 
related with the ontological features of scientific prediction. From the ontology 
of science, the problem of prediction connects with the reality of the 
phenomena. This feature involves research into the specific characteristics 
that phenomena of different realms of the reality (natural, social, or artificial) 
might have. From this perspective, the attention goes to the repercussions 
(above all, epistemological and methodological) of the reality of phenomena 
on scientific prediction. Besides the realms of reality — in its triple empirical 
dimension — there is the problem of the characterization of future 
phenomena, which is connected with the time horizon of prediction and the 
possibility of control over phenomena. 
Also from the ontology of science it is possible to research the 
ontological obstacles of scientific prediction. This is an especially important 
issue in Rescher’s approach. In this regard, the relevant varieties and modes 
of complexity are researched, which lead to emphasize the notion of 
historicity. Thus, the reflection on complexity is developed from the 
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perspective of historicity, which is especially important for the social sciences 
and the sciences of the artificial. 
Then, in chapter 8, the problems related to the axiological elements of 
scientific prediction are considered. This perspective leads to analyzing, 
firstly, Rescher’s proposal regarding the axiology of research, in order to see 
how he modulates the axiological features of prediction. This involves 
considering the values as a system, where there is a double perspective of 
analysis: internal and external. The internal perspective sees science as 
activity by itself, while the external viewpoint deals with the relations of 
science with the context. In Rescher’s axiology, which is preferentially 
structural, the internal component of analysis has primacy, where the 
epistemological and methodological values are emphasized. 
Secondly, the axiological characters of prediction are investigated. To 
do this, on the one hand, the research in prediction as a value of science is 
addressed; and, on the other, the values which accompany prediction are 
analyzed. Regarding these problems, there are two dimensions of analysis: 
the structural perspective and the dynamic component. Rescher’s proposal is 
preferentially structural. In this way, it is possible to broaden his proposal 
through the attention to the dynamic component. Thus, the study considers 
how prediction and the connected values modulate the aims, processes, and 
results of the scientific research (basic, applied, or of application), both from 
an internal perspective and from an external viewpoint. 
Finally, in chapter 9, the research in scientific prediction is developed 
from the ethics of science. To do this, two perspectives of analysis are 
considered: a) the endogenous ethics, which is oriented towards scientific 
activity by itself; and b) the exogenous ethics, which analyses science as an 
activity connected with other activities (social, cultural, political, economic, 
ecological, etc.). The starting point of this chapter is the study of Rescher’s 
ethics of science, which gives primacy to the internal perspective. This leads 
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to go more deeply into the exogenous perspective, which is also important for 
the problem of prediction. 
After that, the research is oriented towards reflection about the 
problems posed by the relation between scientific prediction and ethical 
values. Firstly, the repercussions on scientific prediction of the ethical limits 
of science are considered. Secondly, the study of the ethical values of 
scientific prediction is developed from the dynamic viewpoint, which deals 
with the evaluation of the aims, processes, and results of the research. To do 
this, the differences between basic science, applied science, and the 
application of science must be taken into account. 
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CHAPTER 1 
SCIENTIFIC PREDICTION IN A SYSTEM OF PRAGMATIC IDEALISM 
 
Undoubtedly, Nicholas Rescher is one of the most productive 
contemporary philosophers. Besides his large list of publications, his 
intellectual trajectory has covered a variety of realms. Certainly, his academic 
production encompasses very different issues. Thus, he has addressed all 
the areas of the philosophy and methodology of science: semantics of 
science, logic of science, epistemology, methodology of science, ontology of 
science, axiology of scientific research, and ethics of science. Additionally, he 
has dealt with other philosophical realms, such as logic, metaphysics, history 
of philosophy, and theory of knowledge.1 
Through that thematic extent and variety of analyses, Rescher has 
come to develop his own philosophical system. He is probably the 
contemporary philosopher that has addressed the most philosophical fields. 
In this regard, when he deals with the problem of scientific prediction, 
prediction does not appear as something isolated, but as an element that is 
part of a whole.2 This means that, in order to analyze the concept of scientific 
prediction in Rescher’s work, it is necessary to clarify the general coordinates 
                                            
1 The extent of Rescher’s work can be noticed in the bibliography, which is current to the 
year 2009, that is included in the book of JACQUETTE, D. (ed.), Reason, Method, and Value: 
A Reader on the Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher, Ontos Verlag, Frankfurtt, 2009, pp. 633-
643. An updated list of Rescher’s publications can be seen in his web page: 
http://www.pitt.edu/~rescher/, (access on 14.12.2014).  
His influence in the contemporary philosophy of science can be seen in the books 
devoted to his though. Besides the book of Jacquette, already quoted, some others can be 
highlighted: SOSA, E. (ed.), The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher. Discussions and Replies, 
Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979; ALMEDER, R. (ed.), Praxis and Reason: Studies in the Philosophy of 
Nicholas Rescher, University Press of America, Washington, D.C., 1982; and ALMEDER, R. 
(ed.), Rescher Studies. A Collection of Essays on the Philosophical Work of Nicholas 
Rescher, Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm, 2008, 
2 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica. Concepciones filosófico-metodológicas desde 
H. Reichenbach a N. Rescher, Montesinos, Barcelona, 2010, chap. 8, pp. 253-281; 
especially, pp. 253-259. 
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of his philosophical proposal, which is configured as a system of “pragmatic 
idealism.”3 
Within this framework, this chapter seeks to offer the philosophico-
methodological coordinates for the analysis of scientific prediction in 
Rescher’s thought, which has the idea of a system as a backdrop. In this 
regard, there is, in the first place, a reconstruction of his academic and 
intellectual trajectory. Through his philosophical work, Rescher came to 
articulate a system of thought that is supported by two mainstays: the theory 
of knowledge of Immanuel Kant and the pragmatism of Charles Sanders 
Peirce.  
In the second place, the historical framework of his trajectory is followed 
by an analysis of his thematic frame, which is the conception of pragmatic 
idealism. In this approach, the concepts are particularly relevant to the 
articulation of knowledge, and his proposal of scientific progress is of 
pragmatic character. Both aspects are related to prediction. Next, the main 
philosophico-methodological characters of scientific prediction are 
addressed. This involves paying attention to the semantic, logical, 
epistemological, methodological, ontological, axiological, and ethical features 
of prediction, that in Rescher’s approach are closely related. Finally, his 
system of pragmatic idealism is analyzed within the contemporary context.     
 
1.1.  Nicholas Rescher’s Philosophy: General Coordinates 
There are some background coordinates that modulate Rescher’s 
thought. Following them it seems to me that his philosophical production, 
which is characterized by its amplitude and thematic diversity, has coherence 
                                            
3 This is developed by Rescher in an explicit way in his three volumes on a system of 
pragmatic idealism: RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: Human Knowledge 
in Idealistic Perspective, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1992; RESCHER, N., A 
System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. II: The Validity of Values: Human Values in Pragmatic 
Perspective, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1993; and RESCHER, N., A System of 
Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. III: Metaphilosophical Inquires, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ, 1994. 
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and systematicity. In this regard, the reflections that he made in his 
intellectual autobiography on his academic and research trajectory can be 
emphasized.4 His main effort, which is directed to clarify the philosophico-
methodological framework where his contributions are placed, is also 
relevant. This effort can be seen in his three volumes on A System of 
Pragmatic Idealism.5 
In order to properly understand his proposal for scientific prediction, the 
first step consists of the reconstruction of his intellectual and academic 
trajectory.  In this regard, the years when Rescher worked as a 
mathematician in the RAND Corporation are especially relevant. This is 
because at RAND he developed — together with Olaf Helmer and Norman 
Dalkey — the predictive procedure called Delphi6. As a second step, an 
inquiry into his system of pragmatic idealism will be conduced, since it is the 
framework where Rescher’s approach to scientific prediction is placed.   
 
1.1.1.  Academic Training and Career 
Nicholas Rescher was born on July 15th, 1928 in Hagen, a German city 
in the region of Westphalia. Faced with the troubles of the rise of Nazism, his 
family decided to emigrate to the United States of America. Erwin Hans 
Rescher was the first that crossed the Atlantic, followed a year after by his 
                                            
4 This autobiography has had several editions. In this research the edition used is RESCHER, 
N., Enlightening Journey. The Autobiography of an American Scholar, Lexington Books, 
Lanham, MD, 2002. 
5 These are the previously quoted volumes: A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: Human 
Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective; A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. II: The Validity of 
Values: Human Values in Pragmatic Perspective; and A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. 
III: Metaphilosophical Inquires.  
6 On the Delphi procedure of prediction, see LINSTONE, H. A. and TUROFF, M., The Delphi 
Method. Techniques and Applications. Electronic version is available in 
http://is.njit.edu/pubs/delphibook/delphibook.pdf, (access on 3.7.2013); RESCHER, N., 
Predicting the Future. An Introduction to the Theory of Forecasting, State University of N. 
York Press, N. York, 1998, pp. 91-96; ROWE, G. and WRIGHT, G., “Expert Opinions in 
Forecasting: The Role of the Delphi Technique,” in ARMSTRONG, J. S. (ed.), Principles of 
Forecasting: A Handbook for Researchers and Practitioners, Kluwer, Boston, 2001, pp. 125-
144; AYYUB, B. M., Elicitation of Expert Opinions for Uncertainty and Risks, CRC Press, Boca 
Ratón, FL, 2001, pp. 99-105; and BELL, W., Foundations of Futures Studies. History, 
Purposes, and Knowledge, Human Science for a New Era, Vol. 1, Transaction Publishers, 
Piscataway, NJ, 2003 (5th reimp. 2009; 1st ed. 1997), pp. 261-272. 
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wife, Meta Anna, and his son, Klaus Helmut Erwin Rescher, who was named 
Nicholas Rescher after his arrival to the United States. On July 8th, 1938 
Rescher and his mother embarked on the USS President Roosvelt for North 
America, where they arrived in the morning of July 16th 1938.  
At an early age, Rescher was interested in mathematics and 
philosophy.7 He took a degree in Mathematics at Queens College in 
Flushing, New York, between 1946 and 1949; although he also attended 
some philosophy lessons. Herbert G. Bohnert (who was a student of Carnap) 
and Carl Gustav Hempel, one of the main representatives of the Berlin 
School (lead by Hans Reichenbach) were among his teachers in those years. 
Once Rescher got his degree, he received offers from the departments of 
Mathematics and Philosophy of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. Rescher chose 
Princeton, where he was a PhD student from 1949 and 1951. 
He attended the courses of Logic of Alonzo Church at Princeton. He 
was of an special relevance in Rescher’s career, because Church decisively 
contributed to increase the interest of Rescher in Logic. In 1950 he earned 
his Master’s degree, and started to teach at the university. By this time, he 
collaborated with Paul Oppenheim. In 1951 he earned his Ph.D. with a 
dissertation on “Leibniz’s Cosmology: A Study of the Relations between 
Leibniz’s Work in Physics and his Philosophy.” By doing this, he became at 
the age of 22 in the youngest student who obtained a Ph.D, at the 
Department of Philosophy in Princeton. 
Between 1952 and 1954 he served in the United States Marine Corps. 
This meant a break in his academic career. In 1954 he was offered a job in 
the Mathematics Division of RAND Corporation, which was then directed by 
John D. Williams. Rescher accepted the offer, and he moved to Santa 
Monica, where he stayed until 1956. During these years working at RAND 
                                            
7 In his autobiography, Rescher links his interest on philosophy with the reading of the 
History of Philosophy by Will Durant. Cf. RESCHER, N., Enlightening Journey. The 
Autobiography of an American Scholar, p. 50. 
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Corporation, Rescher started to be interested in the problem of scientific 
prediction. 
This aspect is relevant insofar as RAND Corporation (Research and 
Development) is a good example of what has been labeled a think tank (an 
organized group to provide ideas): it is a research institution that offers ideas 
and advice on political, trade or military interests. RAND Corporation was 
created in the first place to offer research support to the US Armed Forces. 
This was its main role when Rescher joined the Corporation as a researcher.  
When he started his work at the RAND Corporation, Rescher was 
interested in issues related to game theory. After that, he collaborated with 
Fred Thompson in economic issues related to air war. After a second project, 
where he collaborated again with Fred Thompson and Frederick B. Moore, 
Rescher started to work in a project that he designed at the beginning of 
1955. It was “a speculative assessment of how, given current intelligence 
assessments of then-extant Russian military capabilities, a preemptive 
nuclear ‘counterforce’ attack against U.S. retaliatory potential might be 
designed.”8  
RAND Corporation came to develop a great interest on prediction as a 
relevant part of its research support to the US Air Force. According to 
Rescher, “predicting enemy intentions has always been a key task of military 
intelligence, but in the modern technological world forecasting the 
development and deployment of weapons systems became no less crucial a 
mission. Acondingly the issue of identifying and validating prediction methods 
evolved as an area of RAND interest.”9 
Within the RAND Corporation, the set of investigations related to 
prediction were known with the code name “Delphi Project.” The judgmental 
predictive procedure that Rescher developed together with Olaf Helmer and 
                                            
8 RESCHER, N., Enlightening Journey. The Autobiography of an American Scholar, p. 90. 
9 Enlightening Journey. The Autobiography of an American Scholar, p. 92. 
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Norman Dalkey was named “Delphi Method.”10 Helmer was the most 
influential person for Rescher during the years he worked at RAND 
Corporation. Both of them shared a common interest on the theoretical 
aspects of scientific prediction, so they decided to meet once a week for work 
sessions to go more deeply into some aspects related with Delphi procedure. 
Delphi procedure is a predictive procedure based on the interaction 
among a group of predictors, who are experts on the issue that prediction is 
about. Predictors do not confront each other. Instead, they answer a series of 
questionnaires in an individual and anonymous way. These questionnaires 
are presented to them in several successive rounds. After each round is 
finished, the predictors can know the group results, so that they can review 
their own initial answers. The final goal is to achieve an “aggregate 
prediction” that is supported by all the experts.11 
The study of this predictive procedure was divided in two successive 
levels: on the one hand, Rescher collaborated with Helmer on the theoretical 
analysis of Delphi procedure; and, on the other, Helmer collaborated with 
Dalkey — and thereafter with Bernice Brown and Theodore Gordon — in the 
study of concrete cases. The first of these levels concerns basically the 
epistemology of prediction. One of the first papers that Rescher published on 
prediction (with the collaboration of Helmer) was about this issue: “On the 
Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences.”12 
In 1957, after he left the RAND Corporation, Rescher started his 
academic career at the University of Lehigh, in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. 
                                            
10 Rescher takes into account two mayor methodological approaches: (i) judgmental 
procedures, which are based on the estimation of experts who use a kind of unformalized 
reasoning; and (ii) discursive or scientific methods, which are based on the correcteness of 
inferential principles. Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future. An Introduction to the Theory of 
Forecasting, State University of N. York Press, N. York, 1998, p. 87. This idea appears in 
one of his first papers on prediction. Cf. RESCHER, “The Future as an Object of Research,” 
RAND Corporation Research Paper P-3593, 1967. 
11 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future. An Introduction to the Theory of Forecasting, p. 92. 
12 Cf. RESCHER, N. and HELMER, O., “On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences,” 
Management Sciences, v. 6, (1959), pp. 25-52. 
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There, he teaches philosophy lessons to undergraduate students until 1961. 
In this period, he met Adolf Grünbaum, who was also in the Department of 
Philosophy at the University of Lehigh. It is quite remarkable that Rescher’s 
philosophical interests were at this moment very diverse, among them his 
research on Arabic logic can be highlighted. Moreover, his philosophical 
publications in this period are about this topic.13 
Following Grünbaum’s suggestions, who has accepted a position at the 
University of Pittsburgh and recommended Rescher, he was named 
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh in 1961. Since then, 
he has been in Pittsburgh, where he is a Distinguished University Professor 
since 1970. He started then a prestigious and prolific career as professor and 
researcher, that lead him to be named Honoris Causa by eight universities: 
the University of Loyola, Chicago (1970); Universidad Nacional of Córdoba, 
Argentina (1992); University of Lehigh (1993); University of Konstanz (1996); 
Queens College (1999); University of Hagen (2001); University of Helsinki 
(2006); and University of Cleveland (2007).  
Besides these Honoris Causa, Rescher has also received many 
prestigious awards. Among them, the Alexander von Humboldt Humanities 
Prize (1983); the Medal of Merit for Distinguished Scholarship, University of 
Helsinki (1990); the Chancellor’s Distinguished Research Award, University 
of Pittsburgh (1990); and the Medal of Merit of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Bundesdienstkreuz erster Klasse), 2011. It should be highlighted 
that in 2010 the University of Pittsburgh established the biennial Nicholas 
Rescher Prize for Contributions to Systematic Philosophy. 
                                            
13 See, for instance, RESCHER, N., “Some Technical Terms of Arabic Logic,” Journal of the 
American Oriental Society, v. 82, (1962), pp. 203-204; RESCHER, N., “Al-Farabi on Logical 
Tradition,” The Journal of the History of Ideas, v. 24, (1963) pp. 127-132; and RESCHER, N., 
“Avicenna on the Logic of ‘Conditional’ Propositions,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 
v. 4, (1963), pp. 48-58. A complete list of his publications in the sixties can be found in his 
web page: http://www.pitt.edu/~rescher/, (access on 15.12.2014). 
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Another recognition of his academic and researcher career is his 
participation as president of numerous associations: Charles Sanders Peirce 
Society (1983-1986); G. W. Leibniz Society of America (1983-1986); 
American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (1989-1990); American 
Catholic Philosophical Association (2003-2004); and American Metaphysical 
Society (2004-2005). He is also an elected member of many Academies, 
among which are the Institut International de Philosophie, the Academie 
Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences, the European Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, the Royal Society of Canada, and the American Academy of 
Arts and Sciences. 
Reshcer has also been the editor of several journals, including 
American Philosophical Quarterly (1964-1994), History of Philosophy 
Quarterly (1983-1992), and Public Affairs Quarterly (1986-1991). In addition, 
he is co-editor of the Pittsburgh Series in Philosophy and History of Science, 
of the University of California Press, since 1980, and of C.P.S. Publications in 
Philosophy of Science, at the University of America Press, since 1982. He is 
in the editorial committee of many scientific journals, including Epistemologia, 
Mind and Society, Journal of the Philosophy of Management, History of 
Philosophy and Logical Analysis, Idealistic Studies, and Philosophisches 
Jahrbuch. 
Rescher himself acknowledges a key feature of this fruitful and long 
academic trajectory: “I was unwilling or unable to settle down to one 
particular specialty.”14 Nevertheless, he came to articulate his own system of 
thought, which has some well-defined coordinates, so his philosophical 
contributions form part of that system. In this regard, the contact with some 
important thinkers of the neopositivism and logical empiricism is relevant. 
Rescher himself, in a paper entitled “The Berlin School of Logical Empiricism 
and its Legacy,” says that he is part of the “younger generation” of the Berlin 
                                            
14 RESCHER, N., Enlightening Journey. The Autobiography of an American Scholar, p. 115. 
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School insofar as he was a student of Hempel.15 This is especially relevant to 
his studies on prediction, because Rescher considers that they are “in the 
wake of [Hans] Reichenbach’s work.”16 
Nevertheless, his system of though is not in tune with empiricism. 
Moreover, he is in a quite different approach: he endorses a “pragmatic 
idealism.” This system that Rescher proposes has its roots in his own 
conception of the task of a philosopher: “A good philosopher, it seems to me, 
must be many-sided because the impetus to philosophizing is ultimately a 
search for systematic principles underlying the jumbled profusion of 
phenomena.”17 Regarding this issue, he acknowledges the Leibnizian 
influence: “The inspiration of Leibniz is clearly present in some of my books 
(e.g., The Coherence Theory of Truth) and is discernible in my general 
approach to the conduct of philosophical work.”18 
However, Immanuel Kant and Charles Sanders Peirce are, 
undoubtedly, the philosophers who have influenced most of Rescher’s 
proposals. De facto, there is in his work an explicit concern to elaborate a 
system of thought where the idealism is compatible with the pragmatism: “I 
have gradually acquired the vision of a system of philosophy geared to the 
idealistic tradition from Leibniz and Berkeley through Kant to Hegel and 
Peirce, with the German idealists on the left side, the English Hegelians on 
the right, and the American pragmatists to the front.”19 It is a philosophical 
system of pragmatic idealism built on the basis of two mainstays: Kant’s 
theory of knowledge and Peirce’s pragmatism. 
 
1.1.2.  A Kantian Pragmatism: The Primacy of Practice 
                                            
15 Cf. RESCHER, N., “The Berlin School of Logical Empiricism and its Legacy,” Erkenntnis, v. 
64, (2006), pp. 281-304. 
16 RESCHER, N., “The Berlin School of Logical Empiricism and its Legacy,” p. 298. 
17 RESCHER, N., Enlightening Journey. The Autobiography of an American Scholar, p. 174. 
18 RESCHER, N., Autobiography, Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm, 2010, p. 69. 
19 RESCHER, N., Enlightening Journey. The Autobiography of an American Scholar, p. 174. 
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By means of a large number of publications, Rescher has configured 
his own philosophy. It is a “‘Kantian pragmatism’ open to realist 
contributions.”20 In effect, in the three volumes entitled A System of 
Pragmatic Idealism,21 he sees human knowledge from an idealistic 
perspective, according to which our categories and concepts have a decisive 
role to characterize reality. But Rescher’s idealism admits realist notions, 
such as “fact” or “objectivity.” Thus, Kantism is open to realist contributions.22 
This is possible because “realism is compatible with a pragmatism in the 
style of that proposed by Charles S. Peirce.”23 
Within this framework of a Kantian pragmatism, Rescher offers an 
approach to human rationality that moves away from maximization,24 which is 
the favorite conception of rationality in neoclassical approaches to 
economics. In this regard, his proposal on rationality is a pragmatic one, 
insofar as rational agent is that who “proceeds on the basis of the grounds 
that are available to him (which may well also be imperfect).”25 Thus, he 
takes into account the limitations of the knowing subject, as well as the 
information limitations to which the subject can be exposed.   
Due to these limitations, Rescher maintains that rationality demands an 
“optimization” with regard to the circumstances, which in not maximization in 
                                            
20 GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica. Concepciones filosófico-metodológicas desde H. 
Reichenbach a N. Rescher, p. 254. 
21 These are the three volumes published by Princeton University Press: A System of 
Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective; A System of 
Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. II: The Validity of Values: Human Values in Pragmatic Perspective; 
and A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. III: Metaphilosophical Inquires. 
22 Certainly, he rejects the naïve realism, which claims that it is easy to access reality (and 
also considers that it is easy to identify true statements). On the varieties of realism related 
to science, cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “El realismo y sus variedades: El debate actual sobre las 
bases filosóficas de la Ciencia,” in CARRERAS, A. (ed.), Conocimiento, Ciencia y Realidad, 
Seminario Interdisciplinar de la Universidad de Zaragoza-Ediciones Mira, Zaragoza, 1993, 
pp. 11-58. 
23 GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 256. 
24 Cf. RESCHER, N., Rationality. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and the Rationale of 
Reason, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988. 
On the notion of “rationality” in Rescher’s work, it can be see MOUTAFAKIS, N. J., Rescher 
on Rationality, Values, and Social Responsibility. A Philosophical Portrait, Ontos Verlag, 
Heusenstamm, 2007; especially, cap. 1, pp. 21-61. 
25 RESCHER, N., Rationality. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and the Rationale of 
Reason, p. 7. 
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the strict sense.26 He raises the issue from the primacy of practice: “Being 
rational consists in the disposition to make good reasons constitute the 
motives for what one does. Since this is something we can achieve only 
within limits, one must regard perfect rationality as an idealization and 
acknowledge that we humans are ‘rational animals’ because of our capacity 
for reason, and certainly not because of our achievement of perfected 
rationality.”27 
Based on rationality as something limited, Rescher suggests a holistic 
conception of rationality, where the role of values is fundamental. Thus, there 
are — in his judgment — three kinds of rationality, depending on the object of 
rational deliberation: “Philosophical tradition since Kant sees three major 
contexts of choice, those of belief, of accepting or endorsing theses or 
claims, of action, of what overt acts to perform, and of evaluation, of what to 
value or disvalue. These [contexts] represent the spheres of cognitive, 
practical, and evaluative reason, respectively.”28 
The pragmatic and Kantian influence that characterizes his philosophy 
is noticeable. On the one hand, Rescher gives priority to practice in his 
approach to human rationality, in general, and to scientific rationality, in 
particular.29 This leads him to insist on the role of economic rationality, which 
refers to the instrumental component of rationality. In effect, Rescher thinks 
that both actions and beliefs should be evaluated in accordance to their 
effectiveness and efficiency to achieve ends. Thus, in order to achieve a 
                                            
26 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Maximization, Optimization, and Rationality. On Reasons why 
Rationality is not Necessarily a Matter of Maximization,” in RESCHER, N., Ethical Idealism. An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Function of Ideals, University of California Press, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 1987, pp. 55-84; especially, pp. 71-79. 
27 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 10. 
28 RESCHER, N., Rationality, pp. 2-3. This involves a holistic view of rationality according to 
which “cognitive, pragmatic, and evaluative rationality constitute a unified and indissoluble 
whole in which all three of these resources are inseparably co-present. Good reasons for 
believing, for evaluating, and for acting go together to make up a seamless and indivisible 
whole,” RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. vii. 
29 Cf. MARSONET, M., The Primacy of Practical Reason. An Essay on Nicholas Rescher's 
Philosophy, University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1996. 
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goal, “a rational creature will prefer whatever method process or procedure 
will, other things equal, facilitate goal realization in the most effective, 
efficient, and economical way.”30 
But, on the other hand, Rescher thinks that “a really thorough 
pragmatism must dig more deeply.”31 Thus, he considers that practice — the 
rational human activity — requires the selection of the best means in 
accordance with rational beliefs, appropriate values, and valid goals. 
Therefore, human rationality is not — in his judgment — merely an 
instrumental rationality, which only selects the means according to given 
ends. Whereas, the realm of rationality is certainly wider, since there is a 
rationality of ends or evaluative rationality that leads to select the appropriate 
ends. 
In this regard, Rescher defends the existence of a clear nexus between 
rationality, science, and human values. He sets this nexus in an explicit way 
on the basis of two fundamental proposals: “1) that rationality includes not 
only correct reasoning (razonamiento correcto), but also adequate 
evaluation; and 2) that praxis — the effective implementation of practice into 
action — is ultimately the criterion of evaluation.”32 
Certainly, there is in his work an explicit criticism to those approaches to 
rationality understood as a merely instrumental rationality (i.e., a rationality 
centered only on the process that does not take into account the issue of the 
                                            
30 RESCHER, N., “Pragmatism and Practical Rationality,” Contemporary Pragmatism, vol. 1, n. 
1, (2004), p. 44. 
31 RESCHER, N., Realistic Pragmatism, p. 168. In this regard, Rescher distinguishes two types 
of pragmatism: a) practicalism  and b) funcionalism. Practicalism sees theory and theorizing 
as secondary in importance, so it gives a more important role to praxis. Meanwhile, 
funtionalism subordinates theory to praxis not in importance, but rather in fundamentally (that 
is, the justification of human beliefs, ends, and actions is always relative to the realm of 
action). Thus, theory is something crucial in importance, but the criterion of successful 
theorizing is success in matters of practical implementation. So Rescher’s pragmatism is in 
the line of what he calls functionalism. See RESCHER, N., “Pragmatism and Practical 
Rationality,” pp. 43-60; especially, pp. 43-44. 
32 RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, Paidós, Barcelona, 1999,  
p. 48. 
26 
 
value of the result).33 It happens that Rescher thinks of science as an activity 
oriented towards ends. From this perspective, “values play a crucial role in 
science, and (...) this role is not something arbitrary or added, but it is 
inherent to the goal structure that defines science as a rational search.”34 
He maintains then that it is not good enough to evaluate diverse 
courses of action with regard to given ends. Instead, the election of ends 
should be evaluated as well and this should be done from a pragmatic 
perspective. Thus, an “axiology of purposes” is required, which he sees as “a 
normative methodology for assessing the legitimacy and appropriateness of 
the purposes we espouse”35. According to this “axiology of purposes,” the 
assessing of the ends is a pragmatic assessing, that evaluates the 
appropriateness of the concrete ends with regard to the human needs and 
interests.36 
Together with the Kantian and pragmatic influences — that can be seen 
in his approach to rationality, there are also realist elements in Rescher’s 
philosophical proposal. In this regard, objectivity of values is a key feature. 
On the one hand, he insists on science as our science, since it is indebted to 
the conceptual categories of human beings.37 And, on the other hand, it is a 
human activity of a teleological character that is modulated by values. Thus, 
both the ends sought by the research and the means oriented towards those 
ends should be selected in accordance with valid values. The validity of 
                                            
33 Rescher criticizes the purely instrumentalist approaches to rationality. This can be seen in 
Herbert Simon’s proposal, insofar as he does not accept a rationality of ends but only a 
rationality of means. Cf. RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. viii. An analysis of the notion of 
“rationality” in Simon and a comparison with Rescher’s account is in GONZALEZ, W. J., 
“Racionalidad y Economía: De la racionalidad de la Economía como Ciencia a la 
racionalidad de los agentes económicos,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Racionalidad, 
historicidad y predicción en Herbert A. Simon, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2003, pp. 65-96. 
34 RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, p. 95. 
35 RESCHER, N., “Pragmatism and Practical Rationality,” p. 45. 
36 Cf. “Pragmatism and Practical Rationality,” pp. 44-47. 
37 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Our Science as our Science,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic 
Idealism. Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, pp. 110-125; and RESCHER, N., 
“Nuestra Ciencia en tanto que nuestra,” Daimon, Revista de Filosofía, n. 6, (1993), pp. 1-9. 
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values has an objective basis, which lead to an ontological component: it is 
rooted in the human needs that are of an universal character. 
This leads Rescher to maintain that there is a plurality of values that 
should modulate both the ends and the means of the scientific research. 
These values can be internal (cognitive, methodological, …) or external 
(social, cultural, ecological, economic, etc.). Among them, Rescher gives 
priority to the values that are internal to scientific activity (above all, the 
epistemological and methodological values). This highlights his Kantism, 
“insofar as the content of science is more important than the socio-historical 
milieu.”38 
Despite this primacy of the internal component, Rescher’s axiological 
approach — which connects to his proposal on scientific rationality — leads 
to a holism of values.39 Thus, although it is certainly possible to make 
distinctions among values — there are internal values and external values, a 
complete separation of them is not possible. The reason for this criterion is a 
pragmatic one: in practice, the set of values is linked to human needs that 
are of a universal kind.40 Nevertheless, as long as the values shape a 
system, it is possible to establish a hierarchy or scale of preferences. 
Consequently, the principal values, which modulate the ends and means of 
the research, are — for Rescher— the internal values to scientific activities. 
 
1.2.  A Systematic Conception of Science and Philosophy 
The idea of a system has a clear presence in Rescher’s work. In effect, 
he thinks that the aim of his task as a philosopher “is to become clear about 
                                            
38 GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 269. 
39 Cf. RESCHER, N., “How Wide is the Gap between Facts and Values?,” in RESCHER, N., A 
System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol II: The Validity of Values, pp. 65-92; and RESCHER, N., 
“Values in the Face of Natural Science,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. 
Vol II: The Validity of Values, pp. 93-110. 
40 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Racionalidad científica y actividad humana. Ciencia y valores en la 
Filosofía de Nicholas Rescher,” in RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-
tecnológica, pp. 11-44; especially, p. 22. 
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the import and the credentials of various sorts of human knowledge—above 
all in the sciences, in everyday life, and in philosophical reflection itself. The 
adequate comprehension of the character of these various realms of 
inquiry—especially of the mutual interrelationships—is the formative purpose 
of the enterprise.”41 
This system is supported by two fundamental mainstays: Kantism and 
pragmatism. Thus, on the one hand, Rescher thinks that human knowledge 
is modulated by concepts and ideas, so that “science is indebted to the 
conceptual categories of the human beings and it is different from [the kind of 
science] that would be made by other agents with other conceptual 
configuration.”42 In this regard, the Kantian influence of his thought has 
primacy. And, on the other hand, when he focuses on the progress in 
science, the pragmatic dimension of his thought is highlighted. The nexus 
between scientific progress and technological innovation is then emphasized; 
and, furthermore, he highlights the link between scientific progress and 
prediction.  
 
1.2.1.  The Role of Concepts in the Development of Knowledge  
Pragmatism modulates the idealistic proposal of Rescher. Thus, he 
discards a strong idealism and opts for “a middle-of-the-road idealism that 
makes significan concessions to realism.”43 In his judgment, the complexity 
of the discussion between idealism and realism is rooted in the wide variety 
of realisms and idealisms that have been defended during the history of 
philosophy.44 This leads him to think that the solution cannot be found in the 
imposition of one of these philosophical doctrines, because realism and 
                                            
41 RESCHER, N., Enlightening Journey. The Autobiography of an American Scholar, p. 174. 
42 GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 254. 
43 RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic 
Perspective, p. xiv. 
44 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Realism and Idealism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. 
Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, pp. 304-306. 
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idealism are not necessarily exclusive. On the contrary, “the sensible move is 
to opt for the middle ground and to combine a plausible version of realism 
with a plausible version of idealism.”45 
In his approach, this view does not involve that he takes an eclectic 
posture or a simple hybrid or combination of stances. As a Kantian 
philosopher, the concepts gain relevance to the articulation of knowledge. 
Categories and concepts in general allow us to articulate the reality. 
Therefore, science is a human product, which is above all of an intellectual 
kind and related with certain practices. The scientific view of the world is not 
absolute in cognitive terms, because science is “our” science. This means 
that it is the result of the interaction between the researcher and the 
environment (in principle, natural), according to our conceptual scheme.46 
Rescher’s acceptance of elements of ontological realism is based in 
pragmatic reasons. They encompass our notions of truth, communication, 
fact, or research, insofar as they require to presuppose the notion of reality.47 
At the same time, he defends a conceptual idealism: we know reality through 
our mental categories, our concepts to characterize real things. Knowledge of 
reality can only be reached through the resources that human beings have: 
“our only access to information about what the real is through the mediation 
of mind.”48 
By this way, Rescher establishes a distinction between reality as such 
and reality as it presents itself to us.49 This involves that “the range of fact is 
                                            
45 RESCHER, N., “Realism and Idealism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. 
Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 324. 
46 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Our Science as O-U-R Science,” in RESCHER, N., A Useful Inheritance. 
Evolutionary Aspects of the Theory of Knowledge, Rowman and Littlefield, Savage, 1990, 
pp. 77-104. 
47 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Pragmatic Idealism and Metaphysical Realism,” in SHOOK, J. R. and 
MARGOLIS, J., A. (eds.), Companion to Pragmatism, B. Blackwell, Oxford, 2006, pp. 386-397; 
especially pp. 388-393. 
48
 RESCHER, N., “Realism and Idealism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. 
Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 324. 
49 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Our Science as O-U-R Science,” in RESCHER, N., A Useful Inheritance. 
Evolutionary Aspects of the Theory of Knowledge, p. 77. 
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always broader than that of knowledge.”50 Certainly, he does not call into 
question the existence of a reality that is independent of the knowing 
subject.51 Thus, he accepts the notion of objectivity, which he associates with 
impartiality. He does this by pragmatic reasons, because objectivity is — in 
his judgment — a “functionally useful instrumentality”52 to guide research.  
In his thought, the acceptation of an objective reality has to do with its 
utility. Thus, he takes into account six reasons by which it is required the 
notion of a mind-independent reality: “1) to preserve the distinction between 
true and false with respect to factual matters and to operate the idea of thuth 
as agreement with reality; 2) to preserve the distinction between appearance 
and reality, between our picture of reality and reality itself; 3) to serve as a 
basis for intersubjective communication; 4) to furnish the basis for a shared 
project of communal inquiry; 5) to provide for the fallibilistic view of human 
knowledge; and 6) to sustain the causal mode of learning and inquiry and to 
serve as basis for the objectivity of experience.”53  
Consequently, Rescher accepts the existence of a reality that is 
independent of the subjects that try to know that reality. But the knowledge of 
reality is always mediated by the categories and concepts of human beings, 
in such a way that it “represents information about an inquiry-relative 
empirical reality.”54 In his approach, the acceptation of an objective reality 
and a fallibilistic view of knowledge go hand-in-hand, since human being 
articulates reality through an imperfect conceptual scheme.55 
This approach involves a view of science as a human product, where 
agents prevail as producers of science and recipients of the things achieved. 
                                            
50 RESCHER, N., “Our Science as O-U-R Science,” p. 79. This idea is developed by Rescher 
in his book Scientific Realism, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1987. 
51 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Nuestra Ciencia en tanto que nuestra,” p. 2. 
52 RESCHER, N., “Pragmatic Idealism and Metaphysical Realism,” in SHOOK, J. R. and 
MARGOLIS, J., A. (eds.), Companion to Pragmatism, p. 388. 
53 “Pragmatic Idealism and Metaphysical Realism,” pp. 390-391. 
54 RESCHER, N., “Our Science as O-U-R Science,” p. 80. 
55 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Pragmatic Idealism and Metaphysical Realism,” p. 390. 
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In this way, Rescher maintains that “the limits of our experience set limits to 
our science.”56 From this perspective, the ideal of a perfect science can be 
ruled out; i.e., the possibility of a fully completed science is rejected.57 That is 
way in his approach the characterization of science as our science leads to a 
view of scientific knowledge as imperfect and incomplete.58 
There is a clear connection between this issue of “perfect science” and 
the problem of the limits of scientific research. With regard to the limits of 
science, there is initially two different sides: the limits as “barriers” 
(Schranken) — what separates science from non-science — and the limits as 
“confines” (Grenzen), which deal with the final frontiers of the scientific 
research.59  
Usually, when Rescher analyzes the limits of science, his attention is 
focused on the second side of the problem: the possible “confines” or the 
ceiling for scientific activity. His effort leads him to insist on the fact that we 
cannot know now the science that we will have in the future.60 In addition, 
insofar as he sees science as a system, it is implicit in his view that there are 
also “barriers,” which separate science from other human activities.61  
With regard to the confines, the perspective of a systems highlights the 
distinction between the “internal” obstacles — those that are due to scientific 
activity itself — and the “external” obstacles, which are those that come from 
                                            
56 RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, University of Pittsburgh Press, 
Pittsburgh, 1999, p. 216 
57 RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, pp. 145-176. 
58 Cf. RESCHER, N., “The Imperfectibility of Science,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic 
Idealism. Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, pp. 77-95.  
59 Cf. RADNITZKY, G, “The Boundaries of Science and Technology,” in: The Search for 
Absolute Values in a Changing World. Proceedings of the VIth International Conference on 
the Unity of Sciences, vol. II, International Cultural Foundation Press, N. York, 1978, pp. 
1007-1036. 
An analysis of the limits of science as a matter that involves these two dimensions (the 
“barriers” and the “confines”) is in GONZALEZ, W. J., “Rethinking the Limits of Science: From 
the Difficulties for the Frontiers to the Concern on the Confines,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), 
The Limits of Science: An Analysis from “Barriers” to “Confines,” forthcoming. 
60 Cf. RESCHER, N., “The Problem of Future Knowledge,” Mind and Society, v. 11, n. 2, 
(2012), pp. 149-163. 
61 The existence of some kind of “barriers” follows from his acceptance that science cannot 
cover the full field of human knowledge and specific human activities. See, in this regard, 
RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, pp. 99-121. 
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the environment. Usually, Rescher is focused on the internal obstacles to 
scientific activity, which he analyzes in accordance with the distinction 
between limits in the weak sense — the current difficulties to solve a problem 
— and limits in the strong sense (the unsolvable problems of science).62 In 
this regard, there are internal limits to science that are rooted in its 
constitutive elements, so we can find obstacles due to the language of 
science, its structure, its knowledge, its processes, its activity, and its values 
(among then, ethical values).63 
But there are also external limits to science that have to do with the 
relations between science and the environment (natural, social, or artificial). 
These limits have to do with the complexity that hinders scientific knowledge 
and that — in Rescher’s proposal — has a strong impact on prediction.64 
Thus, when the future we try to predict is developmentary open, it can 
become unpredictable for us (or, at least, “not predictable”.) This is what 
happens with future knowledge, which is not accessible to our current 
categories of knowledge, above all when the future is in the long run and we 
try to predict in a very detailed way.65 
Regarding the barriers — what separates science from pseudoscience 
or other legitimate ways of knowledge — Rescher points out that science is 
also a limited endeavor, since scientific knowledge is just one human good 
among others.66 He takes into account other ways of knowledge, so science 
                                            
62 Cf. RESCHER, N., “On Learned Ignorance and the Limits of Knowledge,” in RESCHER, N., 
Cognitive Pragmatism. The Theory of Knowledge in Cognitive Perspective, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA, 2001, pp. 63-80; especially, pp. 73-75. 
63 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, pp. 275-276; and GONZALEZ, W. J., 
“Rethinking the Limits of Science: From the Difficulties for the Frontiers to the Concern on 
the Confines,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), The Limits of Science: An Analysis from “Barriers” to 
“Confines,” forthcoming. 
On the constitutive elements of science, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “The Philosophical 
Approach to Science, Technology and Society,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Science, 
Technology and Society: A Philosophical Perspective, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2005, pp. 3-49; 
especially, pp. 10-11. 
64 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, chap. 8, pp. 133-156. 
65 Cf. RESCHER, N., “The Problem of Future Knowledge,” pp. 149-163. 
66 Cf. RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, pp. 103-105. 
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is only one possible way of knowing. Nevertheless, scientific knowledge is — 
in his judgment — an especially important good due to its high instrumental 
value. Thus, from a pragmatic point of view, the pursuit of knowledge as a 
good “in no way hinders the cultivation of other legitimate goods; on the 
contrary, it aids and facilitates their pursuit, thereby acquiring an instrumental 
value in addition to its value as an absolute good in its own right.”67  
Thus, Rescher acknowledges that can be legitimate knowledge outside 
the science that has to do with philosophy and humanistic disciplines68. 
However, he does not use to take into account the historicity of knowledge. In 
particular, regardless his objections to Strawson related to the processes,69 
historicity is not adequately stressed in his view.70 Above all, the lack of 
attention to the notion of “historicity” can be seen when he characterizes 
scientific change, which he connects to the idea of “progress.” In this regard, 
his approach is in terms of “process,” instead of being an approach focused 
on historicity. 
 
1.2.2.  Scientific Progress 
Undoubtedly, scientific progress is one of the topics that receive more 
attention in the contemporary philosophy and methodology. Since 1978, 
Rescher has published several monographs where he analyzes scientific 
progress. Usually, he sees progress from a perspective focused on the 
economic dimension, so that he offers an approach to scientific progress 
where the analysis in terms of costs and benefits is especially relevant.71  
                                            
67 RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 243. 
68 Cf. RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, pp.106-113. 
69 Cf. RESCHER, N., Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy, State 
University of N. York Press, Albany, NY, 1996, pp. 60-64. 
70 On the role of historicity in scientific change, cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “El enfoque cognitivo en 
la Ciencia y el problema de la historicidad: Caracterización desde los conceptos,” Letras, n. 
114, n. 79, (2008), pp. 51-80. 
71 His interest in the economic aspects of scientific progress can be seen, fundamentally, in 
five of his monographs: RESCHER, N., Peirce’s Philosophy of Science, University of Notre 
Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1978; RESCHER, N., Scientific Progress. A Philosophical Essay on 
34 
 
Generally speaking, it is possible to claim that the term “‘progress’ is a 
normative or goal-relative — rather than a purely descriptive — term.”72 So 
when it is claimed that, in fact, there has been “scientific progress,” it is 
assumed that the new things achieved are an improvement in comparison 
with the old things; that is, there has been a scientific change and that 
change has a positive character (at least in epistemological terms).73 Thus, 
the ends are closer than they were before the change had taken place.  
In this regard, Ilkka Niiniluoto maintains that “‘progress’ can be 
contrasted with such neutral terms as 'development', and a philosophical 
analysis of scientific progress is tantamount to a specification of the aims of 
science.”74. That is, if we want to be able to recognize the progress, the aims 
sought must also be recognizable. Rescher’s notion of “scientific progress” 
goes in the same way, because — in his judgment — scientific progress is 
relative to the ends of science.75 For him these ends are basically four: 
description, explanation, prediction, and control over nature.76 
There are several aspects that characterize Rescher’s notion of 
“scientific progress”: 1. Scientific progress is potentially unlimited, since it is 
impossible for us to achieve a perfect science (that is, a completed science), 
                                                                                                                           
the Economics of the Natural Science, B. Blackwell, Oxford, 1978; RESCHER, N., Cognitive 
Economy. The Economic Dimension of the Theory of Knowledge, University of Pittsburgh 
Press, Pittsburgh, 1989; RESCHER, N., Priceless Knowledge? Natural Science in Economic 
Perspective, Rowman and Littlefield, N. York, 1996; and RESCHER, N., Epistemetrics, 
Cambridge University Press, N. York, 2006.  
For a synthesis of the content of this books, see WIBLE, J. R., “How is Scientific 
Knowledge Economically Possible?: Nicholas Rescher’s Contributions to an Economic 
Understanding of Science,” in ALMEDER, R. (ed.), Rescher Studies. A Collection of Essays on 
the Philosophical Work of Nicholas Rescher, pp. 445-476. 
72 NIINILUOTO, I., “Scientific Progress,” Synthese, n. 45, (1980), p. 427. 
73 On the notion of “scientific progress”, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “Progreso científico, 
autonomía de la Ciencia y realismo,” Arbor, v. 135, n. 532, (1990), pp. 91-109; and 
GONZALEZ, W. J., “Progreso científico e innovación tecnológica: La ‘Tecnociencia’ y el 
problema de las relaciones entre Filosofía de la Ciencia y Filosofía de la Tecnología,” Arbor, 
v. 157, n. 620, (1997), pp. 261-283.  
74 NIINILUOTO, I., “Scientific Progress,” p. 428. 
75 Cf. RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, chapter 10, pp. 145-165. 
76 Cf. RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, p. 138. This highlights 
that his approach is principally oriented toward the sciences of nature. 
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so that it is always possible to enlarge or improve the available knowledge.77 
2. Regarding the limits that hinder scientific progress, economic limits are 
especially important. They involve that there is a deceleration of scientific 
progress as its costs increase.78 3. Scientific progress has basically a 
conceptual character, although the practical dimension of scientific research 
should be stressed to assess progress: above all, the improvements with 
regard the ability of prediction and control over nature.79  
1. On the first feature — scientific progress as potentially unlimited or 
endless — Rescher thinks that science is always open to future 
developments. In this regard, there is a relevant difference between two 
different senses of limits: the limits in the weak sense and the limits in the 
strong sense. There are limits in the weak sense when we are not able now 
to answer questions, because we do not have the knowledge required to 
answer them. Meanwhile, there are limits in the strong sense when we think 
that there are questions that we will not answer in the future, even in the long 
run.80 
When Rescher compares the limits in the weak sense to the limits in the 
strong sense, he considers that the later are more problematic than the 
former. Limits in the strong sense are associated with insolubilia (the 
unsolvable problems of science). In this regard, when we accept that science 
is subject to limitations in the strong sense, it is accepted that there is now or 
there will be in the future significant questions that never will be answered. 
                                            
77 Cf. RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, pp. 5-18; and RESCHER, N., 
Scientific Progress. A Philosophical Essay on the Economics of the Natural Science, pp. 38-
53. 
78 Cf. RESCHER, N., Scientific Progress. A Philosophical Essay on the Economics of the 
Natural Science, pp. 79-94. 
79 Cf. RESCHER, N., Methodological Pragmatism. A Systems-Theoretic Approach to the 
Theory of Knowledge, B. Blackwell, Oxford, 1977. 
80 Cf. RESCHER, N., “On Learned Ignorance and the Limits of Knowledge,” in RESCHER, N., 
Cognitive Pragmatism. The Theory of Knowledge in Cognitive Perspective, pp. 63-80; 
especially, pp. 73-75. 
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They are questions whose solution is beyond the limits of science — as a 
human activity; this is also the case in the long run. 
However, Rescher points out that “there is no reason to think, on the 
basis of general principles, that any issues within the domain of natural 
science lie beyond its capabilities.”81 From this point of view, limits that affect 
science are always limits in the weak sense. In this case, this proposal — 
that science is subject to limits in the weak sense — is compatible with the 
claim that whatever be the question posed in a concrete moment of scientific 
research, we should think that we will be able to answer it, at least in the 
future. 
But, on the basis of the unpredictability of the future science, it cannot 
be claimed that all the questions posed by science will be eventually 
answered.82 Thus, Rescher accepts, in principle, the possibility that there are 
limits in the strong sense, so that they can be unsolvable problems in 
scientific research. However, he points out that these are two different 
theses: (i) that there could be unsolvable problems, and (ii) that those 
unsolvable problems can be identified. The later thesis — that we can identify 
now the questions that science will never be able to solve — is called 
“hyperlimitation” by Rescher.83 
Certainly, this topic has to be seen in connection to the difficulties to 
predict the future knowledge. As Rescher states this problem, it is possible to 
                                            
81 RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 3. 
82 There is an important distinction between “unpredictable” and “not predictable.” 
“Unpredictability” involves the complete impossibility of predicting. It is mainly due to the 
presence of anarchic phenomena. Meanwhile, “not predictability” is related to the current 
impossibility of achieving a prediction, which is usually due to the instability of the 
phenomena. This distinction is in GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica. Concepciones 
filosófico-metodológicas desde H. Reichenbach a N. Rescher, p. 289; and GONZALEZ, W. J., 
Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in Economics, Springer, 
Dordrecht, 2015, p. 56. See also EAGLE, A., “Randomness Is Unpredictability,” British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science, v. 56, (2005), pp. 749-790. 
83 Cf. RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 113. 
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claim that there are difficulties to identify the insolubilia,84 insofar as there are 
also difficulties to predict how the future science will be.85 In fact, he points 
out that “the prospect of present knowledge about future discoveries is 
deeply problematic since the future of knowledge is fundamentally 
unpredictable. The details of the cognitive future are hidden in an 
impenetrable fog.”86 
This issue is connected with the Kant’s principle of question 
propagation, which — in Rescher’s judgment — has two main consequences 
for science: a) the unpredictability of future science, and b) the impossibility 
of achieving a perfect science. Thus, in the first place, on the basis of current 
knowledge, Kant’s principle of question propagation involves the impossibility 
of predicting the questions we will ask in the future and, certainly, we do not 
know now the answers to these questions. For this reason, we cannot 
identify the insolubilia or assure their existence (that is, not as a current 
incapability that will be overcome in the future). 
Obviously, the advancement of science can be seen as a wide cognitive 
process based on a “Kantian inspiration,” because it can be seen as a 
process of questions and answers, where each new answer influences the 
question that can be posed. In this regard, Rescher points out different ways 
by which new knowledge can affect the questions that we consider: I) it can 
give new answers to old questions; II) it can generate new questions; and III) 
it can show that old questions are improper or illegitimate.87 
Therefore, Rescher considers that we cannot predict now with accuracy 
the content of future knowledge. In consequence, we cannot predict what 
questions we will consider in the future. In addition, we do not know (and 
cannot know) if all the questions we have not answer yet are legitimate. 
                                            
84 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 186-188; and RESCHER, N., The Limits of 
Science, revised edition, chapter 8, pp. 111-127. 
85 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 177-183. 
86 RESCHER, N., “On Learned Ignorance and the Limits of Knowledge,” p. 64.  
87 Cf. RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 12. 
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Thus, “the task of specifying the limits of scientific capability in the production 
of knowledge is itself one that transcends the limits of our cognitive 
powers.”88 In this way, it also transcends our capabilities the task of 
identifying what the insolubilia problems of science are, although we can 
assume that those problems exist. 
 It should be pointed out that Kant’s principle of question propagation 
involves the impossibility of the completeness of science. Rescher relates 
this issue to the existence of limits in the weak sense. Thus, scientific 
knowledge is open to the future, and this means that perfect science is an 
unfeasible ideal; that is, he does not accept the possibility of a completed 
science.89 This is because each scientific improvement will generate new 
questions that require an answer, and so on. In this way, science is 
developed through a question-answering process, insofar as it overcomes 
the limits that hinder its advancement. 
The distinction between limits in the weak sense and limits in the strong 
sense — where hyperlimitation can be included — has major implications for 
scientific progress. Rescher’s proposal is clear: “the distinction between 
these various types of limits thus carries the important lesson—already 
drawn by Kant—that even the resolution of all our scientific problems would 
not necessarily mean that science as such is finite or completable.”90 
                                            
88 RESCHER, N., Unknowability. An Inquiry into the Limits of Knowledge, Lexington Books, 
Lanham, MD, 2009. p. 18. 
89 Rescher calls into question the possibility of achieving a perfect science form theoretical 
and practical viewpoints. His starting point is in the goals of science, which in his judgment 
are four: description, explanation, prediction, and control. Then, he identifies four conditions 
that a scientific discipline should meet in order to be considered completed: erotetic 
completeness, predictive completeness, pragmatic completeness, and temporal finality (the 
omega-condition). He considers that the first three are problematic from a theoretical point of 
view and unfeasible form a pragmatic viewpoint. Meanwhile, the temporal finality is 
unfeasible if we take into account the internal dynamics of the connection between scientific 
progress and technological innovation. Cf. RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised 
edition, pp. 145-176.   
90 RESCHER, N., “On Learned Ignorance and the Limits of Knowledge,” p. 74. 
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Thereby, he maintains an approach to scientific progress as unlimited, 
insofar as it is always open to the future.91 
On the one hand, Rescher sees science as subject to limits in the weak 
sense. They are current limits that can be found in each historical stage of 
scientific development and will affect science also in the future. But they are 
obstacles that can be overcome through scientific development itself. In his 
own words: “to maintain (…) the essential limitlessness of science on the 
side of terminating limits—the feasibility of unending scientific progress—is 
not to deny the prospect of problems whose solution lies beyond the physical 
and/or economic limits of man’s investigative capacities. The existence of 
actually unanswerable questions in science—problems whose solution lies 
forever on the inaccessible side of a technologically imposed data-barrier—
would not mean an eventual end to scientific progress.”92 
Accordingly, Rescher thinks that, de facto, there will be always limits 
that hinder scientific progress; but, at the same time, he considers that 
scientific progress is always possible to the extent that those limits can be 
eventually overcome. Concurrently, he calls into question that there are, 
strictly speaking, limits in the strong sense. This is because, in the first place, 
when we consider that a question is in principle beyond the powers of 
science, it is difficult to maintain that this question is a legitimate scientific 
one (i.e., that it belongs to the scientific domain); and, in the second place, 
even if those limitations exist, it is impossible for us to identify them.93 
Following such way, it is questionable whether there is now or will be in the 
future a “ceiling” of scientific research, even when we must acknowledge the 
present existence of limits to scientific progress. 
                                            
91 Cf. RESCHER, N., Scientific Progress. A Philosophical Essay on the Economics of the 
Natural Science, passim. 
92 RESCHER, N., “Some Issues Regarding the Completeness of Science and the Limits of 
Scientific Knowledge,” p. 32. 
93 Cf. RESCHER, N., “On Learned Ignorance and the Limits of Knowledge,” p. 75.  
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2. When Rescher considers the limits in the weak sense (that is, those 
limitations that affect science in each concrete stage), the second feature of 
his characterization of scientific progress appears: the relevance of the 
economic limits. In effect, “Rescher’s approach on scientific progress is 
frequently based on the language of cost and benefit, because — for him — 
cost-effectiveness is a salient aspect of rationality, where the benefits of 
knowledge can be theoretical (or purely cognitive) or practical (or applied).”94 
In this regard, it can be pointed out that  “on the one hand, among the 
internal benefits of sciences is the increasing capacity that a science has to 
provide explanation and prediction, which also contribute explicitly to the 
human worldview as well as the solution of many practical problems of 
everyday life. On the other hand, there are growing external costs, mainly in 
the natural sciences and in the sciences of the artificial, which are due to the 
enlarging complexity of the phenomena studied as well as the greater 
difficulty in learning and mastery.”95 
Therefore, with regard to the economic limits to scientific progress, the 
analysis of the external costs is a fundamental issue. Regarding this problem, 
Rescher pays attention to the relations between science (above all, natural 
sciences) and technology. He thinks that science and technology are like 
“two legs of the same body,”96 since each of them needs the other and 
contributes to its development. Again, his pragmatic component is clear: they 
are endeavors interrelated. 
Because Rescher’s analysis is focused on the natural sciences, he 
maintains that technologies for observation, experimentation, and de 
subsequent data-processing have a key role in scientific progress. In this 
                                            
94 GONZALEZ, W. J., “Economic Values in the Configuration of Science,” in AGAZZI, E., 
ECHEVERRÍA, J. and GÓMEZ, A. (eds.), Epistemology and the Social, Poznan Studies in the 
Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 2008, p. 92. 
95 GONZALEZ, W. J., “Economic Values in the Configuration of Science,” in AGAZZI, E., 
ECHEVERRÍA, J. and GÓMEZ, A. (eds.), Epistemology and the Social, p. 92. 
96 RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, p. 100 
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way, scientific progress and technological innovation are two notions that go 
together in his approach.97 As J. F. Wible points out, in Rescher’s proposal 
“scientific progress depends on scientific observation and it in turn depends 
both on the availability and types of resources required for scientific 
observation.”98  
In effect, Rescher thinks that there cannot be scientific progress without 
technology. “On the one hand, the transforming resources of technology use 
and exploit our scientific understanding of the world’s processes. But, on the 
other hand, it turns out that science cannot progress without technology, 
because we can only obtain information about reality by interacting with it. 
We can only theorize about nature in an effective way to the extent that we 
can detect its processes (by ‘observation’) and manipulate its phenomena (by 
‘experimentation’).”99 
On the other hand, this relation of inter-dependence between science 
and the available technology involves a major limitation to scientific progress, 
since there are increasing costs related to data acquisition and management 
technologies as science advances. On the other hand, technological 
innovation enlarges complexity, because each solution given to the problems 
related to information processing and the control of the processes generates 
new problems of complexity.100 
                                            
97 “Although scientific progress is always possible in principle (…) the achievement of this 
permanent possibility demands a continuous improvement of the technological capability of 
data extraction and exploitation,” RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-
tecnológica, p. 126. 
98 WIBLE, J. R., “How is Scientific Knowledge Economically Possible?: Nicholas Rescher’s 
Contributions to an Economic Understanding of Science,” in ALMEDER, R. (ed.), Rescher 
Studies. A Collection of Essays on the Philosophical Work of Nicholas Rescher, p. 446. 
99 RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, p. 100. Rescher calls this 
“thesis of the technological dependency,” which maintains that “progress in the theoretical 
superstructure of natural science hinges crucially upon improvements in the technological 
basis of data-acquisition and processing,” RESCHER, N., Scientific Progress, p.142. 
100 Cf. RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, pp. 118-121. On 
scientific creativity and technological innovation in the context of complexity, cf. GONZALEZ, 
W. J., “The Roles of Scientific Creativity and Technological Innovation in the Context of 
Complexity of Science,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Creativity, Innovation, and Complexity in 
Science, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2013, pp. 11-40. 
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In Rescher’s judgment, “Kant’s principle of question-propagation” is also 
present in the technological realm, and it is related to complexity. In his 
words, “throughout the progress of science, technology, and human artifice 
generally, complexity is self-potentiating because it engenders complications 
on the side of problems that can only be addressed adequately through 
further complication on the side of process and procedure. The increase in 
technical sophistication confronts us with a dynamic feedback interaction 
between problems and solutions that ultimately transforms each successive 
solution into a generator of new problems.”101 
This problem involves that there is — or can be in principle — a 
deceleration in scientific progress due to economic elements. Thus, the costs 
related to scientific progress increase at the same time that the benefits 
decrease, since “each successive order-of-magnitude step involves a 
massive cost for lesser progress; each successive fixed-size investment of 
effort yields a substantially diminished return.”102 From this point of view, the 
major limits to scientific progress are practical limits that rest basically on the 
physical-economic limitations to data acquisition and processing.103  
3. The third basic feature that characterizes Rescher’s proposal on 
scientific progress — which goes with its potentially unlimited character and 
the relevance of the economic limits — has a double side: on the one hand, 
he emphasizes that science progresses, fundamentally, through conceptual 
change; and, on the other hand, he considers that scientific prediction and 
control over nature are the best criteria at our disposal to assess scientific 
progress. Thus, he thinks of scientific progress as a process where changes 
occur and these changes are basically related to concepts.104 
                                            
101 RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, p. 120. 
102 Cf. RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 59.  
103 Cf. RESCHER, N., Scientific Progress, p. 236. 
104 Conceptual progress form the point of view of processes is not the same as conceptual 
historicity as the driving force of scientific change. Cf. THAGARD, P., Conceptual revolutions, 
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In effect, Rescher points out in an explicit way that “scientific change 
(…) is not just a matter of marginal revisions of opinion within a fixed and 
stable framework of concepts; the crucial developments involve a change in 
the conceptual apparatus itself.”105 This leads to a view of scientific progress 
as “a process of conceptual innovation that always places certain 
developments outside the cognitive horizons of earlier workers because the 
very concepts operative in their characterization become available only in the 
course of scientific discovery itself.”106 
But, at the same time, Rescher thinks that it is problematic to assess 
scientific progress on the basis of conceptual change. This is because, in his 
judgment, “when the ‘external’ element of control over nature is given its due 
prominence, the substantiation of imputations of scientific progress becomes 
a more manageable project than it could ever possibly be on a ‘internal,’ 
context-oriented basis.”107 
This approach is — in my judgment — problematic if we consider the 
framework of thought that Rescher offers. Clearly, he acknowledges that 
concepts can have an objective content. So it could be possible to assess, on 
the basis of the objectivity of the concepts, scientific progress in connection 
with conceptual changes, where historicity (of science, the agents and the 
researched reality itself) is compatible with objectivity.108 Instead of doing 
that, Rescher claim is different: “the progress of science will be taken to 
center on its pragmatic aspect—the increasing success of applications in 
problem solving and control.”109 
                                                                                                                           
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992; and GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Conceptual 
Revolutions: From Cognitive Science to Medicine, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2011. 
105 RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 39. 
106 RESCHER, N., “The Problem of Future Knowledge,” p. 151. 
107 RESCHER, N., Methodological Pragmatism, p. 188. 
108 On an analysis of conceptual change from the notion of “historicity,” see GONZALEZ, W. J., 
“Conceptual Changes and Scientific Diversity: The Role of Historicity,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. 
(ed.), Conceptual Revolutions: From Cognitive Science to Medicine, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 
2011, pp. 39-62. 
109 RESCHER, N., Methodological Pragmatism, p. 185. 
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Ilkka Niiniluoto, among other authors, has criticized this proposal of 
Rescher. In his judgment, Rescher’s insistence on prediction and the ability 
of control as criteria to assess the verisimilitude of theories results in a biased 
view of scientific progress. From this perspective, pragmatic success would 
be at most a criterion to evaluate cognitive success, but it is neither the only 
criterion nor the most important.110 So Niiniluoto considers that there are a 
wide variety of reliable criteria. They are “cognitive factors such as truth, 
information, explanatory power, predictive capacity, precision, and 
simplicity.”111 
Regarding Niiniluoto’s criticism, I need to point out that Rescher does 
not maintain, strictly speaking, that predictive success is, by itself, a criterion 
to assess the verisimilitude of scientific theories. What Rescher actually 
thinks is that “only a complex, reciprocally interactive gearing of explanation, 
prediction, and control can in the final analysis provide a satisfactory 
standard of scientific adequacy.”112 Nevertheless, he thinks that its role as a 
criterion to assess scientific progress is fundamental. Thus, “predictive 
efficacy is the best available token for the explanatory adequacy of our 
theories.”113 
 
1.3. The Main Philosophico-Methodological Elements of Prediction 
Certainly, the problem of scientific prediction is among the most 
representative and discussed topics of the philosophy and methodology of 
science in the 20th century and the beginning of 21th century. From different 
philosophical approaches, it has been highlighted the relevance that the 
                                            
110 Cf. NIINILUOTO, I., “Límites de la Tecnología,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Progreso científico 
e innovación tecnológica, Arbor, v. 157, n. 620, (1997), p. 402. 
111 NIINILUOTO, I., “Límites de la Tecnología,” p. 402. 
112 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 165. 
113 Predicting the Future, p. 164. It seems odd to maintain that “predictive efficacy” is key for 
“explanatory adequacy,” above all if we take into account that Rescher supports the 
asymmetry between explanation and prediction. 
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notion of “prediction” has to scientific activity.114 In effect, prediction has 
several relevant roles in science: (i) it is an important aim of scientific 
research; (ii) in basic science prediction is usually used as a test of theories; 
(iii) it precedes the prescriptive task of applied sciences;115 and (iv) it can be 
a starting point for decision making in the realm of the application of 
science.116 
These considerations are based on the fact that the different 
components of science (language, structure, knowledge, method, activity, 
ends, and values)117 can be oriented towards the future. Consequently, 
scientific prediction can be analyzed from a variety of realms that concern the 
aforementioned components. Thus, the study of scientific prediction has 
been addressed from the semantic, logical, epistemological, methodological, 
ontological, axiological, and ethical realms.118  
Within Rescher’s philosophical conception, the problem of scientific 
prediction is placed in a prominent position. It should be highlighted his 
monograph devoted to scientific prediction, where he offers many elements 
to the analysis of prediction from the perspective of the diverse constituents 
of science: language, structure, knowledge, method, activity, ends, and 
                                            
114 However, when it is compared with scientific explanation, the problem of prediction has 
undoubtedly received less attention in the contemporary philosophy and methodology of 
science: “Despite the fact that most philosophers acknowledge the general importance of 
prediction for science, the vast majority of the intellectual focus between the two goals rests 
on explanation. Prediction is rarely a topic in its own right, appearing mainly in discussions of 
confirmation, realism, and other topics. It has been this way for over 40 years,” DOUGLAS, H. 
E., “Reintroducing Prediction to Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, v. 76, n. 4, (2009), p, 
445. 
115 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 11. 
116 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “The Roles of Scientific Creativity and Technological Innovation in 
the Context of Complexity of Science,” in GONZALEZ, W. J., Creativity, Innovation, and 
Complexity in Science, pp. 11-40; especially, pp. 17-18.  
117 On the constitutive elements of science, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “The Philosophical 
Approach to Science, Technology and Society,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Science, 
Technology and Society: A Philosophical Perspective, pp. 3-49. 
118 On the roles of prediction and the diversity philosophical analyses regarding its different 
realms, see GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, passim. These realms of philosophical 
analyses have a direct repercussion in sciences such as economics. See GONZALEZ, W. J., 
Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in Economics, passim. 
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values.119 As he explicitly states, the book seeks “to provide a theory of 
prediction.”120  These components considered are interrelated within his 
proposal — that is a pragmatic idealism — since he is interested on a 
system.  
Therefore, they are a set of interdependent elements in his conception, 
so “each factor can be distinguished from the others, but it cannot be 
properly separated: it is a part of a whole.”121 In fact, to a greater or lesser 
extent, Rescher deals with the semantic, logical, epistemological, 
methodological, ontological, axiological, and ethical components of scientific 
prediction. His goal is to offer a systematic conception of prediction; where 
the different levels are related giving rise to an interdependence network. De 
facto, he reaches the proposed aim: to provide a theory of prediction, which 
is analyzed here. 
 
1.3.1. Semantic and Logical Features of Prediction 
From a semantic viewpoint, prediction is about a future (something that 
is not yet). Thus, its referent is, in principle, something potential rather than 
actual. In this way, the sense and referent of a predictive statement belong to 
the realm of what is expected.122 In this regard, Rescher’s proposal is not, 
strictly speaking, a semantic approach to prediction. It is rather a pragmatic 
conception of prediction. In effect, his accounts of scientific language, in 
general, and the language of prediction, in particular, follow the pragmatic 
view of language. Thus, he sees meaning from use conditions, instead of 
considered that truth conditions are more important for the meaning.123 
                                            
119 See RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, passim. 
120 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 1. 
121 GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 259. 
122 Cf. La predicción científica, p. 284. See also BENTON, M. A. and TURRI, J., “Iffy Predictions 
and Proper Expectations,” Synthese, v. 191, (2014), pp. 1857-1866. 
123 Rescher’s approach to language is developed in RESCHER, N., Communicative 
Pragmatism and Other Philosophical Essays on Language, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 
MD, 1998. 
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Within this framework, the pragmatic vision of meaning — as use — 
connects to pragmatism, since to predict is — in Rescher’s judgment — an 
activity oriented towards the achievement of meaningful statements about 
future events and phenomena. To predict is “to endeavor to provide 
warranted answers to detailed substantive questions about the world’s future 
developments.”124 For this reason, it also has an instrumental component: 
“Prediction (…) is our instrument for resolving our meaningful questions 
about the future, or at least of endeavoring to resolve them in a rationally 
cogent manner.”125  
From the point of view of language, Rescher accepts the Israel 
Scheffler’s idea of scientific prediction as a statement that is about the 
future.126 Thus, there is a clear difference between prediction and 
explanation, because the latter can be an argument.127 This difference will be 
developed here from a logical viewpoint. In addition, in contrast to authors 
such as Milton Friedman128 or Stephen Toulmin129, Rescher does not accept 
a “prediction about the past.”130  Prediction is oriented towards the future and, 
consequently, “the semantics of prediction allows a predictive language 
                                            
124 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 37-38. 
125 Predicting the Future, p. 39. 
126 Cf. SCHEFFLER, I., “Explanation, Prediction, and Abstraction,” British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, v. 7, (1957), pp. 293-309. 
127 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 260. On explanation as argument, see 
SINTONEN, M., The Pragmatics of Scientific Explanation, Acta Philosophica Fennica, v. 37, 
Helsinki, 1984, pp. 8, 10, 89-90, and 112. 
128 Cf. FRIEDMAN, M., “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in FRIEDMAN, M., Economics, 
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953, p. 9. 
129 The conception of Toulmin with regard to the possibility of obtaining predictions of past is 
in TOULMIN, S., Foresight and Understanding, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1961, 
pp. 26-27. 
130 According to Rescher, prediction is always future oriented, so pure statements about the 
past cannot be considered as a prediction. However, there can be “hybrid statements” that 
combine past features and future happenings. For example, “Columbus discovered America 
in 1492” is a statement about the past, but “If you go to the ‘Archivo de Indias,’ you will find 
records about the discovery of America” is future oriented statement (a prediction) which 
contains also information about the past. Rescher, N., Personal Communication, 12.5.2015.  
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about the future whose status of being true or false might not be specified on 
the basis of the knowledge available.”131  
Logically, a major problem regarding prediction is related to the logical 
similarities or differences between prediction and explanation. In this regard, 
it has been widely discussed whether prediction and explanation are 
symmetrical or asymmetrical processes. It is a controversy which started in 
1948, when Carl Gustav Hempel and Paul Oppenheim published their well-
known paper on “Studies in the Logic of Explanation.”132 For these 
philosophers, the difference between explanation and prediction would be 
just a temporal anisotropy: explanation deals with past phenomena, whereas 
prediction is oriented toward the future. 
During the years when the symmetry thesis was widely accepted, 
Rescher suggested an analysis that went further than the mere temporal 
anisotropy. He clearly saw that explanation and prediction were different 
logical processes. In his judgment, “it cannot be maintained that explanation 
and prediction are identical from the standpoint of their logical structure, the 
sole point of difference between them being one of content, in that the 
hypothesis of a prediction concerns the future, while explanations concern 
the past.”133 Many years later, in Predicting the Future, he criticizes again the 
symmetry thesis. He does so in four successive levels: (i) logical, (ii) 
epistemological; (iii) methodological; and (iv) ontological.134 
Generally, scientific explanation has more credibility than scientific 
prediction, insofar as it is possible to maintain with high probability the truth of 
                                            
131 GONZALEZ, W. J., Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in 
Economics, p. 15. 
132 Cf. HEMPEL, C. and OPPENHEIM, P., “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” Philosophy of 
Science, v.15, (1948), pp. 135-175. 
133 RESCHER, N., “On Prediction and Explanation,” British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, v. 8, n. 32, (1958), p. 289. Rescher’s criticism of the symmetry thesis can be seen 
also in RESCHER, N., Scientific Explanation, The Free Press, New York, 1970, pp. 30-37; 
especially pp. 32-34. 
134 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 264. See, in this regard, RESCHER, N., 
Predicting the Future, pp. 165-166. 
49 
 
the conclusion in an explicative argument. Meanwhile, a predictive statement 
is usually associated much lower degrees of probability.135 In addition, the 
relation between informativeness and security is different in both cases. This 
leads Rescher to state the existence of a significant disanalogy between 
explanation and prediction.136 Thus, the more specific and detailed an 
explanation is the more secure it is. Nevertheless, the more exact and 
informative a prediction is, the less confidence we can have in it. 
Explanation and prediction are, therefore, two different processes, so it 
cannot be claimed that they are logically equivalent. However, insofar as — 
for Resche r— science is a system, both processes are coordinated. In this 
way, in contrast to the symmetry thesis, he suggests the “harmony thesis” 
between explanation and prediction, which maintains that both are closely 
related.137 For this reason, Rescher thinks that “theories that do not yield 
predictions are sterile, and predictions—however successful—that lack a 
theoretical backing are for that very reason cognitively unsatisfactory.”138 This 
leads to the problem of predictivism, which has been widely discussed. 
Furthermore, when prediction is analyzed from the logic of science, it 
appears problem of the “well-structured” theories oriented toward prediction. 
In this regard, a question is whether a “well-structured” theory can have an 
inductive structure (for example, the hypothetical-inductive139) or, on the 
contrary, the deductive structure (especially, the hypothetical-deductive) is 
the only valid structure. This leads us to considering several problems that 
affect prediction: a) how to characterize (and justify) the inductive inference, 
b) what is the role of induction regarding scientific prediction, and c) what are 
                                            
135 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 166. 
136 Cf. Predicting the Future, p. 257, nota 90. 
137
 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 167-169. The “harmony thesis” is outlined in his 
book Scientific Explanation: “The key thing in scientific understanding is the capacity to 
exploit a knowledge of laws to structure our understanding of the past and to guide our 
expectations for the future,” RESCHER, N., Scientific Explanation, p. 135. 
138
 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 167. 
139 Cf. NIINILUOTO, I. and TUOMELA, R., Theoretical Concepts and Hypothetico-Inductive 
Inference, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1973. 
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the possible limits to deductivism for scientific prediction. 
 
1.3.2. Prediction in the Epistemological and Methodological 
Realms 
Epistemologically, scientific prediction connects with the need to obtain 
a high degree of control of the variables in order to achieve a reliable 
knowledge about the future. Consequently, two major issues arise: on the 
one hand, the possibility of detecting the patterns that affect the changes of 
the variable that is studied; and, on the other, the availability of means to 
know other variables that interact with the studied variable.140 This allows us 
to understand why very often we can only obtain conditional predictions 
instead of categorical predictions.141 
From this perspective, it is assumed that scientific prediction must be 
supported by reasons. For Rescher, predictions which do not rest on reasons 
are in rigor prophecies. Prophecies, unlike scientific predictions, do not have 
credibility for the scientific endeavor.  Thus, he rejects the thesis of D. H. 
Mellor according to which “predictions don’t need reasons,”142 since those 
predictions without reasons are actually prophecies without practical utility for 
science. Consequently, scientific predictions are characterized by being 
reasoned predictions.143 
This issue connects the epistemological realm of prediction with the 
general field of human rationality and, then, with the specific field of scientific 
rationality. Thus, following Wenceslao J. Gonzalez,144 it is possible to connect 
                                            
140 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 285. 
141 Cf. La predicción científica, p. 286. 
142 MELLOR, D. H., “The Possibility of Prediction,” Proceedings of the British Academy, v.65, 
(1975), p. 221. 
143 “Any prediction worth bothering about must rest on some evidential basis. Some rational 
substantiation must be at hand because serious cognitive interest attaches not to predictions 
as such but rational predictions—those that are credible in the sense that there is good 
reason to accept them as correct then and there, before the fact,” RESCHER, N., Predicting 
the Future, p. 38. 
144 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, pp. 264-265. 
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Rescher’s epistemology of prediction with his theory of rationality.145 On the 
basis of this nexus, it can be seen that Rescher suggests an approach to 
human rationality, in general, and scientific rationality, in particular, which is 
characterized by its broad nature. Because, in his judgment, rationality 
concerns three successive levels: a) beliefs, b) actions, and c) ends.146 Each 
one of them has repercussions on scientific rationality.  
According to this basis, Rescher develops a normative theory of 
rationality. This theory gives primacy to practical reason over theoretical 
reason. This feature affects scientific prediction. His conception highlights the 
pragmatic dimension of prediction, insofar as it is the result of a rational 
activity. Thus, he conceives prediction as an instrument: “Prediction (…) is 
our instrument for resolving our meaningful questions about the future, or at 
least of endeavoring to resolve them in a rationally cogent manner.”147 
Within a pragmatic context, it happens that we have important 
questions on future developments and we need answers to those questions. 
This is not, for Rescher, a simple issue of curiosity, but a matter of survival. 
Every human action needs to some extent information about the future, so he 
considers that “to act, to plan, to survive, we must anticipate the future, and 
the past is the only guide to it that we have.”148 This epistemological element 
is linked with the logical component, since practical rationality gives us a 
justification of the kind of inductive inference that allows us to obtain 
statements of future form the available data about the past-and-present 
experience. 
These coordinates are placed in a fallibilistic epistemological 
                                            
145 Rescher has devoted a large number of his publications to human rationality, in general, 
and scientific rationality, in particular. Besides the first two volumes already quoted on “a 
system of pragmatic idealism,” there are his books Rationality, published in 1988, and Razón 
y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, published in 1999. 
146 Cf. RESCHER, N., Rationality. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and the Rationale of 
Reason, passim. 
147 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 39. 
148 Predicting the Future, p. 65. 
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framework. Thus, for Rescher, scientific knowledge is always revisable, so it 
is possible to improve what we have now.149 This issue connects with the 
problem of the limits of science. Among them, he highlights the 
epistemological and ontological limits.150 Epistemological limits (such as 
uncertainty, inferential incapacity, etc.) are especially important for scientific 
prediction, since it is a knowledge that, because of its very nature, cannot be 
tested in the present.151 Meanwhile, ontological limits have to do with the 
complexity of phenomena, where can be chaos, chance, etc. In short, he 
maintains that “our predictions are in principle always fallible.”152 
However, the epistemology of prediction in Rescher — which is 
fallibilistic — has also elements of realism, among them that predictive 
knowledge must rest on objective basis. It is possible then to obtain true 
knowledge about the future (or at least close to truth). In this regard, his 
approach is — in my judgment — correct, because he rejects a naïve version 
of realism and opts for “a realism which, while acknowledging our limitations 
in this regard, nevertheless persists in using the resources of reason to doing 
the best we can in the recognition that while overall this is going to prove to 
be quite a lot, it will never be nearly as much as we would ideally like.”153 
Methodologically, a systematic account of scientific prediction should 
take into account a diversity of issues, which can be analyzed according to 
different methodological levels. In effect, there are at least two different levels 
in methodology of science: (i) the general methodology of science; and (ii) 
                                            
149 Rescher himself characterizes his epistemology in terms of fallibilism in RESCHER, N., The 
Limits of Science, revised edition, especially in chapter 3, pp. 29-42. 
150 Cf. GUILLAN, A., “Límites del conocimiento y Ciencias de la Complejidad: Factores 
epistemológicos y ontológicos como obstáculos a la predicción científica”, in GONZALEZ, W. 
J. (ed.), Las Ciencias de la Complejidad: Vertiente dinámica de las Ciencias de Diseño y 
sobriedad de factores, pp. 181-204. 
151 “Epistemological limits on prediction exist insofar as the future is cognitively 
inaccessible—either because we cannot secure the needed data, or because it is impossible 
for us to discover the operative laws, or even possibly because the requisite inferences 
and/or calculations involve complexities that outrun the reach of our capabilities,” RESCHER, 
N., Predicting the Future, p. 134. 
152 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 66. 
153 Predicting the Future, p. 222. 
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the special methodology of science.154 Within the later, two realms can be 
approached: a) the broad scope, which is concerned to the nexus between a 
discipline and methodological problems of the general realm; and b) the 
restricted scope, which takes into account the specific features of each 
science.155 In this regard, Rescher is mainly focused on the natural sciences, 
although he also addresses some specific problems of the social sciences 
(he is not expressly concerned to the sciences of the artificial). 
Moreover, there is the question of the roles of prediction in scientific 
practice, which can be different in basic science, in applied science, and in 
the application of science.156 Thus, scientific prediction plays different 
roles:157 1) in basic research (both in sciences of nature and in social 
sciences), prediction can be used as a test for the hypothesis and theories. 
2) In the case of applied science (pharmacology, medicine, economics, etc.) 
prediction is usually a guide (i.e., a previous step to prescription), since the 
anticipation of the possible future is needed to suggest the patterns oriented 
toward the solution of concrete problems. 3) When the application of science 
is considered, prediction has also a relevant role as the basis for the 
decision-making. 
With regard to the methodology of scientific prediction, Rescher’s 
account is de facto within a framework of methodological pragmatism. It is an 
approach which maintains that scientific theses and theories should be 
evaluated according to methodological criteria, where the ability to obtain 
successful predictions is basic.158 Within these coordinates, his contributions 
                                            
154 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Marco teórico, trayectoria y situación actual de la Filosofía y 
Metodología de la Economía,” Argumentos de Razón Técnica, v. 3, (2000), pp. 13-59. 
155 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 286. 
156 Cf. NIINILUOTO, I., "The Aim and Structure of Applied Research,” Erkenntnis, v. 38, n. 1, 
(1993), pp. 1-21; NIINILUOTO, I., "Approximation in Applied Science,” Poznan Studies in the 
Philosophy of Sciences and the Humanities, (1995), pp. 127-139; and GONZALEZ, W. J., “The 
Philosophical Approach to Science, Technology and Society,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), 
Science, Technology and Society: A Philosophical Perspective, pp. 3-49. 
157 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 11. 
158 Cf. RESCHER, N., Methodological Pragmatism, chapter 5, pp. 66-80. 
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regarding the methodological features of scientific prediction follow two major 
steps: (i) the preconditions for rational prediction, and (ii) the typology of the 
predictive processes that can be used in scientific activity.  
On the former step, Rescher seeks to explicitly state the preconditions 
for rational prediction. Thus, he seeks the necessary conditions for achieving 
reliable predictions.159 On the later issue, he accepts a plurality of processes 
that are oriented towards predicting the possible future. Rescher’s 
acknowledgement of a methodological pluralism basically respond to the 
diversity of the predicted phenomena (natural, social or artificial) and the kind 
of question posed about those phenomena.160 Consequently, there is a clear 
nexus between the methodological realm and the epistemological and 
ontological fields. 
 
1.3.3. Ontological Features of Prediction and the Realm of Values 
Ontologically, there are several issues at stake regarding prediction. On 
the one hand, it is possible to think that the kind of predictions we can 
achieve (with regard to their reliability, accuracy, etc.) depends on the type of 
reality prediction is about. In this regard, it should be considered the 
distinction between the natural reality, the social realm, and the field of the 
artificial. From this distinction, the specific problems which affect prediction in 
these realms (natural, social or artificial) could be considered. This can be 
made according to the kind of reality that is researched. 
On the other hand, there is the ontological status of the future. If 
prediction is — for Rescher — a statement that deals with future phenomena, 
there is the problem of how to characterize the future, which is something 
that does not exist yet. In this regard, he considers that the future has several 
features: a) it does not exist yet, by definition; b) it unavoidably will be (i.e., 
                                            
159 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 86. 
160 Cf. RESCHER, N., Personal Communication, 15.7.2014. 
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the future will come in one way or another); c) we can only have incomplete 
information about its nature; and d) the control we can exert over future 
phenomena is very limited.161 
These features of the reality of future (natural, social or artificial) lead to 
acknowledge the ontological limits to prediction, which rests on the 
complexity of phenomena. In this regard, Rescher admits that “ontological 
limits exist insofar as the future of the domain at issue is developmentally 
open—causally undetermined or underdetermined by the existing realities of 
the present and open to the development of wholly unprecedented patterns 
owing to the contingencies of choice, chance, and chaos.”162 
Within the ontological obstacles, some could be highlighted now: (i) 
anarchy and volatility; (ii) chance, chaos, and arbitrary choice; and (iii) 
creativity. In my judgment, the problem of the ontological limits to creativity 
can be seen from the point of view of complexity, which involves taking into 
account historicity (of science, agents, and the reality itself that is 
research).163 Because the reality (natural, social or artificial) that is predicted 
might be complex, so its complexity has repercussions both on the very 
possibility of predicting and the kind of prediction achievable (with regard to 
its reliability, accuracy, precision, etc.). 
Axiologically, the problem of scientific prediction is initially twofold in his 
approach: on the one hand, there is the issue of the role of prediction as a 
value of science; and, on the other hand, it can be considered the problem of 
the values of prediction, that is, what are the desirable characteristics that 
predictive statements should have in order to be worthy. Both dimensions are 
closely interrelated in Rescher’s account, since the value of prediction for 
                                            
161 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 2. The second feature cannot be understood in 
a deterministic way. 
162
 Predicting the Future, p. 134. 
163 On historicity as a feature of science in the three levels mentioned before, see GONZALEZ, 
W. J., “Conceptual Changes and Scientific Diversity: The Role of Historicity,” in GONZALEZ, 
W. J. (ed.), Conceptual Revolutions: From Cognitive Science to Medicine, pp. 39-62. 
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science depends on the kind of values it has (accuracy, precision, etc.).164 
Rescher’s axiology of scientific research, likewise his philosophy of 
science in general, falls within the coordinates of a system of pragmatic 
idealism that admits elements of realism.165 He considers that science as 
activity is modulated by a plurality of values. Among those values, he gives 
primacy to the internal values of scientific activity, which are those that goes 
with the constitutive elements of science (language, structure, knowledge, 
method, activity, ends, and values). He gives them priority over the values 
that modulates sciences as an activity connected with other human activity 
(such as social, political, economic or ecological values). 
When the focus is on scientific prediction, it seems clear that prediction 
appears to be an important aim of science among others. Thus, Rescher 
considers that science has a goal-structure that “encompasses the traditional 
quartet of description, explanation, prediction, and control.”166 Nevertheless, 
it has an especially valuable role, since in his judgment “prediction is the very 
touchstone of science in that it affords our best and most effective test for the 
adequacy of our scientific endeavors.”167  
With regard to the values that should be with scientific prediction, 
Rescher gives primacy to the internal values, above all, he emphasizes the 
epistemological and methodological values. He does this from a structural 
perspective that takes into account two successive levels: a) predictive 
                                            
164 Certainly, it is usual to think of prediction as connected with values such as accuracy and 
precision. This can lead to highlight the value of prediction as an aim of scientific research. In 
this regard, Thomas S. Kuhn claimed that prediction is related with the most assumed values 
of science, above all, when it is a quantitative prediction. Cf. KUHN, TH. S., “Postscript—
1969,” in KUHN, TH. S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 2nd ed., 1970, p. 185. On Kuhn approach to prediction, see GONZALEZ, W. 
J., La predicción científica, chapter 4, pp. 127-159. 
165 On Rescher’s axiology of research, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “Racionalidad científica y 
actividad humana. Ciencia y valores en la Filosofía de N. Rescher,” in RESCHER, N., Razón y 
valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, pp. 11-44; and GONZALEZ, W. J., “Economic Values in 
the Configuration of Science,” pp. 85-112. 
166
 RESCHER, N., Epistemology. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, State University 
of New York Press, Albany, NY, 2003,  p. 258. 
167 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 161. 
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questions, and b) predictive answers of statements about the future (that is, 
the predictions).168 In his conception, he adopts a structural perspective, 
because — in his judgment — prediction is mainly a cognitive content with 
methodological relevance. So the structural factors have primacy.    
But, together with the structural dimension, there is a dynamic trait in 
the axiology of science, which has to do with the teleological character of 
scientific research. This character is modulated by different factors. Initially, 
this activity involves taking into account the aims, processes, and results 
(where there is also the problem of the consequences that could have those 
results)169. In turn, the aims, processes, and results — and the connected 
values — vary in the context of basic science, applied science, and the 
application of science.170 
The ethical components that modulate scientific prediction can also be 
considered here. In this regard, it has been noticed that prediction connects 
with the ethics of science “through the presence of prediction in the research 
activity, mainly when the ethical limits of science are discussed.”171 This 
involves taking into account the differences between basic science, applied 
science, and the application of science, both from an endogenous 
perspective — that has to do with the aims, processes, and results — and 
form the exogenous component, which is oriented towards the relations with 
the environment (social, cultural, political, economic, ecological, etc.), which 
                                            
168 Cf. Predicting the Future, pp. 113-125. 
169 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Value Ladenness and the Value-Free Ideal in Scientific Research,” 
in LÜTGE, CH. (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics, 
Springer, Dordrecht, 2013, pp. 1503-1521. 
170 On the differences between basic science and applied science with regard to the aims, 
processes, and results, cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Ciencia y valores éticos: De la posibilidad de la 
Ética de la Ciencia al problema de la valoración ética de la Ciencia Básica,” in GONZALEZ, W. 
J. (ed.), Ciencia y valores éticos, Arbor, v. 162, n. 638, (1999), pp. 139-171; especially, pp. 
158-159. 
On the distinction between applied science and application of science, see NIINILUOTO, I., 
"The Aim and Structure of Applied Research,” pp. 1-21; and GONZALEZ, W. J., “The Roles of 
Scientific Creativity and Technological Innovation in the Context of Complexity of Science,” 
pp. 11-40; especially, pp. 17-18. 
171 GONZALEZ, W. J., Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in 
Economics, p. 20. 
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is changeable. It is an approach that highlights the historicity of scientific 
activity, which is a feature that Rescher rarely takes into account. 
 
1.4.  Pragmatic Idealism in the Contemporary Context 
When Rescher deals with scientific prediction, each one of the 
aforementioned philophico-methodological angles of analysis (semantic, 
logical, epistemological, methodological, ontological, axiological, and ethical) 
is placed in the framework of his own philosophical proposal, which can be 
characterized as a pragmatic idealism open to elements of realism. This 
involves that the philosophico-methodological study of his concept of 
prediction must take into account the coordinates a system of thought, which 
is supported by two major mainstays: idealism and pragmatism. But, at the 
same time, his view is open to realism with regard to relevant philosophical 
aspects. 
 
1.4.1.  A System Open to Realism without Eclecticism 
It happens that each one of these philosophical traditions (realism, 
idealism, and pragmatism) is characterized by having a heterogeneous 
character. In effect, there is a wide variety of realistic, idealistic, and 
pragmatic approaches within contemporary philosophy, in general, and 
contemporary philosophy and methodology of science, in particular. Thus, 
within the same philosophical tradition, each thinker can defend very diverse 
approaches regarding relevant points. This philosophical diversity leads to 
the existence of proposals that are, in principle, antagonistic (such as, for 
instance, realism and idealism). But, concerning some aspect, there might be 
some convergent points between them. 
Regarding this issue of a possible convergence, it should be pointed out 
that Rescher’s system of thought seeks such combination of different 
conceptions. His view of pragmatic idealism open to realistic elements is not 
59 
 
conceived as an eclectic proposal. Instead of that, he articulates his own 
philosophical system, where he chosses versions of idealism and 
pragmatism that are compatible with realistic elements. They also belong to a 
system, understood as a coherent philosophico-methodological conception 
about science. 
In order to avoid inconsistency, Rescher claims that realism and 
idealism “need not be contradictory; indeed, both contain a substantial 
element of truth”172. Thus, in order to avoid the contradictory elements, it is 
required — in his judgment — “to opt for the middle ground and to combine a 
plausible version of realism with a plausible version of idealism. The issue is 
not one of the dichotomous choice of either realism or idealism but rather one 
of a compromising synthesis in the interests of a fruitful collaboration 
between these historically warring positions.”173 
Due to his pragmatic view, Rescher accepts some realistic notions, 
such as “fact” or “objectivity.” His position seeks to integrate them in a 
pragmatic idealistic proposal. Thus, his approach involves — as it happens in 
some pragmatic conceptions — the acceptation of an ontological variety of 
realism that acknowledges the existence of a reality that is independent to 
the mind of the knowing subject. In addition, he thinks that reality has its own 
properties that are accessible to the subjects that want to know that reality, 
within some limits. In effect, in Rescher’s proposal, human capacity to know 
the reality is limited, so that “we cannot justifiably equate reality with what 
can, in principle, be known by us, nor equate reality with what can, in 
principle, be expressed by our language.”174  
                                            
172 RESCHER, N., “Realism and Idealism,” en RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. 
Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 304. 
173 RESCHER, N., “Realism and Idealism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. 
Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 324. 
174 RESCHER, N., “Cognitive Limits,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: 
Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 253. 
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Following a pragmatic vision, Rescher dismisses a naïve version of 
realism, which is incompatible with his epistemological proposal (that is 
fallibilistic). At the same time, he manifestly rejects the scientific realism. This 
position is characterized by him as the philosophical doctrine that maintains 
that science provides us, in fact, true knowledge about the reality. Thus, in 
his judgment, scientific realism involves equating reality as such with reality 
as we know it through science. Consequently, “what decisively impedes the 
tenability of scientific realism is the fundamentally epistemological 
consideration that the world will doubtless eventuate as being very different 
from the way our best scientific theories currently represent it to be.”175 
From this perspective, Rescher reduces scientific realism to a version of 
naïve realism, which is incompatible with a fallibilistic approach to scientific 
knowledge. Thereby, he does not take into account other versions of 
scientific realism that are certainly more sophisticated.176 Thus, he opts for a 
version of “metaphysical realism” that he describes as “the doctrine that the 
world exists in a way that is substantially independent of the thinking beings 
that inquire into it, and that its nature—its having whatever characteristics it 
does actually have—is also comparably thought independent.”177   
This characterization is an approach that in its development goes 
beyond the “classical” metaphysical realism.178 It is also different from the 
                                            
175 RESCHER, N., “Scientific Realism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: 
Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 277. 
176 In this regard, it can be highlighted the critical scientific realism of the Finnish School, 
which has been developed by authors such us R. Tuomela or I. Niiniluoto. Cf. GONZALEZ, W. 
J., “El realismo y sus variedades: El debate actual sobre las bases filosóficas de la Ciencia,” 
in CARRERAS, A. (ed.), Conocimiento, Ciencia y realidad, pp. 47-50. In addition, Rescher 
does not analyze the recent debates on scientific realism, such as the “structural realism” 
proposed by John Worrall. Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Novelty and Continuity in Philosophy and 
Methodology of Science,” in GONZÁLEZ, W. J. and ALCOLEA, J. (eds.), Contemporary 
Perspectives in Philosophy and Methodology of Science, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2006, pp. 1-
27. 
177 RESCHER, N., “Metaphysical Realism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. 
Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 255. 
178 On the characterization of metaphysical realism, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “El realismo y sus 
variedades: El debate actual sobre las bases filosóficas de la Ciencia,” pp. 40-41 and 44-46. 
A criticism to metaphysical realism can be found in the “internal realism” proposed by H. 
61 
 
“metaphysical realism” defended by K. R. Popper.179 This is so because, in 
Rescher’s thought, the acceptance of an ontological realism is connected 
with an epistemological conception of conceptual idealism, which gives 
primacy to Kantism regarding cognitive matters.  
However, Rescher’s epistemological approach involves elements of 
realism, such as the possibility of obtaining objective knowledge of the 
extramental reality. This is the case due to his acceptance that ontological 
dimension of realism — the existence of a reality independent of the knowing 
subjects — is something inseparable from the epistemological dimension that 
involves the possibility of achieving to some extent adequate information 
about that mind independent reality. Even more, he thinks that the 
epistemological dimension presupposes the acceptance of the ontological 
component.180 
Consequently, Rescher considers that it is required to clarify which 
bases are needed to accept the existence of a mind independent reality. In 
this regard, he clearly acknowledges the Kantian influence, which is 
modulated by a pragmatic conception in the line of Charles S. Peirce. Thus, 
Rescher thinks that “objectivity represents a postulation made on functional 
(rather than evidential) grounds: we endorse it in order to be in a position to 
learn by experience at all. As Kant clearly saw, objective experience is 
possible only if the existence of such a real, objective world is presupposed 
from the outset rather than being seen as a matter of ex post facto discovery 
about the nature of things.”181 
Therefore, for Rescher, the independence of the extramental reality is 
                                                                                                                           
Putnam. See  PUTNAM, H., “A Defense of Internal Realism,” in PUTNAM, H., Realism with a 
Human Face, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 30-42. 
179 Cf. POPPER, P., “Intellectual Autobiography,” in SCHILPP, P. A. (ed.), The Philosophy of 
Karl Popper, Open Court, La Salle (Illinois), 1974, vol. I, pp. 3-181. 
180 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Metaphysical Realism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic 
Idealism. Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 256. 
181 “Metaphysical Realism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: Human 
Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 257. 
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something that we must accept a priori, on the basis of its practical utility, 
insofar as it makes it possible from the beginning the intersubjective 
communication and the communal inquiry. This is because “only in 
subscribing to such a fundamental postulate of reality can we take the sort of 
view of experience, inquiry, and communication that we in fact have. Without 
it, the entire conceptual framework of our thinking about the world and our 
place within it would come crashing down.”182 It is present here one of the 
main concerns of Rescher: the rejection of skepticism, which calls into 
question the very possibility of achieving a true or verisimilar knowledge 
about reality.183 
In order to reject a skeptic approach, Rescher maintains that it is not 
good enough to appeal to the existence of a reality independent of the 
knowing subjects as a necessary condition for scientific practice. What he 
asks for is a “retrojustification” on the basis of the results of the scientific 
research.184 This “retrojustification” has a pragmatic dimension and a 
cognitive component. Thus, “on the pragmatic side we find that we obtain a 
world picture on whose basis we can opérate effectively (pragmatic 
revalidation); on the cognitive side we find that we arrive at a picture of the 
world that provides an explanation of how it is that we are encouraged to get 
things (roughly) right—that we are in fact justified in using our phenomenal 
data as data of objective fact (explanatory revalidation). Accordingly, the 
success at issue is twofold—both in terms of understanding (cognition) and in 
terms of application (praxis). And it is this ultimate success that justifies and 
                                            
182 RESCHER, N., “Metaphysical Realism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. 
Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 266. 
183 On this regard, see RESCHER, N., Skepticism, Blackwell, Oxford, 1980; and RESCHER, N., 
“Skepticism and Its Deficits,” in RESCHER, N., Epistemology. An Introduction to the Theory of 
Knowledge, pp. 37-70. 
184 Cf. “Metaphysical Realism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: 
Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, pp. 266-270. 
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rationalizes, retrospectively, our evidential proceedings.”185 
On the basis of these considerations, the “metaphysical realism” of 
Rescher — understood as a version of realism that admits a mind 
independent reality and the accessibility of that extramental reality to the 
knowing subjects, within some limits — is supported by an epistemological 
idealism, which in turn is connected with a pragmatism of the primacy of 
practice. He emphasizes that “the sort of realism contemplated here is 
accordingly one that pivots on the fact that we think of reals in a certain sort 
of way, and that in fact the very conception of the real is something we 
employ because doing so merits our ends and purposes.”186 Thus, for him, 
reality and concepts are eventually seen from the perspective of human 
practice. 
 
1.4.2.  An Idealism with Distinctive Features 
Rescher offers a type of idealism with distinctive features, since he 
develops a view of idealism that is compatible with some realist elements in 
his philosophical conception. In this regard, he distinguishes two major types 
of idealism: ontological idealism and epistemic idealism. In turn, each one of 
these types of realism can take different varieties of idealism. Within 
ontological idealism, Rescher distinguishes two varieties: (i) causal idealism 
and (ii) supervenience idealism. Both types of ontological idealism have in 
common that they consider that everything there is, apart from minds 
themselves, arises from the operations of minds, either causally or in a 
supervenient way.187 Rescher rejects both kinds of ontological idealism, so 
his idealist proposal is within the coordinates of an epistemic idealism. 
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 RESCHER, N., “Metaphysical Realism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. 
Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 268. 
186 “Metaphysical Realism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: Human 
Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 270. 
187 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Realism and Idealism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic 
Idealism. Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 324. 
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Within the framework of epistemic idealism, there are also several 
options: a) fact idealism, which maintains that to be as a fact is to be a 
language-formable fact —that is, a truth; b) cognitive idealism, which 
considers that to be as a truth is to be knowable; c) strong substantival 
idealism, which is the option according to with to be as a thing or entity is to 
be actually discerned by some knower; d) weak substantival idealism, which 
states that to be as a thing or entity is to be discernible; e) explanatory 
idealism, which maintains that an adequate explanation of the material reality 
requires some recourse to mental characteristics or operations; and f) 
conceptual idealism, which is the version of idealism that maintains that 
whatever is real is in principle knowable and the knowledge of reality involves 
conceptualization.188 
Conceptual idealism is the version of idealism that modulates Rescher’s 
system of pragmatic idealism. In order to deal with concepts, his proposal is 
based on two types of dependences between mind and matter (the 
extramental reality), which follow different directions. Thus, on the one hand, 
he maintains that “mind is causally dependent upon (i. e., causally requires) 
matter, in that mental process demands causally or productively the physical 
workings of matter”; and, on the other hand, “matter (conceived of in the 
standard manner of material substance subject to physical law) is 
explicatively dependent upon (i.e., conceptually requires) mind, in that the 
conception of material processes involves hermeneutically or semantically 
the mentalistic workings of mind.”189 
Therefore, Rescher thinks that our knowledge of the extramental reality 
is always mediated by our concepts and categories, so it is not possible to 
                                            
188 Cf. “Realism and Idealism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: 
Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 305. 
189 RESCHER, N., “Realism and Idealism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. 
Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 318. 
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equate, in principle, reality as such and reality as we know it.190 On this basis, 
he rejects scientific realism, which he sees as the thesis that science, in fact, 
describes now reality in an adequate way.191 Because, in his judgment, “the 
world that we describe in science is one thing, the world as we describe it in 
science is another, and they would coincide only if our descriptions were 
totally correct—something that we are certainly not in a position to claim.”192 
Although Rescher criticizes scientific realism — that, in his conception, 
is reduced to a version of naïve realism — he do not accept an 
instrumentalist approach to science.193 The reason is that his pragmatism is 
out of tune with instrumentalism, insofar as he admits realist elements in the 
worldview. Thus, he admits that the aims of science are in tune with realism, 
since science actively seeks an objective knowledge of reality. But those 
aims are only achievable within some limits, so real science — our science 
— must be distinguished from ideal or perfect science.194 
Consequently, Rescher maintains that it should be accepted that “the 
cognitive enterprise is governed by ideals—in particular, those of 
knowledge/truth and of science/system. But in a community of rational 
agents, even ideals must pay their way by proving themselves to be efficient 
and effective in conducting to full realization of the goals and values in whose 
name they are instituted.”195 This attention to efficacy and efficiency in goal 
realization lead to the pragmatic dimension of his thought, which is clearly 
influenced by Charles S. Peirce.  
                                            
190 To go more deeply in Rescher’s conceptual idealism, see RESCHER, N., Conceptual 
Idealism, Blackwell, Oxford, 1973.  
191 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Scientific Realism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. 
Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, pp. 275-295. 
192 “Scientific Realism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: Human 
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193 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Scientific Realism,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. 
Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, pp. 286-289. 
194 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Science and Idealization,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic 
Idealism. Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, pp. 206-303. 
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66 
 
In effect, together with an ontological conception, which is mainly realist 
in the central tenets, and a epistemology, which gives clearly primacy to a 
conceptual idealism, the pragmatic dimension has eventually primacy in his 
methodological account. This feature is especially important in order to 
understand his contributions to the semantic, logical, axiological, and ethical 
realms. So, when Rescher develops his methodological pragmatism, he 
explicitly declares that it is a return to the Peircean roots of pragmatic 
tradition.196 In this regard, the Peircean influence leads him to reject explicitly 
other versions of pragmatism, such as the subjective pragmatism of W. 
James, pragmatism as social and cultural construction of J. Dewey, and the 
relativistic proposals by F. Schiller and R. Rorty.197 
The differences between the version of pragmatism that Rescher 
subscribes and other proposals of pragmatism — subjective, of social and 
cultural construction, and relativistic — can be seen in the realist elements of 
his system of pragmatic idealism. They are differences between such 
conceptions regarding notions such as “truth,” “fact,” “objectivity,” and 
“value.” Thus, Rescher develops a realist account of those notions that is, in 
fact, compatible with a pragmatic approach to the rationality of the human 
beliefs, actions, choices, and evaluations. 
To sum up, in my judgment, Rescher manages to coordinate in a 
coherent way nuanced philosophical positions from traditions such as 
idealism and pragmatism that are, in principle, very diverse. In addition, he 
accepts central tenets of realism insofar as they are in tune with pragmatism. 
He does this in a way that allows him to avoid a merely eclectic approach. 
Instead of that, he seeks to combine idealism and pragmatism with realist 
elements in such a way that they could be mutually compatible. Thus, he 
                                            
196 On Rescher’s methodological pragmatism there is a more detailed treatment in the 
chapter 5 of this Ph.D. research.  
197 Cf. RESCHER, N., Realistic Pragmatism, chapter 1, pp. 1-56; especially, pp. 15-31 and 44-
47; and chapter 2, pp. 57-80. 
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configures his own system of thought, which is the framework of his 
conception regarding scientific prediction. In effect, the different realms of 
analysis of prediction (semantic, logical, epistemological, methodological, 
ontological, axiological, and ethical) are interrelated in Rescher’s thought, 
which is oriented toward a system of pragmatic idealism that is open to realist 
elements.  
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CHAPTER 2 
ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC PREDICTION FROM LANGUAGE 
 
When Rescher analyses prediction from language, his starting point is a 
pragmatic conception that gives primacy to the use of language when the 
meaning is considered.198 This trait affects prediction, in general, and 
scientific prediction, in particular. Because, in the first place, he is interested 
in the process of communication, so he stresses the features that makes it 
possible in that process the exchange and understanding of informative 
messages. Only in the second place there are other elements related to 
meaning, such as reference.199 Thus, considered from a pragmatic approach 
to meaning, scientific prediction is then the result of an activity that seeks to 
obtain justified answers to meaningful questions about future occurrences.200 
This chapter seeks to offer an analysis of Rescher’s proposal on the 
features of scientific prediction from the viewpoint of language. In order to do 
this, several steps are followed: 1) the general coordinates of his approach to 
scientific language — where pragmatics has primacy over semantics — are 
considered. 2) Within the option that considers meaning as use, the features 
that he assigns to scientific prediction are addressed. 3) His characterization 
of prediction is analyzed and the distinction between qualitative prediction 
and quantitative prediction is addressed.  
4) Also Rescher’s contribution to the analysis of scientific prediction as 
a statement is analyzed. In order to do this, in the first place, the difference 
between “prediction” and “retrodiction” is addressed. In the second place, the 
                                            
198 Cf. RESCHER, N., Communicative Pragmatism and other Philosophical Essays on 
Language, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 1998. 
199 On the differences between the semantic and pragmatic approaches to reference, see 
GONZALEZ, W. J., La Teoría de la Referencia. Strawson y la Filosofía Analítica, Ediciones 
Universidad de Salamanca and Publicaciones de la Universidad de Murcia, Salamanca-
Murcia, 1986. 
200 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 37-39. 
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distinction between “prediction,” “foresight,” “forecasting,” and “planning” is 
considered. It is a distinction established on the basis of the degree of control 
of the relevant variables. 5) The demarcation problem is contemplated with 
regard to scientific prediction. This includes the debate about the role of 
prediction to assess the scientific plausibility of a theory or a discipline. 6) 
The limits of language are seen with regard to prediction, where the 
distinction between “not predictability” and “unpredictability” is highlighted. 
 
2.1.  Characteristic Features of Meaning in Rescher 
Concerning meaning — both human, in general, and scientific, in 
particular — Rescher takes a pragmatic perspective. So he suggests a view 
of meaning as use when he underlines an approach to language as 
communication. Communicative Pragmatism — the title of this main work 
devoted to language, which is the only one on this topic that he has written 
so far — is indicative of his proposal on meaning.201 His view of language 
goes with his approach to knowledge. Thus, as a pragmatist philosopher, he 
highlights the realm of human activity; and, as a Kantian author, he insists 
that human knowledge is modulated by our mental categories and concepts. 
On the one hand, the emphasis on the use prevails in his view of meaning; 
and, on the other, the role of the ideas — which he considers as decisive in 
the characterization of reality — is highlighted regarding knowledge. 
 
2.1.1. Communication as Activity and Meaning with Cognitive 
Content 
This emphasis on communication as human activity involves an 
instrumental account of language, since language appears as an “instrument” 
for human communication, instead of being mainly a way to represent 
                                            
201 Cf. RESCHER, N., Communicative Pragmatism and other Philosophical Essays on 
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reality.202 Thus, for Rescher, communication is the process that allows us to 
share what we know about the world through the use of language: “our 
knowledge regarding the world’s things is always developed within a 
linguistic-systematic system of reference.”203 
However, this pragmatic account of Rescher’s idealism admits some 
elements of realism.204 In his approach to meaning, the notion of “objectivity” 
has an important role. In effect, this notion of objectivity — that influences the 
realist view of “fact” — appears as a necessary condition for communication: 
“Human cognition as we understand it would be impossible without 
communal inquiry into and interpersonal communication about an objective 
order of reality. And without a presupposition of ontological objectivity the 
very idea of investigating a shared world would become inoperable.”205 This 
is important because M. Dummett maintains that objectivity is the key to 
semantic realism. 
In his paper “Pragmatic Idealism and Metaphysical Realism,” Rescher 
insists on this idea of ontological objectivity as a support for human 
communication. He maintains in his paper that the existence of an objective 
reality that is independent of the knowing subject is “a postulate whose 
justification pivots—in the first instance—on its functional utility in enabling us 
to operate as we do with respect to inquiry and deliberation.”206  
                                            
202 These two different usages of language appear in different authors, among them Michael 
Dummett. Within his large intellectual production on philosophy of language, it could be 
highlighted DUMMETT, M., Frege: Philosophy of Language, Duckworth, London, 2nd ed. 
1981. 
203 RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, p. 54. 
204 On realism and meaning two papers of M. Dummett can be highlighted. Cf. DUMMETT, M., 
“Realism” (I), conference in the Oxford University Philosophical Society on March 8th 1963. 
Reprinted in DUMMETT, M., Truth and Other Enigmas, Duckworth, London, 1978, pp. 145-
164; and DUMMETT, M., “Realism” (II), Synthese, v. 52, n. 1, (1982), pp. 55-112. However, 
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205 RESCHER, N, “Obtectivity and Comunication. How Ordinary Discouse is Committed to 
Objectivity,” in RESCHER, N., Communicative Pragmatism and other Philosophical Essays on 
Language, p. 94. 
206 RESCHER, N., “Pragmatic Idealism and Metaphysical Realism,” p. 386. 
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The opening of his thought to realist contributions can be seen in his 
approach to meaning, where the notion of objectivy is crucial as content of 
communication with an ontological basis. He considers that the acceptation 
of an objective reality is “presupposed from the outset rather than being seen 
as a matter of ex post facto discovery about the nature of things.”207 He also 
maintains that it is a necessary condition for communication.  
In his judgment, commitment with objectivity is an instrument that 
makes it possible to carry through any cognitive venture, since meaning itself 
involves a cognitive content. In this way, the concept of “objective reality” is 
justified on functional basis, instead of inferential basis: “We require this 
postulate to operate our conceptual scheme, and its validation accordingly 
lies in its utility. We could not form our existing conceptions of truth, fact, 
inquiry, and communication without presupposing the independent reality of 
an external world.”208 
Therefore, the pragmatic approach to meaning does not lead Rescher 
to see communication in relativistic terms. Because he points out that 
language has cognitive content. Thus, our access to the extramental reality is 
modulated by our categories and concepts. Although human knowledge is 
always fallible, it is possible to achieve objective knowledge. In this way, true 
statements are those that describe reality as it is.209 As Wenceslao J. 
Gonzalez points out, Rescher accepts P. F. Strawson idea that “facts are 
what statements (when true) state.”210 Thus, he distinguishes the notions of 
“truth” and “fact.” Because “thuth” is, for Rescher, a linguistic notion: “it is the 
representation of a fact through its statement (enunciación) in some real 
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210 STRAWSON, P. F., “Truth” (II), Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, v. sup. 24, (1950), 
p. 136. This paper is quoted in GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 256. 
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language. Any correct statement in some real language formulates a 
truth.”211 Meanwhile, a “fact” is a real circumstance that exists in an objective 
way and, therefore, it exceeds the limits of language and knowledge. 
Nonetheless, we can distinguish between truth in language as such 
(truthfulness); truth in knowledge, which is expressed through the adequacy 
of statements and transmits objectivity regarding reality; and truth in the real 
things, which is made explicit in terms of authenticity. The first is, in rigor, the 
“semantic” truth, in the sense of the language as the expression of an actual 
content. The second is a cognitive (or epistemic) truth, since it transmits an 
agreement between the statement and the described fact. The third is an 
ontological truth, where the real thing itself is what is true. Usually Rescher 
deals with the cognitive and ontological analysis of truth. 
 Even when Rescher admits truth in science, the process of information 
acquisition involves cooperation and communication. Thus, it is “a process of 
conceptual innovation that always places certain facts completely outside the 
cognitive range of the researches in any concrete period.”212 For this reason, 
he insists that reality as such cannot be equated with the things we know and 
can express through language. Reality exceeds the descriptive resources of 
language and those resources are in debt to our cognitive mechanisms for 
conceptualization. Reality is potentially emergent to language, but it should 
be first integrated in our conceptual scheme.213 In this regard, it can be 
considered that ontological truth is broader than epistemic truth. 
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213 On this regard, Rescher writes that “blood circulated in the human body well before 
Harvey; substances containing uranium were radioactive before Becquerel. The emergence 
at issue relates to our cognitive mechanisms of conceptualization, not to the objects of our 
consideration in and of themselves. Real-world objects must be conceived of as antecedent 
to any cognitive interaction — as being there right along, ‘pregiven’ as Edmund Husserl put 
it. Any cognitive changes or innovations are to be conceptualized as something that occurs 
on our side of the cognitive transaction, not on the side of the objects with which we deal,” 
RESCHER, N., “Cognitive Limits,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: 
Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 247. 
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But it happens that meaning, knowledge, and reality are actually 
interrelated. In fact, Rescher considers that human beings dump his 
knowledge of the world on the language. In this way, language reflects a 
conceptual system, at the same time that it is limited by that very system. It is 
an imperfect resource, but language can carry an objective content. Thus, in 
his account, meaning is not reduced to a mere intersubjective use of 
language, because he admits objective bases in it.  
 
2.1.2.  The Primacy of the Pragmatic Dimension 
Rescher gives primacy to the pragmatic dimension, since he thinks that 
language is mainly an instrument that makes it possible the communication. 
On this basis, he is fundamentally interested in two matters: (i) what are the 
conditions that provide an effective communication, and (ii) what are the 
conditions that allow us to carry through in an optimal way the effective 
communication.214 Within this framework, he seeks to clarify the normative 
issues that regulate communication; that is, he investigates the general 
principles that make it possible (and also efficient) the communicative 
practice. 
Although his account of meaning involves a cognitive content and he 
also admits an objectivity with ontological basis, Rescher’s approach to 
meaning is not, properly speaking, a semantic approach. He acknowledges 
the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. This distinction leads him 
to admit that there are differences between the use conditions and the truth 
conditions of a statement.215 Use conditions encompass a series of 
operational criteria that allow us to express properly a statement in a 
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concrete language. Truth conditions are those objective circumstances that 
make it possible to claim that a statement is true. Therefore, use conditions 
are oriented towards the users of a language, while truth conditions are 
oriented towards the reality of what is expressed. 
According to Rescher, “for while truth conditions deal with the objective 
facts, use conditions deal with the linguistic properties.”216 In this regard, he 
sees use conditions as more important to communication than truth 
conditions; although he admits that both of them should be taken into 
account in any account of language. For Rescher, “meaning is a 
comprehensive concept that embraces both semantical and pragmatic 
issues. (…) Any exclusivistic doctrine along the lines of meaning is use, or 
meaning is a matter of truth conditions, is one-sided, dogmatic, and 
inappropriate in its claim to exclusiveness.”217 
Rescher insists that both of them (truth conditions and use conditions) 
are required. Because “the fact that both are inextricably interrelated in 
matters of meaning—that meaning analysis has a formal (semantic) and an 
informal (pragmatic) dimension that are inseparably interrelated—means that 
there is a symbiotic interconnection here that permits neither side to claim 
unconditional priority over the other.”218 Therefore, he acknowledges the 
relevance of both types of conditions in the analysis of meaning. 
Nevertheless, his account is mostly focused on the use conditions.219 
Because, even when he expressly claims that both are equally important, he 
                                            
216 RESCHER, N., “Truth Conditions versus Use Conditions (a Study on the Utility of 
Pragmatics),” p. 62. 
217 “Truth Conditions versus Use Conditions (a Study on the Utility of Pragmatics),” p. 67. 
218 RESCHER, N., “Truth Conditions versus Use Conditions (a Study on the Utility of 
Pragmatics),” p. 74. 
219 On the primacy of the pragmatic approach in his philosophical proposal on language, see 
RESCHER, N., “Communicative Pragmatism,” pp. 1-48. 
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considers that an approach to meaning from use conditions has advantages 
over an analysis focused on truth conditions.220 
When Rescher notices that truth conditions of a statement are about 
“objective facts,” it can be claimed that he is in tune with semantic realism.221 
A conception of truth as “agreement” with reality underlies this issue.222 Thus, 
the truth of a statement depends on the agreement of its content with the 
objective facts. To preserve this notion of truth implies, therefore, 
presupposing the existence of a reality that is independent of the knowing 
subject. In the same way, intersubjective communication and research as a 
community task are only possible if we all can access the same objective 
reality.  
However, if we accept that truth conditions are about “objective facts,” 
this involves — in Rescher judgment — that the concept of “truth” is not 
applicable in certain contexts and, then, it remains in the background with 
regard to meaning.223 This happens when the meaning of a question, an 
order or a counterfactual conditional is analyzed, insofar as they are linguistic 
forms that do not refer to an objective reality.224 Here, the issues of 
“correctness” or “appropriateness” — that are oriented towards the practice 
of using the language — supersede the notion of truth in the analysis of 
meaning.225 
                                            
220 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Linguistic Pragmatism,” in RESCHER, N., Epistemic Pragmatism and 
Other Studies in the Theory of Knowledge, Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm, 2008, pp. 13-21. 
221 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Truth Conditions versus Use Conditions (a Study on the Utility of 
Pragmatics),” p. 62. 
222 In fact, he maintains that one of the reasons to accept the assumption that there is an 
objective and mind-independent reality is “to preserve the distinction between true and false 
with respect to factual matters and to operate the idea of truth as agreement with reality,” 
RESCHER, N., “Pragmatic Idealism and Metaphysical Realism,” p. 390. 
223 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Truth Conditions versus Use Conditions (a Study on the Utility of 
Pragmatics),” p. 62. 
224 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Truth Conditions versus Use Conditions (a Study on the Utility of 
Pragmatics),” pp. 72-74. When he analyses prediction from language, his approach is also 
pragmatic, since predictive statements do not usually refer to an objective existing reality, but 
they has to do with the possible future. 
225 Cf. “Truth Conditions versus Use Conditions (a Study on the Utility of Pragmatics),” p. 72. 
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On the basis of the advantages that Rescher sees in pragmatics over 
semantics, he offers a conception of meaning as use and an account of 
language as an instrument that facilitates communication. He is especially 
interested in the communicative use of language, so that he is focused on the 
principles that regulate communication. Then, his pragmatic perspective 
appears with an economic inspiration. Thus, he understands communication 
as a process that follows an economic rationality in terms of costs and 
benefits. A sender and a receiver intervene in this process, which should be 
ruled by economic values such as effectiveness and efficiency.226 
But language is a means to transmit some content, so that language is 
an instrument that makes it possible the transmission of information. This 
concerns both ordinary language (“a general-purpose instrument”) and 
scientific language (“a specialized [instrument].”)227 The use of language 
makes it possible the transmission of information through the communication 
performed by a sender and a receiver. Economic principles are important in 
this process because “effective communication is throughout a matter of 
maintaining proper cost-benefit coordination.”228 
There are a close connection in Rescher between is account of 
language and his approach to rationality. This nexus is rooted in his view of 
language as linked to communication and his account of knowledge as a 
human need. He sees rationality as “a means to adaptive efficiency, enabling 
                                            
226 On the economic features of communication, cf. RESCHER, N., Cognitive Economy. The 
Economic Dimension of the Theory of Knowledge; especially, chapter 2, “Economic Aspects 
of Communication,” pp. 47-68.  
227 RESCHER, N., “Communicative Pragmatism,” p. 8. For a discussion on the conditions of 
possibility of the ordinary language, see CEREZO, M., “La Teoría de la Expresión en el 
Tractatus. Consideraciones en torno a la explicación wittgensteiniana del lenguaje 
ordinario,” in FLÓREZ, A., HOLGUÍN, M., and MELÉNDEZ, R. (eds.), Del espejo a las 
herramientas. Ensayos sobre el pensamiento de Wittgenstein, Siglo del Hombre Editores, 
Pontificia Universidad Javeriana and Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, 2002, pp. 
51-68. 
228 “Communicative Pragmatism,” p. 7. 
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us—sometimes at least—to adjust our environment to our needs and wants 
rather than the reverse.”229  
On the one hand, language makes it possible human communication; 
and, on the other hand, that human beings meet their need of obtaining 
information is something that depends on effective communication. Thus, he 
considers that “gived our need for information to orient us in the world (on 
both pure and practical grounds), the value of creating a community of 
communicators is enormous. We are rationally well advised to extend 
ourselves to keep the channels of communications to our fellows open, and it 
is well worth expending much for the realization of this end.”230  
Thus, Rescher sees communication as a rational process that is 
oriented towards an aim. From the point of view of the sender, the aim is to 
transmit information to the receiver. For the receiver, the aim is to obtain 
information from the sender.231 In the case of science, communication is 
especially important, since the production of scientific knowledge is a 
community process.232 Both the sender and the receiver are interested in 
exchanging information in an effective and efficient way, since they obtain a 
benefit from this process. 
In economic terms, to share information is the rational option: “It is far 
easier, cheaper, and more convenient for people to get information by 
sharing than by themselves having to undertake the often laborious inquiries 
and researches needed to develop it de novo.”233 For Rescher, 
communication is a human activity whose aims, processes, and result should 
be evaluated in economic terms (i.e., criteria based on economic values). 
                                            
229 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 2. 
230 RESCHER, N., “Economic Aspects of Communication,” in RESCHER, N., Cognitive 
Economy. The Economic Dimension of the Theory of Knowledge, p. 53. 
231 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Communicative Pragmatism,” p. 15. 
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Economy. The Economic Dimension of the Theory of Knowledge, pp. 47-48. 
79 
 
In his judgment, communication is not costless, since it involves costs in 
terms of time and effort. To carry through the practice of using the language 
in an effective and efficient way is a question that depends of the acceptation 
of a series of assumptions, which allow us to minimize the costs that are 
inherent to the communication process. These assumptions are independent 
of the special features of the discourse. They are inserted in the general 
context of communication: “They are forthcoming not from the specific 
content of the message at issue but from the contextually indicated 
presuppositions we make on our own responsibility.”234 Therefore, there are 
general principles in communication of normative character such as 
credibility, reliance, clarity, and contextualization.235 
Nevertheless, since language is an “imperfect resource,”236 it is not 
always possible to express oneself in a clear and explicit manner. Even 
more, a statement can be susceptible of several interpretations, at least in 
some cases. Hence, a proper interpretation of a statement involves knowing 
the communication context. For Rescher, “it is fair to say that in interpretation 
context is not just important, it is everything.”237 Thus, he notices that a text 
transmits an informative message in two different ways: (1) the substance of 
what it says; that is, the information it conveys directly through its explicit 
meaning; and (2) the message it conveys obliquely by saying what it says in 
a particular way.238 
When a statement is taken with independence of the context, it can 
admit different interpretations. Besides the aim sought by communication, 
two aspects intervene in the processes of communication: on the one hand, 
                                            
234 RESCHER, N., “Communicative Pragmatism,” p. 6. 
235 Cf. “Communicative Pragmatism,” pp. 7-8. On reliance and cooperation as principles that 
make it possible to minimize the costs of research and communication see RESCHER, N., 
“The Economics of Trust and Cooperation,” in RESCHER, N., Cognitive Economy. Cognitive 
Economy. The Economic Dimension of the Theory of Knowledge, pp. 33-46. 
236 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Communicative Pragmatism,” p.8. 
237 “Communicative Pragmatism,” p. 9. 
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the explicit content of what is stated; and, on the other, the context in which 
that content is send. In this way, the message obtained is the result of the 
interpretation of the context in relation to the context of discourse. Thus, the 
receiver must carry through a process of interpretation, in order to select one 
of the many alternative constructions that a statement or a set of statements 
can admit. For this reason, the suitable transmission of information depends 
on the correct interpretation of the content in relation to the context. 
Besides the context, Rescher highlight the role of reliance and 
credibility in communication.239 The sender must strive to have credibility and 
the receiver must trust in the sender. A high cost comes from a systematic 
critical position on the statements of other people. To proceed always (not 
only in case we have good reasons) under the assumption that we cannot 
trust in the sender has a high cost; because a complete skeptical attitude 
would deprive us of any possibility to obtain information. 
In accordance with his pragmatism with economic components, 
Rescher sees the rational behavior as that that leads us to obtain information 
in an efficient and effective way. To achieve this goal, credibility is really 
important: “We adopt an epistemic policy of credence in the first instance 
because it is the most promising avenue toward our goals, and then persist in 
it because we subsequently find, not that it is unfailingly successful, but that it 
is highly cost-effective.”240 
Considered this issue from an economic viewpoint, an effective activity 
of communication requires conventions such as: a) the sender expresses 
what he or she understands that is the truth (truthfulness in language); and b) 
the sender expresses himself or herself in an accurate and not misleading 
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Economy. The Economic Dimension of the Theory of Knowledge, pp. 33-46. 
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way (which involves truth as agreement).241 These conventions are justified 
on economic grounds, since they are “practices that represent the most 
efficient and economical way to accomplish our communicative work.”242 The 
issue is to obtain the highest benefit from the information transmitted, 
minimizing the inherent costs to the process of information acquisition and 
transmission. It is possible to think that there is profitability in stressing the 
truth in language.  
 Consequently, the pragmatic dimension has primacy in Rescher’s 
account of language. He deals with language as an “instrument” for 
communication and with those conditions that make it possible to exchange 
message with informative content in the communicative practice. The most 
important thing is, then, to achieve effectiveness and efficiency in the 
process. Although he acknowledges that language is an imperfect resource, 
he also admits that it can carry an objective content. In this way, even when 
he gives primacy to the pragmatic dimension, meaning is not reduced to a 
mere intersubjective use of language as long as he admits objective bases in 
its content. 
 
2.2.  Scientific Prediction in a Theory of Meaning 
From the point of view of language, scientific prediction is about a 
possible future.243 Wenceslao J. Gonzalez writes that “its sense — the 
content expressed — and the referent towards which it is oriented belong to 
the realm of what is expected.”244 When Rescher considers the referent of 
prediction, he thinks that it does not agree with an available reality —
something that has already happened or that is happening now—, but with a 
                                            
241 Cf. “Communicative Pragmatism,” p. 8. This is especially important in the case of 
scientific prediction, because it is not possible to determine now if what the predictive 
statement says is true or not. 
242 RESCHER, N., “Communicative Pragmatism,” p. 8. 
243 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 284. 
244 La predicción científica, p. 284. What is expected can be in an ontological, 
epistemological, or heuristic sense.  
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possible future. For this reason, in his approach, truth conditions of a 
predictive statement are in the background. Even more, when he analyses 
scientific prediction from the viewpoint of language, his account is principally 
“pragmatic.” It is not, strictly speaking, a “semantic” account. 
In addition, Rescher places prediction in an active context.245 To predict 
is, in his judgment, an activity whose aim is to achieve meaningful claims with 
regard to future occurrences. In order to predict, we have to endeavor “to 
provide warranted answers to detailed substantive questions about the 
world’s future developments.”246 So, faced with a question about a future 
occurrence, prediction seeks to offer an answer on the basis of the available 
knowledge. Additionally, he gives prediction an instrumental component: 
“prediction, in sum, is our instrument for resolving our meaningful questions 
about the future, or at least of endeavoring to resolve them in a rationally 
cogent manner.”247 
 
2.2.1.  Context of Use 
As it happens in the case of language in the general level, language of 
prediction cannot be analyzed without taking into account the context of use. 
As an intellectual activity, prediction is carried through in a communicative 
context — in every kind of language — and a research context (in scientific 
language). In this way, to a large extent, the value that Rescher confers to 
prediction is due to its practical utility. Because he considers that, in the 
realm of the daily life, to obtain information about the future events is a 
human need.  
We have meaningful questions about future developments, and we 
need answers to those questions. This is not, for Rescher, just a matter of 
curiosity, but a matter of survival. Every human action needs to some extent 
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246 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 37-38. 
247 Predicting the Future, p. 39. 
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information about the future, and practical reasoning is basic in this regard. 
He considers that “to act, to plan, to survive, we must anticipate the future, 
and the past is the only guide to it that we have.”248 But this is not entirely 
accurate, because there is human creativity (and history shows that the 
future can be different from what was thought of in a historical moment). 
Rescher considers that practical rationality is what gives a justification for the 
inductive inference, which allows us to obtain statements about the future on 
the basis of the past experience. 
He also values prediction according to its utility in the scientific realm. 
He thinks that scientific prediction can be used mainly in two directions “as a 
test of the acceptability of theories and as a guide to discovery.”249 In the first 
case, the referent of the prediction is usually something that do not happen 
yet, so prediction deals with an ontological novelty (for example, in the 
prediction of an eclipse or the climate change). Meanwhile, in the second 
case, the novelty is epistemological, so the prediction allows us to discover a 
reality that has not been observed yet. 
From his pragmatic viewpoint, to predict is an activity oriented towards 
an aim — “to provide warranted answers to detailed substantive questions 
about the world’s future developments,”250 and that aim is basically justified 
with regard to its utility. For this reason, Rescher considers that predictive 
knowledge is itself valuable. However, he highlights that “the fact that virtually 
all action is in some way future oriented endows our predictive knowledge 
with special practical potency.”251  
Prediction is an aim of science, but it is an aim among others, since the 
structure of ends of scientific activity is also oriented towards description, 
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explanation, and control over nature.252 But prediction is an especially 
important aim, because it can be used as a guide for prescription in applied 
science and its role as a test in basic science allows us to evaluate de 
comparative theoretical adequacy of scientific theories.253 In this way, the 
meaning of the prediction is seen from the perspective of the use. Therefore, 
it is possible to claim that scientific prediction is one of the realms where — in 
Rescher’s judgment — an analysis of meaning focused on use conditions 
has advantages over an analysis centered on truth conditions.  
 
2.2.2.  Statement about Novel Facts 
As a statement about the future or claim about novel facts, a predictive 
statement can be truth — if what prediction claims happen in the future — but 
we cannot say that a prediction is true before the predicted phenomenon or 
development does happen. For this reason, Rescher maintains that 
“correctness” is more important than “truth” to prediction.254 It is said that a 
prediction is “correct” when, on the basis of the available information, it is 
possible to claim that it adapts well to what we know about how the future 
facts could be. But we have to wait that those facts happen in order to assess 
if the prediction is actually true. 
 For Rescher, what makes that a statement about the future has, in fact, 
predictive character is not something linked to its sense and reference, but 
something that has to do with the nexus between language and action. So he 
accepts that there can be meaning without referent. In that case, scientific 
prediction can be meaningful even when we cannot confirm now if its sense 
is related with a real referent. Then, the reaction of receiver of the prediction 
is more important that prediction itself (its sense), insofar as the receiver 
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attributes to the stament the condition of predictive assertion and he has to 
decide on its correctness.255 
Correctness and credibility must go together —in Rescher’s judgment— 
in a successful prediction. To be credible a prediction must have a plausible 
grounding. Instead of correctness, “it is credibility that is the cardinal 
predictive virtue,”256 because it can be determined at the present time. 
Credibility is based on evidence and probability that support the predictive 
statement, which are the rational support for the prediction. In this way, 
practical utility of a predictive statement rests on its credibility, since only 
those predictions that are credible will be used as test for theories and as a 
guide for action. 
Although it is commonly easier to achieve a successful prediction when 
it is not much informative (i.e., when it is general or without many details), 
science seeks informative definiteness. Scientific language seeks accuracy 
and precision, but — in Rescher’s judgment — this involves taking risks. This 
is because, in principle, the more informative a prediction is — that is, the 
more accurate, precise, detailed, etc. — the less secure it is. Security is 
determined on the basis of its probability or its degree of acceptability.257 
It happens that generic predictive statements are generally the most 
accepted, since they are, in principle, more credible with regard to their 
eventual correctness. However, credibility cannot be obtained by diminishing 
informativeness, which is an “indispensable criterion for a good prediction.”258 
This means that predictions should be seek that are both epistemic secure 
and informative. To achieve an optimal equilibrium between informativeness 
and credibility is, therefore, one of the main aims of prediction; but it is also 
one of the main difficulties it must tackle. 
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258 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 120. 
86 
 
There are — according to Rescher — two ways to establish the 
credibility of a prediction: the evidential and the authoritative.259 These two 
options are related with the procedures and methods that are used to predict. 
He divides the predictive processes into two groups: judgmental or estimative 
procedures — where prediction is rooted in the personal estimation of the 
experts — and the formal or discursive methods that follow processes that 
are explicitly detailed.260 On this basis, a prediction is credible is one of these 
possibilities is available: a) it is considered that it has an evidential basis that 
supports the statement, or b) it is thought that the predictor is a reliable 
source.261  
Every predictive statement can be seen as content or as a result. It is 
revisable, but it should be evaluated in terms of objectivity and truth (or, at 
least, correctness). This is possible if the scientific prediction is, in effect, a 
rational prediction ascribe to it values such as objectivity and truth. Therefore, 
even when he adopts a clearly pragmatic approach, it is important to highlight 
that Rescher’s account does not reduce prediction to the mere use of 
language. He accepts, in effect, the objectivity of the knowledge about the 
future, so it could be true. This is because scientific prediction is a statement 
that we obtain as a result of a rational process supported by evidence (either 
theoretical or empirical). It deals with “novel facts” in some relevant sense 
(ontological, epistemological or heuristic). 
 
2.3.  The Language of “Prediction” 
When “prediction,” in general, is considered, it is understood that 
prediction encompasses a series of features. Thus, to offer a characterization 
of the concept of “prediction,” Rescher suggests four main features: a) it is 
                                            
259 Cf. Predicting the Future, p. 123. 
260 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 85-112. 
261 From this perspective, it seems that Rescher considers that the methodological  
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future-oriented; b) it is correct or incorrect; c) it is meaningful; and d) it is 
informative.262 In my judgment, it is possible to enlarge this characterization if 
it is stressed that prediction has to do with something expected. A predictive 
statement involves that something is expected in the future. This linkage with 
something expected involves novelty, so prediction is connected with the 
notion of “novel facts,” since prediction is about not observed or now 
unobservable things. Moreover, these general features can be diversified in 
two directions: quantitative prediction and qualitative prediction. 
 
2.3.1.  The Concept of “Prediction” 
When Rescher suggests the concept of “prediction,” he places it within 
a framework with regard to language where the pragmatic dimension has 
primacy. As a statement,263 scientific prediction is a content oriented towards 
the future, and it can be correct or incorrect; because it involves a meaning 
with an informative content.264 As a statement oriented towards the future, 
prediction should be supported by rational bases. It is the result of an 
inference made from the data available regarding the facts of the past and 
the present.265 It is not possible, in Rescher’s judgment, to predict without 
reasons,266 because to predict — either scientifically or on the basis of the 
everyday experience — is, eo ipso, a rational activity. 
It happens that, even when scientific prediction is oriented towards a 
potential future —the first feature pointed out—, its content can be objective, 
since it is the result of a rational process. In my judgment, the 
acknowledgement that scientific prediction is supported by reasons —
theoretical or empirical bases that justify an anticipation of the possible 
                                            
262 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 54-55. 
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future— is especially important. Because both the use of prediction as a test 
for the validity of the theories and its use as a guide for policy-making in 
applied sciences can only be justified if the prediction has, in effect, rational 
bases. In addition, these rational bases could be corrigible and this involves 
that it is possible to obtain more or better information about the future in order 
to predict.   
Another feature —besides the orientation towards the future— that 
Rescher attributes to scientific prediction is it can be correct or incorrect. 
They are conditions of the use of language, so that truth conditions remain in 
the background. Because, in his judgment, the meaningful character of a 
predictive statement has to do with the possibility that it turns out to be true, 
instead of being related with its actual truth. In that case, what makes the 
prediction meaningful is the possibility to prove, in the future, that it is true or 
false. Prediction establishes that something will happen instead of something 
else, and it makes this on rational basis that demarcate the predictive 
statement from the simple prophecy. In this way, successful prediction “is a 
matter of conjoining correctness and credibility.”267 
As usual, Rescher gives priority to the epistemological dimension. The 
credibility that is attributed to a prediction rests on its rational basis. This 
rational basis leads us to think that the statement is correct: rationality is the 
cement for the correctness of the prediction. In Rescher’s judgment, 
“predictions are not (or should not be) categorized as being true / false but 
rather as correct / incorrect.”268 This is because he is considering a notion of 
truth as correspondence. Thus, insofar as prediction is about future 
occurrences, the truth of a statement about the future cannot be established 
in the present. In effect, it only can be judged once the fact predicted by the 
statement has happened. So, that a prediction is true is something that 
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depends on what the future facts will be, whereas its correctness depend on 
what we know about how those facts could be. 
Therefore, the predictive statement should be made on the basis of 
reasons that make it credible before the fact or development predicted 
happens. In this way, it is also possible to attribute correctness to it. In 
Rescher’s account, credibility has more weight than truth when prediction is 
analyzed from the point of view of language. A prophecy can be true; but it 
cannot serve as a guide for human action because it does not have an 
inferential basis that allows us to think that it is credible and correct. As a 
consequence of this, the meaningful character of a prediction — the third 
feature pointed out above — rests (in Rescher’s judgment) on use conditions 
instead of truth conditions. Because meaningfulness — in his approach — 
derives form the activity of communication and, in that case, is contextual. 
In addition to the features that have been pointed out, scientific 
prediction must be informative. This means that it should meet several 
requirements, such as definiteness, exactness, detail, precision, etc.269 It is 
difficult to obtain a very informative prediction, because of the problem of 
achieving an optimal equilibrium between predictive security and 
informativeness. The relation between these requirements responds to the 
following principle: “the more informative a forecast is, the less secure it is, 
and conversely, the less informative, the more secure it is.”270 Thus, to 
achieve when of these requirements in a high degree generally involves to 
diminish considerable the other. However, it is possible to achieve both 
requirements in a moderate degree. Rescher situates there the optimal point 
of equilibrium, which is the point where prediction is more effective as a guide 
for human action, in general, and scientific action, in particular. 
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In my judgment, there is another feature that might be added to the 
characterization offered by Rescher: prediction deals with something 
expected, so it is related with novelty. As a statement that, on rational basis, 
is oriented towards the future, scientific prediction belongs to the realm of the 
things expected.271 It is about not observed (or now unobservable) 
phenomena and it is therefore linked to the notion of “novel facts,”272 which 
involve novelty.  
Prediction is different from the mere expectation, since it asserts 
something more than a reasonable possibility. Thus, prediction says that 
something will happen (given some conditions) and it does this on the basis 
of the regularities detected in the past and present facts. In this way, he has 
a cognitive content: it is linked to an objective basis and then it cannot be 
reduced to the mere use of the language. Prediction not only anticipates a 
future fact, but it also asserts that we might expect that it will happen. 
 
2.3.2.  Quantitative Prediction and Qualitative Prediction 
Rescher does not take into account expressly the distinction between 
quantitative prediction and qualitative prediction. It is a question that is 
implicit when he addresses scientific prediction from a methodological 
viewpoint. However, the distinction between “qualitative predictions” and 
“quantitative prediction” is an especially important issue when prediction is 
seen from the point of view of language, since it conditions diverse 
approaches to scientific research. In addition, it is an issue that has clear 
                                            
271 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 284. 
272 Prediction involves some kind of novelty. In fact, it is possible to claim that it is a 
“research on novel facts,” GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 11. 
The philosopher who gives more importance to the notion of “novel facts” was Imre 
Lakatos. Cf. LAKATOS, I., The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. 
Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978. On the notion 
of “novel facts” in Lakatos’ conception, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “Lakatos’s Approach on 
Prediction and Novel Facts,” Theoria, v. 16, n. 3, (2001), pp. 505-508; GONZALEZ, W. J., La 
predicción científica, pp. 179-184; and GONZÁLEZ, W. J., “The Evolution of Lakatos’s 
Repercusion on the Methodology of Economics,” HOPOS: The Journal of the International 
Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, v. 4, n. 1, (2014), pp. 1-25. 
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epistemological and methodological repercussions. Therefore, the concepts 
of “qualitative prediction” and “quantitative prediction” should be clarified. 
Basically, qualitative predictions have the following features. (i) They do 
not follow expressly defined rules, but we achieve them through an intuitive 
procedure, since it seeks to grasp tendencies, rhythms or patterns in 
phenomena to anticipate their behavior in the future. (ii) Since they are not 
obtained through a formal process, subjects who make the prediction are 
fundamental. In this way, the resulting prediction is based to a large extent on 
the expertise of the predictors. (iii) Usually, all the available information used 
for the prediction is not detailed.273 
Insofar as they are qualitative, interpretation has more weight; so 
different predictions might disagree. For this reason, it is possible that 
different experts achieve different predictions, even when they have the 
same information.274 Rescher addresses this problem in terms of “predictive 
scatter,” which is related to uncertainty and adds difficulty to prediction. Thus, 
when we deal with a limited body of information, competing theories can 
arise that will lead to contradictory predictions. Consequently, “the prospect 
of conflicting predictions has to be accepted as a pervasively recurrent 
phenomenon.”275 This can happen in the sciences of nature and, to a larger 
extent, in the social sciences. 
In contrast to qualitative predictions, quantitative predictions have the 
following features: a) they are supported by models that can include some 
kind of law and, in some cases, they have a clear mathematical expression; 
b) the role of the agent who makes the prediction is mostly in the 
background, since the important thing is the model itself; and c) the variables 
used for the prediction are well specified, because the model must offer the 
                                            
273 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in 
Economics, p. 58. 
274 This has been analyzed by B. G. Malkiel in the case of financial and stock markets. Cf. 
MALKIEL, B. G., A Random Walk Down Wall Street, W. W. Norton, N. York, 1973. 
275 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 135-136. 
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information that is relevant for its validity.276 Quantitative prediction has 
advantages over qualitative prediction, since its evaluation has fewer 
difficulties. Firstly, its quantitative character makes it possible to test in a 
more detailed way its accuracy in the future. Secondly, if prediction is 
supported by models that might involve laws —instead of being made on the 
basis of the knowledge of the experts— there will be a higher level of 
objectivity. Thirdly, it is possible to clearly assess to what extent the relevant 
important are taken into account. 
Rescher’s framework to address this distinction between qualitative and 
quantitative prediction is methodological, instead of being a semantic 
framework. This is because when he addresses the different types of 
scientific prediction, his attention goes to the process that has been followed 
to obtain the prediction. Thus, he divides the processes of prediction in two 
groups: the judgmental procedures and the formalized or inferential 
methods.277 It is possible to maintain that, above all, judgmental procedures 
lead to qualitative predictions. Meanwhile, predictions obtained as a result of 
the use of formalized processes can be either qualitative or quantitative. But 
Rescher normally uses the “scientific” term when the methods have an 
important mathematical component. 
Usually, the features of the qualitative predictions can be seen in those 
predictions that, from a methodological viewpoint, Rescher calls 
“judgmental.”278 In this kind of prediction, the credibility and correction of the 
prediction depend directly on the confidence in the experts, because 
predictor’s expertise is basic in a judgmental prediction. Thus, it is possible to 
claim that qualitative prediction is supported by “their intuitive awareness of 
                                            
276 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in 
Economics, pp. 60-63. 
277 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 88.  
278 The main features of this predictive procedure, which is developed on the basis of 
predictor’s expertise, already appear in one of the first papers on prediction by Rescher. Cf. 
RESCHER, N., “The Future as an Object of Research,” RAND Corporation Research Paper P-
3593, 1967; especially, pp. 6-7. 
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detectable patterns in the phenomena.”279 In this case, there is not a formal 
process, and the information used or the inference made is not generally 
shown in an explicit way. 
In my judgment, Rescher has contributed effectively to this type of 
prediction; because he contributed together with Olaf Helmer and Norman 
Dalkey to the creation of the predictive procedure Delphi during the period he 
worked as a mathematician at the RAND Corporation (from 1954 to 1956).280 
Delphi procedure is a predictive process where a group of experts intervene, 
but there is no interaction among them. Through successive questionnaires, 
the aim is to obtain answers of the experts in order to achieve eventually an 
“aggregate prediction.” 
What allows these kinds of predictions is the capability of the agents to 
anticipate the possible future. For this reason, the epistemological obstacles 
to prediction affect these kinds of predictions to a great extent. In this way, 
Rescher considers that in this realm —where the predictions are usually 
qualitative— “the usual shortcoming of a reliance on experts—bias, 
speculative opinionizing, justifactory opacity, and the like—all come into play 
once more.”281 However, he thinks that this kind of predictive procedures 
have a great value, because it makes it possible to predict phenomena that 
are not possible to predict by formal processes.  
For Rescher, unformalized methods should be valued to the extent that 
their usage “extends our predictive range by dispensing with the need for 
detailed theories and/or models to provide the theoretical underpinning of 
prediction.”282 However, this predictions are little valued from a scientific point 
of view.283 In fact, his methodological conception places them out of science, 
                                            
279
 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 89. 
280 Cf. Predicting the Future, p. 110. 
281 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 97.  
282 Predicting the Future, p. 110. 
283 For example, in economics qualitative prediction has been seen as complementary to 
quantitative prediction: “En general, podemos decir que el único procedimiento de predicción 
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because in his approach only the predictions that are the result of a formal 
process (on the basis of models open to laws and mathematical regularities) 
can be called “scientific.” 
With certain redundancy, it is possible to say that, in Rescher’s 
judgment, those methods of prediction that “proceeds on the basis of 
scientific principles”284 are “scientific methods,” and they usually have a 
mathematical component. In this case, he considers as scientific those 
predictions that are the result of processes that are mainly based on laws 
and models. He thinks that law-based predictions have a high value: “our 
most sophisticated predictive method is that of inference form formalized 
laws (generally in mathematical form), which govern the functioning of a 
system.”285 
Certainly, Rescher shows a certain preference for the methods that he 
calls “scientific.” Consequently, he is inclined to see quantitative predictions 
as more valuable than qualitative predictions. To a large extent, this is 
because he stresses accuracy and precision as the values that should 
characterize scientific prediction. However, this preference is more implicit 
than explicit in Rescher, and it is not as noticeably as in other authors. Kuhn, 
for example, emphasized to a greater extent the importance of the 
quantitative predictions in comparison with qualitative predictions.286 Thus, he 
maintained that “probably the most deeply held values concern predictions: 
they should be accurate; quantitative predictions are preferable to qualitative 
                                                                                                                           
que se presta a ser analizado y evaluado de acuerdo con unos criterios científicos es el de 
los modelos econométricos. Sin embargo, estos procedimientos coexisten con una pléyade 
de instrumentos subjetivos, paneles de opinión, encuestas, valoraciones de expertos, etc., 
que muchas veces complementan o son complementados por los resultados de las 
predicciones basadas en modelos,” FERNÁNDEZ VALBUENA, S., “Predicción y Economía,” in 
GONZALEZ, W. J., (ed.), Aspectos metodológicos de la investigación científica, 2nd ed., 
Ediciones Universidad Autónoma de Madrid and Publicaciones Universidad de Murcia, 
Madrid-Murcia, 1990, p. 386. 
284 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 106. 
285 Predicting the Future, p. 106. 
286 On Kuhn’s approach to prediction, cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, chap. 4, 
pp. 127-159. 
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ones; whatever the margin of permissible error, it should be consistently 
satisfied in a given field; and so on.”287 
In this regard Rescher’s position is more qualified than Kuhn’s 
viewpoint. In my judgment, the key is that Rescher is in some sense more 
pluralistic. He notices that predictions that are the result of “scientific” 
processes — that can be associated with quantitative predictions due to the 
usage of models that have a mathematical expression — are the predictions 
that provide more “rational comfort.”288 Moreover, he considers that “it is 
fortunate that the use of experts is no tour only predictive resource.”289 
Concurrently, he insists that every prediction is, in principle, fallible. So the 
most important thing is to acknowledge the limits that affect prediction and try 
to overcome them. 
From this perspective of predictive pluralism, qualitative predictions are 
valuable, since they may extend our predictive range.290 In this way, 
qualitative predictions are something more than a simple complement to 
quantitative prediction, because they allow us to anticipate phenomena that 
are not predictable on the basis of formalized methods of prediction. 
However, Rescher’s approach has several ambiguities: 1) he does not delimit 
in a clear way the differences and relations between quantitative and 
qualitative predictions; 2) he admits that there are, de facto, predictive 
procedures and predictive methods, and thinks that the later are more 
reliable; and 3) he does not characterize what are the thematic realms that 
can obtain some benefit form qualitative predictions, even when it seems that 
social sciences and the sciences of the artificial are the greater beneficiaries 
of the existence of qualitative predictions. 
 
                                            
287 KUHN, TH. S., “Postscript— 1969,” in KUHN, TH. S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
2nd ed., p. 185.  
288 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 110. 
289 Predicting the Future, p. 97. 
290 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 110. 
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2.4.  Characterization of the Predictive Statements 
Although Rescher’s main interest is not the scientific language, his view 
of scientific prediction as a statement that is oriented towards the future 
should be emphasized. Thus, from a pragmatic perspective — the use of 
language, he rejects that we can have a genuine “retrodiction” or “prediction 
of past:” prediction involves the cognitive anticipation of a possible future and 
retrodiction is, in principle, oriented towards the past.291 Moreover, when 
prediction is seen as a statement, it is advisable to distinguish among 
different kinds of scientific predictions. Thus, it is possible to differentiate 
several predictive notions: foresight, prediction, forecasting, and planning, 
according to the degree of control of the variables.292  
 
2.4.1.  Prediction and Retrodiction 
Rescher insists on prediction as a statement oriented towards the 
future. This temporal feature leads him to reject, de facto, that there can be a 
genuine “retrodiction.”293 In this sense, he does not accept that it is possible 
to predict with regard to past events. This thesis of the “prediction of past” 
has been maintained by Milton Friedman, among other authors. In his well-
known text on the methodology of positive economics, Friedman stresses 
that prediction must not necessarily deal with future phenomena, but it can 
                                            
291 However, according to A. Grünbaum, Hempel defends the possibility that “retrodiction” 
and “prediction” can be equivalent. This would be the case when a prediction is made from 
subsequent conditions, so the retrodiction would be oriented towards the future. Cf. 
GRÜNBAUM, A., “Temporally-Asymmetric Principles, Parity between Explanation and 
Prediction, and Mechanism versus Teleology”, Philosophy of Science, v. 29, n. 2, (1962), pp. 
146-170. 
This possibility has been analyzed by Wesley C. Salmon. Cf. SALMON, W. C., “On the 
Alleged Temporal Anisotropy of Explanation. A Letter to Professor Adolf Grünbaum form his 
Friend and Colleague”, in EARMAN, J., JANIS, A., MASSEY, G. and RESCHER, N. (eds.), 
Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds. Essays on the Philosophy of 
Adolf Grünbaum, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pirttsburgh, PA, 1993, pp. 229-248; 
especially, p. 235. 
292 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in 
Economics, pp. 68-72. 
293 The differences between “prediction” and “retrodiction” are addressed from a logical 
perspective in the chapter 3 of the present PhD research 
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be about past events.294 The possibility of predicting with regard to the past 
was also defended by Stephen Toulmin in his book Foresight and 
Understanding.295 
Friedman considers that “the ‘predictions’ by which the validity of a 
hypothesis is tested need not be about phenomena that have not yet 
occurred, that is, need not be a forecast of future events; they may be about 
phenomena that have occurred but observations on which have not yet been 
made or are not known to the person making the prediction.”296 Toulmin not 
only admits the “prediction of past,” but also a “prediction of present.” He 
thinks of prediction as an “assertion about the occurrence of a particular sort 
of event—whether in the past, present, or future.”297 
However, Rescher does not subscribe a possible “prediction of past.” 
He also rejects a “prediction of present,” because prediction is about future 
events or developments. In his judgment, the acceptation of a “prediction of 
past,” which has been maintained by authors such as Milton Friedman and 
Stephen Toulmin, is the result of a failure in the distinction between an event 
as such and people’s stance towards an event. So we can predict future 
reactions to past events, but never something that has already happened.298 
In my judgment, Rescher criticism is right. Nevertheless, the notion of 
“novel facts” should be emphasized when this problem is considered, 
because prediction deals with not observed or now unobservable things.  In 
this way, prediction connects to the notion of “novel facts.” Thus, it seems to 
me that this notion and its relation to scientific prediction is a basic issue, 
both to clarify the concept of “prediction” and to call into question the 
possibility of a genuine “retrodiction.” The notion of “novel facts” can be seen, 
                                            
294 Cf. FRIEDMAN, M., “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in FRIEDMAN, M., Economics, 
p. 9. 
295 Cf. TOULMIN, S., Foresight and Understanding. An Inquiry into the Aims of Science, pp. 
26-27. 
296 FRIEDMAN, M., “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” p. 9. 
297 TOULMIN, S., Foresight and Understanding, p. 31. 
298 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 254, n. 66.  
98 
 
at least, in three different senses: (i) ontological, which deals with a future 
event, temporal in the strict sense; (ii) epistemological, which has to do with a 
phenomenon that exists from an ontological point of view, but that is 
unknown; and (iii) heuristic, whose novelty rests on being a fact that is novel 
for the theory.299 
When prediction involves a novelty in the ontological sense, the 
anticipation of the possible future is clear; for example, a prediction about the 
winner of some election or an event in a time that is posterior to the present 
moment. When the novelty is in the epistemological sense, the inference 
made from the available data leads to conclude that it is expected that 
something exists or that a concrete entity will be discovered (for example, the 
prediction about the existence of the neutrino).300 So together with the strictly 
temporal factor, prediction is also related to something expected. In this way, 
prediction is oriented towards the future and claims that it may be expected 
that something happens.  
Usually, Rescher highlights the temporal factor. He distinguishes 
between a statement about the past and a prediction — a statement about 
the future, on the basis of claiming that only a prediction can be falsified by 
the future development of the events or phenomena. In effect, “only 
statements that reach beyond the facts of the past-&-present—statements 
that could, in principle, be falsified by yet unrealized developments—can 
qualify as genuinely predictive.”301 Thus, with regard to the language, 
scientific prediction is a statement about the future, so it is not possible to 
have neither a prediction of past (a “retrodiction”) nor a prediction of present.  
 
                                            
299 On the different senses of the notion of “novel facts,” cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Lakatos’s 
Approach on Prediction and Novel Facts,” pp. 505-508. 
300 This feature is connected with the role of prediction as a guide for discovery, which is one 
of the roles of prediction that Rescher points out. Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 
160. 
301 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 46. 
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2.4.2.  Foresight, Prediction, Forecasting, and Planning 
From the point of view of the content, although every prediction we can 
obtain appears always as fallible, there are differences between them. They 
are differences that depend on the degree of control of the variables. It 
seems clear that there are different types of predictions, depending on the 
phenomenon studied, the problem discussed, and the methodology that is 
used. They are questions closely related to the degree of control of the 
variables that are important for the prediction. Consequently, it is possible to 
propose specific terms to refer to each type of prediction. 
In a generic way, Rescher admits these differences with regard to 
variations in predictive reliability. It is an issue that, in his approach, is 
addressed from a methodological point of view. This is because — in his 
judgment — the predictions in natural sciences are usually different from 
predictions in social sciences. Thus, he thinks that predictions in astronomy, 
for example, are “virtually certain;”302 and that their predictive security is 
higher than the level of certainty that we often have when the prediction is in 
the social sciences.303 
Within the social realm, the inherent complexity to the studied systems 
is the main problem that affects prediction. In effect “in any system whose 
workings are subject to a very large number of intricately interacting factors, 
there is going to be a great sensitivity to parameter determination, so that 
even a small variation on input values will amplify into substantial variations 
in output values.”304 
However, this higher complexity does not make it impossible the 
predictive task of the social sciences. Nevertheless, it does affect the 
processes that should be followed and the prediction that we obtain 
                                            
302 RESCHER, N., “On Prediction and Explanation,” p. 286. 
303 Cf. RESCHER, N. and HELMER, O., “On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences,” pp. 37-
38; and RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 191-208. 
304 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 197. 
100 
 
eventually as a result. Its characteristics — in Rescher’s judgment — would 
be different from the features of prediction in the realm of the sciences of 
nature. Fundamentally, he addresses this issue in relation to economics, 
where he considers that it is possible to claim that “economics cannot 
succeed with prediction at the level of exact quantitative detail regarding 
specifics, but can only succeed at the leel of generalities, tendencies, and 
probabilities.305 Therefore, Rescher accepts several distinctions. On the one 
hand, he distinguishes between quantitative and qualitative prediction; and, 
on the other hand, he notices the distinction between the generic and the 
specific prediction.  
But, to be more rigorous, it is possible to establish more distinctions. 
Moreover, this issue should not be only contemplated with regard to the 
differences between the predictions of different sciences or groups of 
sciences. It is also advisable to distinguish within each discipline the possible 
types of predictions. A quadruple distinction has been proposed in economics 
among “foresight,” “prediction,” “forecasting,” and “planning.”306 In my 
judgment, this distinction makes the philosophical discussion on prediction 
more rigorous form the point of view of language. 
To be sure, Rescher does not characterize the possible types of 
scientific prediction, and he uses the terms “prediction,” “foresight,” and 
“forecast” as synonymous. However, he can see in his approach a concern 
about assigning a specific term to each type of prediction.307 But this is an 
issue that he does not develop, because, in his judgment, “the actual albeit 
regrettable fact is that English does not afford us this terminological 
luxury.”308 It seems to me that this claim is questionable. 
                                            
305 Predicting the Future, p. 198. 
306 Cf. FERNÁNDEZ VALBUENA, S., “Predicción y Economía,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), 
Aspectos metodológicos de la investigación científica, 2nd edition, pp. 385-405. 
307 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 53-56. 
308 Predicting the Future, p. 55. 
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In effect, several distinctions are accepted in economics. Thus, it is 
possible to differentiate between “foresight,” “prediction,” and “forecasting,” 
according to the degree of control of the variables that they achieve. 
Foresight is the most secure kind of prediction: “it is a presentation about the 
state of a variable within a period of time, when the variable is directly or 
indirectly under our control.”309 Then, a foresight provides knowledge 
oriented towards the future about a variable that can be controlled (for 
example, the VAT). For this reason, it is the most secure type of prediction, 
since — in principle — there will not be changes in the variables that affect 
the foresight success. 
Sensu stricto, prediction is a specific type of statement about the future. 
Thus, unlike foresight, it does not involve the complete control of the 
variables that are relevant to the statement. In this case, there are factors of 
the variable that are not under the control of the predictor, but they are 
subjected to variations, which can be due either to their endogenous 
behavior or to exogenous factors (for example, inflation or unemployment). 
For this reason, the reliability of the prediction — in this strict sense — is 
lower than in the case of a foresight. 
Different from foresight and prediction, a forecasting has a margin of 
error associated with it. In this way, instead of provide a concrete number; 
the forecast establishes a margin where the forecasted phenomenon is 
expected to be placed (for example, a forecast about the unemployment 
rate). If we attend to Rescher’s proposal, we have that, according to the 
relation between predictive security and informativeness, it is possible to 
think that, in principle, he seems to consider the forecast as more secure 
than the prediction, because the former is less precise and detailed than the 
latter.  
                                            
309 FERNÁNDEZ VALBUENA, S., “Predicción y Economía,” p. 388.  
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Now then, the difference between the prediction and the forecast can 
be in the model used. Because, in the case of economics, “that a particular 
presentation could be a prediction or a forecast depends on—almost 
always—the procedure used to make it. Thus, a determinist model (where 
there are no random variables) makes predictions, whereas a stochastic 
model (which includes random variables) makes forecastings.”310 However, 
there is no unanimity in the terms within this discipline, where habitually 
“prediction” and “forecast” are used as they were interchangeable notions.311 
Finally, it can be stressed that “foresight,” “prediction,” and “forecast” 
are different form “planning.” Planning is made on the basis of the different 
statements about the future and it seeks to provide patterns for action in the 
realm of applied science and technology.312 So it encompasses a teleological 
approach, since it is oriented towards problem solving. In this way, within 
applied science it is possible to see prediction as the previous step to 
prescription and this eventually serves the tasks of planning. 
Rescher does distinguish between “prediction” and “planning.” He 
associates planning to an intentional realm of the direction of action. It can be 
“positive,” when the aim is make that something happens; or “negative,” 
when it tries to avoid that something happens.313 He assumes the importance 
of planning in economics: “policy guidance is one of the main aims of the 
macroeconomic enterprise.”314 In his judgment, although economics does not 
achieve the desirable level of predictive success, it can indeed have success 
in policy guidance. Because he considers that “effective operation [of policy 
guidance] does indeed not demand categorical predictions, since even 
                                            
310 FERNÁNDEZ VALBUENA, S., “Predicción y Economía,” p. 389. Quoted in GONZALEZ, W. J., 
Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in Economics, p. 69. 
311 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 262n. 
312 Cf. La predicción científica, pp. 261-263. 
313 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 235-236. 
314 Predicting the Future, p. 198. 
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merely probabilistic considerations can provide serviceable and perfectly 
cogent guidance to action.”315 
So Rescher distinguishes “prediction” and “planning.” But he uses 
without distinction the terms “prediction,” “foresight,” and “forecast.” However, 
sometimes he uses the term “forecast” to refer to a “specific sort of prediction 
which foretells the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a particular concrete 
eventuation at a particular definite time.”316 Therefore, it is a type of 
prediction that can be tested in a clearer way than in the case of less specific 
predictions. In my judgment, this only distinction is not good enough in 
philosophico-methodological terms. 
To be more rigorous with regard to the language, a distinction between 
the diverse types of predictions is required. Regarding this point, Rescher’s 
account is — in my judgment — revisable according to a more sophisticated 
analysis of language. It is possible to distinguish a qualitative prediction from 
a quantitative prediction, as well as differentiate a generic prediction from a 
specific prediction. But it is also possible to establish differences between 
types of prediction such as “foresight,” “prediction,” “forecasting,” and 
“planning.” It should be emphasized that several distinctions are already 
accepted with regard to scientific explanation,317 and it seems advisable to 
achieve a typological variety in the realm of scientific prediction. 
 
2.5.  Scientific Prediction and the Problem of Demarcation 
In some disciplines, such as economics, many authors have seen 
prediction as a criterion to demarcate science from non-science (and also 
from pseudo-science). The use of prediction as a scientific test is a widely 
discussed issue, whose repercussions have been especially important in 
                                            
315 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 198. 
316 Predicting the Future, p. 42. 
317 Cf. SALMON, W. C., Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, University of Minnesota 
Press, Minneapolis, 1990; and GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Diversidad de la explicación científica, 
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economics. This has been the case mainly in mainstream economics. This is 
because predictive success has been considered as the main 
epistemological and methodological evidence to assess the scientific 
character of economics.318 But, to use prediction as a scientific test for a 
discipline, the demarcation between scientific and non-scientific predictions 
should be also clarified.  
 
2.5.1.  Accommodation and Scientific Prediction 
For Rescher, scientific prediction is different from the mere 
“precognition” or “clairvoyance.”319 Although he does not stress the problem 
of demarcation between scientific and non-scientific prediction, he does 
admit differences with regard to the language. Thus, there are “unreasoned 
predictions” that are different from scientific predictions.320 Unreasoned 
predictions lack rational basis, so it is not possible to determine if they are 
credible or not. These unreasoned predictions are also called by Rescher 
“prophecies;” and he sees them as mere conjectures that do not have 
practical utility. In effect, from a scientific perspective, “predictions whose 
merits can be recognized only after the fact with the wisdom of retrospective 
hindsight are effectively useless.”321 
In contrast with a meaningful prediction — and, therefore, a prediction 
with cognitive content — a prophecy is “useless.” In effect, it is not credible 
and, consequently, we cannot assign it the value of correctness. Rational 
basis is what gives credibility to a prediction, which is supported by the 
knowledge about past and present facts. In this way, Rescher demands a 
                                            
318 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Prediction as Scientific Test of Economics,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. and 
ALCOLEA, J. (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy and Methodology of Science, 
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321 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 55. 
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“realistic foresight.”322 Consequently, he criticizes D. H. Mellor’s proposal, 
according to which “predictions don’t need reasons.”323 
Certainly, without reasons that justify an inference oriented towards the 
future, prediction lacks credibility: “Outside the context of grammatical 
examples and imaginative fictions, neither statements nor predictions have 
any serious interest for us in the absence of reasons for seeing them as 
credible.”324 This feature has direct repercussions in order to consider that a 
prediction is a genuine “scientific prediction.” 
The problem of the unrealistic assumptions has been widely discussed 
in economics. This question arises with the publication in 1953 of Milton 
Friedman’s work “The Methodology of Positive Economics.” In this text, 
Friedman proposes a methodological instrumentalism, in the sense of 
subordinate scientific methods to the aim of predicting. He claims that “the 
only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis is comparison of its 
predictions with experience.”325 Thus, in his judgment, an economic model 
cannot be assessed on the basis of realistic assumptions, but through its 
predictive capability, which is understood as correctness in the results. 
Rescher disagrees with this account of methodological instrumentalism, 
and he considers that the defense of predictive models with unrealistic 
assumptions is infeasible. In fact, he explicitly criticizes Friedman’s theses in 
this regard.326 Rescher maintains that “‘models’ that do not acutally model—
that is, do not isomorphically reflect the real world’s arrangements in their 
own makeup—will for this very reason fail to parallel the real world’s modus 
operandi and accordingly prove predictively failure prone.”327 This leads him 
to maintain that the criterion of demarcation between scientific prediction and 
                                            
322 Cf. Predicting the Future, p. 40 
323 MELLOR, D. H., “The Possibility of Prediction,” p. 221. 
324 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 256, n. 81. 
325 FRIEDMAN, M., “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” pp. 8-9. 
326 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 109 and 194-196. 
327 Predicting the Future, p. 109. 
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non-scientific prediction is the realism of the assumption. Thus, a model that 
does not adequately reflect the reality it seeks to predict is not a scientific 
model. 
Reichenbach’s proposal about the clairvoyant can be also criticized. For 
Rescher, what distinguish a prophecy of a clairvoyant and an astronomer’s 
prediction is precisely the realistic assumptions of the later in contrast to the 
former. Thus, scientific prediction is a prediction whose realism can be 
determined in advanced. This makes prediction credible before the predicted 
developments take place eventually. In this way, prediction provides 
knowledge useful to action and from a pragmatic conception of language this 
also makes prediction a meaningful statement. 
But the realism of the assumption is not — in Rescher’s proposal — a 
sufficient criterion to demarcate scientific prediction from non-scientific 
prediction. However, it is a sufficient criterion to distinguish between rational 
and non-rational prediction. Thus, in his judgment, not every rational 
prediction is a scientific prediction. He admits two kinds of rational 
predictions: those that are based on everyday experience and scientific 
predictions.328 Scientific predictions are the result of using scientific methods 
and knowledge; and, in this sense, they are superior to non-scientific 
prediction. He thinks that scientific predictions are superior as science, but 
not necessarily as prediction, because “the fact that all genuine prediction is 
oriented toward the open and (as yet) observationally inaccesible future 
means that our predictions are in principle always fallible.”329 
In this regard, it seems to me that the language can have a role when 
the issue is to distinguish between scientific prediction and non-scientific 
prediction. It is an issue that Rescher does not develop, because — in his 
judgment — the differences between scientific and non-scientific predictions 
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are basically of a methodological character.330 In my judgment, to distinguish 
a scientific prediction from a non-scientific one, the rigor of the language 
used should be also considered (for example, the accuracy and precision in 
the sense and reference of the terms used). 
Moreover, when the scientific character of a prediction is only assessed 
from a methodological viewpoint, this can lead to instrumentalist approaches 
(which are proposals that Rescher tries to avoid). Within this discussion, 
there have been authors — such as M. Friedman or H. Reichenbach — who 
maintained that predictive success is a necessary condition for science. This 
predictivist position involves that only those theories which are oriented 
towards prediction are scientific; and, consequently, only those disciplines 
which have theories that successfully predict novel facts are scientific 
disciplines. From this perspective, predictive success is the main criterion to 
demarcate science from non-science. 
These accounts connect with the debate about the methodological 
weight of prediction of novel facts in comparison to accommodation to 
already available facts.331 Thus, from the predictivist view (that is axiological, 
epistemological, and, above all, methodological), prediction is given more 
weight than accommodation. In effect, generally speaking, predictivism is the 
view according to which “correctly predicting data confers greater 
confirmation than successfully accommodating data.”332 
Rescher does not take part explicitly in this controversy between 
prediction and accommodation, although some of the features that configure 
his approach to scientific prediction allow us to place his conception within a 
                                            
330 Cf. Rescher, N., Personal Communication, 15.7.2014. 
331 On this discussion, see HITCHCOCK, CH. and SOBER, E., “Prediction versus 
Accommodation and the Risk of Overfitting,” British Journal of Philosophy of Science, v. 55, 
(2004), pp. 1-34; and GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, pp. 288-292. 
332 HARKER, D., “On the Predilections for Predictions,” British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, v. 59, (2008), p. 429. 
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moderate version of predictivism.333 On the one hand, he considers that 
prediction has more methodological weight than accommodation; and, on the 
other, he thinks that to predict is more difficult than to explain already known 
facts.334 Thus, he maintains that prediction is our best test for the validity of 
the scientific theories. Moreover, he considers that prediction is — together 
with the advancements regarding the control over nature — the best indicator 
we have in order to assess scientific progress. 
When Rescher thinks of his work about prediction, he points out that 
they are “in the wake of [Hans] Reichenbach’s work.”335 The author of 
Experience and Prediction considers that prediction is the main aim of the 
scientific endeavor.336 This emphasis on prediction as the principal aim of 
science allows us to place him within the predictivist tradiction, where there 
have been philosophers such as Francis Bacon. After him, predictivism 
appears again in authors like W. Whewell, Imre Lakatos, and — with the 
required qualifications — Rescher. However, Reichenbach and Rescher 
differ on their approaches to prediction as an aim of science. This have 
repercussions on their methodological proposals and, subsequently, on their 
views about the role of scientific prediction in the demarcation problem.  
According to Reichenbach, prediction is the main aim of science and he 
considers that the inductive inference is an “instrument of prediction so 
devised that it must lead to success if success is attainable.”337 Thus, 
scientific method must be oriented towards prediction, which is inferred by 
                                            
333 On the different versions of predictivism, cf. HARKER, D., “On the Predilections for 
Predictions,” pp. 429-453. 
334 That Rescher considers that it is more difficult to predict the future than to explain the 
past can be seen in accordance with the reasons he offers for a defense of the thesis of the 
logical asymmetry between explanation and prediction. Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the 
Future, pp. 165-166. The problem of the symmetry or asymmetry between explanation and 
prediction is addressed in the chapter 3 of this PhD research.  
335 RESCHER, N., “The Berlin School of Logical Empiricism and its Legacy,” p. 23. 
336 Cf. REICHENBACH, H., Experience and Prediction. An Analysis of the Foundations and the 
Structure of Knowledge, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1938, reprinted in 1949. 
337 REICHENBACH, H., The Theory of Probability, An Inquiry into the Logical and Mathematical 
Foundations of the Calculus of Probability, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1949, p. 
viii. 
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means of induction (that is related to probability theory). In his own words, 
“the theory of probability supplies the instrument of predictive knowledge as 
well as the form of the laws of nature; its subject is the very nerve of scientific 
method.”338 By linking method with prediction, predictive capability is 
configured as the test that determines the scientific character of a discipline. 
Consequently, a theory that does not predict is a theory that does not 
achieve the main aim of scientific research and, thereafter, it does not meet 
the requirements to be a “scientific” theory. 
In this way, Reichenbach adopts “an instrumentalist perspective: 
prediction is an aim in itself and the improvement of the methods of 
prediction could be made without knowing whether prediction as such is 
possible de facto.”339 In other words, he proposes a methodological 
instrumentalism insofar as he subordinates scientific method to the aim of 
predicting. But also an instrumentalist interpretation of the aim of predicting 
itself is possibly. This interpretation follows from a metaphor that he uses in 
various of his works: “every inductive prediction is like casting a net into the 
ocean of the happenings of nature; we do not know whether we shall have a 
good catch, but we try, at least, and try by the help of the best means 
available.”340 
Meanwhile, Rescher insists in science as an activity that involves a 
wide field, “because it encompasses the traditional quartet composed of 
description, explanation, prediction, and control. In this way, we have two 
areas to address: the theoretical [description and explanation] and the 
practical [prediction and control over nature].”341 However, he gives priority to 
prediction and control in his approach. This is because, for Rescher, “the 
                                            
338 REICHENBACH, H., “Predictive Knowledge,” in REICHENBACH, H., The Rise of Scientific 
Philosophy, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1951 (reprinted in 1966), p. 233. 
339
 GONZALEZ, W. J., “Reichenbach's Concept of Prediction,” International Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, v. 9, n. 1, (1995), p. 47. 
340 REICHENBACH, H., “Predictive Knowledge,” in REICHENBACH, H., The Rise of Scientific 
Philosophy, p. 246. See also REICHENBACH, H., Experience and Prediction, pp. 362-363. 
341 RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, p. 138. 
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former [the theoretical area] is related to what science allows us to say, 
whereas the later [the practical area] is related to what science allows us to 
do.”342 
In Reichenbach’s approach, prediction is a strong demarcator, since — 
in his judgment — it is the main aim of scientific activity. It is then a 
necessary condition to establish that something is scientific. An 
instrumentalist methodology underlies this proposal, because he thinks that 
the scientific processes are the means required to achieve the aim of 
predicting.343 Meanwhile, for Rescher, prediction is not a test in a 
demonstrative sense, but merely evidential. “In this domain [the science] 
even our best confirmed theories are no more than reasonable but also 
provisional estimates of truth.”344  
But, although Rescher avoids adopting a position of instrumentalist 
predictivism, it seems advisable to go deeper in the distinction between 
scientific prediction and non-scientific prediction, where language can have 
an important role. This is an issue that Rescher does not develop — in my 
judgment — in a satisfactory way. Son when the issue is to address the role 
of prediction as a criterion to demarcate science from non-science (or from 
pseudo-science), it seems to me that the demarcation between scientific 
prediction and non-scientific prediction should be also analyzed.  
 
2.5.2.  The Pragmatic Alternative 
As a pragmatic philosopher, Rescher offers an alternative to 
instrumentalism. Thus, he highlights the realm of human activity and, 
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 Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, p. 138. 
343 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Prediction as Scientific Test of Economics,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. and 
ALCOLEA, J. (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy and Methodology of Science, 
p. 85. Reichenbach’s ideas on prediction as an aim and a test for science are to some extent 
similar to those maintained by Milton Friedman, insofar as he sees prediction as the main 
aim of economics and as the most relevant criterion to establish its scientific adequacy. Cf. 
GONZALEZ, W. J., “Prediction as Scientific Test of Economics,” pp. 85-86. 
344 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 171. 
111 
 
consequently, he gives prediction a high value as an aim of science. 
Moreover, he considers that prediction can be used in two different 
directions: “as a test of the acceptability of theories and as a guide to 
discovery.”345 The first direction is epistemological-methodological, while the 
second option is clearly heuristic. In this way, he sees scientific prediction as 
the main criterion to evaluate the comparative theoretical adequacy of 
scientific theories, although he admits that “both theoretical and 
applicative/experimental achievements must be allowed to count in 
assessing the success and viability of research programs.”346 This is 
because, for him, the explanation of phenomena is the characteristic 
cognitive task of science.347 
However, by emphasizing the practical dimension of science, Rescher 
stresses prediction as an aim of science which has priority and its role as a 
test for the acceptability of theories. Thus, he maintains that “theories that do 
not yield predictions are sterile.”348 It is, in my judgment, a claim that can be 
called into question. One of the reasons for that is of a historical character: it 
happens than some of our best supported theories, such as the theory of 
evolution, do not make, strictly speaking, predictions. 
This possibility is an objection that Rescher seems to take into account. 
In this regard, he establishes a distinction between “predictive inference” and 
“predictive import.” He points out that although the theory of evolution does 
not make predictions, it provides a content that allows us to make predictive 
inferences.349 Thus, there are theories oriented only towards past 
developments that do not make predictive inference. However, they do have 
                                            
345 Predicting the Future, p. 160. 
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predictive import, insofar as their content serves as a support to achieve 
statements about the future.350 
Through the pragmatic alternative, predictive language is emphasized. 
Thus, even when Rescher claims that his work is in tune with Reichenbach’s, 
there are important differences between them, especially when the role of 
prediction as a test for scientific theories is addressed. According to 
Reichenbach, prediction is the main aim of science. This leads him to think 
that scientific method should be oriented towards achieve that aim. For this 
reason, he considers that every scientific research should be subordinated to 
the aim of prediction. Meanwhile, Rescher sees prediction as an important 
aim among others. Thus, his approach can be characterized as predictivist 
(due to the high value he gives to prediction); but certainly it is not 
instrumentalist (because scientific methods should not be subordinated to the 
aim of achieving predictions). 
In this way, Rescher’s predictivism is moderate. This is because, even 
when he stresses the role of prediction as the best test for scientific 
theories351 — which is its usual role in basic science — he rejects a 
methodological instrumentalism and insists on explanation as an important 
aim of scientific research. He thinks that instrumentalist authors go too far, 
because there are other important aims of science — such as explanation, so 
scientific theories cannot be considered as mere predictive instruments.352  
                                            
350 On this issue, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez points out that this distinction that Rescher 
establish between “predictive inference” and “predictive import” is similar to that maintained 
by W. C. Salmon between “predictive import” and “predictive content,” cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., 
La predicción científica, p. 266. Salmon distinction is in SALMON, W. C., “Rational Prediction,” 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, v. 32, (1981), pp. 115-125. (Reprinted in 
GRÜNBAUM, A. and SALMON, W. C. (eds.), The Limitations of Deductivism, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1988, pp. 47-60.)  
Due to its “predictive import,” some authors have defended the predictive capacity of 
evolutionary theory. Cf. WINTHER, R. G., “Prediction in Selectionist Evolutionary Theory,” 
Philosophy of Science, v. 76, n. 5, (2009), pp. 889-901. 
351 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 265. 
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Thus, Rescher introduces a series of nuances in his philosophical 
approach that separates his proposal from predictivist positions, such as 
those maintained by Hans Reichenbach or Milton Friedman. De facto, he 
maintains a moderate version of predictivism, which is the proposal 
according to which “theories from which it is possible to make successful 
predictions are better supported by total evidence than those scientific 
theories that merely accommodate existing facts.”353 
Moreover, he is especially interested in the relation between prediction 
and control. Thus, he thinks that it is possible to differentiate two modes of 
prediction: passive predictions and predictions related to control. A prediction 
about an eclipse or a weather forecast, for example, are passive predictions, 
oriented towards providing information about the world, so we can align our 
expectations with those predictions. But there is another kind of predictions 
which are related to our try to control the world. In this case, we not only 
expect things happen in one way or another, but we try to make it happen in 
one way or another. In his judgment, these active predictions or related to 
control are more important and critical in testing scientific theories and in 
running experiments than the predictions of the passive or expecting kind.354 
Certainly, in his pragmatic alternative to instrumentalism, prediction 
would not be the requirement of science. Then it neither is a necessary 
condition — language, structure, etc. — to establish what science is. 
However, prediction in Rescher’s account may be seen as an 
epistemological and methodological criterion to distinguish the scientific 
character of a discipline. Therefore, it might be a demarcator in the weak 
sense; that is, a sufficient condition to determine what science is. It is a weak 
demarcator — in my judgment — as an important aim of scientific research 
                                            
353 GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 292. 
354 RESCHER, N., Personal Communication, 12.5.2015 
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and as a test for theories, besides its role as a guide to orientate scientific 
prescriptions. 
Rescher’s claim that “theories that do not yield predictions are sterile”355 
can be interpreted from a pragmatic viewpoint. Because — in his judgment 
— prediction is the best scientific test we have and it is also crucial as a 
guide to orientate human action. He considers that “to act, to plan, to survive, 
we must anticipate the future.”356 Therefore, he sees prediction as the 
previous step to prescription, both in the realm of human action, in general, 
and in the case of scientific prescription, in particular. He gives them primacy 
to prediction over explanation, due to its clearer nexus with the realm of 
human activity (the practical dimension). 
Concurrently, Rescher insists on prediction as an important aim of 
science among others. Science — above all, basic science — does not only 
seek to predict novel facts. It also deals with explanation and description of 
already available facts and control over nature. Therefore, from a 
methodological viewpoint, prediction is not the only test for scientific theories; 
but it is possible to see it as the best available test (as Rescher does), since 
it has a high confirmation value. 
It would be, in this case, a test that — within basic science — 
guarantees the scientific character of a discipline, with a limited value when 
the issue is to establish that a theory is not scientific. In effect, on the one 
hand, it is not indispensable to achieve predictions in order to have science; 
and, on the other, it might be maintained as scientific a theory that does not 
have success in prediction (in this sense, it is possible to find “good theories 
that make bad predictions”).357 This considerations are taken into account by 
                                            
355 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 167. 
356 Predicting the Future, p. 65. 
357 “As we shall see later, with chaotic systems found in the domains of some of our most 
successful theories (e.g., classical mechanics and electrodynamics), these theories are 
guaranteed to be predictively inadequate and, as a result, unacceptable after all! What this 
philosophically uncomfortable situation demands is an approach to theory validation capable 
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Rescher when he claims that predictive success is a test in an evidential 
sense, rather than being demonstrative.358 
To consider prediction as a strong demarcator involves — in my 
judgment — an overrating of the role played by prediction in science. 
Prediction is a criterion of demarcation that allows us to separate scientific 
theories form non-scientific ones; but it is only a demarcator in the weak 
sense. A theory with predictive success might be considered as scientific. 
But, in this case, it would be a sufficient condition (not a necessary condition) 
to establish its scientific character; because we should not link every science 
to an instrumental subordination to prediction. If prediction is understood as a 
demarcator in the strong sense (as an indispensable condition in order to 
have science) then we would place outside science disciplines such as 
genetics or history that are mainly oriented towards explanation. 
Therefore, it seems that prediction is not, in principle, a necessary 
condition to accept as scientific a theory or a discipline (for example, 
economics).359 In basic science, it can be a test — even the best test we 
have — to establish the scientific value of theories. Meanwhile, in applied 
science, prediction have a direct link to prescription, because it provides the 
information required in order to solve concrete problems. 
Even when Rescher does not develop predictive language to a large 
extent — he does not offer especial details for the characterization of the 
semantic predictive content —, his approach allows us to see, in my 
                                                                                                                           
of accommodating situations in which good theories make bad predictions, i.e., when 
disagreements between predictions and experimental data are not indicative of any 
theoretical or experimental defects,” BATITSKY, V. and DOMOTOR, Z., “When Good Theories 
Make Bad Predictions,” Synthese, v. 157, n. 1, (2007), p. 82. 
358 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 171. 
359 In effect, this issue has been especially important in economics, where its usage to 
determine the scientific character of the discipline has been widely discussed. Wencesalo J. 
Gonzalez has analyzed this problem according to the proposals of four Nobel Prize winners: 
Milton Friedman (1976), John Hicks (1972), James Buchanan (1986), and Herbert Simon 
(1978). Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Prediction as Scientific Test of Economics”; especially, pp. 84-
92; and GONZALEZ, W. J., “A Economía en canto Ciencia: Enfoque desde a complexidade,” 
Revista Galega de Economía, v. 21, n. 1, (2012), pp.183-212. 
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judgment, that prediction has a high value as an aim of science. It is also 
stressed due to its uses as a test for theories (in the realm of basic science) 
and as a previous step to prescription (in applied science). However, to the 
extent that science is oriented towards a variety of goals, prediction is not 
necessarily required in order to have science. As a scientific test, its value is 
limited; and, in principle, prediction is only a sufficient condition to establish 
the scientific validity of theories. 
 
2.6. Limits of Language and Prediction: “Not Predictable” and 
“Unpredictable” 
Within his pragmatic orientation (which sees language from a pragmatic 
perspective), Rescher is interested in the limits of science. In fact, he is one 
of the authors who have paid more attention to the problem of the limits of 
knowledge. In his approach, science is a human product where agents 
prevail, because categories — and, in general, concepts — allow us to 
articulate the reality (categories and concepts are expressed through 
language). To the extent that the scientific vision of the world is a human 
product, it is not cognitively absolute, because science is “our” science. It is 
the result that arises from the interaction between the researcher and her 
context. For this reason, Rescher maintains that “the limits of our experience 
set limits to our science.”360  
Above all, Rescher insists in the limits derived from agents’ capabilities 
(mainly cognitive), although he also points out the obstacles that arise from 
the complexity of the phenomena that are researched.361 Epistemological 
and ontological limits affect scientific knowledge, in general, and knowledge 
about the future, in particular. When he addresses the limits that affect 
prediction, he pays especial attention to the natural science, although he also 
                                            
360 RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 216. 
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addresses the problem in relation to the social sciences, with attention to 
phenomena of economics and sociology.362  
According to Rescher, there are two main types of limits to prediction: 
epistemological and ontological. Epistemological limits are those limits that 
affect prediction insofar as it is made by agents with limited cognitive 
abilities.363 However, the first limit is in the language: it is difficult to know 
something we cannot state. There are also ontological limits to predictability 
insofar as it deals with future phenomena, which have not happened yet and, 
therefore, they are still open. 
Now then, it should be acknowledged that the limits of science are not 
only epistemological and ontological. This can be clearly seen when it is 
considered the distinction between the limits due to the agents and the limits 
of scientific activity itself.364 The limits due to the agents are related with the 
capabilities of scientists as subjects with bounded rationality, who are faced 
with a varied context (cultural, social, etc.) in the knowledge of reality. 
Meanwhile, the limits of scientific activity itself are those limits involved in the 
scientific endeavor: they are rooted in its constitutive elements. They are 
obstacles present in the diverse realms of science: semantic, logical, 
epistemological, methodological, ontological, axiological, and ethical.365 
In other words, we can find obstacles due to the language of science, 
its structure, knowledge, processes, activity, and values (among them, ethical 
values). In this way, there are not only obstacles in the agents, but also in the 
activity itself developed by science. In Rescher’s approach, to the extent that 
science is our science, the barriers between the limits due to the agents and 
                                            
362 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, chapter 11, pp. 101-208; especially, pp. 193-202. 
363 According to Rescher, epistemological limits affect prediction “insofar as the future is 
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the limits due to scientific activity itself tend to fade.366 Thus, he insists on the 
limits due to the limited capabilities of the agents and, besides the 
epistemological and methodological realms, he pays much less attention to 
the obstacles present in the diverse realms of science. 
Within this framework, it is important to analyze prediction from 
language: if words do not involve sense and reference, it is really difficult the 
advancement of science. Thus, it can be addressed the issue of the semantic 
limits to prediction. Strictly speaking, semantic obstacles to prediction are 
related to “the difficulties to identify new phenomena —their sense and 
reference.”367 This gets complicated insofar as Rescher’s approach to 
language is not properly a semantic approach, but a pragmatic one. His 
interest is not in the content of meaning, but rather in the nexus between two 
forms of impossibility of prediction: “not predictability” and 
“unpredictability.”368  
“Unpredictability” involves the full impossibility of prediction for human 
beings. It is mainly due to the presence of phenomena characterized by 
anarchy or lack of laws.369 Meanwhile, “not predictability” refers to the current 
impossibility of stating a prediction, usually due to the instability of the 
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judgment, “an important difference is neatly marked in English usage by the difference 
between unpredictable and impredictable, the former being geared to volatility, the latter to 
intractability. In London weather conditions are unpredictable in March: one minute it can be 
clear and sunny and ten minutes later there may be clouds and rain. Here instability is at 
work. On the other hand, the future of the American poetry is impredictable: we simply have 
no grip on any laws or regularities that provide for rational prediction. Both cases alike 
frustrate the project of prediction,” RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 137.  
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phenomena that we want to predict.370 The former is focused on the 
intractability of phenomena and the latter is oriented towards the volatility of 
the events.  
When a phenomenon lacks regularity, there is no possibility of 
predicting its future behavior. Its “intractability” makes it impossible any 
attempt of prediction. Anarchy prevails, which Rescher distinguishes from 
chaos. Chaos corresponds to extreme instability, and not with the complete 
lack of order.371 Meanwhile, anarchy involves unpredictability. It is not 
possible to predict about an anarchic phenomenon or system, since there is 
no relation between its behavior in the past and its development in the future. 
In this case, the impossibility of prediction is inherent to the phenomenon at 
issue, and not to the current inability to predict it. 
Meanwhile, not predictability is related to volatility, which has to do with 
the behavior of the processes over time. It is linked to the temporal projection 
of the prediction. Thus, commonly, processes are more stable in the short 
run than in the long run. But the volatility of phenomena is always a clear 
obstacle to prediction. In effect, stable processes are more predictable than 
those characterized by being volatile or unstable. In turn, when a 
phenomenon is stable, this makes it easier to clarify what elements give this 
continuity and contribute to a better projection into the future.372 
But, even when Rescher admits this distinction between what is 
completely “unpredictable” and what is merely “not predictable” according to 
the available information and knowledge, he is not always rigorous in the 
                                            
370 Cf. Predicting the Future, pp. 79-82. On the notion of “unpredictability,” see EAGLE, A., 
“Randomness Is Unpredictability,” pp. 749-790. 
371 On chaos as an obstacle to scientific prediction, see WERNDL, CH., “What are the New 
Implications of Chaos for Unpredictability?,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, v. 
60, (2009), pp. 195-220. 
372 This can be seen in the case of economics, where stable elements are sought in order to 
overcome the obstacles to predictability, such as human rationality in decision-making. Cf. 
GONZALEZ, W. J., “Racionalidad y Economía: De la racionalidad de la Economía como 
Ciencia a la racionalidad de los agentes económicos,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), 
Racionalidad, historicidad y predicción en Herbert A. Simon, pp. 65-96. 
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usage of both notions.373 In my judgment, this is because he uses to think of 
this issue in terms of “not predictability.” Thus, according to him, there are no 
reasons to think that science cannot answer any question that arises in its 
domain (if not now, at least in the future).374 In this way, it is problematic to 
claim that something is “unpredictable” in the strict sense.375 
This can be seen with regard to the nexus he establishes between two 
aspects: on the one hand, the notions “not predictability” and 
“unpredictability;” and, on the other, the limits of science in the weak sense 
and in the strong sense.376 Thus, science is clearly subject to limits in the 
weak sense. It seems clear that we have questions that we cannot answer 
now, because nowadays we do not have knowledge enough to solve them. 
Meanwhile, when the limits are in the strong sense, we can establish now 
that there are questions that we cannot answer in the future, even in the long 
run. 
With regard to the limits in the strong sense, Rescher notices that “there 
is no reason to think, on the basis of general principles, that any issues within 
the domain of natural science lie beyond its capabilities.”377 It can be 
considered that there are difficulties to identify the “insolubilia” problems of 
science,378 because there are also — to a greater or lesser extern — 
difficulties to predict how future science will be.379 It happens that new 
                                            
373 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp.138-140, and 146-148. 
374 Cf. RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 3. 
375 Moreover, the possibility of predicting the future depends on both epistemological and 
ontological issues. Regarding what we can predict or not in science, Rescher thinks that the 
best source of information we have comes from science itself: it is not an external issue. 
Moreover, only science itself can inform us about the achievable degree of precision for 
scientific prediction. This depends on circumstances such as the scope — short, medium or 
long run —, the available technology, etc. Additionally, it also depends on the question we 
want to ask. In principle, the more concrete the question is, the more complicated it will be to 
answer it accurately. Rescher, N., Personal communication, 17.6.2014. 
376 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, pp. 274-275. 
377 RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 3. 
378 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 186-188, and RESCHER, N., The Limits of 
Science, revised edition, chapter 8, pp. 111-127. 
379 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 177-183. On this issue, see also JACQUETTE, 
D. (ed.), Reason, Method, and Value: A Reader on the Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher, part 
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knowledge that we achieve leads us to new questions. This generates a 
“principle of question propagation,” where the solutions given to the posed 
problems raise, in turn, new questions.380 
If we cannot identify the unsolvable problems of science, because we 
do not know now what we will know in the future, then there are also 
difficulties to identify the unpredictable phenomena. That is, there are clear 
difficulties to establish what problems are intrinsically unsolvable by human 
science, and not merely not-predictable in accordance with current 
limitations. However, we can claim that it is an unachievable goal the 
complete predictability of phenomena. 
In this case, it is assumed that science is subject to predictive 
incompleteness,381 not merely in descriptive terms but also in prescriptive 
ones. This means that we do not just reflect a factual situation — description 
in the current moment — but also prescription is ruled out — the ought to be 
of science in the future — with regard to the possibility of achieving predictive 
completeness. Because, in order to achieve predictive completeness, there 
are not only problems of language (limits to identify all the affected elements 
of reality), but also epistemological and methodological problems.  
Consequently, in order to be completed with regard to prediction, 
science has to achieve the goal of accurately predicting all things that, in 
principle, science itself considers predictable.382 But, both with regard 
scientific knowledge, in general, and predictive knowledge, in particular, the 
fallibilistic position should be assumed. Therefore, he considers that all 
knowledge we accept is revisable, because it can turn to be false.383 
                                                                                                                           
III, sec. 3 (“The Unpredictability of Future Science”) and 6 (“Unrealizability of Perfected 
Science”). 
380 In addition, Rescher considers that only science can inform us about its own limits, and 
this is always with regard to each particular moment. Cf. RESCHER, N., Personal 
Communication, 17.6.2014. 
381 Cf. RESCHER, N., “The Problem of Future Knowledge,” pp. 149-163. 
382 Cf. RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 146. 
383 Rescher’s characterization of his own episteomology in terms of fallibilism can be seen in 
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Together with prediction there is the metaprediction. In that case, 
Rescher thinks that scientific activity itself is an unpredictable endeavor.384 
“Kant’s principle of question propagation” is also valid in the case of 
prediction: new predictive answers lead to new predictive questions that, in 
turn, require an answer. This leads Rescher to state that natural sciences are 
subject to predictive incompleteness;385 an approach which can be extended 
to the social sciences and the sciences of the artificial. 
However, Rescher thinks that natural sciences are “our best predictive 
tool.”386 But they are an imperfect tool, since they are unpredictable with 
regard to aspects of their very possible future (at least, with the desired level 
of accuracy and precision).387 This fact does not lead him to a skeptic 
position regarding the possibility of prediction, but to a realist approach. 
Thus, in his judgment, “the inescapable imperfection of this instrument 
means that the predictive project too is imperfectable and that our aspirations 
in this direction must be kept within realistic bounds”388. 
Therefore, Rescher accepts predictive and metapredictive limitations of 
science; that is, he admits that scientific theories involve limits to prediction 
and that we cannot predict future developments of the current sciences. 
Thus, he assumes that the complete predictability is a goal that cannot be 
achieved by means of “our” science. In his proposal, he insists on the limits 
that hinders the predictive task of science. He address this issue mainly in 
epistemological and ontological terms, although there are obstacles in the 
different realms of science, starting with the language. This is because we 
                                                                                                                           
RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition; especially, chapter 3, “The Instability of 
Science,” pp. 29-42. 
384 Cf. RESCHER, N., “The Unpredictability of Future Science,” in COHEN, R. S. ET AL. (eds.), 
Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1983, pp. 153-168. 
385 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 183-186. 
386 Predicting the Future, p. 187. 
387 See RESCHER, N., “The Problem of Future Knowledge,” pp. 149-163. 
388 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 188. 
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cannot identify always all the elements at stake in a prediction (relevant 
variables, etc.). 
According to the present analysis, it can be suggested that, besides the 
epistemological and ontological realms, the problem of the limits has to do 
also with the semantic, logical, methodological, axiological, and ethical fields. 
Certainly, they involve two types of impossibility of prediction: “not 
predictability” and “unpredictability,” although it is not always easy to provide 
examples of this conceptual distinction. 
On the one hand, there are “not predictable” phenomena due to the 
existence of current limitations; and, on the other, there are “unpredictable” 
developments, because there are things that we cannot predict neither now 
nor in the future. Although Rescher conceptually assumes this distinction, it is 
not really important in his approach. In addition, it is not clear enough insofar 
as one thing is not being able to offer now an accurate and precise prediction 
and another different is to be “not predictable.” Furthermore, in his proposal, 
we cannot establish the final limits of scientific knowledge. Consequently, 
claiming that there are phenomena that will never be predicted is also 
problematic. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LOGICAL FEATURES OF SCIENTIFIC PREDICTION 
 
Logically, scientific prediction is related to a series of problems that 
have to do with the internal articulation of the scientific theories, whether they 
are conceived as isolated theories (in the Popperian way, for example) or 
they are considered as series of interrelated theories (for example, in the 
Lakatosian way or in other view that articulates theoretical frameworks and 
historicity). In this regard, it should be highlighted that, form a logical 
perspective, “the existence of well-structured scientific theories does not 
imply, in principle, that they should be predictive.”389  
De facto, the nature of scientific theories can be diverse with regard to 
its configuration: a) explicative; b) explicative and predictive; and c) 
predictive.390 Thus, the internal structure of scientific theories can be oriented 
towards explanation, prediction or both. For this reason, an important issue is 
that related to the possible structural similarities or differences between 
explanation and prediction, which includes its symmetry or its asymmetry. 
This topic of the logical features of explanation and prediction became 
relevant for the status of scientific prediction.391 In this regard, this chapter is 
oriented, firstly, toward the analysis of the controversy among those who 
were in favor of the symmetry thesis of explanation and prediction and those 
were not. Secondly, within the framework of the asymmetry thesis between 
explanation and prediction, the account of Rescher regarding their relations 
is studied. Thirdly, this question is related to the factor of temporality and the 
                                            
389 GONZALEZ, W. J., Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in 
Economics, p. 15.  
390 Cf. Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in Economics, p. 15. 
391 See in this regard BARNES, E. C., The Paradox of Predictivism, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2008; and DOUGLAS, H. E., “Reintroducing Prediction to Explanation,” pp. 
444-463.  
On the approaches to scientific explanation, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “Caracterización de la 
‘explicación científica’ y tipos de explicaciones científicas,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), 
Diversidad de la explicación científica, pp. 13-49. 
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relevance it has for the logic of prediction. On the factor of temporality two 
problems are considered: (i) there is a mere temporal anisotropy between 
explanation and prediction?; and (ii) are retrodiction and prediction equal 
from a philosophical perspective? 
Furthermore, when prediction is seen from the logic of science, it should 
be considered the debate on the “well-structured” theories oriented toward 
prediction. Then a question is whether they can have an inductive structure 
(for example, the hypothetical-inductive392) or, on the contrary, the only valid 
structure is the deductive one, especially, the hypothetical-deductive 
structure. This leads to consider the problem of induction in two successive 
dimensions: 1) the characterization and justification of induction; and 2) the 
role of induction regarding scientific prediction. Finally, the possible limits of 
deductivism for scientific prediction are considered. 
 
3.1.  From Logical Symmetry to Asymmetry between Explanation 
and Prediction 
When prediction is seen from a logical point of view, a major problem is 
the issue of the similarities or differences with respect to scientific 
explanation. In this regard, the thesis of the logical symmetry between 
explanation and prediction has been widely discussed. According to this 
thesis, to explain and to predict are equal processes from a logical 
perspective. It is a thesis that, after its initial formulation by Carl Gustav 
Hempel and Paul Oppenheim,393 had a considerable influence on other 
authors, such as Adolf Grünbaum.394 Against this logical account there is the 
thesis of the asymmetry, which maintains that explanation and prediction are 
not equal from a structural or logical viewpoint. 
                                            
392 Cf. NIINILUOTO, I. and TUOMELA, R., Theoretical Concepts and Hypothetico-Inductive 
Inference, passim. 
393 Cf. HEMPEL, C. and OPPENHEIM, P., “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” pp. 135-175. 
394 Cf. GRÜNBAUM, A., “Temporally-Asymmetric Principles, Parity between Explanation and 
Prediction, and Mechanism versus Teleology,” pp. 146-170. 
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Rescher actively participated in this controversy very early. He did it as 
a critic of the symmetry thesis and a defender of the logical asymmetry 
between explanation and prediction. In order to do this, he developed a 
proposal that combines logical, epistemological, methodological, and 
ontological elements of scientific explanation and prediction. Through these 
elements, he maintains that there is a “significant disanalogy” between both 
scientific processes.395 Within this framework, he suggests his own 
alternative to the Hempel and Oppenheim’s thesis: the harmony thesis. It has 
a pragmatic orientation, since it takes into account the nexus between the 
processes of explanation and prediction in scientific practice.396  
 
3.1.1. A Significant “Disanalogy”: Explanation of Past and 
Prediction of Future 
Within the logical features of scientific prediction, a major problem has 
to do with the debate on the logical symmetry or asymmetry between 
“explanation” and “prediction.” This controversy starts in the year 1948, when 
Carl Gustav Hempel and Paul Oppenheim published their well-known paper 
on “Studies in the Logic of Explanation.”397 In this paper they propose the 
thesis of the logical symmetry between explanation and prediction, which 
maintains that “to explain” and “to predict” are symmetrical processes. This 
involves that they are logically equal, mainly due to the use of scientific laws, 
since they are valid both for the past and for the future. 
This philosophers think of scientific explanation according to a 
deductive-nomological model, where explanation is made on the basis of 
                                            
395 Rescher’s criticism appeared for the first time in a paper published in 1958: RESCHER, N., 
“On Prediction and Explanation,” pp. 281-290. One year later, he defends again the logical 
asymmetry between explanation and prediction. He does this in a paper published with O. 
Helmer. Cf. RESCHER, N. and HELMER, O., “On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences,” 
pp. 25-52. 
396 See RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 167-169. 
397 Cf. HEMPEL, C. and OPPENHEIM, P., “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” pp. 135-175. It is 
in the framework of the logical empiricism that was dominant in the philosophy of science of 
the United States in that time.  
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laws and is supported by a deductive logical structure. In their judgment, the 
deductive-nomological patterns of explanation involve a logical symmetry 
between explanation and prediction.398 Thus, Hempel and Oppenheim 
expressly maintain that “wathever will be said in this article concerning the 
logical characteristics of explanation or prediction will be applicable to either, 
even if only one of them should be mentioned.”399 
From this perspective, the different between explaining and predicting is 
of temporal nature with a pragmatic dimension: explanation deals with past 
phenomena, whereas prediction is oriented towards phenomena that have 
not happened yet. This enunciation of prediction expressly involves that 
prediction is prior in time to the predicted phenomena. But it is also possible 
to think of predictions of phenomena that already exist in the present but that 
we do not know yet. Thus, to differentiate between explanation and 
prediction, they emphasize the temporal factor: “If E is given, i.e. if es we 
know that the phenomenon described by E has occurred, and a suitable set 
of statements C1, C2 , … , Ck, L1 , L2 , … Lr, is provided afterwards, we speak 
of an explanation of the phenomenon in question. If the latter statements are 
given and E is derived prior to the occurrence of the phenomenon it 
describes, we speak of a prediction.”400 
On this logical basis, which has methodological projection, the 
symmetry thesis involves that every scientific explanation can serve as 
prediction. Even more, for Hempel and Oppenheim, “is this potential 
                                            
398 Later Hempel will develop the inductive-statistical model of explanation. Cf. HEMPEL, C. 
G., “Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation,” in FEIGL, H. and MAXWELL, G. (eds.), 
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 3, Scientific Explanation, Space, and 
Time, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1962, pp. 98-169.  
In this case there is — for Hempel — a logical symmetry between the inductive-statistical 
model of scientific explanation and the probabilistic prediction, cf. SALMON, W. C., “On the 
Alleged Temporal Anisotropy of Explanation. A Letter to Professor Adolf Grünbaum form his 
Friend and Colleague,” in EARMAN, J., JANIS, A., MASSEY, G. and RESCHER, N. (eds.), 
Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds. Essays on the Philosophy of 
Adolf Grünbaum, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pirttsburgh, 1993, pp. 231-232. 
399 Cf. HEMPEL, C. and OPPENHEIM, P., “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” 138. 
400 Cf. “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” p. 138. 
129 
 
predictive force which gives scientific explanation its importance: only to the 
extent that we are able to explain empirical facts can we attain the major 
objective of scientific research, namely not merely to record the phenomena 
of our experience, but to learn from them, by bassing upon them theoretical 
generalizations which enable us to anticipate new occurrences and to 
control, at least to some extent, the changes in our environment.”401 
But, according to Hempel and Oppenheim, every scientific prediction 
can serve as scientific explanation (either within a deductive-nomological 
model or an inductive-statistical one) under suitable circumstances.402 For 
Salmon, this part is the most problematic aspect of this conception. He 
considers that scientific prediction is an statement about the future.403 Thus, 
“as such, a prediction could not be an explanation, for an explanation, 
according to Peter [Hempel], is an argument. The most that could be 
maintained is that legitimate scientific predictions are the conclusions of 
arguments that conform to the schemas of D-N or I-S explanation.”404 
This logical-methodological position on the structural symmetry 
between “explanation” and “prediction” was influential for several authors. 
Among them, Adolf Grünbaum should be highlighted. However, as Wesley C. 
Salmon notices, Hempel and Oppenheim’s paper was practically unnoticed 
for a decade.405 Thus, in the late fifties, Rescher was one of the first authors 
who criticized the symmetry thesis.406 Later on, in 1998, he gave shape to his 
own alternative to the proposal of Hempel and Oppenheim. In that time, he 
                                            
401 HEMPEL, C. and OPPENHEIM, P., “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” p. 138. 
402 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 216. 
403 This idea was proposed in SCHEFFLER, I., “Explanation, Prediction, and Abstraction,” pp. 
293-309. 
404 SALMON, W. C., “On the Alleged Temporal Anisotropy of Explanation. A Letter to 
Professor Adolf Grünbaum form his Friend and Colleague,” in EARMAN, J., JANIS, A., MASSEY, 
G. and RESCHER, N. (eds.), Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds. 
Essays on the Philosophy of Adolf Grünbaum, p. 232. 
405 Cf. SALMON, W. C., Causality and Explanation, Oxford University Press, N. York, 1998, p. 
68.  
406 See RESCHER, N., “On Prediction and Explanation,” pp. 281-290. 
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proposes the harmony thesis between “explanation” and “prediction.”407 
It should be emphasized that, in 1958, when the symmetry thesis was 
widely accepted, Rescher’s account is critic to it: he goes further than the 
option in favor of a simple temporal difference between explanation and 
prediction. He emphatically claims that ““it cannot be maintained that 
explanation and prediction are identical from the standpoint of their logical 
structure.”408 In his judgment, “rather than being the single point of minor 
difference between explanation and prediction, this temporal asymmetry is of 
far-reaching and fundamental import.”409 In fact, for him, the different 
temporal orientation of explanation and prediction leads to important 
differences between them with regard to their logical structure. 
It happens that, in scientific explanation, conclusion is firmly supported 
by premises. Meanwhile, the degree of probability associated to prediction is 
usually much lower.410 In the paper of 1959 that Rescher published together 
with O. Helmer, he insists on this asymmetry between explanation and 
prediction: “An explanation must establish its conclusion, showing that there 
is a strong warrant why the fact to be explained—rather than some possible 
alternative—obtains. On the other hand, the conclusion of a (reasoned) 
prediction need not be well established in this sense; it suffices that it be 
rendered more tenable than comparable alternatives. Here then is an 
important distinction in logical strength between explanations and predictions: 
An explanation, though it need not logically rule out alternatives altogether, 
must beyond reasonable doubt establish its hypothesis as more credible than 
its negation. Of a prediction, on the other hand, we need to require only that it 
                                            
407 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 167-169. 
408 RESCHER, N., “On Prediction and Explanation,” p. 289. Rescher’s criticism to the 
symmetry thesis can be also seen in RESCHER, N., Scientific Explanation, pp. 30-37; 
especially, pp. 32-34. On this issue, see also VAN FRAASSEN, B. C., “Rescher on Explanation 
and Prediction,” in ALMEDER, R. (ed.), Rescher Studies: A Collection of Essays on the 
Philosophical Work of Nicholas Rescher Presented to him on the Occasion of his 80th 
Birthday, Ontos Verlag, Berlin, 2009, pp. 339-361. 
409 RESCHER, N., “On Prediction and Explanation,” p. 286. 
410 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 166. 
131 
 
establish its hypothesis simply as more credible than any comparable 
alternative.”411 
Once this logical basis is established, Rescher maintains that there is 
not a mere temporal asymmetry between explanation and prediction, but a 
significant disanalogy between them. The “disanalogy” is based in the 
underlying difference between explaining and predicting, which is of an 
ontological kind. Because explanation is about phenomena or events that 
have already happened, whereas prediction is oriented towards phenomena 
of events that we expect in the future. This leads to acknowledge that the 
relation between informativeness and security is different in both cases. 
Thus, the more detailed the explanation is, the more secure it usually is; 
whereas in principle prediction is less secure as its informative content 
increases.412  
Nevertheless, besides this logical basis for the distinction, Rescher 
considers that there are also epistemological, methodological, and 
ontological differences between explanation and prediction. (i) 
Epistemologically, explanation has a causal linkage that is clearer than in the 
case of prediction, for which there can be, in principle, alternatives. (ii) 
Methodologically, prediction and explanation are also different, since there 
are processes that we can explain, but we cannot predict them. (iii) 
Ontologically, past facts are different form future developments, which are 
still open.413 
                                            
411 RESCHER, N. and HELMER, O., “On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences,” p. 32. 
Rescher and acknowledge that there are exceptions to this common pattern: “Of course 
prediction may, as in astronomy, be as firmly based in fact and as tightly articulated in 
reasoning as any explanation. But this is not a general requirement to which predictions 
must conform. A doctor’s prognosis, for example, does not have astronomical certitude, yet 
practical considerations render it immensely useful as a guide in our conduct because it is 
far superior to reliance on guesswork or on pure chance alone as a decision making device,” 
RESCHER, N. and HELMER, O., “On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences,” p. 32.  
412 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 257, n. 90. “Informative content” or 
“informativeness” is understood here as the level of detail achieved by the prediction; that is, 
its precision. 
413 Cf. Predicting the Future, pp. 165-166. 
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Consequently, his criticism of the symmetry thesis combines logical, 
epistemological, methodological, and ontological elements.414 This is 
something that it suggests initially in 1958, so he was one of the first 
philosophers who rejects the proposal — that was dominant then — on the 
logical symmetry between explanation and prediction. But, besides the 
criticism to the characterization of this thesis by Hempel and Oppenheim, 
Rescher came to develop his own alternative to the symmetry thesis. He 
calls it harmony thesis between explanation and prediction, since it 
emphasizes the idea of complementarity. The epistemological and, above all, 
methodological nexus between scientific explanations and predictions are 
highlighted in this harmony thesis.415 
 
3.1.2.  Rescher’s Proposal on the Nexus between Explanation and 
Prediction 
After rejecting the symmetry thesis — that had a great influence on the 
Received View, Rescher considers what the relations between scientific 
explanation and prediction are. He thinks that they are different processes 
form a logical point of view. In addition, he offers epistemological, 
methodological, and ontological reasons that support the asymmetry 
between explanation and prediction. He develops his own proposal from the 
acknowledgement of the logical asymmetry between them. Thus, the 
“harmony thesis between explanation and prediction” maintains that, even 
when to explain and to predict are asymmetrical processes, they are closely 
interrelated.416 
However, this proposal of Rescher is not, strictly speaking, a properly 
                                            
414 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 264. 
415 The “harmony thesis” is already outlined in his book on scientific explanation: “The key 
thing in scientific understanding is the capacity to exploit a knowledge of laws to structure 
our understanding of the past and to guide our expectations for the future,” RESCHER, N., 
Scientific Explanation, p. 135. 
416
 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 167-169. 
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logical account of the relations between explanation and prediction. It is of a 
preferentially methodological character, insofar as it sees the problem in 
terms of the advancement of knowledge. In effect, Rescher’s starting point is 
the following question: “Yet what is to be said about the relative priority of 
prediction versus explanation in science once one abandons the supposed 
equivalence at issue in the Hempel-Oppenheim thesis of logical 
symmetry?”417 This means that, after considering the debate on the logical 
symmetry or asymmetry between explanation and prediction, Rescher deals 
with the problem in new terms, which are oriented towards the 
methodological relevance of prediction and explanation. 
From this perspective, the debate on the logical symmetry or 
asymmetry between prediction and explanation connects with the 
controversy about which one has more relevance to evaluate scientific 
contents: the accommodation to what is already known or the prediction 
about novel facts.418 In this regard, Rescher’s approach is certainly 
predictivist to the extent that he considers that “prediction is the very 
touchstone of science in that it affords our best and most effective test for the 
adequacy of our scientific endeavors”419. It is, however, a weak or moderate 
predictivism.420 In effect, he explicitly criticizes the instrumentalist approaches 
to prediction,421 according to which “prediction is all that matters and thereby 
constitutes the alpha and omega of science.”422 
Within the framework of his pragmatic conception, where the 
advancement of knowledge is oriented towards aims, Rescher thinks that to 
                                            
417 Predicting the Future, p. 167. 
418 On this methodological controversy, see GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, pp. 
288-292; and GONZALEZ, W. J., Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its 
Role in Economics, pp. 50-53. 
419 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 161. 
420 On the distinction between the strong versions of predictivism and the weak predictivism, 
see HITCHCOCK, CH. and SOBER, E., “Prediction versus Accommodation and the Risk of 
Overfitting,” pp. 1-34; and BARNES, E. C., The Paradox of Predictivism, passim. 
421 In this regard, his criticism to the predictivist thesis of Milton Friedman can be highlighted. 
See RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 109 and 194-196. 
422 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 164.  
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explain and to predict are not symmetrical or equivalent processes. He sees 
them as a part of a whole, so they are processes that should be coordinated, 
within a systemic approach to science.423 For this Reason, there cannot be 
— in his judgment — an absolute instrumental priority of prediction with 
regard to explanation. Thus, he considers that “theories that do not yield 
predictions are sterile, and predictions—however successful—that lack a 
theoretical backing are for that very reason cognitively unsatisfactory.”424 
After acknowledging a methodological difference, with preference for 
prediction, Rescher suggest the “harmony thesis” between explanation and 
prediction. It involves a functional complementarity: “scientific adequacy […] 
involves a complex negotiation in which both prediction and explanation play 
a symbiotic and mutually supportive role.”425 He summarizes this thesis in 
three principles: “1. To qualify as well established, our explanatory theories 
must have a track record of contributing to predictive success. 2. To qualify 
as credible, our predictions must be based upon theories that militate for 
these particular predictions over against other possibilities. 3. Our 
explanatory theories should be embedded in a wider explanatory framework 
that makes it possible to understand why they enjoy their predictive 
successes”426. 
According to this perspective, an adequate scientific understanding of 
phenomena involves the capacity to explain and predict those phenomena, at 
                                            
423 Cf. Predicting the Future, pp. 167-169. 
424 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 167. The first part of this proposal should be 
qualified, because there are examples of scientific theories that are really influential and that 
are not oriented towards prediction. Thus, Charles Darwin did not orient his theory of 
evolution towards the elaboration of predictions, but his theory was not sterile regarding the 
phenomena at stake. Certainly, the Darwinian evolutionary approach might generate 
predictions of new species, but there is no evidence that this was the aim of the author of 
The Origin of Species.  
425 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 167. 
426
 Predicting the Future, p. 168. Even when Rescher’s proposal certainly makes sense, it 
could be qualified. It is possible to think in explicative theories of historical character that do 
not aim to make predictive contributions, at least in a direct way. There can also be 
considered predictive theories with correct predictions that do not have yet a well-developed 
explicative theory. 
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least in principle. Thus, on the one hand, scientific theories oriented towards 
explanation should — in Rescher’s judgment — yield predictions. This fits 
with his methodological pragmatism, whose final goal is say how to evaluate 
the truth or verisimilitude of scientific knowledge.427 Faced with this goal of 
the scientific activity, the capacity of theories to yield successful predictions 
prevails.428 Even more, he maintains that “explanatory theories that yield no 
predictive advantages are […] deficient. For in the final analysis only their 
role in providing for correct predictions can validate theories as adequate.”429 
And, on the other hand, scientific prediction should be made on the 
basis of reasons: science is not interested on predictive success without 
rational basis.430 Así, “with any cogent prediction […] one should be able to 
provide a validating rationale as to why that prediction is acceptable (a 
rationale that need not necessarily qualify as an explanation of the 
phenomenon being predicted)”431. As predictive success can be not good 
enough for science, he manifestly rejects the methodological 
instrumentalism. In this way, it is required to give the reasons that support a 
prediction in order to consider it as a scientific prediction. In this regard, 
Rescher thinks that “explanatory theories are best situated to yield effective 
predictions in a systematic and reliable manner.”432 
Thus, Rescher clearly rejects that explanation and prediction are 
symmetrical or equivalent processes. In addition, he does this on the basis of 
                                            
427 Methodological pragmatism is developed by Rescher in some of his publications. Among 
them, the following could be highlighted: RESCHER, N., Methodological Pragmatism. A 
Systems-Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Knowledge, passim; RESCHER, N., Realistic 
Pragmatism. An Introduction to Pragmatic Philosophy, passim; and RESCHER, N., 
“Pragmatism at the Crossroads,” in RESCHER, N., Pragmatism. The Restoration of its 
Scientific Roots, Transaction Publishers, N. Brunswick, NJ, 2012, pp. 1-19.  
428 “Prediction is the very touchstone of science in that it affords our best and most effective 
test for the adequacy of our scientific endeavors,” RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 
168. 
429 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 167. 
430 For example, an astrologer may predict successfully, but he does not offer genuine 
scientific knowledge. 
431 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 167. 
432 Predicting the Future, p. 167. 
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reasons that show their asymmetry in diverse realms: semantic433, logical, 
epistemological, methodological, and ontological. However, he thinks that 
they are coordinated process, so science must aim to achieve a harmony 
between explanation and prediction. In this way, he also rejects the 
instrumentalist predictivism and opts for a moderate version of predictivismo, 
which is — in my judgment — a position more adequate to scientific practice.  
 
3.2.  The Temporality Factor 
Wesley C. Salmon offers a quite interesting review of the symmetry 
thesis, where the logical elements have more weight than in the case of 
Rescher.434 In fact, Salmon directly objects Grünbaum’s approach to 
symmetry, which gives an especial relevance to the logical dimension of the 
problem from a characterization of the scientific laws. Thus, the temporality 
factor — the temporal anisotropy between explanation and prediction — is 
emphasized.435 
This issue of temporality connects with the problems posed by the 
notion “retrodiction.” In effect, two logical issues can be considered here. On 
the one hand, there is the problem of the possible equivalence of 
“retrodiction” and scientific explanation, which arises when the possibility of 
explaining on the basis of subsequent conditions to explicandum (the fact 
                                            
433 Semantic reasons are not explicitly in Rescher’s criticism to the symmetry thesis. But it is 
implicit that there are differences between explanation and prediction from the point of view 
of language to the extent that he characterizes scientific prediction as a statement. It seems 
clear that the referent of a statement about the future can be different from what exists now 
or what existed in the past (that is the realm of explanation). The sematic differences have 
logical repercussions with regard to the problem of the symmetry. 
However, this view of prediction as a statement is not clear in the whole set of Rescher’s 
publications on this issue. Thus, in a paper of 1963, he characterizes prediction as an 
argument: “A potential prediction of the supposed fact that a system will exhibit the 
characteristic Q  at time t is an argument whose conclusion is the statement that the system 
exhibits Q at t,” RESCHER, N., “Discrete State Systems, Markov Chains, and Problems in the 
Theory of Scientific Explanation and Prediction,” Philosophy of Science, v. 30, n. 4, (1963), 
p. 329. 
434 Cf. SALMON, W. C., “On the Alleged Temporal Anisotropy of Explanation,” pp. 229-248. 
435 Cf. GRÜNBAUM, A., “Temporally-Asymmetric Principles, Parity between Explanation and 
Prediction, and Mechanism versus Teleology,” pp. 146-170. 
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that is explained) is accepted. And, on the other hand, there is the question 
of the logical equivalence between prediction and “explanation,” which is 
usually linked with the acceptation of a genuine “prediction of past.”  
 
3.2.1. Is There Just and Anisotropy between Explanation and 
Prediction? 
Following the thread of the logical-methodological proposal of Adolf 
Grünbaum this question is posed as a key for solving this problem. 
Grünbaum has been one of the major defenders of the symmetry thesis 
between explanation and prediction. In his judgment, many of the objections 
to this thesis (among them, those by Rescher) are due to an inadequate 
understanding of Hempel’s proposal on this matter.436 For this reason, he 
considers that the first step is to shed light on the symmetry thesis as it was 
formulated by Hempel and Oppenheim in his well-known paper of 1948.437 
According to Grünbaum interpretation of the symmetry thesis, we have 
this position: “For Hempel, the particular conditions Ci (i = 1, 2, ... n) which, in 
conjunction with the relevant laws, account for the explanandum-event, E, 
may be earlier than E in both explanation and prediction or the Ci may be 
later than E in both explanation and prediction. Thus, a case of prediction in 
which the Ci would be later than E would be one in astronomy, for example, 
in which a future E is accounted for by reference to Ci which are still further in 
the future than E. These assertions hold, since Hempel's criterion for an 
explanation as opposed to a prediction is that E belong to the scientist's past 
when he offers his account of it, and his criterion for a corresponding 
prediction is that E belong to the scientist's future when it is made.”438 
                                            
436 Cf. GRÜNBAUM, A., “Temporally-Asymmetric Principles, Parity between Explanation and 
Prediction, and Mechanism versus Teleology,” pp. 146-170. 
437 Cf. HEMPEL, C. and OPPENHEIM, P., “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” pp. 135-175. 
438 GRÜNBAUM, A., “Temporally-Asymmetric Principles, Parity between Explanation and 
Prediction, and Mechanism versus Teleology,” p. 156. 
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In effect, the difference between prediction and explanation is, for 
Hempel and Oppenheim, a temporal anisotropy with regard to the subject 
who explains or predicts the concrete fact. Thus, in scientific explanation, the 
fact has already happened, whereas in prediction the fact has not yet 
occurred.439 Consequently, the temporal difference with regard to the 
particular conditions (Ci) does not allow us to distinguish between 
explanation and prediction, but they lead to de distinction between prediction 
and retrodiction.  
Following this argumental line, we have — as Grünbaum noticed — that 
“in the retrodiction-prediction antithesis, a retrodiction is characterized by the 
fact that the Ci are later than E, while the Ci are earlier than E in the kind of 
prediction which is antithetical to retrodiction but not identical with Hempelian 
prediction.”440 When the problem is seen in this way, there are two aspects: 
“Firstly, a retrodiction as well as a prediction can be an H-prediction, and a 
prediction as well as a retrodiction can be an H-explanation. Secondly, being 
an H-prediction rather than an H-explanation or conversely depends on the 
transient homocentric ‘now,’ but there is no such ‘now’-dependence in the 
case of being a retrodiction instead of a prediction, or conversely.”441 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
439 Cf. HEMPEL, C. and OPPENHEIM, P., “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” p. 138. 
440 GRÜNBAUM, A., “Temporally-Asymmetric Principles, Parity between Explanation and 
Prediction, and Mechanism versus Teleology,” p. 156. 
441 GRÜNBAUM, A., “Temporally-Asymmetric Principles, Parity between Explanation and 
Prediction, and Mechanism versus Teleology,” p. 156. An example of how a H-prediction 
could be a retrodiction is provided by Salmon: “If, for example, the Astronomer Royal had, in 
1917, established the state that the sun-moonearth system would assume in 1921, and had 
(still in 1917) derived the occurrence of the 1919 eclipse from the 1921 conditions, his 
inference would have been both a retrodiction and a H-prediction,” SALMON, W. C., “On the 
Alleged Temporal Anisotropy of Explanation,” p. 235. 
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Fig. 1 Reproduced from GRÜNBAUM, A., “Temporally-Asymmetric 
Principles, Parity between Explanation and Prediction, and Mechanism 
versus Teleology,” Philosophy of Science, v. 29, n. 2, (1962), pp. 156. 
 
On the basis of this characterization, Grünbaum answers the objections 
that Rescher points out with regard to the symmetry thesis. In his judgment, 
two different types of asymmetries between explanation and prediction 
should be distinguished: (i) epistemological asymmetry, and (ii) logical 
asymmetry. “We shall refer to the first asymmetry as pertaining to the 
‘assertibility’ of the explanandum while speaking of the second as an 
asymmetry in the ‘inferability’ or ‘why’ of the explanandum. In the light of this 
distinction, we shall be able to show that the existence of an epistemological 
asymmetry in regard to the assertibility of the explanandum cannot serve to 
impugn the Hempelian thesis of symmetry, which pertains to only the why of 
the explanandum.”442 In this way, Grünbaum thinks that, on the basis of the 
epistemological asymmetry between explanation and prediction, it is not 
possible to maintain that there is also a logical asymmetry between them. 
Certainly, Rescher’s criticism to the symmetry thesis takes into account 
several aspects, and the epistemological asymmetry between explanation 
and prediction is one among them. Because, in his approach, science is a 
system, so the diverse elements that conforms science are interrelated. 
Consequently, besides the logical features, there are semantic, 
epistemological, methodological, and ontological aspects that support the 
                                            
442 GRÜNBAUM, A., “Temporally-Asymmetric Principles, Parity between Explanation and 
Prediction, and Mechanism versus Teleology,” p. 159. 
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asymmetry between explanation and prediction.443 From this perspective, it 
seems to me that Grünbaum is right when he claims that, in Rescher’s 
criticism to symmetry thesis, the logical elements are in the background; 
whereas — for Hempel and Grünbaum — it is a proposal on the logical 
relations between scientific explanations and predictions. 
But — in my judgment — Grünbaum is wrong when he claims that 
Rescher rejects the symmetry thesis on the basis of the epistemological 
asymmetry between explanation and prediction. Rather, there is a broader 
approach at stake: Rescher shows that there are several asymmetries 
between both processes. They are basically differences that have to do with 
the logical, epistemological, methodological, and ontological realms (where it 
is possible to add the semantic field). In this way, he offers a broad view of 
the relations between explanation and prediction. In addition, he gives 
reasons that lead to reject the symmetry between them in the different realms 
that can be considered.  
It should be highlighted that Wesley Salmon directly criticizes Hempel’s 
symmetry thesis on the basis of the structural elements. He does this in a 
book in honor of Grünbaum and, due to their friendship, Salmon writes his 
paper as a letter and includes kind remarks on him. Certainly, Grünbaum is 
one of the major defenders of the symmetry thesis.444 Salmon is well aware 
of that and his starting point is the analysis of the two parts of Hempel’s 
symmetry thesis: (i) every scientific explanation can, under suitable 
circumstances, serve as a prediction; and (ii) every scientific prediction can, 
under suitable circumstances, serve as an explanation.445 
                                            
443 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 165-166. 
444 Cf. SALMON, W. C., “On the Alleged Temporal Anisotropy of Explanation. A Letter to 
Professor Adolf Grünbaum form his Friend and Colleague,” pp. 229-248. 
445 An analysis of Salmon criticism of Hempel’s proposal is in GONZALEZ, W. J., 
“Caracterización de la ‘explicación científica’ y tipos de explicaciones científicas,” pp. 13-49; 
especially, pp. 18-19. See also GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, pp. 216-217; and 
GONZALEZ, W. J., Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in 
Economics, pp. 48-50. 
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On the first part of the argument, Salmon considers that it “seems 
clearly hold for D-N explanations.”446 In this way, he notices that, within a 
deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation, an argument that 
provides an explanation of a past event might also serve to anticipate it in the 
future (for example, the knowledge used to explain a solar eclipse can also 
serve to predict it). Thus, “if the explanatory facts had been at our disposal 
before the occurrence of the fact to be explained (the explanadum) we would 
have been able to predict that fact, for we would have been in possession of 
true premises from which it follows deductively.”447 
Meanwhile, the second part of the Hempelian argument is more 
problematic, as Peter Achinstein admits.448 Because there is a logical 
difference: Salmon sees scientific prediction as a statement, whereas for 
Hempel scientific explanation is an argument. From this perspective, 
prediction cannot be an explanation, but it has its own characteristics. Then, 
the most that can be maintained is that a prediction can be the conclusion of 
an argument that conforms to either a deductive-nomological model of 
explanation or a inductive-probabilistic model.449 In addition, Salmon 
                                            
446 SALMON, W. C., “On the Alleged Temporal Anisotropy of Explanation,” p. 231. 
447
 “On the Alleged Temporal Anisotropy of Explanation,” p. 231. 
448 “This part of the symmetry thesis is usually thought to be more dubious of the two. To 
begin with, it might be said, a prediction is simply a statement that something will occur (or 
perhaps that something has occurred that has not been verified),” ACHINSTEIN, P., “The 
Symmetry Thesis,” in FETZER, J. H. (ed.), Science, Explanation, and Rationality. The 
Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p. 168. 
449 SALMON, W. C., “On the Alleged Temporal Anisotropy of Explanation,” p. 232.  
However, for Achinstein, to acknowledge that prediction is a statement does not involve 
an objection to this part of the symmetry thesis; because “Hempel is concerned not just with 
predictive statements (ones that say something will occur), but with predictive arguments or 
inferences, that is, with cases in which some prediction is made from, or on the basis of, 
something,” ACHINSTEIN, P., “The Symmetry Thesis,” in FETZER, J. H. (ed.), Science, 
Explanation, and Rationality. The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel, pp. 168-169.  
Achinstein considers that a more fair objection is provided by the following example: 
“Suppose a drug company tests a drug on one thousand patients with symptoms S and 
discovers that in eight hundred cases the symptoms are relieved, while no one in a control 
group not taking the drug had relief. This might provide a very sound scientific basis for the 
prediction that the drug will be effective approximately 80 percent of the time. Yet the 
explanation for the drug’s general effectiveness is not that it was effective in the test cases,” 
ACHINSTEIN, P., “The Symmetry Thesis,” p. 169. 
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considers that this is the position adopted by Grünbaum in his defense of the 
symmetry thesis.450 
It also happens that — in Grünbaum’s judgment — Hempel’s symmetry 
thesis has consequences for the notion of retrodiction. Because, to the extent 
that the temporal anisotropy is with regard to the subject who explains or 
predicts, he considers that it has no relevance whether the initial conditions 
are antecedents conditions (previous to the fact that we want to explain) or 
subsequent conditions (later that the fact that we want to explain). In this 
way, “a retrodiction as well as a prediction can be an H-prediction, and a 
prediction as well as a retrodiction can be an H-explanation.”451 
Because Salmon is focused on examples from physics, a central 
problem in this regard has to do with the reversibility or irreversibility fo the 
processes of nature and their relation with causal processes. On this issue, 
Salmon points out a series of considerations: 1) Objectively, the universe 
possesses a temporal anisotropy based on irreversible physical processes. 
2) The fundamental laws of nature are symmetric from a temporal point of 
view. 3) The temporal anisotropy of the universe is something de facto not de 
jure; that is, it is based on matters of fact, not on temporally asymmetric 
physical laws. 4) Although many laws of nature are temporally symmetric, 
there are de facto in nature processes that are irreversible.452 
These are considerations that Salmon attributes to Hans Reichenbach, 
and he thinks that his colleague Grünbaum would agree with them.453 Thus, 
Salmon analyses the consequences of these claims about the “direction of 
time” for the problem of the logical symmetry between explanation and 
prediction. In his judgment, the temporal anisotropy applies to reversible 
physical systems and to irreversible ones: “We distinguish, consequently, 
                                            
450 SALMON, W. C., “On the Alleged Temporal Anisotropy of Explanation,” p. 232.  
451 GRÜNBAUM, A., “Temporally-Asymmetric Principles, Parity between Explanation and 
Prediction, and Mechanism versus Teleology,” p. 156. 
452 Cf. SALMON, W. C., “On the Alleged Temporal Anisotropy of Explanation,” pp. 241-242. 
453 Cf. “On the Alleged Temporal Anisotropy of Explanation,” p. 241. 
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earlier and later where lunar and planetary motions are concerned just as we 
do with regard to ice cubes melting in glasses of ginger ale.”454 
This leads to three anisotropies that go together: (i) the anisotropy of 
time, (ii) the anisotropy of causation, and (iii) the anisotropy of scientific 
explanation.455 Because, on the one hand, causes normally precede the 
effects; and, on the other, if we want to explain a phenomenon or event it is 
not good enough to know its effects — subsequent to the phenomenon, but 
we have to consider the causes that are, in principle, prior to the 
phenomenon or event that we want to explain.456 In this way, Salmon rejects 
two logical-methodological symmetries that Grünbaum accepts: a) the 
symmetry between prediction and explanation; and b) the symmetry between 
retrodiction and explanation. 
 
3.2.2.  Are Retrodiction and Prediction Logically Equivalent? 
According to Grünbaum’s interpretation of Hempel and Oppenheim’s 
symmetry thesis, “in the retrodiction-prediction antithesis, a retrodiction is 
characterized by the fact that the Ci are later than E, while the Ci are earlier 
than E in the kind of prediction which is antithetical to retrodiction but not 
identical with Hempelian prediction.”457 For Grünbaum, as it could be seen in 
the figure exposed above, a retrodiction can be about past or future 
phenomena, so it could be equivalent to H-explanation or to H-prediction, 
respectively. The difference is that, in a retrodiction, information used to make 
the inference is subsequent to the explained or predicted phenomenon; that 
                                            
454 SALMON, W. C., “On the Alleged Temporal Anisotropy of Explanation,” p. 242. 
455 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 217. 
456 The temporal precedence of the cause with regard to the effect is something clear in 
Salmon’s approach: “Time and causality go hand in hand. The anisotropy of time is deeply 
connected to the anisotropy of causality. Causes come before their effects, not after them. 
Now, if one agrees that causality is an indispensable component of scientific explanations of 
particular events, it is natural to suppose that the anisotropy of time and causality would be 
reflected in an anisotropy of scientific explanation,” SALMON, W. C., “On the Alleged 
Temporal Anisotropy of Explanation,” pp. 242-243.  
457 GRÜNBAUM, A., “Temporally-Asymmetric Principles, Parity between Explanation and 
Prediction, and Mechanism versus Teleology,” p. 156. 
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is, the conditions used are subsequent conditions instead of antecedent 
conditions.458 
Salmon gives an example in which a prediction in the sense of Hempel 
(H-prediction) can be a retrodiction: “If, for example, the Astronomer Royal 
had, in 1917, established the state that the sun-moon-earth system would 
assume in 1921, and had (still in 1917) derived the occurrence of the 1919 
eclipse from the 1921 conditions, his inference would have been both a 
retrodiction and an H-prediction.”459 This notion of “retrodiction” as equivalent 
to “prediction” is not especially problematic, since the information used deals 
with events of the past or the present and is about eclipses, which have a 
well-known regularity. 
On this issue, Rescher’s account is the following: “any sort of rational 
prediction (…) will accordingly require informative input material that 
indicates that three conditions are satisfied: 1. that relevant information about 
the past-&-present can be obtained in an adequately timely, accurate, and 
reliable way, 2. that this body of data exhibits discernible patterns, and 3. that 
the patterns so exhibited are stable, so that this structural feature manifests a 
consistency that also continues into the future.”460  
It could be considered that, in Salmon’s example exposed above, these 
preconditions of rational prediction pointed out by Rescher are met in both 
cases: first, in the prediction about the state of the solar system in 1921; and, 
second, in the prediction of the eclipse of 1919 using a prediction made 
previously (the state of the solar system in a more distant future). However, 
this is certainly not the usual curse of action in scientific practice. 
In effect, as Salmon points it out, this usage of the term retrodiction 
“may seem a bit odd form the standpoint of the ordinary usage.”461 Because, 
                                            
458 See fig. 1 of Grünbaum, p. 139. 
459 SALMON, W. C., “On the Alleged Temporal Anisotropy of Explanation,” p. 235. 
460 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 86.  
461 SALMON, W. C., “On the Alleged Temporal Anisotropy of Explanation,” p. 235.  
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frequently, “retrodiction” is understood as a “prediction of past” (for example, 
an inference in the realm of archeology), instead of being a “prediction of 
future” made on the basis of subsequent conditions to the predicted event 
(for example, to anticipate in 1917 an eclipse that will occur in 1919 on the 
basis of the knowledge about the solar system’s state in 1921). 
Another piece of information that can clarify this discussion is the notion 
of “retrodiction” as “prediction of past,” which appears in authors such as 
Stephen Toulmin. Because he thinks, in effect, that prediction is an “assertion 
about the occurrence of a particular sort of event—whether in the past, 
present, or future.”462 In this regard, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez points out that 
prediction has a vague meaning in Toulmin “as a consequence of the sense 
of prediction as ‘testable implication’ whose reference could be in the past, 
present or future.”463 
It should be emphasized that, faced with this option with regard to 
temporality, Rescher does not accept this possible usage of the term 
“retrodiction” as prediction of past. Expressly, he claims that “a potential 
prediction of the supposed fact that a system will exhibit the characteristic Q 
at time t is an argument whose conclusion is the statement that the system 
exhibits Q at t.”464 Meanwhile, “a potential retrodiction of the purported fact 
that a system has exhibited the characteristic Q at time t is an argument 
whose conclusion is the statement that the system exhibits Q at t.”465 
Thus, on the basis of the language used, there is a clear difference 
between a prediction and a retrodiction. This is because, in Rescher’s 
judgment, scientific prediction has a content that is always oriented towards 
the future; whereas retrodiction is oriented towards the facts of the past. This 
                                            
462 TOULMIN, S. E., Foresight and Understanding, p. 31. 
463 GONZALEZ, W. J., “Scientific Prediction in the Beginning of the ‘Historical Turn:’ Stephen 
Toulmin and Thomas Kuhn,” Open Journal of Philosophy, v. 3, (2013), p. 355. 
464 RESCHER, N., “Discrete State Systems, Markov Chains, and Problems in the Theory of 
Scientific Explanation and Prediction,” p. 329.  
465 “Discrete State Systems, Markov Chains, and Problems in the Theory of Scientific 
Explanation and Prediction,” p. 329. 
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involves that, on the one hand, there cannot be an authentic “retrodiction” 
understood as “prediction of past,” insofar as — in his approach — prediction 
deals with a possible future. And, on the other hand, insofar as Rescher 
characterizes retrodiction as a statement that deals with something past, it 
cannot be equivalent to a prediction made from subsequent conditions, which 
is one of the senses of “retrodiction” that Grünbaum attributes to Hempel.466 
Another possibility about this problem is offered by the term 
“postdiction.” After the publication of Experience and Prediction, it has been 
claimed that the major innovation of Hans Reichenbach regarding the 
problem of prediction was the introduction of the term “postdictability” as 
opposed to “predictability.”467 With this notion of “postdictability” the temporal 
factor is emphasized, so what is “pre-dicted” is something previous to the 
phenomenon at issue; whereas what is “post-dicted” occurs once the 
phenomenon has happened. However, “prediction” and “retrodiction” are, in 
my judgment, different notions.468 The differences between them can be 
clearly seen in Reichenbach’s proposal on “postdictability.” 
 After Reichenbach, Imre Lakatos also used the term “postdiction,” but 
he does this in a way that “prediction” also encompasses post-diction: “I use 
‘prediction’ in a wide sense that includes ‘postdiction’,”469 which in his 
approach is a sort of “retrodiction.” Thus, for Lakatos, prediction can be about 
                                            
466 “A retrodiction as well as a prediction can be an H-prediction, and a prediction as well as 
a retrodiction can be an H-explanation,” GRÜNBAUM, A., “Temporally-Asymmetric Principles, 
Parity between Explanation and Prediction, and Mechanism versus Teleology,” p. 156. 
467 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, pp. 48-49. The notion of “postictability” 
appears for the first time in the book Philosophical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Cf. 
REICHENBACH, H., Philosophical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 1944, p. 13. 
468 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Reichenbach’s Concept of Prediction,” pp. 37-58; especially, pp. 
53-54. 
469 LAKATOS, I., “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programes,” in 
LAKATOS, I. and MUSGRAVE, A. (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 91-196. Reprinted in LAKATOS, I., The Methodology 
of Scientific Research Programmes. Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, p. 32, note. 
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past occurrences, instead of being always oriented towards the future.470 But 
it happens again that there are reasons for the differences between 
prediction and retrodiction, both in basic science and in applied science.471 
Because the anticipation of the possible future is not the same that the 
enunciation of a past, which is something that has already happened and 
therefore will not change. Human future is open, whereas the past is already 
closed (at least, with regard to the existence of the phenomena). This can be 
seen in the normal scientific practice, above all, when it is applied research 
(as well as in the subsequent phase of application of science). Because in 
applied science prediction is related to prescription. Thus, prediction offers 
knowledge about the possible future that is needed to solve the concrete 
problem posed. It is a role that cannot encompass “retrodiction,” “insofar a 
statement about the past does not offer us, in principle, any relevant 
information about the future whose problems we try to solve by means of the 
prescription.”472 
Now then, Lakatos’ focus of attention is in the methodologically positive 
character of prediction. Reichenbach, however, was not interested in the 
controversy about the logical symmetry or asymmetry between explanation 
and prediction. Nevertheless, Hempel and Oppenheim used Reichenbach’s 
proposal as a source that supports the symmetry thesis. In their judgment, 
“the logical similarity of explanation and prediction, and the fact that one is 
directed towards past occurrences, the other towards future ones, is well 
expressed in the terms ‘post-dictability’ and ‘predictability’ used by 
                                            
470 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Lakatos’s Approach on Prediction and Novel Facts,” pp. 499-518; 
and GONZALEZ, W. J., “The Evolution of Lakatos’s Repercussion on the Methodology of 
Economics,” pp. 1-25. 
471 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Prediction and Prescription in Biological Systems: The Role of 
Technology for Measurement and Transformation,” in BERTOLASO, M. (ed.), The Future of 
Scientific Practice: “Bio-Techno-Logos,” Pickering and Chatto, London, 2015, pp. 133-146 
and 209-213. 
472 GONZALEZ, W. J., “Prediction and Prescription in Biological Systems,” in BERTOLASO, M. 
(ed.), The Future of Scientific Practice: “Bio-Techno-Logos,” p. 139. 
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Reichenbach.”473 
But it is possible to think that Hempel and Oppenheim fail in their 
interpretation of Reichenbach’s proposal. They do this — in my judgment — 
in two different senses: a) insofar as they consider that “post-diction” can be 
equivalent to “explanation;” and b) when they consider that Reichenbach lay 
the foundations of the defense of the logical symmetry between “explanation” 
and “prediction.” It seems to me that, when the most notable features of 
Reichenbach’s conception of prediction are analyzed, this interpretation by 
Hempel and Oppenheim has problems. 
The key is that, for Reichenbach, the relation between the statements 
that deal with past phenomena and the statements about future 
depelopments does not rest on a possible logical symmetry, but on the 
probabilistic character of scientific knowledge. In his judgment, there is “a 
close connection between the weights of propositions concerning past events 
and predictions: their weights enter into the calculations of predictional values 
of future events which are in causal connection with the past event.”474 
Therefore, with the introduction of the term “postdictability,” 
Reichenbach “is emphasazing the limits of science in accordance with his 
probabilistic view.”475 This is because, in his judgment, “the same limitation 
follows for the determination of past data in terms of given observations, and 
that we therefore must also speak of a limitation of postdictability.”476 So 
Reichenbach is emphasizing that — as it happens with regard to prediction 
— “all relations between observational data are restricted to statistical 
relations.”477 
In The Direction of Time, Reichenbach also deals with the problems of 
postdictability. He points out there that there is an important difference 
                                            
473 HEMPEL, C. and OPPENHEIM, P., “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” p. 138, note 2a. 
474 REICHENBACH, H., Experience and Prediction. p. 27. 
475 GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 48. 
476 REICHENBACH, H., Philosophical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, p. 13. 
477 Philosophical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, p. 49. 
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between postdiction and prediction, which is due to the sort of information 
and knowledge required in each case: “Predictions require a knowledge of 
the total cause; postdictions, or statements about past events, can be based 
on partial effects, on records.”478 Thus, he highlights the divergent points 
between “predictability” and “postdictability,” that basically has to do with the 
epistemological and methodological realms. So he goes further that the mere 
temporal anisotropy between them. On this basis, it is possible to maintain 
that — in his approach — there is not a logical equivalence between 
“postdiction” and “prediction.” 
 
3.3. The Role of Inductive Logic with Regard to Scientific 
Prediction 
Habitually, the logical aspects of science are linked with deduction and 
induction, without rejecting a recent interest on abduction.479 Certainly, logic 
has to with deduction and Popper insisted — as well as other rationalist 
philosophers — on the nexus between prediction and deduction. Meanwhile, 
other empiricist-inspired authors, such as Reichenbach or Salmon, put effort 
into associating prediction with induction. If it is accepted that deduction is 
demonstrative whereas induction is not, then there are clear repercussions in 
terms of the validation of predictions.  
Rescher’s approach to induction has its own characters, since he offers 
an account which gives priority to the epistemological realm and, later, to the 
methodological level. This is because he is interested in a specific view on 
induction as a kind of ampliative reasoning. Thus, even when he 
acknowledges the logical basis of induction — and he also establishes 
                                            
478
 REICHENBACH, H., The Direction of Time, edited by M. Reichenbach, University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1956, p. 22. 
479 Cf. NEPOMUCENO, A., “Scientific Models of Abduction: The Role of Non Classical Logic,” in 
GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Bas van Fraassen’s Approach to Representation and Models in 
Science, Springer, Dordrecht, 2014, pp. 121-141; and SINTONEN, M., “Reasoning to 
Hypotheses: Where do Questions Come?,” Foundation of Science, v. 9, (2004), pp. 249-266. 
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several sorts of inductive inference — his attention is usually focused on the 
cognitive content provided by induction. He does this from a pragmatic 
approach, where the use of induction as a procedure to solve answers is 
highlighted. 
Within this framework, Rescher addresses the two facets of the problem 
of induction: a) its characterization, which has incidence for the subsequent 
use of induction in our science; and b) its justification, since he researches 
the bases that support induction as a process. In this regard, there are two 
different dimensions, although they are intertwined. On the one hand, in his 
approach, induction can be characterized as a mode of reasoning and, 
consequently, as an issue that has to do with Logic. And, on the other hand, 
Rescher’s justification of induction is pragmatic. Thus, the validity of an 
inductive argument is established on the basis of epistemological 
considerations (that is, with regard to the content of knowledge that it 
provides) and its methodological repercussions.480 
When the focus is on the use of induction by science, then we have that 
Rescher acknowledges the role of induction with regard to scientific 
prediction. This is because induction can lead to achieve statements about 
the future, based on the available information about the development 
followed by phenomena in the past and present. This activity, which gives 
relevance to induction for scientific prediction, can be seen in two successive 
levels. These levels have to do with the context of discovery and the context 
of justification, respectively: (i) induction as a procedure to achieve predictive 
statements; and (ii) the role of induction in the justification of prediction. 
 
3.3.1.  The Problem of Induction as Scientific Procedure 
                                            
480 Cf. RESCHER, N., “A Pragmatic Justification of Induction,” in RESCHER, N., Pragmatism. 
The Restoration of its Scientific Roots, Transaction Publishers, N. Brunswick, NJ, 2012, pp. 
133-149. 
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Undoubtedly, the problem of induction is one of the most debated and 
controversial issues in philosophy and methodology of science, in general, 
and in the sphere of logic of science, in particular. According to Hempel’s 
view of this topic, the so-called “problem of induction” can be divided, in 
principle, into two sub-problems.481 One has to do with the characterization of 
induction (what is induction and which kind of rules does the inductive 
reasoning follow?). The other sub-problem, which depends on the solution to 
the previous one, deals with the justification of induction (that is, the possible 
validation of the inductive reasoning).482 
When Rescher thinks of the problem of induction, he preferably takes 
into account the second sub-problem. Thus, in his book Induction, his focus 
of attention is on the problem of how to provide a pragmatic justification of 
induction. However, he also addresses the problem of the characterization 
(the first level of analysis). Nevertheless, his conception addresses a “broad” 
perspective on induction, instead of a “narrow” view. In his judgment, a 
“narrow” viewpoint of induction maintains that induction is a method for 
reasoning that allows us to achieve universal generalizations from supportive 
instances.483  
In contrast to this characterization of induction, of a clear logical 
inspiration, Rescher suggest a broader characterization in order to overcome 
some problems. His idea is to include “all of our rational devices for 
reasoning from evidence in hand to objective facts about the world. Induction, 
thus understood, will encompass the whole of ‘the scientific method’ of 
                                            
481 Cf. HILPINEN, R., “Hempel on the Problem of Induction,” in FETZER, J. H. (ed.), Science, 
Explanation, and Rationality. The Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel, p. 91.  
482 Cf. HEMPEL, C. G., “Turns in the Evolution of the Problem of Induction,” Synthese, v. 46, n. 
3, (1981), pp. 389-404; especially, pp. 389-390. 
483 Cf. RESCHER, N., Induction, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980, p. 2. As an example of the 
“narrow” viewpoint, Rescher mentions J. S. Mill’s approach to induction, of Aristotelian 
inspiration, that sees induction as “the operation of discovering and proving general 
propositions,” RESCHER, N., Induction, p. 2, n. 2. 
152 
 
reasoning, and in treating of the justification of induction we take in hand the 
validation of the processes of reasoning in the sciences.”484 
Within this “broad” perspective, it seems that Rescher assumes that, in 
principle, scientific procedures always encompasses an inductive element, 
insofar as they are based on the observation an experimentation of particular 
phenomena in order to achieve general statements. Thus, when the problem 
of the justification of induction is addressed, in his judgment, the validity of 
the typical mode of reasoning used in scientific praxis is also called into 
question. 
In his later works, Rescher basically maintains his initial view of 
induction, as it appears in his monograph Induction. He holds that it is a kind 
of reasoning that allow us to obtain answers to question through an optimal 
use of the available information.485 But, at the same time, he offers now 
additional elements for a more exhaustive characterization of induction. In 
this regard, he notices that “induction is a mode of reasoning that moves from 
premises that present presumably acceptable data to conclusions that make 
claims whose information extends above and beyond what those premises 
provide for.”486 Therefore, for him, the major characteristic of induction 
consists in its ampliative character. 
Expressly, Rescher points out that he understands the “ampliative” 
character of inductive reasoning in the same way that C. S. Peirce did it: “For 
Peirce, ‘ampliative’ reasoning is synthetic in that its conclusion goes beyond 
(‘trascends’) the information stipulated in the given premises (i.e., cannot be 
derived from them by logical processes of deduction alone), so that it ‘follows’ 
from them only inconclusively.”487 The inductive character of induction (that 
                                            
484 RESCHER, N., Induction, p. 2. 
485 Induction, pp. 19-20. 
486 RESCHER, N., “Induction as a Pragmatic Resource,” in RESCHER, N., The Pragmatic 
Vision. Themes in Philosophical Pragmatism, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2014, p. 
52. 
487 RESCHER, N., Induction, p. 6. 
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is, that induction provides new knowledge that is not stipulated in the 
premises) involves a clear different with respect to deductive Logic. 
This clear difference with deduction follows already known lines. 
Because Rescher claims that “we cannot pass by any sort of inference or 
cognitive calculation from the ‘premises’ of an inductive ‘argument’ to its 
‘conclusion’ because (ex hypothesi) this would be a deductive non sequitur—
the conclusion (in the very nature of the case) asserts something regarding 
which its premises are altogether silent. Clearly the paradigm mode of 
inference—of actually deriving a conclusion from the premises—is actual 
deduction, and this paradigm does not fit induction smoothly (…) With 
inductive reasoning there is always an epistemic (or conjectural) gap 
between the premises and the conclusion.”488 
Regarding the comparison between kinds of inferences from a logical 
point of view, it is usual to notice that inductive inferences are contingent, 
whereas deductive inferences are necessary.489 This has repercussions on 
scientific prediction. They affect its very possibility and reliability. This aspect 
can be seen with regard to one of the modes of inductive reasoning, which 
consists in the transition from the information about the past developments to 
the achievement of statements oriented towards the future. In this way, 
induction could be required to predict the possible future.490 
                                            
488 RESCHER, N., “Induction as a Pragmatic Resource,” in RESCHER, N., The Pragmatic 
Vision. Themes in Philosophical Pragmatism, p. 56. In this regard, besides the Peicean 
influence, Rescher quotes William Whewhell with approval. For Whewhell, deduction 
“descends steadily and methodically, step by step: Induction mounts by a leap which is out 
of the reach of method [or, at any rate, mechanical routine]. She bounds to the top of the 
stairs at once…,” WHEWELL, W., Novum Organon Renovatum, J. W. Parker and Son, 
London, 1858, p. 114. Text quoted in RESCHER, N., “Induction as a Pragmatic Resource,” pp. 
55-56. 
489 Cf. VICKERS, J., “The Problem of Induction,” in ZALTA, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall edition of 2014), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/induction-problem/ (access on 10.12.2014). 
490 “Deductive inference can never support contingent judgments such as meteorological 
forecasts, nor can deduction alone explain the breakdown of one's car, discover the 
genotype of a new virus, or reconstruct fourteenth century trade routes,” VICKERS, J., “The 
Problem of Induction,” in ZALTA, E. N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(access on 10.12.2014). 
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These considerations support Rescher’s rejection to what he calls 
“narrow” view on induction, in the line of authors such as J. Stuart Mill and 
many others who insist on the logical perspective on induction.491 Because, 
since inductive reasoning is ampliative — in contrast to deductive inference 
—, then it cannot be just a kind of inference that gets universal 
generalizations from particular cases. Thus, besides the reasoning that goes 
from the particular to the general, Rescher admits that there is a variety of 
modes of inductive reasoning: from the past to the future, from the sample to 
population, from the instance to the type, etc.492 
So he combines two aspects in his characterization of induction. On the 
one hand, there is the logical basis, which has to do with induction as an 
ampliative mode of reasoning that can follow different ways (particular to 
general, past to future, etc.); and, on the other hand, there is the 
epistemological dimension, which has primacy in Rescher’s approach. This is 
due to the ampliative character of inductive reasoning, which involves a 
cognitive gap, insofar as it goes further than the available information in order 
to provide new knowledge. In this way, he associates induction with its 
pragmatic usage, insofar as it is a procedure of question answering: 
“induction is at bottom an erotetic (question-answering) rather than an 
inferential (conclusion-deriving) procedure”493. 
 
3.3.2.  Justification of Induction: The Pragmatic Preference 
                                            
491 Within the wide bibliography on this matter, it can be highlighted the relation beween 
inductive Logic and probability. See, for example, BLACK, M., “Inducción,” Spanish version by 
Pascual Casañ, in BLACK, M., Inducción y probabilidad, Cátedra, Madrid, 1984, pp. 33-83; 
BLACK, M., “Probabilidad,” Spanish version by Rafael Beneyto, in BLACK, M., Inducción y 
probabilidad, pp. 85-148; GALAVOTTI, M. C., “The Modern Epistemic Interpretations of 
Probability: Logicism and Subjectivism,” in GABBAY, D. M., HARTMANN, S., WOODS, J., 
Handbook of the History of Logic. Vol. 10: Inductive Logic, Elsevier, Oxford, 2011, pp. 153-
203; GILLIES, D., Philosophical Theories of Probability, Routledge, London, 2000; and HÁJEK, 
A. and HALL, A., “Induction and Probability,” in MACHAMER, P. and SILBERSTEIN, M., The 
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science, Blackwell, Oxford, 2002, pp. 149-172,  
492 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Induction as a Pragmatic Resource,” p. 52. 
493 “Induction as a Pragmatic Resource,” p. 59. 
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Since inductive inferences are “ampliative” (i.e., they give a cognitive 
content that extends that provided by the available information), there is 
always certain risk of error.494 This leads to the second aforementioned level 
of the problem of induction, which has to do with its justification. Because, in 
contrast to deduction, inductive reasoning can lead to false conclusions on 
the basis of true premises.495 On this issue, David Hume’s proposals have 
greatly influenced the philosophical reflection on the validation of the 
inductive inferences.496 
This issue of the justification of induction can be addressed, in principle, 
from two different perspectives: the strictly logical perspective — in the sense 
of providing a proof of validity of an inductive conclusion — and the 
epistemological perspective, which appeals to the content of knowledge 
provided by the inductive reasoning. From the logical perspective, in the line 
of the Humean criticism of induction, it might be considered that it is 
impossible to justify the conclusion of the inductive reasoning as true. This 
means that induction is not demonstrative. So it is accepted that it is not 
possible to provide a proof in terms of truth as justification of an inductive 
inference.  
Once the logical path is abandoned with regard to problem of the 
justification of induction, Rescher adopts a basically epistemological 
perspective (the second possibility aforementioned) with methodological 
repercussions. In his approach there is a clear pragmatic component. This is 
                                            
494 Cf. VICKERS, J., “The Problem of Induction,” section 1, (access on 10.12.2014). 
495 “In valid deduction we are in the fortunate position of having premises that provide 
conclusive grounds for our conclusions: we have situations of fully supportive pro-
information. Induction effectively inverts this proceeding, resolving the questions we face 
correlatively with the minimum of contraindications. We seek to minimize the as-yet-visible 
risks in the inevitably risky venture of cognitive gap filling,” RESCHER, N., “Induction as a 
Pragmatic Resource,” p. 53. 
496 Cf. HUME, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1, edited by D. F. Norton and Mary J. 
Norton, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, book 1, part 3, section VI, pp. 61-65. In this 
regard, it can be seen LANGE, M., “Hume and the Problem of Induction,” in GABBAY, D. M., 
HARTMANN, S., and WOODS, J. (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic. Vol. 10: Inductive 
Logic, Elsevier, Oxford, 2011, pp. 43-91. 
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a solution which is coherent with his characterization of induction, where the 
epistemological dimension has primacy over the strictly logical 
considerations.497 Moreover, he thinks that the problem of the justification of 
induction is in no case a matter which could be solved on the basis of Logic. 
For this reason, he is inclined to “search a validation of induction on the basis 
of practical considerations.”498 
Firstly, Rescher acknowledges the problem that is posed by the 
Humean account with regard to induction: “Hume may be taken to have 
shown, with all the lucidity that philosophical arguments admit of, that there 
simply can be no ‘justification of induction’ by way of a demonstrative 
proof.”499 He considers that the Scottish empiricist was right when he 
maintained that it is not possible to demonstrate that a conclusion of an 
inductive inference is true. Thus, he assumes the intrinsic difficult that has 
the achievement of generalization of universal character from experience, 
which is something temporal and episodic.500 
But, secondly, Rescher notices that “it is senseless to make demands 
or impose conditions that cannot in the very nature of things be satisfied, and 
absurd to require a demonstration whose accomplishment is manifestly 
impracticable.”501 For this reason, Humean objection to induction does not 
lead Rescher to reject the validity of the inductive reasoning, since it is 
possible to provide a pragmatic justification of induction. Moreover, he 
accepts that it is possible to justify induction on the basis of epistemological 
reasons, which have methodological repercussions. Thus, the most important 
thing is not the inference oriented towards something general, but the ability 
                                            
497 On his own approach to induction, Rescher writes that “it sees induction not as a 
characteristic mode of drawing conclusions, but as an estimation technique, a methodology 
for obtaining answers to our factual questions through optimal exploitation of the information 
at our disposal,” RESCHER, N., Induction, p. 20. 
498 RESCHER, N., Personal Communication, 19.8.2014. 
499 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 64. 
500 RESCHER, N., Personal Communication, 19.8.2014. 
501 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 64. 
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of induction to solve questions in those contexts where the available 
information is limited or imperfect.502 
This kind of pragmatic justification suggested by Rescher is — my 
judgment — coherent with his characterization of induction. This is because, 
to the extent that he maintains that “induction is not really a mode of 
inference, strictly speaking, but rather one of estimation,”503 justification of 
induction cannot proceed on the basis of the rules of Logic.504 In turn, he also 
avoids a strictly empiricist approach, which in principle decontextualizes 
inductive reasoning from the situation. Instead of that, Rescher maintains that 
we must take into account the context and purpose of inductive reasoning.505 
From this epistemological-pragmatic perspective, the importance of 
induction for scientific prediction is emphasized. Insofar as Rescher 
understands induction as an enlargement of knowledge, this involves a clear 
nexus between induction and the anticipation of the future, at least at a 
general level: “It is undeniably possible to look upon an induction as an 
argument: a process of drawing a general conclusion of inherently future 
applicability from evidence regarding the past.”506 This is because “for to 
                                            
502 RESCHER, N., Personal Communication, 19.8.23014. 
503 RESCHER, N., “Induction as a Pragmatic Resource,” p. 63. 
504 In this regard, it is advisable to distinguish between “Logic,” as the study of the inferential 
principles and rules with a well-defined rigor, and “logic,” that can consist of processes of 
reasoning which seek an estimation oriented towards the truth. When Rescher thinks of 
“inductive logic,” he has usually in mind the second sense of “logic” (as truth estimation), so 
he assumes that inductive logic does not have the rigor that deductive logical rules have.  
The advisability of distinguishing Logic — as a rigorous formal science — form logic — 
understood as an approach that seeks general patterns without proving in a formal way that 
what is obtained is true — has been pointed out by W. J. Gonzalez in order to study the work 
of philosophers such as Karl Popper, who sometimes uses the first sense (when he appeals 
to formal logic as the basis of methodological approaches of general character), whereas in 
other occasions uses the second sense, which is wider (for example, in some approaches 
regarding the social sciences). These differences between the two possible senses can be 
seen in GONZALEZ, W. J., “La evolución del Pensamiento de Popper,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. 
(ed.), Karl Popper: Revisión de su legado, Unión Editorial, Madrid, 2004, pp. 23-194. 
505 “Induction is, in the final analysis, a venture in practical/purposive rather than in strictly 
theoretical/illuminative reasoning,” RESCHER, N., “Induction as a Pragmatic Resource,” p. 63. 
506 RESCHER, N., “A Pragmatic Justification of Induction,” p. 135. When Rescher analyses 
scientific prediction, he usually considers the realm of basic science, where inductive 
prediction can be a test for scientific theories. But the role of generic inductive prediction can 
be also addressed in the context of applied science (as the previous step to prescription) and 
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evidentiate our predictive claims about the future, we have no alternative but 
to look to the past-&-present.”507 This involves that, in order to predict the 
possible future, to use the mode of reasoning that goes from past to future 
can be an option (and it is a role that seems to be usual in certain time 
projections of available data). 
 
3.4.  Importance of Induction for Scientific Prediction 
If induction is seen as a kind of reasoning from past to future, then there 
is an inductive component that goes with scientific prediction: “All modes of 
rational prediction call for scanning the data at hand in order to seek out 
established temporal patterns, and then set about projecting such patterns 
into the future in the most efficient way possible. For sensible prediction is 
always a matter of rational economy, of adapting our expectations of the 
future to the occurrence structures of the past in the most simple and 
economical way that the epistemic circumstances of the case admit.”508 This 
involves assuming the economics of research, which is part of the economics 
of science proposed by Rescher. 
As a matter of fact, this pragmatist viewpoint based on the economics of 
research is central in Rescher’s approach to induction. In his conception, 
inductive reasoning oriented to prediction has a crucial role. In effect, one of 
the modes of induction that he mentions and accepts is related to the 
transition from past to future. So inductive reasoning can have a predictive 
orientation. Furthermore, he thinks that “it is, of course, true, and trivially true, 
that any authentic generalization must apply to future cases.”509  
 
                                                                                                                           
in the case of the application of science (for example, in business, where it is usual to make 
prediction on the basis of the trends observed in the past.) 
507 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 86. 
508 Predicting the Future, p. 86. 
509 RESCHER, N., “A Pragmatic Justification of Induction,” in RESCHER, N., Pragmatism. The 
Restoration of its Scientific Roots, p. 135. 
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3.4.1.  Role in the “Context of Discovery” 
Two different levels can be distinguished when the importance of 
induction to scientific prediction is addressed. One has to do with the context 
of discovery, where induction can be seen as a process that allows us to 
achieve predictive statements; whereas the other falls within the context of 
justification, where its task has to do with the validation of the predictive 
processes and their results.510 In turn, within this second level, two possible 
dimensions should be considered: a) justification of induction as a process to 
predict scientifically (that is, to what extent induction is a predictive 
“procedure” or a predictive “method”)511; and b) the role of induction for the 
justification of the results, that is, the content of prediction as such or the 
predictive theories. 
Rescher takes into account both the “context of discovery” and the 
“context of justification” when he develops his approach to induction. He is 
aware of the importance of induction to predict scientifically the possible 
future. In effect, he considers that “on the standard ‘inductive’ model of 
scientific method, the predictions of science are generated by logico-
mathematical derivations that apply general theories to situation-specific 
facts so as to preindicate future observations.”512 Thus, inductive process can 
lead to the discovery of new predictions, insofar as it is possible to anticipate 
                                            
510 Javier Echeverría has suggested enlarging the traditional distinction between “context of 
discovery” and “context of justification.” In his approach four contexts of scientific activity can 
be distinguished: context of education, context of innovation, context of evaluation, and 
context of application. He addresses this with regard to the axiology of research. So he 
insists on the axiological features of each of these contexts. Cf. ECHEVERRÍA, J., “El 
pluralismo axiológico de la Ciencia,” Isegoría, v. 12, (1995), pp. 44-79. 
In this study, the relation between scientific prediction and induction is addressed from a 
logical-methodological perspective. So the main interest is in how induction can be a process 
to obtain scientific predictions (the “context of discovery”) and how it is possible to validate 
predictive processes and results through induction (the “context of justification”). 
511 On this distinction between “predictive procedures” and “predictive methods,” see 
GONZALEZ, W. J., Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in 
Economics, chapter 10, pp. 251-284. 
512 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 161. 
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the possible future on the basis of the available information about the past 
and present occurrences. 
Furthermore, Rescher generally maintains that prediction is the result of 
an inference from the information about the things that already happened. 
Thus, an argument oriented towards prediction fits usually in the type of 
reasoning that goes from the past to the future. This seems clear if the 
preconditions of rational prediction are considered. These conditions are the 
following: a) data availability; b) pattern discernability; and c) pattern stability, 
so the patterns observed continue into the future.513 In this regard, induction 
can have a role with regard to the goals of scientific research when it seeks 
to predict the possible future. 
However, the patterns can change. Consequently, the development of 
phenomena in the future can be different from the patters followed in the 
past. Thus, there is uncertainty with regard to the future, so we have to 
acknowledge the limits to inductive prediction. For this reason, Rescher 
thinks that we have to deal with Hume criticism of induction, which has clear 
consequences for the prediction obtained on the basis of the available 
information about something that has already happened. De facto, Rescher 
is mainly interested in the justification of the inductive process that is oriented 
toward question-answering regarding the possible future, which has 
repercussions on the problem of inductive predictions’ reliability. 
 
3.4.2.  Task in the “Context of Justification” 
As Rescher notices, “for Hume, the predictive aspect of all attempts to 
use available evidence to establish general conclusions calls for ‘the 
transferring of past experience to the future,’ a process he saw as predicated 
                                            
513 Cf. Predicting the Future, pp. 86-88. There is a deeper treatment on this topic in the 
chapter 5 of this Ph.D. 
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on the assumption ‘that the future resembles the past.’”514 In Hume’s 
judgment, since experience is the only rational justification to admit this 
assumption, “there is no rational warrant for our inductive predictions. Its only 
basis lies in a habit-established psychological expectation.”515 
However, it seems clear that, contrary to what Hume maintained, 
Rescher does not think that inductive prediction requires the assumption that 
future invariably resembles the past. Instead of this position, he accepts that 
there can be changes in phenomena, because the predicted phenomena 
may be irregular. Even more, he explicitly recognizes that obstacles such as 
choice, chance or chaos are common. From this point of view, phenomena 
may follow unprecedented pattern, so there are clear limits to the predictions 
obtained through inductive reasoning.516 
Thereby it is not possible to justify inductive prediction by merely 
accepting the regularity of phenomena, since the patterns can change. For 
this reason, even when Rescher accepts Hume’s criticism of inductive 
reasoning, he thinks that a change of perspective is required to deal with the 
problem of the validation of induction. This change of perspective — which is 
coherent with his characterization of induction as a mode of reasoning 
oriented towards question-answering — consists of putting the strictly logical 
viewpoint aside and taking an epistemological approach, which has 
methodological repercussions. He sees the problem form a pragmatic 
viewpoint, which involves a contextual character.  
In effect, Rescher addresses two problems related to the context of 
justification — the justification of induction as a process for predicting in a 
scientific way and its role for the justification of the results — within a 
                                            
514 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 64. According Hume, “there can be no 
demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had no 
experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience,” HUME, D., A Treatise of 
Human Nature, vol. 1, edited by D. F. Norton and Mary J. Norton, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2007, book 1, part 3, section VI, p. 62. 
515 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 64. 
516 Cf. Predicting the Future, p. 134.  
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framework that is clearly pragmatic. As a process used to predict the future, 
he thinks that there are two reasons to use induction in scientific practice: 1) 
utility, insofar as we know that induction may succeed as a predictive 
process; and 2) improvement, insofar as induction offers a better prospect of 
success than other alternatives.517 
According to these reasons offered by Rescher, it seems to me that 
there are several issues at stake that he does not explicitly state. (i) Induction 
has a role in the context of discovery insofar as it allows us to obtain 
predictions. Thus, it is relevant with regard to the aims of the research, since 
the kind of inductive inference that goes from past to future leads us to obtain 
predictive hypotheses. (ii) Induction has also a role in the context of 
justification. It appears in two successive levels, which have to do with the 
processes and the results. a) Regarding the processes, there is the problem 
of the justification of the use of induction as a procedure for predicting the 
future in a scientific way. b) With regard to the results, justification deals with 
the statements about the future (the inductive predictions). This involves the 
problems related to the quantity and quality of the observations and 
experiments (to what extent they have evidential value with regard to the 
predictions obtained). 
The solution that Rescher gives to the problems related to justification 
— that deal with the processes and the results — is contained, in my 
judgment, in his account of methodological pragmatism; because, in effect, 
“Rescher argues that a method of inquiry whose use systematically meets 
with success is to be seen as truth-indicative. False belief may sometimes 
lead to success, but it could hardly be supposed to do so on a routine 
basis.”518 According to this methodological pragmatism, we can “monitor tour 
                                            
517 Cf. Predicting the Future, p. 64. 
518 SANKEY, H., “Why is it Rational to Believe Scientific Theories Are True?,” in CHEYNE, C. 
and WORRALL, J. (eds.), Rationality and Reality. Conversations with Alan Musgrave, 
Springer, Dordrecht, 2006, p. 126. 
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acceptance of theses via the methods that substantiate them, and then 
validate these methods by pragmatic tests—specifically considerating how 
well we fare in applying and implementing its professed claims in matters of 
prediction and control.”519 
Thus, in the first place, the validity of the predictive statements of 
inductive character is assessed on the basis the methods that substantiate 
those statements. Then, in the second place, the validity of the methods is 
evaluated with regard to their ability to give successful predictions (i.e., 
statements regarding the future). Therefore, according to Rescher, the 
justification of the results involves taking into account the processes that lead 
to those results. If those processes have been systematically successful with 
regard to prediction, then it could be said that the result is valid.  
It seems clear that Rescher’s methodological pragmatism involves itself 
an inductive element, since it is rooted in an inference that goes from past to 
the future. In effect, results are considered valid if the method used has 
achieved — in the past — a systematic success in matters related to 
prediction and the control of phenomena. Thus, on the basis of past 
experience, we conclude that the method at issue will also lead to reliable 
results in the future. From this perspective, the justification of induction — 
both with regard to processes and results — is a pragmatic issue, and the 
most important thing is the ability to have predictive success. 
This pragmatic perspective leads Rescher to criticize in an explicit way 
Hans Reichenbach’s approach to induction.520 Because, for Reichenbach, 
the conclusion of an inductive reasoning can be accepted to the extent that it 
is our best posit or wager with regard to the future: “What we obtain is a 
wager; and it is the best wager we can lay because it corresponds to a 
procedure the applicability of which is the necessary condition of the 
                                            
519 RESCHER, N., Realistic Pragmatism. An Introduction to Pragmatic Philosophy, p. 96. 
520 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 258, note 92. 
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possibility of predictions. To fulfill the conditions sufficient for the attainment 
of true predictions does not lie in our power; let us be glad that we are able to 
fulfill at least the conditions necessary for the realization of this intrinsic aim 
of science.”521 
Although there is no objection to accept, in principle, that “an absolute 
reliability of the predictions cannot be warranted”522 there are reasons to 
reject that “it would be illusory to imagine that terms ‘true’ or ‘false’ ever 
expressed anything else than high or low probability values.”523 In effect, 
predictions’ fallibility is a feature that Rescher and Reichenbach’s accounts 
have in common; but Reichenbach’s notion of “prediction” is a really weak 
characterization of scientific prediction, insofar as he associates the 
statements about the future with posits or wagers. 
Expressly, Rescher objects the approach of Reichenbach to prediction 
in terms of a wager: “Hans Reichenbach (…) saw the matter [the problem of 
induction] not as one of establishing knowledge but rather as making a 
bet.”524 As opposed to the conception of the logical empiricists of the Berlin 
School, which associates prediction with induction and relates induction to 
the theory of probability in frequentist terms, Rescher insists on the 
epistemological component of induction, which he considers from a genuinely 
pragmatic perspective. Because, in his judgment, “the validation of an 
inductive knowledge of the future must in the end be founded on the non- or 
preinductive basis of essentially practical reasoning. What we have here is 
not a theoretical demonstration of a thesis but a pragmatic validation of a 
cognitive praxis.”525 
                                            
521 REICHENBACH, H., Experience and Prediction, p. 357. 
522 Experience and Prediction, p. 86. 
523 REICHENBACH, H., “Logistic Empiricism in Germany and the Present State of its 
Problems,” Journal of Philosophy, v. 33, n. 6, (1936), p. 156. 
524 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 258, n. 92. 
525 Predicting the Future, p. 65. 
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Therefore, the problem of induction is not a matter of making a “wager” 
— according to Reichenbach’s expression. Instead of this path, we have to 
proceed in a rational way in science, according to the available information, 
which is usually imperfect. For Rescher, to predict is a rational activity, which 
is oriented towards answering in the best possible way the questions we 
have about the world’s future developments. From this pragmatic 
perspective, which sees to problem solving, the justification of the use of 
induction as a predictive procedure is ultimately rooted in the capability of 
those procedures developed on the basis of induction to obtain successful 
predictions.  
 
3.5.  Possible Limits of Deductivism to Scientific Prediction 
Karl R. Popper maintained a logical-methodological approach to 
scientific prediction of an expressly deductivist character.526 In effect, the 
Viennese philosopher thought that he had found a solution to the problem of 
induction527, which involved its complete rejection as a logical-methodological 
procedure.528 This has clear consequences for prediction, since — in his 
judgment — the Logic of prediction is the deductive Logic: “Corroboration has 
no inductive aspect; and the logic of prediction consists, simply, in deducting 
predictions from hypotheses plus initial conditions. In other words, the logic of 
prediction is the ordinary deductive logic and nothing else.”529 From this 
                                            
526 On Popper’s approach to scientific prediction, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “The Many Faces of 
Popper’s Methodological Approach to Prediction,” in CATTON, PH. and MACDONALD, G. (eds.), 
Karl Popper: Critical appraisals, Routledge, London, 2004, pp. 78-98; and GONZALEZ, W. J., 
La predicción científica, chapter 2, pp. 55-89. On the influence of falsificationism on 
prediction in economics, see GONZALEZ, W. J., Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of 
Prediction and its Role in Economics, chapter 3, pp. 79-101. 
527 “I think that I have solved a major philosophical problem: the problem of induction,” 
POPPER, K. R., “Conjectural Knowledge: My Solution of the Problem of Induction,” in POPPER, 
K. R., Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972 (5th 
revised ed., 1979), p. 1. 
528 Nevertheless, Popper finally admits that we need a whit of induction to achieve general 
statements. Cf. POPPER, K. R., “Replies to my critics,” in SCHILPP, P. A. (ed.), The Philosophy 
of Karl Popper, vol. 2, Open Court, La Salle, IL, 1974, p. 1193. 
529 POPPER, K. R., “Replies to my Critics,” in SCHILPP, P. A. (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl 
Popper, vol. 2, p. 1030. 
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perspective, scientific prediction cannot be made on the basis of an inductive 
inference. 
It is an approach that “assumes that, among the array of generalizations 
that are compatible with the available observational evidence, there is a 
rational basis in favor of one unrefuted generalization (conjecture, 
hypothesis, etc.) instead of others for use in a predictive argument.”530 
Therefore, there are rational bases for the preference of a generalization 
instead of another one, where “corroboration” also has a role. In this regard, 
Popperian notion of corroboration involves that corroboration only allows us 
to judge past performance of a theory, but it is not possible to use it to predict 
future performance.531 
Wesley Salmon made a valuable critique of this Popperian proposal. In 
his paper on rational prediction,532 Salmon highlights the problems that may 
have a logical approach to prediction that is developed on purely deductive 
basis, such as the Popperian approach.533 In this regard, he goes more 
deeply in something that Reichenbach had already made: Salmon seeks to 
analyze the limits of deductivism to the problem of scientific prediction.534 
Within an approach that combines a defense of Logic as the basis of 
induction and probability as a key element for the philosophy of science, 
Reichenbach maintains that Popper fails when he discards the notion of 
                                            
530 GONZALEZ, W. J., Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in 
Economics, p. 86. 
531 Cf. POPPER, K. R., Unended Quest. An Intellectual Autobiography, Fontana/Collins, 
London, 1976 (enlarged edition, Routledge, London, 1992; reprinted in 2002), p. 103. 
532 SALMON, W. C., “Rational Prediction,” pp. 115-125. (Reprinted in GRÜNBAUM, A. and 
SALMON, W. C. (eds.), The Limitations of Deductivism, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1988, pp. 47-60.) 
533 An analysis of Salmon’s criticism to Popper’s proposal is in GONZALEZ, W. J., 
Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in Economics, pp. 85-87. 
534 “I (…) unfortunately feel compelled to declare my opposition to the theses presented in 
Popper’s book, for they appear to me to be completely untenable,” REICHENBACH, H., “Über 
Induktion und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Bemerkungen zu Karl Poppers Logik der Forschung,” 
Erkenntnis, v. 5, n. 4, (1935), pp. 267-284. Translated by E. Schneewind: “Induction and 
Probability. Remarks on Karl Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery,” in REICHENBACH, 
H., Selected Writings, vol. 2, edited by M. Reichenbach and R. Cohen, Reidel, Dordrecht, 
1978, p. 372. 
167 
 
probability: “Contrary to his claims: 1. The process of falsifying a theory 
contains the concept of probability. 2. The procedure for constructing a new 
theory contains the concept of probability.”535 This is an element that 
supports the need of induction, since according to Reichenbach the inductive 
inference allows us to obtain probability statements that, in turn, are the basis 
of the statements about the future.536 
Salmon also criticizes the insufficiency of deductivism to give an 
adequate basis for rational prediction. However, he does this from a 
perspective that is different from that adopted by Reichenbach, where it is 
required to take into account the purpose of the prediction. For Salmon, there 
are at least three reasons that can lead us to predict. “First, we are 
sometimes curious about future happening, and we want to satisfy that 
curiosity (…) Second, we sometimes make predictions for the sake of testing 
a theory. (…) Third, we sometimes find ourselves in situations in which some 
practical action is required, and the choice of an optimal decision depends 
upon predicting future occurrences.”537 
Therefore, together with the future knowledge provided by prediction 
and its role as a test of scientific theories, Simon acknowledges the practical 
dimension, where prediction is linked with decision-making. Rescher also 
admits those roles of prediction.538 However, these options do not exhaust 
the complete framework of the uses of prediction. Because in science, 
besides basic science — which seeks to explain and to predict, there is 
                                            
535 REICHENBACH, H., “Induction and Probability. Remarks on Karl Popper’s The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery,” in REICHENBACH, H., Selected Writings, vol. 2, p. 373. 
536 “Probability propositions express relative frequencies of repeated events, that is, 
frequencies counted as a percentage of the total. They are derived from frequencies 
observed in the past and include the assumption that the same frequencies will hold 
approximately for the future. They are constructed by means of an inductive inference,” 
REICHENBACH, H., “Predictive Knowledge,” p. 236. 
537 SALMON, W. C., “Rational Prediction,” pp. 115-116. 
538 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, passim. He has also related his approach to 
prediction with decision-making in RESCHER, N., “Predictive Incapacity and Rational 
Decision,” European Review, v. 3, n. 4, (1995), pp. 327-332. Collected in RESCHER, N., 
Sensible Decisions. Issues of Rational Decision in Personal Choice and Public Policy, 
Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2003, pp. 39-47. 
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applied science — which relates prediction and prescription — and there is 
also the application of science, where predictions are required too.539 
The proposal of Salmon has consequences for the choice between 
different generalizations that have not been refuted. Because in order to 
prefer a generalization instead of another one, it is required to take into 
account the purpose of the generalization. This involves that, on the basis of 
the different reasons to predict, the distinction between two kinds of 
preferences should be considered: the theoretical preference and the 
practical preference.540 Thus, with regard to the practical preference, Salmon 
considers that Popper was wrong when he maintained that corroboration 
cannot be used to predict future performance. 
In Popper’s judgment, corroboration can motivate the preference of a 
theory, although it has not predictive import; but, for Salmon, the problem is 
how it is possible to justify this preference.541 Because “in order to make a 
prediction, one must choose a conjecture which has predictive content to 
serve as a premise in a predictive argument. In order to make a rational 
prediction, it seems to me, one must make a rational choice of a premise for 
such an argument. But from our observational evidence and from the 
statements about the corroboration of a given conjecture, no predictive 
appraisal follows.”542 
Through his alternative to Popper’s approach, Salmon combines the 
positive character of experience with the pragmatic component of decision-
making and the reliability of predictions. Thus, we need to solve “how it could 
be rational to judge theories for purposes of prediction in terms of a criterion 
                                            
539 See GONZALEZ, W. J., “The Roles of Scientific Creativity and Technological Innovation in 
the Context of Complexity of Science,” pp. 11-40; especially, pp. 17-18. When Salmon 
criticizes Popper, he only thinks of basic sciences and the ordinary uses of prediction 
(curiosity and decision-making in daily life).   
540 Cf. SALMON, W. C., “Rational Prediction,” p. 118. 
541 “Rational Prediction,” p. 121. 
542 SALMON, W. C., “Rational Prediction,” p. 119. 
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which is emphatically claimed to be lacking in predictive import.”543 Even 
more, in order to have an adequate conception of rational prediction, this 
problem of the justification of the choice between general statements must be 
solved. 
For Salmon, the solution to this issue requires to distinguish between 
predictive content and predictive import. Because “statements whose 
consequences refer to future occurrences may be said to have predictive 
content; rules, imperatives, and directives are totally lacking in predictive 
content because they do not entail any statements at all. Nevertheless, an 
imperative—such as ‘No smoking, please’—may have considerable 
predictive import, for it may effectively achieve the goal of preventing the 
occurrence of smoking in a particular room in the immediate future.”544 
With this distinction between predictive content and predictive import, 
Salmon highlights how corroboration statements can have predictive import, 
even when they are not about future happenings.545 On this issue, Rescher 
position is clear: “of course past performance is a predictive indicator. (What 
could possibly serve better?) What past performance does not enable one to 
do is to predict with failproof accuracy”546. Thus, Rescher insists in the 
legitimacy of the use of induction, although the fallibility of the inductive 
prediction must be acknowledged. 
Criticism of Popper’s deductivist conception is especially important for 
Rescher, since his methodological pragmatism cannot be supported by 
                                            
543 “Rational Prediction,” p. 122. 
544 SALMON, W. C., “Rational Prediction,” p. 123. 
545 In Predicting the Future Rescher makes a distinction similar to Salmon’s. It consists of 
distinguishing between “predictive import” and “predictive inference”. Thus, on the one hand, 
there are theories which make predictive inferences; that is, they are theories which can 
provide statements about the future. And, on the other hand, there are theories which deal 
with the past and, consequently, they do not make predictions; but they can have predictive 
import, so they can provide the content required to make predictive inferences (for example, 
the theory of evolution), cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 161. The similitudes 
between them have been noticed by Wenceslao J. Gonzalez, cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La 
predicción científica, p. 266. 
546 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 260, n. 112. 
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exclusively deductive bases. There is room for induction in Rescher’s 
methodological pragmatism. Thus, a thesis can be justified methodologically. 
The procedure follows two successive steps.547 In the first place, a thesis is 
methodologically justified through the application of a cognitive method for 
the validation or substantiation of factual claims.548 In the second place, the 
adoption of this method is justified on the basis of practical criteria, which are 
preeminently two: “success in prediction and efficacy in control.”549 
This two steps procedure can be applied to the inductive practices. 
Instead of appealing to Logic, Rescher thinks that induction can be 
methodologically justified; that is, it can be supported assessing if the 
inductive practice of obtaining generalizations on the basis of the available 
evidence works.550 To do this, experience must have a positive role in the 
substantiation of generalizations, so — for Rescher — falsification does not 
suffice in this regard. 
The Popperian logical-methodological pairing of falsification-refutation is 
considered by Rescher as something marginal. Thus, “of course, an 
evidentially falsified or disconfirmed generalization must be ruled out, but this 
step does not take us far. The absence of evidential invalidation is no 
touchstone of truth—as any statician knows from curve-fitting problems; 
mutually incompatible generalizations may yet be compatible with all the 
evidence.”551 
Because Rescher explicitly considers that falsification — and, therefore, 
refutation — does not suffice, experience must have a positive role for the 
justification of a generalization. But it happens that we cannot establish that a 
generalization is true on the basis of the available evidence: “Where 
generalizations are concerned, finite evidence cannot go as far as to yield 
                                            
547 Cf. Methodological Pragmatism, p. 67. 
548 Cf. RESCHER, N., Methodological Pragmatism, p. 15. 
549 Methodological Pragmatism, p. 67. 
550 Cf. RESCHER, N., “A Pragmatic Justification of Induction,” pp. 135-136. 
551 “A Pragmatic Justification of Induction,” p. 136. 
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assured truth, and so the ‘it works’ at issue cannot mean success at 
providing correct (true) empirical generalizations.”552 In this regard, his 
concern is the same that Salmon shows in his paper on rational prediction: 
how is it possible to choose in a rational way among several generalizations 
that are incompatible amongst each other, but are compatible with the 
available evidence. 
On this issue, Rescher takes again a pragmatic criterion. Thus, for him, 
it is not an issue of “establishing an empirical generalization, but validating 
the rationality of a practice (an epistemic practice, to be sure, by which 
generalizations are supported).”553 To do this, the purpose that is sought by 
the practice must be taken into account. This is because to establish the 
validity of an epistemic practice is a matter that directly depends on the 
efficacy and efficiency in the achievement of the aim sought, since epistemic 
practices are means than seek to achieve a certain aim.554 
From this perspective, the methodological pragmatism suggested by 
Rescher requires to use the past performance of the methods (among them, 
inductive procedures) as an indicator of their predictive success in the future. 
But, “to be sure, its experiential support through evidence-in-hand regarding 
its record of success does not prove that a method will succeed in future 
applications. But the probative weight of experience cannot be altogether 
discounted: established success must be allowed to carry some weight.”555 
Once again, Rescher notices that the impossibility of proving the truth of 
a generalization should not lead to reject the positive role of experience and 
the validity of the inductive reasoning. This is because, on the basis of 
pragmatic considerations, he thinks that the use of past performance as a 
predictive indicator to establish generalizations is a valid procedure. Thus, 
                                            
552 RESCHER, N., “A Pragmatic Justification of Induction,” p. 136. 
553 “A Pragmatic Justification of Induction,” p. 139. 
554 Cf. RESCHER, N., Methodological Pragmatism, passim. 
555 RESCHER, N., “A Pragmatic Justification of Induction,” p. 141. 
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through a different way, he achieves the same background conclusion that 
Salmon reached: deduction alones does not suffice for scientific prediction. 
Therefore, when prediction is analyzed from the logic of science, which 
deals with the structural features of scientific theories, there are several 
questions at stake. Firstly, there are the problems that arise when prediction 
is compared with scientific explanation in terms of their logical structure. In 
this regard, it seems clear that there is a logical asymmetry between 
explanation and prediction, so a structural equivalence between both 
processes can be rejected. Secondly, the perspective of temporality gives 
more elements in favor of the asymmetry thesis, at the same time that it 
offers an adequate framework to address the analysis of the logical 
differences between prediction and retrodiction. 
Thirdly, there is the problem of induction, which Rescher tries to solve in 
a positive way. Thus, he thinks that it is possible to justify the validity of the 
inductive reasoning for scientific prediction on the basis of pragmatic 
considerations. This involves a change of perspective, since the strictly 
logical perspective is rejected in favor of an epistemological approach to 
induction that has methodological repercussions. Finally, this leads to pose 
the problem of the limits of deductivism to prediction. In this regards, the 
elements offered by Rescher and Salmon’s criticism emphasize the 
insufficiency of deductivism to solve the problems posed by scientific 
prediction. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL FACTORS OF SCIENTIFIC PREDICTION 
 
Initially, scientific prediction can be characterized as a kind of prediction 
based on reasons. This feature connects the epistemological field of 
prediction with the general realm of human rationality, which leads to the 
specific realm of scientific rationality. In this regard, Nicholas Rescher’s 
epistemology of scientific prediction has links with his approach to 
rationality.556 He accepts a normative conception of rationality and gives 
primacy to practical reason, which, in turn, leads to an evaluative rationality. 
In his judgment, rationality is not a simple matter of adjustment of means to 
ends, because the very ends should be subjected to rational deliberation.557 
His approach is in terms of practicable rationality, which has similitudes with 
Herbert A. Simon’s bounded rationality.558 
Within this framework, the present chapter addresses Rescher’s 
approach to rationality and the problems that arise due to its relation with 
predictive knowledge. Although he insists on the primacy of practice,559 
                                            
556 Rescher has addressed the problem of rationality in many publications. But, among them, 
it can be highlighted RESCHER, N., Rationality. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and the 
Rationale of Reason, passim. Among his papers devoted to this topic, some should be 
emphasized: RESCHER, N., “Pragmatism and Practical Rationality,” pp. 43-60; RESCHER, N., 
“Homo Optans: On the Human Condition and the Burden of Choice,” in RESCHER, N., Studies 
in Philosophical Anthropology, Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm, 2006, pp. 1-7; and RESCHER, 
N., “Rationality and Moral Obligation,” in RESCHER, N., Studies in Philosophical 
Anthropology, pp. 79-93. 
557 See, for example, RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, pp. 77-
90. 
558 On the notion of bounded rationality, see the papers compiled in SIMON, H. A., Models of 
Bounded Rationality. Vol. 1: Economic Analysis and Public Policy, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1982; SIMON, H. A., Models of Bounded Rationality. Vol. 2: Behavioral 
Economics and Business Organization, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982; and SIMON, 
H. A, Models of Bounded Rationality. Vol. 3: Empirically Grounded Economic Reason, The 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997. 
It might be considered that Rescher is in tune with Simon with regard to the bounded 
character of human rationality, in general, and scientific rationality, in particular. However, 
Rescher’s approach to rationality is broader, to the extent that he accepts an evaluative 
rationality or rationality of ends. Meanwhile, for Simon, rationality is mainly instrumental (that 
is, it is a rationality of means). 
559 RESCHER, N., The Primacy of Practice, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1973. On this feature of 
Rescher’s philosophy of science, see MARSONET, M., The Primacy of Practical Reason. An 
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knowledge is his starting point, so the cognitive realm is crucial in his 
conception of human rationality, in general, and scientific rationality, in 
particular. Thus, firstly, his theory of rational choice is analyzed. It is a holistic 
theory, according to which human being’s abilities for reason are bounded. 
Secondly, the main types of rationality (cognitive, practical, and evaluative) 
are addressed. These types of rationality, as Rescher admits, can be 
detected in I. Kant.560 In addition, their relation with scientific prediction is 
considered, insofar as prediction is — for Rescher — the result of a rational 
process. 
Thirdly, the attention goes to the fallibilism that characterizes Rescher’s 
epistemological approach, which is also related to predictive knowledge. 
Regarding this issue, two questions arise: a) the problem of determining the 
truth of the predictive statements, and b) the knowledge of the variables 
important for the prediction. Fourthly, the epistemological limits to 
predictability are analyzed, where the problem of uncertainty can be 
highlighted. Moreover, other problem considered is how these limits can 
affect the decisions made by using knowledge about the future. Finally, the 
problem of risk is analyzed in relation with cognitive rationality, as a 
framework for addressing the nexus between risk and scientific prediction. 
 
4.1.  A Holistic Theory of Rationality 
Rescher suggests an approach to rationality that gives primacy to the 
practical dimension, so it is not a “pure reason.”561 Thus, he differentiates the 
realm of the intelligence from the field of rationality, where there a diversity of 
possibilities. Initially, rationality has two sectors: one theoretical and the other 
                                                                                                                           
Essay on Nicholas Rescher's Philosophy, passim. 
560 Cf. RESCHER, N., Rationality. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and the Rationale of 
Reason, pp. 2-3. 
561 On Rescher’s proposal about scientific rationality, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “Racionalidad 
científica y actividad humana: Ciencia y valores en la Filosofía de Nicholas Rescher,” in 
RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, pp. 11-44; especially, pp. 24-
27. 
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practical. The latter has primacy in his approach, insofar as the pragmatic 
dimension prevails. But he admits that human rationality is subject to 
limits,562 which are noticeable in the cognitive realm. Then, he rejects the 
notion of “maximization,” which involves having the whole range of 
possibilities in a context, and suggests the concept of “optimization,” which 
means the acknowledgement of limitations, so it is oriented towards the best 
we can do in each concrete context.563 
His approach to rationality — above all, in the cognitive domain — has 
certain parallelism with Herbert A. Simon’s proposal, insofar as he assumes 
de facto an approach of bounded rationality. But their philosophical roots are 
different: Simon is an empiricist. He learnt it from R. Carnap’s positivism.564 
Furthermore, the notion of “optimization” in Rescher is different from the 
concept of “satisfaction” proposed by Simon.565 The difference between both 
approaches is mainly rooted in two issues: I) the normative character of 
Rescher’s proposal on rationality, in contrast to the preferential descriptive 
character of Simon’s approach; and II) Rescher’s attention to the evaluative 
realm of rational, which does not appear in Simon’s proposal. 
 
4.1.1.  The Realm of Rationality: Knowledge, Actions, and Values 
Because Rescher considers that the intellectual field is very important 
to address human matters, he sees intelligence and rationality as “two sides 
                                            
562 As rational activity, prediction is a task subjected to limits; among them, there are 
epistemological limits.  
563 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Maximization, Optimization, and Rationality. On Reasons why 
Rationality is not Necessarily a Matter of Maximization,” in RESCHER, N., Ethical Idealism. An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Function of Ideals, pp. 55-84. 
564 Cf. SIMON, H. A., Models of my Life, Basic Books, N. York, NY, 1991 (reprinted in MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996). Rudolf Carnap was one of his professors at the University of 
Chicago. On Simon’s position, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “Herbert A. Simon: Filósofo de la 
Ciencia y economista (1916-2001),” in GONZALEZ, W. J., Racionalidad, historicidad y 
predicción en Herbert A. Simon, pp. 7-63. 
565 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Maximization, Optimization, and Rationality. On Reasons why 
Rationality is not Necessarily a Matter of Maximization,” in RESCHER, N., Ethical Idealism. An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Function of Ideals, pp. 55-84. 
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of the same coin.”566 In his judgment, “the structure of rationality is a matter 
of system, not of sequence.”567 In this way, intelligence is an instrument of 
rationality. In effect, he considers that “to behave rationally is to make use of 
one’s intelligence to figure out the best thing to do in the circumstances.”568 
Thus, he uses the concept of “intelligence” in order to characterize what 
human rationality consists of. 
But, sometimes, Rescher uses both notions interchangeably; for 
example, when he notices the difference between the ability to being rational 
and the exercise of that ability: “there is a crucial distinction between having 
the capacity for intelligent (rational) action and exercising this capacity 
intelligently (rationally).”569 In effect, one thing is being able to do something 
in an intelligent way and another thing is achieving that exercise in the 
practical life. However, he admits that rationality is broader than the simple 
intelligence, since it encompasses several realms. Thus, when he 
characterizes rationality as the intelligent pursuit of the appropriate ends, he 
notices that “ʻintellligenceʼ indicates cognition, ʻpursuitʼ action, and 
ʻappropriatenessʼ evaluation”570. So rationality encompasses three different 
areas: cognition, action, and evaluation; while intelligence is mainly related to 
cognition. 
The distinction between “intelligence” and “reason” seems clearer when 
Rescher addresses the faculties demanded by rationality. He notices that the 
rational subject must have five faculties: imagination, information-processing, 
evaluation, selection—informed choice, and agency.571 Both informed choice 
                                            
566 RESCHER, N., “The Light of Reason,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. 
Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 4. 
567 RESCHER, N., Rationality. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and the Rationale of 
Reason, p. 124. 
568 RESCHER, N., “The Light of Reason,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. 
Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 4. 
569 “The Light of Reason,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: Human 
Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 10. 
570 RESCHER, N., Epistemology. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, p. 188. 
571 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 11. 
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and agency — that is defined by Rescher as the capacity to implement 
choices — indicate that rationality is not merely intellectual, since it involves 
the capacity to choice. Thus, free-will is required for rationality.572 
Then, Rescher highlights that “intelligence” is different from “rationality.” 
So, in his judgment, the capacity to implement choices “separates rational 
agency from mere intelligence as such, thus setting persons apart from mere 
intelligences.”573 This issue is related to the notion of “artificial intelligence,” 
since an artificial device can solve given problems, but only persons can 
decide what problems they want to solve. Consequently, rationality requires 
intelligence (“the ability to acquire knowledge”574) and free will, which is “the 
capacity for decision and action in the light of evaluation on the basis of 
information.”575 
Consequently, for Rescher, intelligence is a necessary condition for 
rationality, which is developed in the different human domains, since the 
rational agent must be also an intelligent subject. But intelligence as such is 
not good enough for guarantying the rational behavior, because rationality 
“consists in the intelligent pursuit of appropriate objectives.”576 To the extent 
that it consists in a “pursuit,” rationality is related to the realm of the human 
action. It is an “intelligent” pursuit, since is supported by knowledge about the 
issues that are important in order to achieve the goals of the action 
developed. Therefore, knowledge, action, and evaluation are the three 
realms that shape rationality. 
                                            
572 On this issue, see RESCHER, N., “Free Will,” in RESCHER, N., Philosophical Explorations, 
Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm, 2011, pp. 61-77; and RESCHER, N., Free Will: A Philosophical 
Reappraisal, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 2009. 
573 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 11.  
574 RESCHER, N., “The Light of Reason,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. 
Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 10. 
575 “The Light of Reason,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: Human 
Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, p. 10. 
576 RESCHER, N., “Rationality and Moral Obligation,” in RESCHER, N., Studies in Philosophical 
Anthropology, p. 79. 
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In contrast to “intelligence,” which involves — in principle — immediacy, 
rationality involves certain mediation with a discursive component. 
Specifically, rationality encompasses deliberation, either in the field of 
knowledge, in the area of action, or in the realm of evaluation. Meanwhile, 
intelligence allows the grasp of something in the way of intuition. It is situated 
then in the realm of something “immediate;” while rationality belongs to the 
field of something “mediated.” Thus, intelligence is related to the capacity to 
achieve knowledge, but the deliberation about the consistency and 
coherence of the knowledge achieved — theoretical, practical, or about ends 
— belongs to the realm of rationality.  
Additionally, human rationality — with its different forms — can have a 
historical component. This feature is present in Rescher’s approach when he 
notices that “the methods we use in cultivating rationality change in the light 
of the experience we have with them.”577 Thus, although he considers 
rationality itself as something stable — to the extent that it consists in the 
effective and efficient action in order to achieve valid ends — Rescher 
notices that rationality involves changes with regard to the circumstances and 
conditions of the subject. There is a component of variability in this 
adaptation to the context that — in my judgment — can become genuinely 
historical. 
Within this framework, a salient point is that Rescher rejects an 
instrumental conception of rationality.578 So, in his judgment, rationality is not 
a simple matter of adjustment of means to ends, but the very ends should be 
subjected to rational deliberation. Precisely, evaluative rationality makes his 
approach (that is pragmatic) different from an instrumental conception. 
Moreover, he maintains that rationality is holistic: “cognitive, pragmatic, and 
evaluative rationality constitute a unified and indissoluble whole in which all 
                                            
577 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 14. 
578 In fact, he uses the notion “practical rationality,” which is broader than the simple 
instrumental rationality. 
181 
 
three of these resources are inseparably co-present.”579 Usually, he gives 
primacy to practical reason over theoretical reason, because the justification 
both of the ends and the beliefs is always — in his judgment — related to the 
realm of action.580 Thus, he considers that the rules of reason are “regulative 
principles” that guide human action on the basis of efficacy and efficiency. In 
this way, “reason is eminently practical—it wants what works (is efficient and 
effective).”581 
On this basis, Rescher rejects the establishment of clear frontiers 
between the theoretical and practical realms of rationality. In effect, he 
considers that each one of the three realms of rational deliberation — 
theoretical, practical, and evaluative — is supported by others.582 Then, 
rational deliberation has the character of a system: an interdependence 
network. His approach to rationality is holistic, insofar as he sees rationality 
as “a unified and indissoluble whole in which all three of these resources 
[cognitive, practical, and evaluative] are inseparably co-present. Good 
reasons for believing, for evaluating, and for acting go together to make up a 
seamless and indivisible whole.”583 
From the theroetical and practical reflection, rationality works in three 
realms, since it deliberates about knowledge, actions, and ends. But, in some 
sense, this is a conceptual distinction, because each one of those realms 
involves the others in the usual practice. When this approach is lead to 
scientific rationality, then scientific rationality is not a simple adjustment of 
means to ends, because the ends should be evaluated. In Rescher’s 
approach, rational action leads us to the achievement of preferable ends in 
an effective and efficient way, on the basis of well-grounded knowledge and 
                                            
579 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. vii. On Rescher approach to rationality, see MOUTAFAKIS, N. 
J., Rescher on Rationality, Values, and Social Responsibility. A Philosophical Portrait, 
passim. 
580 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Pragmatism and Practical Rationality,” pp. 43-60; especially, pp. 43-44. 
581 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 17. 
582 Cf. Rationality; especially, chap. 8, pp. 119-132. 
583
 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. vii. 
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valid values. 
The acknowledgement of a rationality that deals with the ends of the 
human activity involves — in my judgment — an improvement with regard to 
narrower conceptions about human rational, in general, and scientific 
rationality, in particular; for example, the approaches that give primacy to 
substantive rationality (focused on results)584 and the proposals of procedural 
rationality (focused on processes).585 In effect, besides the results and the 
processes, Rescher takes into account expressly the rationality of the ends.  
This approach has clear consequences for prediction, above all, from 
the epistemological, methodological, and axiological perspectives. 
Epistemologically, scientific prediction can be seen as cognitive content, 
insofar as it provides knowledge about the possible future. From this 
perspective, cognitive rationality has a role regarding the predictive 
knowledge. From a methodological point of view, prediction is the result of a 
rational process directed to predicting scientifically the possible future. 
Therefore, not only the result is important, but also the predictive models 
must meet some requirements, such as the realism of the assumptions. 
But Rescher’s conception is not reduced to an approach to scientific 
rationality as a procedural rationality, because the ends sought must be also 
rational. Thus, axiologically, his holistic view of rationality has also 
repercussions for scientific prediction. It involves that prediction has value, 
firstly, with regard to the aims on science; and, secondly, regarding the 
processes and the potential results. In this way, the holistic framework that he 
                                            
584 When rationality is characterized as “substantive,” then level of the results has primacy. It 
is the prevailing approach in the mainstream economics. Regarding scientific prediction, 
substantive rationality involves the primacy of the predictive success. Therefore, what 
matters is the result of the prediction — the predictive success, instead of the process. Cf. 
FRIEDMAN, M., “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” pp. 3-43. 
585 Simon distinguishes his approach of “procedural rationality” (which is developed from 
psychology) from “substantive rationality,” which has its origins in economics. Cf. SIMON, H. 
A., “From Substantive to Procedural Rationality,” in LATSIS, S. (ed.), Method and appraisal in 
economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, pp. 129-148. Cf. GONZALEZ, W. 
J., Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in Economics, chapter 8, 
pp. 203-228. 
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proposes about human rationality, in general, and scientific rationality, in 
particular, is related to a broad approach to scientific prediction, where there 
are three levels at stake: the aims of scientific research, the processes 
oriented towards obtaining those aims, and the results eventually 
achieved.586 
 
4.1.2.  An Approach of Bounded Rationality 
Rescher considers that human rational behavior is subjected to limits. 
De facto, he assumes a view of the human agent with bounded rationality: 
“Rationality does not make demands beyond the limits of what is genuinely 
possible for us—it does not require accomplishments beyond the limits of the 
possible.”587 This leads to relate this approach of pragmatic idealism to 
rationality with other two conceptions: on the one hand, the standard 
economic theory of rational choice;588 and, on the other, Herbert A. Simon’s 
proposal of bounded rationality.589 
He criticizes both theories from several angles, but above all his 
criticism is made insofar as they do not take into account the evaluative 
dimension of rationality.590 Regarding the standard theory of rational choice, 
he also opposes the notion of maximization of the expected subjective utility. 
Instead, he proposes the concept of “optimization,”591 which has into account 
                                            
586 The aims, processes, and results are the three successive stages in the internal 
dynamics of scientific research. Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Las Ciencias de Diseño en cuanto 
Ciencias de la Complejidad: Análisis de la Economía, Documentación y Comunicación,” in 
GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Las Ciencias de la Complejidad: Vertiente dinámica de las Ciencias 
de Diseño y sobriedad de factores, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2012, pp. 7-30; especially, pp. 8-9. 
587 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 8. 
588 On the standard theory of rational choice, see HAUSMAN, D. M., The Inexact and Separate 
Science of Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992 (2nd rep., 1996); 
especially, chapter 1, pp. 13-27. 
589 Cf. SIMON, H. A., “Theories of Bounded Rationality,” in MCGUIRE, C. B. and RADNER, R. 
(eds.), Decision and organization, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1972, pp. 161-176. (Reprinted 
in SIMON, H. A., Models of Bounded Rationality. Vol. 2: Behavioral Economics and Business 
Organization, pp. 408-423). 
590 Cf. RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 95 y pp. 107-132. 
591 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Maximization, Optimization, and Rationality. On Reasons why 
Rationality is not Necessarily a Matter of Maximization,” in RESCHER, N., Ethical Idealism. An 
Inquiry into the Nature and Function of Ideals, pp. 55-84; especially, pp. 71-79. 
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the limits of the subjects and the importance of the context, so his approach 
has certain parallelism with Simon’s “bounded rationality.” 
Like Simon, Rescher rejects the concept of “maximization” of the 
standard theory of rational choice; that is, the theory accepted by mainstream 
economics.592 This theory has a normative character that is accepted in the 
realm of neoclassical microeconomics. In its standard formulation, theory 
seeks to characterize how rational agents should make their choices, in case 
they behavior as rational agents. In order to do this, agents must obey the 
axioms demanded by the theory: transitivity, completeness, context-
independence, and continuity.593 The axioms of the theory introduce a 
normative element, since they establish what the characteristics of the 
agents’ preference orders are. If preferences are ordered in accordance with 
these requirements, a utility function can be elaborated with only one 
maximum. In this way, a rational agent is the agent who makes decisions by 
maximizing his utility function. 
Since the middle of the 20th century, standard theory has to face 
criticism and alternative proposals, which have been suggested both with 
regard to the general level of human choices and to the specific realm of 
scientific choices. David Houghton, in his paper on “Reasonable Doubts 
about Rational Choice,” offers a clear exposition of some of the problems of 
the standard theory. Among them, he highlights three: a) the impossibility of 
making perfectly informed decisions; b) the lack of empirical support to the 
conception of the rational subject as utility maximizer;594 and c) the lack of 
attention to social norms or rules for acting.595 
                                            
592 Cf. RESCHER, N., Rationality, pp. 107-132. 
593 Cf. HAUSMAN, D. M., The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics, pp. 15-19. 
594 In this regard, Hausman notices that “to argue that utility theory is a good theory of how 
people actually behave because it is also a theory of how they ought to behave seems like 
the argument that people do not cheat on their taxes because they morally ought not to do 
so,” HAUSMAN, D. M., The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics, p. 218. 
595Cf. HOUGHTON, D., “Reasonable Doubts about Rational Choice,” Philosophy, v. 70, n. 271, 
(1995), pp. 53-68. Regarding the problems of the standard theory, see also SEN, A., “The 
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Rescher’s criticism is focused on the first two points. Regarding the first 
point — the impossibility of making completely informed decisions — he 
considers that human beings generally do not have all the important 
information for decision-making. In this way, “the rational resolution of 
problems is context-sensitive to the information in hand.”596 For this reason, 
context is crucial for a conception of rationality with a practical component. In 
this way, he rejects the axiom of the standard theory about the context-
independent preference order. 
In effect, Rescher maintains that “rationality as such is something 
fixed—its nature is constant. But while rationality itself is something stable, 
the course of action it requires of us changes with circumstances and 
conditions.”597 Those circumstances and conditions involve that it is not 
always possible to make perfectly informed decisions. But it is possible to 
improve and increase the information at hand. Moreover, this is a demand of 
rationality.598 
Regarding the second point (the idea of rational agent as utility 
maximizer), Rescher thinks that the notion of “utility” in rational choice theory 
is “a mere fiction—sometimes useful.”599 Since his starting point is a holistic 
conception of rationality, which has an evaluative dimension, he sees the 
notion of “maximization” as a narrow approach to rational choice. In fact, in 
his judgment, “rational choice is a matter not of one-dimensional 
maximization, but of the structurally diversified optimization that calls for 
                                                                                                                           
Formulation of Rational Choice,” The American Economic Review, v. 84, n. 2, (1994), pp. 
385-390; and BOUDON, R., “Limitations of Rational Choice Theory,” The American Journal of 
Sociology, v. 104, n. 3. (1998), pp. 817-828. 
596 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 22. 
597 Rationality, p. 15. 
598 In this regard, Rescher maintains that “rationality is not just a passive matter of making 
good use of the materials one has on hand —in cognitive matters, say, the evidence in view. 
It is also a matter of actively seeking to enhance these materials: in the cognitive case, by 
developing new evidential resources that enable one to amplify and to test one’s 
conclusions,” RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 8. 
599 RESCHER, N., “Maximization, Optimization, and Rationality. On Reasons why Rationality is 
not Necessarily a Matter of Maximization,” in RESCHER, N., Ethical Idealism. An Inquiry into 
the Nature and Function of Ideals, p. 64. 
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harmonizing a complex profile of diversified goods and goals.”600 
The conception of rationality in terms of “utility maximization” involves 
assuming that “utility” is measurable and that the rational agent seeks to 
maximize it. This feature means that the different values and ends of the 
human action can be evaluated on the basis of a common measure. In 
Rescher’s judgment, this claim is problematic, because the realm of the 
human values is complex and varied.601 Therefore, it is problematic to claim 
that the different choices of the agents can be characterized in terms of 
“potentiating utility.” Rescher considers that, regarding this issue, 
“economists incline to proceed strictly in terms of preferences, since these 
seem to be a common denominator in people’s choices.”602 
But, for Rescher, preferences are not good enough for characterizing 
rationality. What is important is not merely what is preferred, but what is 
preferable, according to valid values and ends. For this reason, “once the link 
between utility and value is broken, the link between utility maximization and 
rational choice is also severed.”603 Moreover, the very notion of 
“maximization” is problematic, since generally human beings cannot achieve 
what is the best, but what in principle can be seen as the best possible taking 
into account the context.  
Consequently, Rescher does not think of human rationality as expected 
subjective utility maximization, but as an optimization. His approach at this 
point is realistic, since takes into account the limitations of the knowing 
subject, as well as the informational restrictions to which the agents can be 
subjected.604 Therefore, rationality does not demand that the agents act 
                                            
600 RESCHER, N., “Maximization, Optimization, and Rationality. On Reasons why Rationality is 
not Necessarily a Matter of Maximization,” p. 55. 
601 Cf. “Maximization, Optimization, and Rationality. On Reasons why Rationality is not 
Necessarily a Matter of Maximization,” p. 58. 
602 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 109. 
603 Rationality, p. 111. 
604 Rescher especially insistis in characterizing his own approach to rationality as a realist 
conception. Cf. RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: Human Knowledge in 
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according to the rational decision form an ideal perspective, but according to 
the best decision, taking into account that neither our resources nor our 
capacities are unlimited. 
Herbert A. Simon — who made a proposal on universal basis supported 
in the case of economics — has especially insisted on the limited character 
of human rationality.605 In his judgment, “there is today a very strong tradition 
of a priorism in economics, or what might be called deductionism. There is a 
very strong tradition of accepting the utility maximization hypothesis and then 
seeing, often with the aid of very powerful and elegant mathematical tools, 
what kind of conclusions you can draw from those premises, preferably by 
mathematical means. And there are even some economists who think that 
the theory is analytic and not refutable. I find it a rather curious point of view 
that a theory which purports to be about the real world should, somehow or 
other, follow from unrefutable premises and therefore not be subject to 
empirical test.”606 
Although Rescher’s main interest is not focused on the case of 
economics, a similar criticism to the “standard” conception in economics is in 
his work, but his reasons for the objections are different. Certainly, his 
proposal is also normative in origin, as it is the standard theory of rational 
choice. But his view is a normative theory with regard to the type of rationality 
that human beings, in fact, can achieve, and the justification of this type of 
rationality is — in his judgment — pragmatic. Thus, a rational agent is the 
agent who seeks the optimum understood as “the best available,” instead of 
being the “maximum.”  
From different philosophical perspectives, Simon and Rescher offer 
                                                                                                                           
Idealistic Perspective, p. 6. 
605 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Configuración de las Ciencias de Diseño como Ciencias de lo 
Artificial: Papel de la Inteligencia Artificial y de la racionalidad limitada,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. 
(ed.), Las Ciencias de Diseño. Racionalidad limitada, predicción y prescripción, Netbiblo, A 
Coruña, 2007, pp. 41-69; especially, pp. 59-63.  
606 SIMON, H. A., “Why Economists Disagree,” in SIMON, H. A., Models of Bounded Rationality. 
Vol. 3: Empirically Grounded Economic Reason, p. 407. 
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alternative proposals to the standard theory of rational choice. Based on an 
empiricist support, Simon presents a realistic and psychological 
characterization of the limits to human rationality;607 that is, he offers a 
description of human rationality “as ʻboundedʼ and ʻsatisfacingʼ — instead of 
being unlimited and maximizing.”608 His thematic axis is an empiricist 
approach oriented towards the observation of human behavior. 
Meanwhile, although Rescher develops a holistic approach to 
rationality, his framework is more pragmatic than Simon’s. So, “a rational 
person proceeds on the basis of the grounds that are available to him (which 
may well also be imperfect).”609 Thus, generally, maximization is not 
available. So in his approach rationality demands and “optimization” 
according to the circumstances, which is different from “maximization:”610 it 
does not involve a possible maximum, but the best we can obtain. But 
“satisfaction” is neither good enough, because Rescher’s normative 
approach to rationality involves the rational deliberation about the ends of 
human action, which transcends the mere “preferences.”  
 
4.1.3.  Practicable Rationality 
Our capacity to reason is limited and, for Rescher, we can only exercise 
it within the framework of practicable rationality. Practicable rationality is 
characterized as the rationality “geared to resolutions that are rationally 
appropriate with everything relevant taken into account that we can 
effectively manage to take account of in the prevailing circumstances—that 
are optimal as best we can manage to tell.”611 This practicable rationality is 
                                            
607
 Cf. SIMON, H. A., “From Substantive to Procedural Rationality,” in LATSIS, S. J. (ed.), 
Method and Appraisal in Economics, p. 144. 
608 GONZALEZ, W. J., “Herbert A. Simon: Filósofo de la Ciencia y economista (1916-2001),” in 
GONZALEZ, W. J., Racionalidad, historicidad y predicción en Herbert A. Simon, p. 11. 
609 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 7.  
610 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Maximization, Optimization, and Rationality. On Reasons why 
Rationality is not Necessarily a Matter of Maximization,” pp. 55-84; especially, pp. 71-79. 
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 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 28. 
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then different from an ideal rationality, “which is geared to resolutions that are 
rationally appropriate with (absolutely) everything relevant taken into 
account—that are optimal pure and simple.”612 
Rescher is concerned about the limits of rationality both in the 
theoretical real and in the practical dimension. His approach is in terms of 
practicable rationality, so he is aware that not always is possible to have all 
the information relevant and, in addition, the means at our disposal can be 
also limited. In this way, rationality only demands “that we do the best we can 
manage with the means in hand.”613 Thus, rational agent is required to use 
the limited resources he has in each concrete situation in order to guide his 
choices in the best possible way (that is, in an optimal way). 
Then, the “predicament of reason” appears. It involves that human 
rationality (i) aims at the absolutely best; but (ii) it settles for the best that is 
available.614 At this point, it is important to notice that “rationality is 
‘information-sensitive’: exactly what qualifies as the most rational resolution 
of a particular problem of belief, action, or evaluation depends on the precise 
content of our data about the situation at issue. And this dependency so 
functions that a ‘mere addition’ to our information can transform the optimality 
situation radically.”615 Faced with those features, human beings are rational 
within a context: they only can do the best in the concrete circumstances of a 
certain context. 
However, the acknowledgment of the inherent limitations of human 
rationality does not lead Rescher to reject a view of rationality as a matter of 
idealization. Thus, an idealization is possible a) because we justify possible 
courses of action, and b) because the rational solution that we can achieve is 
that which, under similar circumstances, any other human agent can identify 
                                            
612 Rationality, p. 28. 
613 RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic 
Perspective, p. 9. 
614 Cf. RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 30.  
615
 Rationality, p. 24. 
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as the rational solution.616 In this way, his approach to human rationality is 
not only of a normative character, but it also encompasses a descriptive 
element. Thus, although the rational solution to every problem — theoretical 
or practical — is context-dependent, it is universal at the same time. So, 
given exactly the same circumstances, the rational choice is the same for 
every agent. 
To the extent that they agree with the idea that rationality is with regard 
to real subjects, Simon and Rescher are close in their approaches, but there 
is an explicit pragmatic component in Rescher, who sees the problem from 
practice: “being rational consists in the disposition to make good reasons 
constitute the motives for what one does. Since this is something we can 
achieve only within limits, one must regard perfect rationality as an 
idealization and acknowledge we humans are ‘rational animals’ because of 
our capacity for reason, and certainly not because of our achievement of 
perfected rationality.”617 
Between Simon’s and Rescher’s proposals there are differences, at 
least, with regard to two crucial issues: (i) the normative character of 
Rescher’s approach against the genuinely descriptive character of Simon’s 
bounded rationality, and (ii) the explicit acknowledgement of the evaluative 
realm of rationality, which is only present in Rescher’s account. This 
normative character of his account involves that “the key point is that the 
significance of rationality does not, ultimately, lie in its role as a descriptive 
characterization of human proceedings (in how people do function) but rather 
in its normative role, as an indication of how people should function in the 
best interests of their cognitive and practical concerns. (…) The norms of 
rationality—like those of morality—are in no way undermined or invalidated 
                                            
616 Cf. MARSONET, M., The Primacy of Practical Reason. An Essay on Nicholas Rescher's 
Philosophy, pp. 63-69. 
617 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 10. 
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by the fact that people violate them.”618 
For Rescher, the social scientists who, like Simon, suggest a merely 
descriptive theory of rationality, “are engaged in a futile venture and 
condemned from the very outset to an inappropriate view of the rational 
enterprise.”619 Rescher’s proposal is fundamentally a normative one. But, in 
contrast to the standard theory of the rational choice, it is not inclined to an 
ideal type of rationality. Instead, it is oriented towards a “practicable” 
rationality, which is the rationality for which agents are in fact qualified. 
Moreover, it takes into account the fact that human beings sometimes 
behave in a non-rational way.620 
There are five requisites that, in Rescher’s judgment, are demanded by 
rationality in matters of belief, action, or evaluation: (i) consistency (to avoid 
self-contradiction); (ii) uniformity (to treat similar cases alike); (iii) coherence 
(to make sure that one’s commitments hang together); (iv) simplicity (to avoid 
needless complications); and (v) economy (to be efficient in the cost-benefit 
relation).621 
Those requirements give rationality a systemic character, insofar as 
they are “an organic (or systematic) unity of procedure, serving to make sure 
that everything fits together in an effective and mutually supportive way.”622 
Moreover, those requirements are flexible to some extent, as it can be seen 
in Rescher’s treatment of the problem of inconsistency in the case of 
cognitive rationality.623 In his approach, they are ideals that should be sought, 
cultivated, and valued; but their absence would not collapse every rational 
endeavor from the beginning. 
Besides the emphasis in the normative character of his approach, the 
                                            
618 Rationality, pp. 196-197. 
619 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. viii. 
620 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Homo Optans: On the Human Condition and the Burden of Choice,” in 
RESCHER, N., Studies in Philosophical Anthropology, pp. 1-7. 
621 Cf. RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 16. 
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 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 16. 
623 Cf. Rationality, pp. 73-91. 
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other important point that separates Rescher’s approach from Simon’s 
bounded rationality is the rationality of ends.624 In effect, although Simon 
mentions the ends in some papers,625 he does not contemplate in rigor the 
problem of the rationality of the ends chosen: there is not an evaluation of 
ends in his approach. He is only focused on the rationality of the beliefs of 
the agents and the means selected in order to achieve certain end, so the 
ends are assumed as “given.” Meanwhile, for Rescher, “rational choice is a 
matter of opting not for what is preferred, but for what is preferable.”626 Thus, 
besides the evaluation of ends, he considers that rationality in terms of 
“satisfaction of preferences” — which is Simon’s proposal — is the result of a 
biased approach to rationality. In his judgment, rationality is not about what 
people prefer, but about what is preferable in accordance with human 
interests and values. 
This feature is — in my judgment — the main contribution of Rescher to 
the problem of rational choice and scientific rationality. Thus, by introducing 
the question of the rationality of ends (what is preferable) rationality broadens 
its realm to encompasses the evaluation of the ends according to values. In 
this way, the rational agent not only has to justify his beliefs, but also the 
preferability of his options. Thus, Rescher suggests a holistic view of 
rationality, according to which rationality not only deliberates about the 
processes (the selection of the best means), but also about the result, insofar 
                                            
624 A comparison between both approaches is in GONZALEZ, W. J., “Racionalidad y 
Economía: De la racionalidad de la Economía como Ciencia a la racionalidad de los agentes 
económicos,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Racionalidad, historicidad y predicción en Herbert A. 
Simon, pp. 65-96; especially,  pp. 70-79.  
The expressly acceptation of a rationality of ends can especially affect the sciences of 
design, since their activity is oriented towards concrete aims. This is a matter that Rescher 
does not develop, because he is mainly interested in the natural science and, sometimes, in 
the social sciences. Meanwhile, he does not expressly address the realm of the sciences of 
the artificial. On this matter, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “Rationality and Prediction in the Sciences 
of the Artificial,” in GALAVOTTI, M. C., SCAZZIERI, R. and SUPPES, P. (eds.), Reasoning, 
Rationality and Probability, CSLI Publications, Stanford, 2008, pp. 165-186. 
625 SIMON, H. A., “Rationality in Political Behavior,” Political Psychology, v. 16, (1995), pp. 45-
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as it orientates the action towards the achievement of the best goals.627  
 
4.2.  Scientific Prediction and the Main Types of Rationality 
In order to analyze the epistemological factors of prediction in Rescher, 
after the consideration of his holistic approach to rationality, the three types 
of rationality at stake must been taken into account. Thus, as he notices, 
“philosophical tradition since Kant sees three major contexts of choice, those 
of belief, of accepting or endorsing theses or claims, of action, of what overt 
acts to perform, and of evaluation, of what to value or disvalue. These 
[contexts] represent the spheres of cognitive, practical, and evaluative 
reason, respectively.”628 
From those realms, there are — in Rescher’s judgment — three types 
of rationality according to the object of rational deliberation: (i) cognitive 
rationality, which addresses what should be believed or accepted in the 
realm of knowledge, either theoretical or empirical; (ii) practical or 
instrumental rationality, which is about what actions should be performed; 
and (iii) evaluative rationality, which is focused on what goals and ends 
should be preferred or valued.629 
This approach to rationality suggested by Rescher is connected to his 
proposal about the epistemological factors of scientific prediction. In effect, in 
his judgment, to predict is a rational activity, so scientific predictions are 
characterized by being reasoned prediction. Thus, they are statements about 
the future which are supported by theoretical or empirical reasons that justify 
the anticipation of the possible future. On this basis, scientific prediction can 
be related to the three realms of rationality that Rescher contemplates: 
cognitive, practical, and evaluative.630 
                                            
627 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Pragmatism and Practical Rationality,” pp. 43-60. 
628 RESCHER, N., Rationality, pp. 2-3. 
629 Cf. Rationality, p. 3. 
630 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, pp. 264-265.  
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4.2.1.  Cognitive Rationality 
Rescher considers that rationality involves a cognitive or epistemic 
dimension. Cognitive rationality deals with what should be accepted in the 
realm of knowledge and, therefore, what belongs to the theoretical realm of 
rationality. On the one hand, this cognitive rationality demands answers to 
questions posed about the world; and, on the other, it requires that those 
answers could be justified. Thus, cognitive rationality requires increasing the 
available information in order to increase and improve our knowledge about 
the world. In addition, it allows us to justify the beliefs accepted as valid. The 
justification of beliefs can be of two types: discursive or presumptive.631 
A belief is justified discursively when the justification is obtained on the 
basis of another belief established previously. From this perspective, 
cognitive rationality seeks homogeneity in information-processing, since 
“there must be justified beliefs as inputs to arrive at justified beliefs as 
outputs.”632 Meanwhile, the presumptive justification does not proceed 
through other previously accepted beliefs, but in a direct way through a 
“presumption.” Thus, a belief is justified in this way when “there is a standing 
presumption in its favour and no pre-established (rationally justified) reason 
that stands in the way of its acceptance.”633 
Rescher suggests a series of indicators that are “presumptions of 
reliability.” On the basis of these “presumptions” a belief or beliefs can be 
justified presumptively. They are general principles such as the following: (i) 
believe the evidence provided by the senses; (ii) accept the declarations of 
other people (in the absence of any counter-indications); (iii) trust in the 
reliability of the cognitive aids and instruments used in the research (for 
example, telescopes or reference works); and (iv) accept, in principle, the 
                                            
631 Cf. RESCHER, N., Rationality, pp. 49-50. 
632 Rationality, p. 49. 
633 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 50. 
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declarations of established experts.634 
When prediction is at issue, scientific rationality (in its epistemic 
dimension) follows the same process. Thus, on the basis of the available 
knowledge, the aim is to obtain answers to substantive questions about 
future developments. Moreover, the answers given (that is, the predictions) 
must be justified. The presumptions of reliability are also relevant to 
prediction, since predictive statements are oriented towards a possible future 
and, therefore, it is not possible to test them now. Furthermore, prediction 
has also role for the justification of hypotheses and theories. This role is 
usual in basic science, where prediction can be used as test for theories. 
Both with regard to scientific knowledge, in general, and predictive 
knowledge, in particular, the procedure of the cognitive rationality is 
supported by economic principles. Thus, in Rescher’s approach, the practical 
dimension has primacy over the theoretical component, because — in his 
judgment — reason is eminently practical: “Be it in matters of belief, action, 
or evaluation, its mission centers about the deliberate endeavor to maximize 
benefits relative to expenditures.”635 Therefore, there is in science an internal 
economic dimension, which affects not only the actions, but also the 
cognitive content; because the cognitive dynamics of science is not cost-free. 
In this way, scientific rationality should be considered as connected to 
economic rationality. 
Rescher suggests an economic-cognitive approach that demands an 
epistemic optimization: it seeks a positive balance between the required 
costs and the benefits eventually obtained with regard to an aim sought. 
Thus, he considers that the cognitive component of rationality involves an 
economic dimension. In effect, he maintains that “rationality and economy 
are inextricably interconnected. Rational inquiry is a matter of epistemic 
                                            
634 Cf. Rationality, p. 52. 
635 RESCHER, N., “Knowledge and Scepticism in Economic Perspective,” in RESCHER, N., 
Cognitive Economy. The Economic Dimension of the Theory of Knowledge, p. 11. 
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optimization, of achieving the best overall balance of cognitive benefits 
relative to cognitive costs.”636 
On the one hand, the human process of knowing involves benefits, both 
theoretical (or cognitive) and practical (or applied);637 and, on the other, it 
involves costs (in terms of complexity, difficulty, resources, etc.). This 
economic-cognitive approach has methodological repercussions, because 
the methods are above all oriented towards the increase of knowledge. For 
Rescher, in the process of knowing there is an economy of means: “Concern 
for answering our questions in the most straightforward, most cost-effective 
way is a crucial aspect of cognitive rationality in its economic dimension.”638  
This feature means that scientific rationality requires an epistemic 
optimization; that is, it is oriented towards an optimal use of the resources 
with regard to the potential benefits of the cognitive endeavor.639 With this 
economic-cognitive approach, Rescher emphasizes the importance of the 
economic factors that are internal to the process of knowing. He insists on 
science as human activity, so scientific rationality is eminently pragmatic: 
“inquiry and the acquisition of information is itself a practical activity on the 
same footing with any other—a process that must be governed by the 
standard justificatory ground rules of practical reason.”640 
This claim — to some extent cryptic — emphasizes the primacy of 
practice; that is, problem-solving as a proof of cognitive validity. On this 
basis, scientific prediction can be seen also in practical terms, as a rational 
                                            
636 “Knowledge and Scepticism in Economic Perspective,” in RESCHER, N., Cognitive 
Economy. The Economic Dimension of the Theory of Knowledge, p. 13. 
637 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Racionalidad y Economía: De la racionalidad de la Economía como 
Ciencia a la racionalidad de los agentes económicos,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), 
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procedure that involves an economic dimension, since prediction should be 
obtained in an effective and efficient way, so it could be possible an epistemic 
optimization in the process of predicting. Therefore, there is a nexus between 
cognitive rationality and scientific prediction, which emphasizes the presence 
of economic factors that are internal to prediction. 
In effect, cognitive rationality intervenes in the predictive task of 
science, since prediction is supported by knowledge about the important 
variables, as well as by adequate inferences.641 Certainly, it is not a free-cost 
task, since it requires a series of resources: experimentation techniques, 
observation means, procedures of data processing, etc. Thus, the 
minimization of costs should be sought in prediction. 
In turn, this nexus between cognitive rationality and scientific prediction 
has repercussions for the problem of the epistemological limits of prediction. 
In effect, predictive knowledge is subjected to limits, insofar as the cognitive 
capacities of the human beings are limited. For example, the presence of 
informational restrictions for the subjects that make science is one of the 
factors that might limit the predictions. This kind of limits favors uncertainty, 
which accompanies the bounded rationality and has repercussions on 
scientific prediction. In effect, the capacity to compute the information is 
limited; and, in principle, the future has a number of different possibilities. 
 
4.2.2.  Practical Rationality 
A general feature of Rescher’s epistemological approach is that 
rationality is eminently practical; and, in certain sense, it is also contextual. 
Practical rationality deals with the realm of action, and is about the means 
that are used to achieve a certain goal. But, since he develops a holistic 
conception of reason, he has a critical attitude toward approaches such as 
Herbert Simon’s view, because Simon does not assume in rigor a rationality 
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of ends, but only of means.642  
The practical dimension of rationality defended by Rescher requires the 
adjustment of means to ends; but the very ends must be adequate according 
to values that have an objective component.643 Thus, there are two issues 
that are closely related: selecting the ends and having values in order to 
choose them. In contrast to Simon, he also claims that “in the broad scheme 
of things, the two aspects are needed: the ends without the requirement of 
the means are frustrating; the means without adequate ends are 
unproductive and useless.”644  
Thus, Rescher gives primacy to the practical reason in his approach to 
rationality. But it is not a simple rationality of means to given ends, so it is not 
a purely instrumental rationality. In his judgment, the rational character of an 
action cannot be assessed without an evaluation of the adequacy of the ends 
of action. In this way, “both matters—the efficacy of means and the validity of 
goals—are essential aspects of practical rationality.”645 
From a pragmatic perspective, there is a practical criterion of 
evaluation. For Rescher, actions and beliefs are evaluated according to their 
efficacy and efficiency in the achievement of the goals and aims. Then, 
rationality is associated to the achievement of goals or to meet a concrete 
need. In those cases, “a rational creature will prefer whatever method 
                                            
642 On Herbert A. Simon’s theory of rationality, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “Racionalidad y 
Economía: De la racionalidad de la Economía como Ciencia a la racionalidad de los agentes 
económicos,” pp. 65-96; BEREIJO, A., “La racionalidad en las Ciencias de lo Artificial: El 
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predicción en Herbert A. Simon, pp. 131-146; and GONZALEZ, W. J., “Configuración de las 
Ciencias de Diseño como Ciencias de lo Artificial: Papel de la Inteligencia Artificial y de la 
racionalidad limitada,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Las Ciencias de Diseño. Racionalidad 
limitada, predicción y prescripción, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2007, pp. 41-69. 
643 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Pragmatism and Purpose,” in RESCHER, N., Pragmatism. The 
Restoration of its Scientific Roots, pp. 21-47. On the objectivity of values in the axiological 
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research. 
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process or procedure will, other things equal, facilitate goal realization in the 
most effective, efficient, and economical way.”646 
Rescher insists that practical rationality is mainly of an economic kind. 
Thus, it seeks the optimization of the benefits obtained from rational behavior 
in relation to the costs of the recourses. The, the process — the search — 
prevails, instead of the product (the final result). This feature is related to 
approaches like the Aristotelian conception, where rationality is more the 
processes (the decision-making) than the result. Here, there is certain 
similitude with Simon, who also sees rationality more as a process than as a 
result.647 
For Rescher, on the basis of the available information, we try to achieve 
the sought goal by selecting those means that allow us to achieve it in an 
efficient way. But this pragmatic feature not only has to do with the means. In 
effect, he considers that it is present in the three realms of rational 
deliberation: the field of the information (the cognitive realm), the area of the 
means (the practical component), and the realm of the ends (the evaluative 
aspect). 
Since in Rescher’s thought rationality is addressed from a pragmatic 
perspective, the very justification of the rational behavior is also of a 
pragmatic character: “Rationality has the perfectly rational justification that in 
failing to heed the dictates of reason we came up on the short end of the 
balance of benefits gained versus advantages foregone.”648 Thus, practical 
rationality, which has to do mainly with the processes, seeks that those 
                                            
646 RESCHER, N., “Pragmatism and Practical Rationality,” p. 44. 
647 Simon is more interested in what the disciplines of Aristotelian inspiration (logic, ethics, 
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translation: “La racionalidad limitada en Ciencias Sociales: Hoy y mañana,” in GONZALEZ, W. 
J. (ed.), Racionalidad, Historicidad y Predicción en Herbert A. Simon, pp. 97-110. 
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processes are effective and efficient. In turn, this feature connects with the 
normative aspect of his approach, which is focused on the methods instead 
of the results, but that direct the processes towards what ought to be, which 
can have general validity. 
Certainly, the process has primacy over the product, but Rescher seeks 
that the process has universal or universalizable features. In this way, his 
approach rejects the relativism. This can be seen in different levels where 
rational deliberation is focused on the procedures. Thus, his pragmatic 
approach to rationality involves some elements of general character: (i) 
rationality deals with the processes of truth validation; (ii) it is focused on act-
recommending norms; (iii) it affects the processes to answer-determination; 
and (iv) it is related with the procedures by which the endorsement of 
hypotheses is validated649. 
By insisting on the processes regarding rationality, the methodological 
aspect is crucial. But this features does not involve that the methodological 
aspect is the only we should take into account. Thus, there is always an end 
that modulates the processes, so the different processes are oriented 
towards the achievement of a result. In this way, human actions always have 
a teleological dimension. So, among the different procedures, a rational 
creature would choice the procedure that leads to the end sought in the most 
effective and efficient way. 
This includes that, if the processes are not self-sufficient in 
epistemological and methodological terms, then the rationality of the very 
ends sought must be taken into account. In Rescher judgment, evaluating 
different courses of action is not good enough when these are about “given” 
ends. So the very choice of the ends must be evaluated and legitimated form 
a pragmatic perspective, and this is a task that should be carried through 
from rationality. 
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201 
 
Within this approach, there is a nexus between practical rationality and 
prediction. In effect, for Rescher, to predict is mainly a process that is 
oriented towards an end: it is an activity that seeks to answer our meaningful 
questions about the future. In this way, practical rationality intervenes in 
prediction, by selecting the adequate process of prediction, which — in 
relation to the end sought — must be effective and efficient. Thus, the choice 
of a concrete method or procedure in order to solve a predictive question 
depends, to a large extent, on the kind of phenomenon that we want to 
predict.650 For this reason, he considers that “the comparative efficacy of 
predictive processes is (…) in the end an empirical matter.”651 
If practical rationality is eventually determined on empirical basis, then 
his rationality is not only normative, but also descriptive. Moreover, Rescher 
gives primacy to practice in his approach to rationality, and practice is also 
crucial in his approach to scientific prediction. In effect, in his judgment, “to 
act, to plan, to survive, we must anticipate the future, and the past is the only 
guide to it that we have.”652 This involves an empirical and descriptive 
component: “practical reasoning serves as the basis for the justification of the 
inference towards the future form past experience.”653 Once again, his 
“pragmatic idealism” includes elements that are not “idealistic,” but rather 
“realist.” In my judgment, this is due to his acceptance of the realist notions of 
“fact” and “objectivity.”654 
 
4.2.3.  Evaluative Rationality 
Rationality also deals with what should be valued regarding the ends, 
                                            
650 On the distinction between “predictive procedures” and “predictive methods,” see 
GONZALEZ, W. J., Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in 
Economics, chapter 10, pp. 251-284. 
651 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 111-112. 
652 Predicting the Future, p. 65. 
653 GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 265. 
654 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Cognitive Limits,” in RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. 
I: Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 
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according to the real interests of the human being. This task accompanies 
the other two already mentioned: (i) to deliberate about what should be 
believed on the basis of the available information; and (ii) to decide what 
means should be used in order to achieve an end in an effective and efficient 
way. Thus, both rationality, in general, and scientific and technological 
rationality, in particular, are not reduced only to the means that should be 
used in order to achieve given ends. Rationality should consider the very 
ends sought. About this issue, Rescher explicitly shows his disagreement 
with Simon.  
For Simon, “reason is wholly instrumental. It cannot tell us where to go; 
at best it can tell us how to get there. It is a gun for hire that can be employed 
in the service of whatever goals we have, good or bad.”655 In Rescher’s 
judgment, this type of approaches fade the frontiers between what is rational 
and what is non-rational, insofar as they do not take into account the nexus 
between rationality and what is advisable and intelligent.656 Thus, in his 
approach, he avoids the term “instrumental” to refer to the rationality of 
means. Instead, he uses the notion of “practical rationality,” since he 
considers that it is connected with a rationality of ends, which deliberates 
about the ends of human action. 
Therefore, in contrast to Simon’s approach, which is clearly of 
instrumental rationality and empirically based, Rescher considers that 
“rationality is thus a two-side, Janus-faced conception. On the side of means, 
it reflects a pragmatic concern for efficient process, while on the side of the 
‘appropriateness of ends’ it reflects a value-geared concern for product. 
(Moreover, the acceptability of the means themselves also enters in.)”657 In 
that case, the issues regarding the efficacy and efficiency of means are only 
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656 Cf. RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 95. 
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a part of rational action. Thus, in order to be considered as fully rational, 
human action should take into account the value of the ends it seeks.658 
In this approach, the adequacy of ends — if they are appropriate or not 
as ends of human action — is an issue that belongs to the evaluative order of 
rational deliberation.659 Rescher assumes this evaluative component of 
rationality. He considers that this requires justification; that is, that rationality 
not only deals with matters of fact, but also with matters of values. This is 
because, in his judgment, the Humean tradition of separation between 
reason and values is still widely accepted. 
According to Rescher, the rejection of the objectivity of values and, 
therefore, the dismissal of the rationality of ends, is due to some confusion 
with the terms “taste” and “value.”660 Tastes are about what people prefer, 
while values have to do with what should be considered as preferable. Thus, 
although “ʻThere’s no disputing about tastes’ may be true, (…) ‘There’s no 
disputing about values’ certainly is not. Values too can be altogether 
objective, in that value claims admit of rational support through impersonally 
cogent considerations.”661 Rationality also requires an objective assessment 
regarding value matters: rationality “asks for an estimation of preferability, 
more than the pure expression of a preference.”662 
Thus, Rescher admits the objectivity of values, which in his approach 
goes hand in hand with the normative character of the rationality of ends. 
This issue is connected with the “self-interest,” that is, with the own welfare 
and well-being. In his judgment, the “self-interest” can be interpreted in three 
different ways: (i) what someone wants; (ii) what somebody thinks is good for 
                                            
658 Both the axiology of research and the ethics of science in Rescher are clearly 
teleological, insofar as he gives primacy to the perspective of human activity as oriented 
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659 Cf. RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 93. 
660 Cf. RESCHER, N., Realistic Pragmatism, p. 170. 
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him or for her on the basis of the available information; and (iii) what 
somebody objectively ought to want (what is, in fact, beneficial for him).663  
Usually, the third option is beyond our possibilities. But the first of the 
three options is not good enough, since rationality also has a normative 
character. Thus, rationality is required a strengthened version of the “self-
interest,” as it is the case in the second interpretation. Then, self-interest 
consists on “what someone has good reason (in the prevailing state of his 
information) to think to be truly beneficial to him.”664 
This notion of the self-interest can be understood from either a narrow 
perspective or a wide viewpoint. Rescher defends a wide notion of self-
interest, according to which the self-interest of one individual also 
encompasses, to some extent, the other’s interest.665 In my judgment, this 
feature broadens self-interest in order to include reciprocity, active 
cooperation, and solidarity, which are three stages in interpersonal 
relationships.666 
On this wide orientation, Rescher maintains that those values that 
implement the best interest of people are adequate values. Like the cognitive 
and the practical rationality, the evaluative rationality is also universal in the 
following sense: what I should want or prefer is “what the reasonable 
(impartial, well-informed, well-intentioned, understanding) bystander would 
think that I ought to want on the basis of what is ‘in my best interests.’”667 
Therefore, a theory of rational choice not should be reduced to what people 
in fact prefer, but it should encompass what they should prefer according to 
their real interests. 
                                            
663 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Rationality and Moral Obligation,” p. 79. 
664 “Rationality and Moral Obligation,” p. 80. 
665 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Rationality and Moral Obligation,” p. 80.  
666 On recent studies about altruism, which is present in the cases mentioned, see the 
monographic number of Economics and Philosophy, which offers papers of Philip Kitcher 
and others in the case of economics. Cf. KITCHER, PH., “Varieties of Altruism,” Economics 
and Philosophy, v. 26, n. 2, (2010), pp. 121-148; and SCHEFCZYK, M. and PEACOCK, M., 
“Altruism as a Thick Concept,” Economics and Philosophy, v. 26, n. 2, (2010), pp. 165-187. 
667 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 102. 
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Therefore, the rational agent is that who is ready to go from his 
preference to his interests, by subjecting his desires to rational deliberation. 
This feature involves an objective judgment. Through this objective judgment, 
it is possible to decide if our actual ends are rational or not. In this way, the 
valid or adequate ends are those that result in the best interest of the agents; 
for example, those ends related to the satisfaction of universally shared 
needs, such as health or affection; the ends related with the particular role 
one planes as relative of someone, as professional, etc.; and those ends that 
have to what one simply happens to want. 
In order to consider a certain interest as appropriate, it has to meet the 
requirement of being connected with some universal interest.668 Thus, some 
concrete interest of one agent can be considered as valid if it is possible to 
subordinate it to a universal interest. With this position, Rescher’s approach 
satisfactorily combines two different aspects: a) the fact of the existence of 
numerous interests, which are contemplated by the agents in order to select 
those that will guide their actions; and b) the existence of a universal principle 
of rationality, which allow us to determine in an objective way the validity of 
those interests.  
If the claims about value matter are not beyond the realm of rationality, 
then there can be objective. To the extent that values are not simple tastes, 
rational evaluation follows the same principle as rational action in general. 
This feature leads to the following principle: “proceed in the same way than a 
rational or reasonable personal would proceed in those circumstances.”669 
Therefore, Rescher admits the realist notion of “objectivity” as a crucial factor 
in his defense of the evaluative realm of rationality. 
However, within a system of pragmatic idealism, the ultimate 
justification of the evaluative dimension of human rationality does not rest on 
                                            
668 Cf. RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 101; and RESCHER, N., Realistic Pragmatism, p. 178. 
669 RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, p. 75. 
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the realist principle of objectivity; instead, it can be seen in the capacity of 
values to guide our actions and make them meaningful. Thus, “the pragmatic 
aspect of values lies in the fact that they provide a thought tool that we 
require in order to achieve a satisfying life. By contrast, the idealistic aspect 
of values lies in the fact that thy alone enable us to achieve a meaningful 
life.”670 
The idealistic aspect of evaluation can be clearly seen when Rescher 
characterizes values as “indispensable thought-tools.”671 Human knowledge 
has a clear teleological dimension (an orientation towards ends) and it is 
never passive. In his approach, values constitute an indispensable 
requirement in order to orientate human thought towards the ends sought. In 
this way, the acceptance of the rationality of ends has a clear repercussion in 
his conception of scientific activity as modulated by values. Among them, 
Rescher gives primacy to the cognitive values. 
When rationality is seen in its three dimensions — cognitive, practical, 
and evaluative — human being can go beyond what in fact is to evaluate 
what ought to be. Thus, “value is concerned not only with what does happen 
but with what might happen, and not just ‘realistically’ but even ‘by the wildest 
stretch of the imagination.’”672 Therefore, as rational beings, we compare 
different possibilities for the direction of our actions.673 
In order to accomplish this task, evaluative rationality is crucial. In 
effect, Rescher considers that human beings are characterized by their 
capacity to choose on the basis of rational evaluation. For this reason, he 
                                            
670 RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. II: The Validity of Values: Human 
Values in Pragmatic Perspective, p. 248 
671 A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. II: The Validity of Values: Human Values in 
Pragmatic Perspective, p. 249. 
672 RESCHER, N., A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Vol. II: The Validity of Values: Human 
Values in Pragmatic Perspective, p. 246. 
673 According to Michele Marsonet, Rescher sees rationality as a matter of idealization: 
“Rationality is the expression of mankind’s capacity to see not only how things actually are, 
but also how they might have been and how they could turn out to be if we were to take 
some course of action rather than another,” MARSONET, M., The Primacy of Practical 
Reason. An Essay on Nicholas Rescher’s Philosophy, p. 63.  
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maintains that “comparative evaluation is also an unavoidable requisite of the 
human condition. The burden of choice—and thereby of reason-guided 
evaluation—is one of the definitive features of the human condition.”674 
Within these coordinates, scientific prediction can have a crucial role 
when different courses of action are evaluated, in order to choose among 
them. In fact, prediction makes it possible to anticipate future events and 
developments, so it provides knowledge that can have an important role in 
order to orientate human actions. This can be seen, above all, in three 
realms: (i) applied science, (ii) the application of science, and (iii) the use of 
predictive knowledge in everyday life. Usually, Rescher is focused in the 
application of science and in the everyday life realms, while he hardly takes 
into account the applied science. 
First, prediction is required in applied sciences in order to make 
prescriptions directed to solving a concrete problem. Second, prediction has 
also a role regarding the ends of the application of science, where scientific 
knowledge is used by agents in institutional and professional contexts (for 
example, in hospitals or in problems concerning policy). In this case, 
prediction can serve as a support in decision-making. Third, agents might 
use the knowledge about the future provided by scientific predictions as a 
guide for action in daily contexts (for example, this is what commonly 
happens with meteorological predictions). 
Furthermore, the predictive activity itself is a rational activity that is goal-
oriented, so it involves an evaluative dimension. This can be seen in two 
successive levels, which are clear when prediction is seen as a human 
activity: the value of prediction and the values of prediction. On the one hand, 
the role of prediction as a value of science can be addressed (that is, insofar 
as it is a goal sought in order to promote scientific progress). From this 
                                            
674 RESCHER, N., “Homo Optans: On the Human Condition and the Burden of Choice,” pp. 1-
7, p.5. 
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perspective, prediction has a role when the aims of scientific research are 
selected, which are prior to the selection of the processes and the 
achievement of results. And, on the other hand, the question of the values of 
prediction can be considered; that is, what are the desirable characteristics 
that should accompany the predictive statements. 
Consequently, evaluative rationality intervenes in the scientific activity 
oriented towards anticipating the possible future, insofar as prediction is — 
for Rescher — one of the main goals of science. When a prediction is 
achieved, other more specific ends can be sought (for example, to serve as a 
test for a theory in basic science or as a previous step to prescription in 
applied science). But prediction itself must be subjected to evaluation. In this 
regard, Rescher notices the values that scientific prediction should have, 
such as correctness, accuracy, precision, etc.675 First, those values modulate 
the ends sought; and, second, they also modulate the processes oriented 
towards those ends. Latter, they have also a role for the evaluation of the 
result finally obtained and its possible consequences.676  
 
4.3.  Fallibilism and Predictive Knowledge 
Besides the pragmatic approach to rationality, which emphasizes the 
presence of cognitive and instrumental limitations, Rescher maintains a 
fallibilistic view of scientific knowledge. He defends that every piece of 
knowledge we can achieve is always subjected to revision, since it is 
impossible to achieve perfection in science.677 However, he rejects both 
relativistic and skeptical proposals. He considers that the information we 
have now is the best possible and that the desire to enlarge and improve it 
                                            
675 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 119-125. 
676 These issues, which connect the evaluative realm of rationality with problems that have to 
do with the relation between scientific prediction and the axiology of research as well as the 
ethics of science, are analyzed in the chapters 8 and 9 of this Ph.D. research. 
677 On the imperfect character of science, see RESCHER, N., “The Theoretical Unrealizability 
of Perfected Science,” in RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, pp. 145-165. 
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motivates the research, promoting new advancements. 
Within this fallibilistic epistemological framework, successful scientific 
prediction is connected with truth — in the epistemological realm — and with 
the progress of science (in the methodological area). Thus, prediction is a 
statement that provides knowledge about the possible future that can be true. 
Furthermore, it is a test for scientific theories in basic science, so it has a 
high confirmatory value. In this way, successful prediction allows us to 
evaluate the content of truth of the scientific theories. Moreover, prediction 
contributes to problem-solving in applied research. This feature is related to 
the progress of science, which — in Rescher’s judgment — “is mostly 
strikingly and decisively manifested on its technological side. Science is 
marked by an ever-expanding predictive and physical control over nature.”678 
 
4.3.1.  Scientific Prediction and the Problem of Truth 
Rescher’s approach regarding the truth of predictive statements and 
their role as test for theories (basic science) and as a previous step to 
prescription (applied science) is developed within a framework of 
fallibilism.679 According to him, fallibilism maintains that “our theoretical 
scientific knowledge claims are always vulnerable: they must always be 
staked tentatively because the prospect that further inquiry and discovery will 
lead to their modification or replacement can never be eliminated.”680 
Therefore, on this basis, it is not possible to have certainty regarding 
the cognitive content of the current science. In effect, scientific knowledge is 
the result of a rational process of research and — for Rescher — rationality is 
a matter of optimization, instead of maximization. Thus, he maintains that 
science only can achieve what, in some concrete circumstances, is the best 
                                            
678 RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 39.  
679 Rescher attention is usually focused on basic science, and he rarely pays attention to the 
problems that more specifically have to with the applied sciences. For this reason, he 
highlights above all the role of prediction as scientific test. 
680 RESCHER, N., Satisfying Reason. Studies in the Theory of Knowledge, p. 72. 
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thing available. In that case, the rational solution to a problem is not, in 
principle, the best solution in absolute terms; but only the best solution 
possible given certain context. The limited and contextual character of 
rationality, in general, is also characteristic of scientific rationality, in 
particular. 
In terms of knowledge optimization, in science “the answers we give to 
our questions are literally the best we can provide.”681 For this reason, it is 
not possible to be certain that a scientific theory or statement is true; but we 
can claim that it is the best answer we can offer in order to solve a concrete 
problem. Therefore, every theory or statement is vulnerable, insofar as they 
can turn out to be false. With these reflections, Rescher does not put into 
question the possibility of achieve true knowledge; but he acknowledges that 
it is probable that future developments replace or change the knowledge we 
have now. 
Thus, Rescher rejects a skeptic or relativist approach regarding 
knowledge, since he admits clearly the possibility of achieving true 
statements. In this regard, he distinguishes “our truth” (what we think that is 
true now) y “the truth” (what is in fact true).682 For him, this is a “convenient 
fiction,” as a hypothesis that allows us to make advancements in the process 
of research.683 Consequently, it should be acknowledged that every belief we 
accept that can turn out to be false. Moreover, many of our beliefs will be 
falsified.684 
In order to justify this epistemological approach, Rescher contemplates 
the history of science. The historical dimension of science involves that this 
                                            
681 RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 30. 
682 Cf. The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 36.  
683 “We have no alternative to proceeding on the working hypothesis that in scientific matters 
our truth is the truth. But we must also recognize that that is simply not so —that the working 
hypothesis in question is no more than just that, a convenient fiction,” RESCHER, N., The 
Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 36.  
684 Cf. RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 34. 
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activity is “one transitory state of things in an ongoing process.”685 In this 
sense, he thinks that “the clearest induction from the history of science is that 
science is always mistaken.”686 However, it is not a “pessimistic induction” in 
the style of Larry Laudan,687 since in Rescher’s approach this induction is 
connected with an account of science according to which science is 
progressive regarding knowledge: “later science is better science—that is, 
better warranted science.”688 In this way, the main lesson is that it is always 
possible to improve the available knowledge. 
Rescher establishes the progressive character of science on the basis 
of the continuous improvement and increasing of the available knowledge.689 
But the way of evaluating this progress is within a framework of 
methodological pragmatism, according to which the predictive success and 
the control over nature are the best available indicators regarding scientific 
progress.690 In this realm, prediction connects with his epistemological 
fallibilism. In my judgment, this connection can be seen in four different 
directions: 1) insofar as prediction provides knowledge about the future that 
is fallible; 2) because prediction is a test for the adequacy of theories, so it 
has a relevant role in the justification of the accepted beliefs; 3) since 
prediction is a guide for prescription (applied science) or for both individual 
and social agent’s decision-making (application of science); and 4) prediction 
as an indicator of scientific progress, so the advancement of science can be 
evaluated on the basis of predictive success. 
1) Rescher considers that scientific prediction can have an objective 
                                            
685 The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 38. 
686 RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 36. 
687 See LAUDAN, L., “A Confutation of Convergent Realism,” Philosophy of Science, v. 48, 
(1981), pp. 19-49. It has been noticed that the pessimistic induction can even lead to 
semantic antirealism. Cf. FROST-ARNOLD, G., “From the Pessimistic Induction to Semantic 
Antirealism,” Philosophy of Science, v. 78, n. 5, (2011), pp. 1131-1142. 
688 The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 40.  
689 Cf. RESCHER, N., Scientific Progress. A Philosophical Essay on the Economics of the 
Natural Science, passim. 
690 Rescher’s methodological pragmatism is analyzed in the chapter 5 of this Ph.D. research. 
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content. Thus, he insists on the rational basis of prediction and the realism of 
the assumption in all the empirical sciences, also in economics.691 Then, he 
rejects the possibility of predicting without reasons and rejects the 
instrumentalist approaches that defend the absence of realism in predictive 
models. Scientific prediction rests — in his judgment — in the knowledge and 
control of the variables important for the phenomenon studied. It is also 
supported by the adequate inferences. These features seek to reduce the 
uncertainty about the future and to obtain true predictions. 
However, every predictive statement — as all the knowledge — is 
revisable. From an approach of bounded rationality, the task of predicting is 
also a task subjected to limits, both cognitive and practical. But accepting that 
our intent of anticipating the future is subjected to limits does not mean that, 
for this very reason, it is doomed to failure. For this reason, he maintains that 
we should persist “in using the resources of reason to doing the best we can 
in the recognition that while overall this is going to prove to be quite a lot, it 
will never be nearly as much as we would ideally like.”692 
Therefore, scientific prediction is a rational prediction. It consists in a 
statement about the future that is obtained as the result of processes in 
which cognitive, practical, and evaluative rationality intervene. Thus, the 
rational bases — theoretical or empirical — of prediction justify the 
anticipation of the possible future. Moreover, as the content of the prediction 
is the result of a rational process, it can be objective. In this way, the use of 
scientific prediction as a test for theories is also justified. 
2) In effect, scientific prediction can be used as a test for scientific 
theories. However within a fallibilistic epistemological approach, prediction 
cannot provide a definitive proof of the validity of theories. For Rescher, 
                                            
691 Thus, he disagrees with Milton Friedman, whose approach Rescher criticizes expressly. 
Cf. FRIEDMAN, M., “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” pp. 3-43; and RESCHER, N., 
Predicting the Future, pp. 109 and 194-196. 
692 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 222. 
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prediction is the best we have, but “the scientific bearing of predictive 
success is not demonstrative but merely evidential, in this domain even our 
best confirmed theories are no more than reasonable but also provisional 
estimates of the truth.”693  
3) Furthermore, the reliability of the predictive statements in applied 
science has repercussions for prescription. On the one hand, prediction can 
turn to be false. This has a negative incidence on prescriptions, which are 
designed by using the knowledge about the possible future. And, on the other 
hand, the fallible character of scientific prediction requires — in my judgment 
— adopting a wary attitude when the action is designed on the basis of 
predictive knowledge. This also happens in the context of the application of 
science, where prediction can serve as a basis for the agents’ decision-
making. Thus, the fallible character of the cognitive content of scientific 
prediction makes it difficult the decision-making of the agents (both individual 
and social) when they try to solve practical problems of acting. 
4) Within this fallibilistic framework, Rescher’s attention goes usually 
towards the realm of basic science. In this regard, he thinks that scientific 
prediction has an important role for scientific progress. So, as a test for 
theories, prediction is also an important indicator of scientific progress.694 
Thus, although his proposal is clearly pragmatic, it is not an instrumentalist 
approach, since scientific progress is not directly connected with problem-
solving. In this regard, the Kantian component of this thought prevails, so 
scientific prediction is above all a cognitive content, which also has 
methodological import.  
 
4.3.2.  Knowledge of the Variables of Prediction 
                                            
693 Predicting the Future, p. 171. 
694 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 164. 
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Although Rescher is usually focused on the role of prediction in basic 
science, scientific prediction has several roles, according to the type of 
activity where prediction is achieved or used.695 I) Prediction can be used in 
basic science (either natural sciences or social sciences) as a test for 
establishing the scientific character of the hypotheses and theories. II) Within 
the realm of applied science (pharmacology, medicine, economics, etc.), 
prediction is usually the previous step to prescription. Thus, the anticipation 
of the possible future is required in order to guide the action towards the 
solution of concrete problems. III) Prediction has also a role in the application 
of science, where it can serve as a support for the procedures of decision-
making.696 
Above all, Rescher attention goes to the role of prediction as a test for 
theories, since his main interest is usually in the realm of basic science. In 
order to meet this function, the knowledge provided by the predictive 
statement must be an objective knowledge. He admits the objectivity of the 
knowledge about the future, which can be true. In his approach, the 
objectivity of prediction is related to its rational character. Then, he rejects the 
thesis according to which “predictions don’t need reasons.”697 So, in his 
judgment, prediction is not credible when there are not reasons that justify an 
inference of future: “Outside the context of grammatical examples and 
imaginative fictions, neither statements nor predictions have any serious 
interest for us in the absence of reasons for seeing them as credible.”698 
He considers that a scientific prediction can be distinguished from a 
prophecy because scientific prediction has rational bases. However, not 
every rational prediction is, eo ipso, a scientific prediction. Thus, although the 
                                            
695 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 11. 
696 Cf. La predicción científica, p. 11. On the application of science, see GONZALEZ, W. J., 
“The Roles of Scientific Creativity and Technological Innovation in the Context of Complexity 
of Science,” pp. 11-40; especially, p. 18. 
697 MELLOR, D. H., “The Possibility of Prediction,” p. 221.  
698 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 256, n. 81. 
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rational bases of prediction are generally associated with its scientific 
character, rational predictions can be of an informal character; that is, 
predictions made on the basis of everyday experience. Rescher provides the 
following example of rational non-scientific prediction: it is possible to predict 
with confidence and appropriateness that the bright sunshine will melt the 
snow without having knowledge about the sun’s thermonuclear processes 
and the physics of thermal radiation.699 
Consequently, “scientific predictions are thereby superior as science; 
but this does not by itself make them superior—or safer—as predictions.”700 
So, what makes a scientific prediction superior than other rational prediction, 
based on everyday experience, is the fact that scientific prediction is 
supported by scientific knowledge about the phenomena, obtained through 
processes that follow clear rules.701 This feature allows us to answer with 
more accuracy and precision the question about why a certain prediction has 
been achieved. For this reason, the standards for the acceptation of a 
prediction in science should be more demanding. 
From this perspective, the knowledge about the relevant variables for 
prediction is crucial, since it allows us to justify an inference of future from the 
available data about the past and present. In fact, a distinction has been 
proposed in economics between “foresight,” “prediction,” and “forecast,” on 
the basis of their different degree of control of the variables.702 Thus, 
“foresight” is most secure kind of prediction, and “forecast” is the least one, 
because it is a prediction with a margin of error.  
This conceptual distinction is not considered by Rescher, although he 
                                            
699 Cf. Predicting the Future, p. 57. 
700 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 57. 
701 In effect, Rescher thinks that the main difference between scientific and non-scientific 
prediction lies in the type of processes. Thus, non-scientific prediction uses procedures that 
do not have the same rigor than the scientific methods. Meanwhile, scientific prediction is 
supported by scientific methods such as predictive models. RESCHER, N., Personal 
Communication, 15.7.2014.  
702 Cf. FERNÁNDEZ VALBUENA, S., “Predicción y Economía,” pp. 385-405.  
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insists in the importance of the information about the relevant variables in 
order to have predictive success. In effect, he notices that prediction is 
sensitive to the information available. For this reason, “with prediction, as 
elsewhere, we must be careful not to identify automatically the vastly 
extensive (ontological) realities that make for the actuality of what is 
predicted with the comparatively modest (cognitive) considerations that 
furnish a prediction’s evidential warrant.”703 This means that the more 
variables we know and the better our knowledge about these variables is, the 
more secure the prediction will be.  
However, for Rescher, scientific perfection is not always attainable. On 
the one hand, there is always risk of error; and, on the other, the available 
information can be incomplete. In this regard, he notices that prediction is 
inherently risky, so “when we make claims about the future, things can almost 
invariably go awry.”704 But it is a risk we must take, because the importance 
that by the human being has the achievement of knowledge about the future 
events and developments. Thus, the best perspective of success involves the 
rational bases of prediction, which are objective and, therefore, reliable. 
He suggests that prediction must be the result of a rational process 
supported by proofs (either theoretical or empirical); because, although the 
future is observationally and physically inaccessible, it is not inaccessible in a 
cognitive way. Access to the future is possible through prediction, “even 
though it always involves an intrinsically risky, error-liable epistemic leap from 
information regarding the past-&-present to claims regarding the yet 
unrealized future.”705 The perspective of error cannot be completely 
eliminated, but the reliability of a prediction will depend on the quality of the 
information it is based on. In this way, in the rational process of prediction, 
knowledge about the variables — in number and quality — is crucial for 
                                            
703 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 59. 
704 Predicting the Future, p. 59. 
705 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 54. 
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predictive success.   
 
4.4.  Epistemological Limits to Predictability 
Due to the primacy of the epistemological realm in Rescher’s 
philosophical approach, the epistemological limits to scientific prediction are 
an especially important issue. Expressly, Rescher maintains that 
“epistemological limits on prediction exist insofar as the future is cognitively 
inaccessible—either because we cannot secure the needed data, or because 
it is impossible for us to discover the operative laws, or even possibly 
because the requisite inferences and/or calculations involve complexities that 
outrun the reach of our capabilities.”706 Thus, he assumes, de facto, an 
approach of bounded rationality707 as a framework for the analysis of the 
epistemological limits that affect predictability. It is another feature that 
separates Rescher’s philosophy of science from the traditional philosophical 
idealism. 
 
4.4.1.  The Problem of Uncertainty 
In Rescher’s thought, the epistemological realm has primacy over the 
ontological dimension;708 because concepts and categories are what allow us 
to articulate the reality. Thus, science is our science: it is the result of an 
activity carried through by human beings with limited capacities, within a 
context where the information available is usually also limited. For this 
reason, Rescher notices that “the limits of our experience set limits to our 
                                            
706
 Predicting the Future, p. 134. 
707 On the characterization of “bounded rationality,” GONZALEZ, W. J., “Racionalidad y 
Economía: De la racionalidad de la Economía como Ciencia a la racionalidad de los agentes 
económicos,” pp. 65-96. 
708 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Racionalidad científica y actividad humana: Ciencia y valores en la 
Filosofía de Nicholas Rescher,” in RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-
tecnológica, pp. 11-44. 
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science.”709 Now then, this experience can be articulated only from our 
concepts, our mental structure.  
Insofar experience is limited, Rescher sees uncertainty as the main 
obstacle to scientific prediction in the epistemological realm.710 His approach 
insists at this point: “the circumstances of our existence are such that many 
of our decisions — and many of the most important ones — have to be made 
under conditions of unavoidable uncertainty.”711 This feature especially 
affects prediction. In effect, since prediction is usually oriented towards a 
possible future, uncertainty can be a clear obstacle to predictability.  
Therefore, uncertainty can limit scientific prediction according to several 
degrees: (i) uncertainty can involve unpredictability (that is, the impossibility 
to obtain a prediction); (ii) it is possible that uncertainty entails not-
predictability with regard to a concrete issue (the current impossibility to state 
a prediction);712 and (iii) uncertainty can make it difficult to achieve an ideal 
degree of exactness and precision. In this case, it might only be possible to 
obtain a generic prediction, instead of a specific prediction.713 
Regarding how to address the problem of predictive uncertainty, 
cognitive or epistemic rationality is the starting point. But Rescher does not 
endorse an approach to rationality based on the idea of maximization, as 
mainstream economists — for example — does.714 He considers that human 
                                            
709 RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 216 
710 See GUILLAN, A., “Epistemological Limits to Scientific Prediction: The Problem of 
Uncertainty”, The Open Journal of Philosophy, v. 4, n. 4, (2014), pp. 510-517. 
711 RESCHER, N., “Deliberative Conservatism,” in RESCHER, N., Sensible Decisions. Issues of 
Rational Decision in Personal Choice and Public Policy, p. 33. 
712 This distinction between “not-predictability” and “unpredictability” is in GONZALEZ, W. J., La 
predicción científica, Concepciones filosófico-metodológicas desde H. Reichenbach a N. 
Rescher, p. 289.  
713 Regarding what we can predict or not in science, Rescher thinks that the best source of 
information we have comes from science itself: it is not an external issue. Moreover, only 
science itself can inform us about the achievable degree of precision for scientific prediction. 
This depends on circumstances such as the scope — short, medium or long run —, the 
available technology, etc. Additionally, it also depends on the question we want to ask. In 
principle, the more concrete the question is, the more complicated it will be to answer it 
accurately. Rescher, N., Personal communication, 17.6.2014. 
714 About rationality as maximization and the alternative of bounded rationality, see 
GONZALEZ, W. J., “Rationality in Economics and Scientific Predictions: A Critical 
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rationality is, in fact, a bounded rationality. In his judgment, rationality is 
bound to a circumstantial optimization (the best thing that can be done in a 
concrete situation), instead of being associated with something absolute or 
maximization.715 This has to do with the human beings environmental 
conditions or social milieu, which are usually affected by uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is one of the aspects that go hand in hand with bounded 
rationality. On the one hand, it is not usual that we have all the relevant 
information; and, on the other, human ability to compute information is also 
limited.716 Hence, in Rescher’s approach, rationality and uncertainty are 
closely related. This has direct repercussions on scientific prediction, insofar 
as it is the result of a rational activity. Moreover, this rational activity is 
oriented to a future that, in principle, has a number of possibilities. 
In Rescher’s conception, rational prediction is the result of a process. It 
involves several aspects: 1) prediction is obtained where there is the relevant 
information about past and present events; 2) the paths reflected in this body 
of data for prediction are discerned; and 3) the patterns detected in past and 
present phenomena are stable, to some extent, so they continue into the 
future.717 If we consider these preconditions for rational prediction, it seems 
clear that uncertainty is, de facto, one of the main limits to predictability. 
Furthermore, Rescher notices that “uncertainty produced by sheer 
ignorance is clearly the most obvious obstacle to prediction.”718 Thus, 
although the phenomenon that we are trying to predict is — or may be — a 
regular one, the failure is still possible when all the relevant information about 
                                                                                                                           
Reconstruction of Bounded Rationality and its Role in Economic Predictions,” Poznan 
Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, v. 61, (1997), pp. 205-232. 
715 Cf. RESCHER, N., Rationality. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and the Rationale of 
Reason, passim, and RESCHER, N., “Maximization, Optimization, and Rationality. On 
Reasons why Rationality is not Necessarily a Matter of Maximization,” in RESCHER, N., 
Ethical Idealism. An Inquiry into the Nature and Function of Ideals, pp. 55-84; especially, pp. 
71-79. 
716 Cf. RESCHER, N., Epistemology. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, chapter 11, 
pp. 187-206 
717 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 86. 
718 Predicting the Future, p. 135. 
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its operation is not available. Obtaining the relevant information is a 
necessary condition to predictability. However, too often it is difficult — or 
even impossible — for human beings to gain access to the information (at 
least, to the relevant information). 
This aspect leads Rescher to accept that “the limits of one’s information 
set unavoidable limits to one’s predictive capacities.”719 Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to distinguish between uncertainty and ignorance. Ignorance 
means the complete lack of information about a concrete issue, whereas 
uncertainty has to do with the characteristic of indecisiveness. Thus, “with 
uncertainty we know (or think we know) what the range of possibilities is: it is 
based on (presumed) knowledge of the possibility range for correct. 
Accordingly we can generally grapple with uncertainty by means of 
probabilities — at least in favorable circumstances.”720  
But, although it was possible to deal with uncertainty by means of 
probabilistic knowledge, this may not be good enough to guarantee a 
scientific prediction. Firstly, available information can be insufficient, making 
the predictive task difficult: “possibilities rest on actualities that require 
information to project possibilities, although unfortunately, misinformation will 
also come into play.”721 Thus, uncertainty might affect the probabilistic 
calculus, because the available information might be insufficient or wrong.  
Secondly, Rescher insists that prediction cannot be reduced to a 
probabilistic statement. In his judgment, to make a prediction is something 
more than assigned probability to phenomena’s occurrence. In fact, he thinks 
that “the probability of a prediction thus affords an index of its acceptability — 
a measure of the extent to which rational confidence in its realization is 
                                            
719 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 135. 
720 RESCHER, N., “Cognitive Compromise. On Managing Cognitive Risk in the Face of the 
Imperfect/Flawed,” in RESCHER, N., Epistemological Studies, Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm, 
2009, p. 57. 
721 RESCHER, N., “Cognitive Compromise. On Managing Cognitive Risk in the Face of the 
Imperfect/Flawed,” p. 58. 
221 
 
warranted in the prevailing circumstances.”722 Consequently, claiming the 
occurrence of something (that is, making a prediction) is different from 
claiming that something is going to happen with certain probability.723 From 
this viewpoint, probability can be relevant to predict the degree of uncertainty 
of the obtained forecast.  
Thirdly, since scientific prediction is the result of an intellectual rational 
activity, it should be made on the basis of available knowledge and the 
control of the variables that are relevant with respect to the phenomenon at 
issue. It also should be based on the appropriate inferences. This will lead to 
reduce the uncertainty associated with future phenomena, and to the 
conclusion of reliable and correct predictions. Thus, probability can be a tool 
that helps to overcome the obstacles related to uncertainty, but probabilistic 
knowledge — by itself alone — is not good enough to obtain a prediction. 
Furthermore, the difficulty of achieving appropriate knowledge about the 
studied phenomena has repercussions on the temporal dimension, which 
affects the scope of prediction. Rescher distinguishes between long-run 
forecast and short-run forecast, depending on the temporal distance of the 
predicted phenomenon with respect to the present moment.724 Thus, to the 
extent we cannot predict what we cannot conceive, uncertainty will increase 
as we try to predict a more distant future (however, this is not a general rule: 
some phenomena can be easier to predict in the long run than in the short 
run).725 
According to Rescher’s viewpoint, predicting is similar to trying to see 
through the fog: “very little can be seen at a distance — and that little with but 
little clarity.”726 Undoubtedly, the problem of complexity can increase 
                                            
722 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 44. 
723 Rescher develops quite interesting ideas on probability in a recent paper. Cf. RESCHER, 
N., “Probability as Potentially Problematic,” Mind and Society, forthcoming. 
724 Cf. Predicting the Future, pp. 76-78. 
725 This is the case of the desertification of part of the Earth. 
726 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 76. 
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uncertainty. Even if it is known that something is possible, this sometimes 
might be insufficient to make a prediction. The more complex the studied 
phenomenon, the more problematic it will be, in principle, to obtain a reliable 
prediction about it.727  
There is also another aspect that adds difficulty to scientific prediction: 
uncertainty is related with predictive scatter. When we are dealing with a 
limited body of information, it is possible that various competing theories 
arise. This can lead to conflicting predictions. Hence, “the prospect of 
conflicting predictions has to be accepted as a pervasively recurrent 
phenomenon.”728 Conflicting predictions concern both the natural sciences 
and, to a greater extent, the social sciences (especially, in economics). 
When the question at issue is the prediction about the development of 
future science, uncertainty is also present. In fact, Rescher maintains that 
future science is unpredictable. He thinks on the Kantian “principle of 
question proliferation” that intervenes here making the knowledge of future 
science impossible (at least, in a specific way). According to this principle, 
each answer given to solve a problem makes new questions arise, which, in 
turn, needs an answer. Furthermore, we cannot predict what questions we 
will ask in the future, because we cannot anticipate what the answers to 
currently open questions will be. In this case, the available information about 
past developments does not justify an inference about the future 
advancements.729  
According to Rescher, scientific progress is basically of a conceptual 
nature. Thus, scientific research advances trough conceptual creativity. 
Consequently, “the questions we can pose are limited by our conceptual 
                                            
727 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Complejidad estructural en Ciencias de Diseño y su incidencia en la 
predicción científica: El papel de la sobriedad de factores (parsimonious factors),” in 
GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Las Ciencias de la Complejidad: Vertiente dinámica de las Ciencias 
de Diseño y sobriedad de factores, pp. 143-167. 
728 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 135. 
729 Cf. RESCHER, N., “The Problem of Future Knowledge,” pp. 149-163. 
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horizons.”730 Following this way, prediction about the future science is only 
possible at a generic level. This is so because there is a cognitive 
indetermination here: the more detailed and precise the prediction is, the less 
confidence we can attribute to it. It is possible, for example, to predict with 
certainty that scientific means for observation and experimentation will 
improve in the future, but it is not possible to anticipate what these 
improvements will be. 
This allows us to infer that uncertainty has more weigh in specific 
predictions than in generic predictions. This is so because there is a relation 
of balance between informativeness (exactness, detail, precision, etc.) and 
security, both in scientific knowledge, in general, and in scientific prediction, 
in particular. Thus, as the degree of detail of the prediction increases, the 
uncertainty with respect to its reliability also increases. This is an especially 
relevant question, since the utility of the prediction lies in its informativeness. 
In Rescher’s words, “an ironic but critically important feature of scientific 
inquiry is that the unforeseeable tends to be of special significance just 
because of its unpredictability. The more important the innovation, the less 
predictable it is, because its very unpredictability is a key index of 
importance.”731 This increases the problem of uncertainty because, generally, 
those things we do not know are, for that very reason, the most relevant for 
us. 
On this basis, it is not advisable to obtain predictive security by losing 
informativeness, since the value of prediction lies in its content. Hence, it has 
                                            
730 RESCHER, N., Satisfying Reason. Studies in the Theory of Knowledge, p. 76. 
731 RESCHER, N., Unknowability. An Inquiry into the Limits of Knowledge, Lexington Books, 
Lanham, MD, 2009. p. 15. Rescher does not distinguish clearly creativity and innovation. In 
this regard, it has been noticed that it is usual to distinguish the concept of “creativity,” as it 
appears in a scientific context, from the notion of “innovation,” which connects with the 
technological realm (where there are often modifications of existing realities rather than 
something completely new or original). Cf. NEIRA, P., “Complejidad en Ciencias de la 
Comunicación debido a la racionalidad: Papel de la racionalidad limitada ante la creatividad 
e innovación en Internet,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Las Ciencias de la Complejidad: 
Vertiente dinámica de las Ciencias de Diseño y sobriedad de factores, p. 217. 
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to aspire to exactness and precision. However, when it is impossible to obtain 
a specific prediction due to uncertainty, at least a generic prediction could be 
possible. In this case, uncertainty does not entail unpredictability, but it acts 
as an obstacle with respect to the achievable degree of exactness and 
precision. 
Comparatively, according to the type of phenomena that prediction is 
about, it is possible to claim — in my judgment — that prediction generates 
fewer difficulties in the natural sciences than in the social sciences. This is 
due to the higher level of complexity that social phenomena can have,732 
where uncertainty also has more weight than natural phenomena.733 Usually, 
Rescher’s approach is focused on natural sciences (mainly, physics), so he 
leaves open the question of uncertainty with respect to social sciences (and, 
undoubtedly, he does not pay especial attention to prediction in the sciences 
of the artificial). 
In principle, social sciences have to do with agents’ actions and 
choices, which make their decisions in changeable social and historical 
settings. These structural and dynamic factors involve an additional source of 
complexity for prediction in these sciences. Too often, Rescher is focused on 
the problem of prediction with regard to the limits of the information, that is, 
on the internal aspects of science. In the specific case of scientific prediction, 
uncertainty has to do then with the future environment, so that available 
information does not allow us to predict or, at least, makes it difficult for those 
predictions to have the desired degree of exactness and precision. 
                                            
732 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., "Complexity in Economics and Prediction: The Role of Parsimonious 
Factors,” in DIEKS, D., GONZALEZ, W. J., HARTMAN, S., UEBEL, TH. and WEBER, M. (eds.), 
Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation, Springer, Dordrecht, 2011, pp. 319-330; 
especially, pp. 319-321. 
733 According to Rescher, social phenomena are more difficult to predict than natural 
phenomena. He considers that there is a very simple reason that explains this issue: social 
prediction deals, in principle, with people’s acts and choices. How people consciously and 
deliberatively act depends not on the reality of the world, but on what people think about that 
reality (i.e., it depends on beliefs, ideas, expectations, etc. that are immensely variable). By 
contrast, natural prediction is about natural processes, which are an objective matter: they 
depend on the state of affairs of the world. Rescher, N., Personal communication, 10.6.2014.  
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It happens that in social sciences, in general, and in economics, in 
particular, there is an additional source of uncertainty. It is decision-making, 
which is related with the problem of rational decision. In economics, the 
problem of uncertainty is not only related with the future environment, but 
also has to be considered with regard to the agents’ decision-making, that is 
usually carried through in circumstances of uncertainty.734 Consequently, 
when prediction is about economic agents’ decision-making, it is not usually 
to obtain a “foresight” (that is, the securest kind of prediction), but a mere 
“forecast,” which always involves a margin of error and hence intrinsically 
involves uncertainty. 
In this context, it is possible to highlight the relevance of the 
methodological role of uncertainty, especially in the case of economic 
prediction.735 When the result of economic forecasts “are known, the 
corresponding forecast errors and the anticipated forecast uncertainty can be 
used to evaluate the models from which the forecasts were generated.”736 
Thus, uncertainty has a methodological role that has repercussions on the 
use of the forecast as a test to assess the appropriateness of predictive 
models. 
Therefore, it is possible to state that, with regard to uncertainty, there 
are more questions than those contemplated by Rescher. In his approach, 
which is primarily oriented to the natural sciences, uncertainty is the main 
epistemological obstacle to predictability. It has to do with lack of knowledge 
about the regularities of phenomena, which is due to epistemic failures in 
                                            
734 About uncertainty as an obstacle to prediction in social sciences, in general, and in 
economic science, in particular, Cf. SIMON, H. A., “Bounded Rationality in Social Science: 
Today and Tomorrow,” Mind and Society, v. 1, n. 1, (2000), pp. 25-39. See Spanish 
translation: “La racionalidad limitada en Ciencias Sociales: Hoy y mañana,” in GONZALEZ, W. 
J. (ed.), Racionalidad, historicidad y predicción en Herbert A. Simon, p. 107. 
735 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “La vertiente dinámica de las Ciencias de la Complejidad. 
Repercusión de la historicidad para la predicción científica en las Ciencias Diseño,” in 
GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Las Ciencias de la Complejidad: Vertiente dinámica de las Ciencias 
de Diseño y sobriedad de factores, p. 91. 
736 ERICSSON, N. R., “Predictable Uncertainty in Economic Forecasting,” in CLEMENTS, M. and 
HENDRY, D. F. (eds.), A Companion to Economic Forecasting, Blackwell, Oxford, 2002, p. 19. 
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obtaining or computing the information. But, besides the epistemological 
dimension, there are — in my judgment — a methodological aspect and an 
ontological feature, which can be seen clearly when the problem of prediction 
in economics is analyzed.  
Methodologically, the problem arises about whether or not prediction is 
a necessary condition or test to have science. This is a question that has 
been argued above all in economics, where the problem of the lack of 
reliability of economic predictions has special relevance.737 Uncertainty has 
influence on this question, so that it is possible to ask if it is good enough to 
obtain forecasts (predictions that involve uncertainty) instead of a genuine 
foresight. 
This methodological problem related with prediction has ontological 
roots. De facto, in the social sciences and the sciences of the artificial, “it sits 
on the complexity of human activity involved in the social environment. This 
complexity contributes to the frequent lack of reliability of economic 
predictions, which has its roots in the object of study of this science: 
economic reality is a social and artificial undertaking (quehacer), which is 
commonly mutable, as a consequence of its dependence on the human 
activity that develops historically.”738 From this point of view, it is possible to 
consider uncertainty as a source of complexity in economic activity, so that it 
is an obstacle of special relevance to prediction in economics. 
However, the epistemological dimension is fundamental, because 
uncertainty has to do, in principle, with the lack of knowledge about the 
regularities, which is due to the lack of information. For this reason, it is not 
usual that uncertainty involves “unpredictability”, i.e., the actual impossibility 
                                            
737 About prediction as the “scientific test” of economics, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “Prediction as 
Scientific Test of Economics,” pp. 83-112. The approaches’ of four Nobel Prize winners in 
economics are analyzed in this text: Milton Friedman, John Hicks, James Buchanan, and 
Herbert Simon. 
738 GONZALEZ, W. J., “La vertiente dinámica de las Ciencias de la Complejidad. Repercusión 
de la historicidad para la predicción científica en las Ciencias Diseño,” p. 92. 
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of predicting. On the contrary, it can be possible to predict under conditions of 
uncertainty (at least, at the level of forecasts or generic predictions). 
It must be considered that a phenomenon we cannot currently predict, 
because of the presence of uncertainty — or an issue that we can only 
predict generically, or by means of forecasts —, can be predictable in the 
future. Even more, the exactness and the degree of precision of the obtained 
predictions can increase. In this case, it is necessary to stress the rational 
basis of scientific prediction, since it is possible to overcome uncertainty if the 
knowledge and control of the relevant variables increase. 
 
4.4.2.  Prediction and Decision-Making 
Although Rescher is mainly focused on natural science, he also takes 
into account the role of prediction in social sciences, and notices limits to 
prediction in this field. In this regard, predicting the behavior of the agents in 
a social context involves the assumption that these agents make choices in a 
rational way. They should seek an optimal choice with regard to their context. 
But, even acting as rational agents, there are situations in which agents are 
not capable of predicting the optimal course of action.739 This involves clear 
limits to the predictive capacity of social sciences.  
An especial complex task in social science is to meet the necessary 
conditions for prediction, because of the obstacles that involves the 
characteristic of their object of study for predictability. Thus, the 
indeterminism of human affairs must be taken into account, as well as the 
predictive errors related to the knowledge of the variables that intervene in 
the process.740 For Rescher, the limits to prediction in social sciences “lie in 
the intractability of the issues, so that there is little reason to think that the 
relatively modest record of the past will be substantially improved upon the 
                                            
739 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Predictive Incapacity and Rational Decision,” in RESCHER, N., Sensible 
Decisions, pp. 39-47. 
740 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 273. 
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future.” 741 
Initially, social sciences have to do with the actions and choices of the 
agents, above all if we assume the methodological individualism. In that 
case, it can be noticed that both — actions and choices — are predictable to 
the extent that they are also rational. From this perspective, the behavior of 
the agents can be predicted if they choose the optimal option in their specific 
circumstances. However, agents’ do not always behave rationally. Then, 
arbitrary choices intervene, which involve non-rational and, therefore, not-
predictable decision making (at least with a desired level of accuracy and 
precision). In this way, it can be possible to predict that an agent will act in an 
arbitrary way, but then we cannot predict what his action or choice will be in 
an accurate way.742  
However, even if the agents act in a rational way, prediction in a social 
context is not always possible. Rescher contemplates two cases where, 
although the behavior of the agents is fully rational, it is impossible to state a 
reliable prediction about their actions.743 First, he notices the informational 
underdetermination; and, second, the analysis overdetermination as limits to 
predictability.  
Informational underdetermination can make prediction impossible; 
because, if we do not have information (or the information that we have is 
incomplete), then we cannot achieve a rational prediction about the agents’ 
actions and choices, even if they were ideally rational agents. In addition, 
analysis overdetermination involves that it is possible to reach several 
rational solutions that are divergent among then. Then, the agent whose 
actions we want to predict is in a situation where an optimal solution cannot 
be established, since several different choices are equally rational. The 
                                            
741 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 202. 
742 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Predictive Incapacity and Rational Decision,” in RESCHER, N., Sensible 
Decisions, p. 39. 
743 Cf. “Predictive Incapacity and Rational Decision,” pp. 40-45. 
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prisoner’s dilemma is a clear example of this kind of obstacle. 
Despite the different limits mentioned, Rescher thinks that human 
actions should be, in principle, predictable, insofar as they are rational 
actions.744 In fact, the social system — which is certainly complex — is 
supported by the predictability of agents’ behavior. Thus, even when he 
admits that “mere arbitrary choice can provide resolutions that lie beyond the 
dictates of reason,”745 he also understands that “the acts of rational agents 
are usually predictable.”746 
This idea is related with the thesis maintained by Merrilee Salmon, 
when she analyses the possibility of predicting in the realm of the social 
science. This philosopher claims that “if people were completely 
unpredictable, social life would break down altogether.”747 There are many 
social phenomena that include regularities and, therefore, they are 
predictable. On this basis, predictive success in social sciences is an 
attainable goal. However complexity, to the extent that it involves the lack of 
regularities, undoubtedly makes scientific prediction more difficult, both in 
science, in general, and in social sciences, in particular.  
 
4.5.  Rationality and the Problem of Risk 
Rescher considers that rational behavior involves an important risk: the 
error. In his judgment, there are three main categories of error, which 
                                            
744 “The acts of rational agents are usually predictable because it is often and perhaps even 
usually possible to figure out on the basis of general principles what the rational thing to do is 
in the prevailing situation. This circumstance makes rationality into a crucial predictive 
resource in matters of human action. Indeed, it is on just this basis that we try to understand 
people, since we ordinarily credit them with being rational until such time as they prove 
themselves otherwise. In consequence, the actions of free agents must be substantially 
predictable — if they are rational, at any rate,” RESCHER, N., “Predictive Incapacity and 
Rational Decision,” p. 39. 
745 “Predictive Incapacity and Rational Decision,” p. 46. 
746 RESCHER, N., “Predictive Incapacity and Rational Decision,” p. 39. 
747 SALMON, M. H., “Philosophy of the Social Sciences,” in SALMON, M. H. ET AL., Introduction 
to the Philosophy of Science, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1992, p. 406. On this 
topic, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “Sobre la predicción en Ciencias Sociales: Análisis de la 
propuesta de Merrilee Salmon,” Enrahonar, v. 37, (2005), pp. 181-202. 
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corresponds with the three realms of rationality: (i) cognitive error, which 
arises when there are failures in information acquisition; (ii) practical error, 
which involves failures with regard to the goals of action; and (iii) axiological 
error, which has to do with failures in the realm of evaluation.748  
Consequently, when we accept a belief, make an action, or evaluate 
different alternatives, there is always certain risk of error. Rescher’s interest 
is mainly in the problem of risk in relation to cognitive rationality. His 
approach is, above all, a criticism to skepticism. Thus, in his judgment, the 
acceptation of information as valid always involves certain risk. However, he 
considers that we need to calculate the risk and, in some cases, assume it, if 
we expect to obtain some benefit from the cognitive undertaking. 
This issue is connected with scientific prediction is several successive 
levels. Firstly, prediction is a statement that provides information about a 
potential future. Therefore, it can be considered that, by accepting a 
predictive statement as true, we assume a higher risk than when we accept 
as true information regarding past or present facts. In effect, it is not possible 
to test now what prediction states about the future. Secondly, prediction can 
anticipate a risk (a natural disaster, for example), so it can be linked with the 
problem of rational decision-making. Thirdly, the relation between prediction 
and prescription intervene, because, once the risk is anticipated, decisions 
should be made about the adequate measures to avoid or, at least, minimize 
that risk.   
 
4.5.1.  Cognitive Rationality and Risk: A Criticism of Skepticism 
Within an epistemological framework of fallibilism, it is assumed that 
every attempt to obtain knowledge — human, in general, and scientific, in 
particular — involves certain risk. In Rescher’s judgment, “virtually all of our 
                                            
748 Cf. RESCHER, N., Error: On Our Predicament When Things Go Wrong, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA, 2007, p. 1. 
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ventures in claiming knowledge about reality carry some risk of cognitive 
error in their wake: it is unavoidable companion of the enhancement of 
knowledge.”749 
When we try to obtain knowledge, it is not possible for us to achieve 
conclusions that we can consider true beyond doubt. History of science itself 
leads us to think that the hypotheses and theories that we accept now will be 
revised in the future.750 In effect, Rescher considers that “the skeptical 
tradition reminds us that all our claims to knowledge and truth carry some 
element of risk.”751 
Regarding the problem of risk, Rescher maintains that there are three 
different approaches that are related to three different types of personalities: 
(i) risk avoiders, who are people who have little or no tolerance for risk (ii) risk 
seekers, who are people extremely tolerant for risk; and (iii) risk calculators, 
who proceed in a cautious way, taking risks only when the situation seems to 
be favorable.752 Regarding cognition, the first of these approach corresponds 
with a skeptical position regarding knowledge, according to with no risk 
should be assumed, since there is no guarantee that it is possible to achieve 
true knowledge.  
But, although they never assume risks, the possibility of error is not 
completely avoided. This is because, regarding knowledge, errors can be of 
two different types: errors of commission and errors of omission.753 Errors of 
commission can be avoided in two different ways: by giving less informative 
answers or by giving no answer to the questions posed. In both cases alike 
there are errors of omission. By offering vague and insufficient answers, the 
risk of errors of commission is avoided (to accept false claims); but the 
                                            
749 RESCHER, N., “Cognitive Compromise: On Managing Cognitive Risk in the Face of the 
Imperfect/Flawed,” p. 59. 
750 Cf. RESCHER, N., “The Problem of Future Knowledge,” pp. 149-163. 
751 Cf. RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 72. 
752 Cf. Rationality, pp. 54-64. 
753 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Cognitive Compromise: On Managing Cognitive Risk in the Face of the 
Imperfect/Flawed,” in RESCHER, N., Epistemological Studies, p. 61. 
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knowledge that can be achieved in this way is unsatisfactory, because the 
detail, accuracy, precision, etc. are values that should accompany scientific 
knowledge.  
Furthermore, the achievement of knowledge (human and scientific) is a 
human need. For Rescher, “the knowledge that orients our activities in this 
world is itself the most practical of things—a rational animal cannot feel at 
ease in situations of which it can make no cognitive sense. We have 
questions and want (nay, need), to have answers to them. And not just 
answers, but answers that cohere and fit together in an orderly way can 
alone satisfy a rational creature. This basic practical impetus to (coherent) 
information provides a fundamental imperative to cognitive intelligence.”754 
Therefore, when we accept information as valid we are always taking 
certain risk. On the one hand, there can be errors of commission (when a 
false belief is accepted) or there can be errors of omission (when a true belief 
is rejected). Risk avoiders will incur many errors of omission; while risk 
seekers will incur may errors of commission. For Rescher, the most adequate 
position is the approach of the risk calculators, who based their choices and 
actions on “sensible calculation and prudent management.”755 In effect, the 
achievement of answers is a human need, which should be satisfied. Faced 
with the risks of this task, the rational thing to do is “acting as best we can to 
balance the positive risks of outright loss against the negative ones of lost 
opportunity.”756 
In this way, the practical aspect of rationality and therefore the 
methodological component of the scientific undertaking are highlighted. So, 
Rescher agrees when the skeptical tradition when he claims that “each of our 
accepted beliefs may turn out to be false, and many of our accepted beliefs 
                                            
754 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 65. 
755 Rationality, p. 59. 
756 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 59. 
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will turn out to be false.”757 But this feature does not involve, in his judgment, 
that every attempt to obtained knowledge is doomed to failure. Skepticism is 
directed to the content of concrete theses. For Rescher, this is a wrong 
approach, since the problem is of a methodological character and is related 
to the policies for the acceptation of theories.758 
In other words, we have to establish cognitive policies that can be 
justified and that allow us to accept as valid the concrete statements, 
hypotheses and theories. This is because, at the level of the cognitive 
content, there is always certain risk of error. In the case of the knowledge 
about the future, for example, it should be accepted that both a prophecy of a 
clairvoyant and a scientific prediction can turn out to be false. However, 
unlike a prophecy, we can establish that a scientific prediction is reliable, if 
there are theoretical or empirical proofs that justify the inference of future.  
Nevertheless, it is not possible to completely eliminate the cognitive 
risk. But a policy regarding risk should be accepted, in order to minimize the 
errors and have the maximum possible benefits, so we can meet our need of 
knowledge. Once again, practical rationality is crucial, because the costs and 
the benefits of the scientific research should be correctly calculated. Thus, 
“the crucial fact is that inquiry, like virtually all other human endeavors, is not 
a cost-free enterprise. The process of getting plausible answers to our 
questions also involves costs and risks. Whether these costs and risks are 
worth incurring depends on our valuation of the potential benefit to be 
gained.”759 
Therefore, Rescher’s approach to the problem of risk is mainly 
pragmatic. The presence of risks in the cognitive venture must be 
acknowledged. This feature should not lead us to skepticism, but to a realist 
                                            
757 RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 34. 
758 Cf. RESCHER, N., Rationality, pp. 61-64. 
759 RESCHER, N., “Cognitive Compromise: On Managing Cognitive Risk in the Face of the 
Imperfect/Flawed,” in RESCHER, N., Epistemological Studies, p. 61. 
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position about what is possible — both in the sense of attainable and 
acceptable — for us. In effect, achieving knowledge is a human need that 
serves as a basis for action. An action can be performed on the basis of not 
cognitive policies (instinct or tradition, for example), but this is not good 
enough. As a rational creature, human being not only seeks to act, but also 
to justify the actions he choices to perform.760 
Consequently, if no cognitive risk is assumed, the costs are too higher, 
since it avoids, from the very beginning, every attempt to obtain true 
knowledge. Also the opposite position — that tends to be extremely tolerant 
regarding the risk — has problems, because it involves many risks of 
commission; that is, to accept as valid beliefs that are false. It is necessary 
some “error management,” which allows us to reduce the probability that an 
error occurs and to reduce the negative consequences of the error when it 
occurs.761 
Ideal knowledge is far from the type of knowledge that, in fact, we can 
achieve. But here “an analogue of the old Roman legal precept is operative 
here—one is never obliged beyond the limits of the possible (ultra posse 
nemo obligatur).762 Thus, risk is always present due to the possibility of error, 
but this possibility can be reduced when the value of knowledge is admitted 
and, consequently, the potential benefits of the cognitive venture justify the 
acceptance of certain previously calculated risk. In Rescher’s words, “with 
cognition as elsewhere rationality calls for a pragmatic balance of costs and 
benefits in the presence of limited resources. Here too we must strike a 
reasonable compromise between what is ideal and what is affordable.”763  
 
                                            
760 Cf. RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 67. 
761 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Cognitive Compromise: On Managing Cognitive Risk in the Face of the 
Imperfect/Flawed,” in RESCHER, N., Epistemological Studies, p. 62. 
762 RESCHER, N., Rationality, p. 70. 
763 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Cognitive Compromise: On Managing Cognitive Risk in the Face of the 
Imperfect/Flawed,” in RESCHER, N., Epistemological Studies, p. 63. 
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4.5.2.  Risk and Prediction 
For Rescher, every attempt to obtain knowledge involves risks. In the 
case of the predictive knowledge this is even clearer, because prediction is 
about a potential future or a reality that we do not know now, instead of deal 
with past or present phenomena and events. Thus, prediction can turn to be 
false. For this reason, by accepting its content we assume risks of error, 
either of commission or of omission. Assuming the risks is a question that 
depends on two crucial factors: on the one hand, the reliability of the 
prediction; and, on the other, the benefits derived from the knowledge that 
prediction provides.  
The reliability of a statement about the future depends on its rational 
bases. Thus, when there are not rational bases that justify the inference from 
the available data, prediction is not credible. In effect, “only reasonable and 
substantive predictions—those which are both informative and can be 
rendered plausible to other people by way of substantiation—are of any 
cognitive interest.”764 Consequently, the risk of error would be higher in a 
“prediction without reasons” than in a reasoned prediction, since rational 
prediction has evidential basis that justifies it.  
However, predictive success cannot be guaranteed. In fact, Rescher 
considers that prediction is an inherently risky business.765 But the risk 
should be assumed, since the complete lack of knowledge about the future is 
more damaging than the possible errors derived from our attempt to know it. 
Thus, he insists that to obtain some knowledge about the future events and 
developments is a human need: “to act, to plan, to survive, we must 
anticipate the future.”766 So, in his judgment, every human action depends, to 
some extent, on information about the future. 
                                            
764 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 55. 
765 Cf. Predicting the Future, p. 59. 
766 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 64. 
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Also prediction can be about a matter that involves risks (the 
anticipation of a natural disaster, for example). In that case, prediction 
connects with risk management that, in turn, is related with prescription 
(applied science) and decision-making (application of science). Rescher 
defines risk as “the chancing of a negative outcome.”767 Thus, he considers 
that it is an ontological notion instead of being an epistemological issue. This 
distinction leads him to differentiating two aspects: on the one hand, to run a 
risk; and, on the other hand, to take a risk, which involves an epistemic 
component that is not present in the first case.768 
To run a risk is something that happens independently of the knowledge 
that there is or there will be a situation of risk. In this case, the individual or 
the society is facing a risk that is unknown, so the situation of risk is not 
linked with any type of action performed by the agents. Meanwhile, when a 
risk is taken, there is a previous knowledge that some king of harm or lost 
can occur. Thus, it implies a choice or choices by the individual or the 
society, which act on the basis of that knowledge. In this way, the anticipation 
of risks connects with rational choice and leads to ethical problems that have 
to do with prediction. 
In this second case — “to take a risk” — the problem of risk 
management arises. Thus, although Rescher’s main interest is not the realm 
of the applied science, his approach to risk connects with the role of 
prediction in this area. In fact, from this perspective, prediction is crucial, 
since only by the anticipation of risks — that is, by prediction — policies can 
be suggested, either to avoid some occurrence or to produce some result. 
However, he thinks that the anticipation of the possibility of a risk is easier 
than the identification of the risk and the determination of its magnitude or 
                                            
767 RESCHER, N., Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and 
Management, University Press of America, Washington, 1983, p. 5. 
768 Cf. RESCHER, N., Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and 
Management, pp. 6-7. 
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negativity.769 Therefore, the evaluation of the magnitude and negativity of the 
risk predicted is the previous step to what is properly the risk management.  
In order to evaluate the magnitude of a risk, three main questions must 
be valued: (i) character, which is the identification of what type of negativity is 
at issue: physical injury, monetary loss, etc.; (ii) extent, which is the gravity 
and magnitude of some risk, which involves issues such as the number of 
persons affected or the amplitude of the area at danger (in the case of a 
natural disaster, for example); and (iii) timing, which is the duration of the 
situation of risk.770 
But there is the possibility that we cannot evaluate in a precise way the 
three indicators of the magnitude of a risk. Thus, even when the risk is 
anticipated, there is usually uncertainty. The very risk of error related to every 
prediction impedes that we consider a predictive statement as absolutely 
secure. Moreover, there is a cognitive indetermination, according to which 
the more informative a prediction is, the less secure it is.771 In the case of a 
prediction about a risk (earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, etc.), this 
involves that the prediction is less secure the more we go deeply in questions 
such as the extent or timing of the risk.  
Within this framework, Rescher notices that uncertainty is the 
indeterminacy of some of the characteristic elements in a situation of risk.772 
This feature is especially important, since “impredictability and risk go hand in 
hand in human affairs.”773 Therefore, the cognitive limitations that affect 
prediction should be taken into account, as well as the problem of 
uncertainty. In turn, these limits affect the human capacity to control the 
                                            
769 Cf. Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management, 
p. 18. 
770 Cf. RESCHER, N., Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and 
Management, p. 19. 
771 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 62. 
772 Cf. RESCHER, N., Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and 
Management, p. 94. 
773 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 237.  
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future phenomena and events, since “a future we cannot foresee is a fortiori 
a future we cannot control.”774 Therefore, to avoid or to minimize a potential 
risk is only possible is that risk has been anticipated. This has repercussions 
in the configuration of the applied sciences, where prediction is the previous 
step to prescription and the subsequent application of science.775 
Through risk management the aim is to have control over the future 
events or the repercussions that these events can have on people, society, 
or the environment. For Rescher, control is “the capacity to intervene in the 
course of events so as to be able both to make something happens and to 
preclude it from happening, this result being produced in a way that is not 
only foreseen but intended or planned.”776 Therefore, there are two main 
kinds of control: negative control (to preclude something from happening) 
and positive control (to make something happens). Both can be founded in a 
context of applied science. 
Rescher notices that, generally, the control we can have over the future 
events and phenomena is a negative control.777 This usually happens in risk-
management. Thus, once a risk has been anticipated, the prescription, in 
principle, seeks to preclude the risk from happening. In order to do this, we 
need to intervene in the course of events. This requires a causal participation 
of the individuals in the course of events.778 But this is not always possible in 
applied science. 
For example, we can anticipate an earthquake, but we cannot prevent it 
from happening. In this case, the aim of the prescription (applied science) 
and the planning (application of science) is to minimize the harm predicted. In 
this causes, the so-called “precautionary principle” is used, according to 
                                            
774 Predicting the Future, p. 236. 
775 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Rationality and Prediction in the Sciences of the Artificial,” pp. 165-
186; especially, pp. 181-182.  
776 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 235. 
777 Cf. Predicting the Future, p. 235. 
778 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 235-236. 
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which measures of protective character should be taken if there is some 
indicator that a situation of risk will happen (a natural disaster, for example) 
or when a certain product or technological device might involve risks for 
health or for the environment.779 Thus, although it was not possible to 
anticipate a risk with certainty, we should act in order to prevent it.780 
However, in principle, the prescription will be more effective if the risk is 
known in detail. In that case, prediction is crucial, because the evaluation of 
risk; and, after it, the prescription to orientate the action, will be made on the 
basis of the kind of knowledge about the future that we can achieve. 
Therefore, although — as Rescher notices — “impredictability” or, at least, 
not-predictability “and risk go hand in hand in human affairs,”781 two things 
should be sought: firstly, to reduce the uncertainty that accompanies the risk 
in order to achieve reliable predictions; and, secondly, to implement an 
effective and efficient risk-management in order to minimize the harms that 
have been anticipated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
779 Cf. GÓMEZ, A., “El principio de precaución en la gestión internacional del riesgo 
medioambiental,” Política y Sociedad, v. 40, n. 3, (2003), pp. 113-130. 
780 On this issue, see LUJÁN, J. L. and LÓPEZ CEREZO, J. A., “La dimensión social de la 
Tecnología y el principio de precaución,” Politica y Sociedad, v. 40, n. 3, (2003), pp. 53-60; 
and LUJÁN, J. L. and TODT, O., “Precaution: Building Bridges Between Innovation and 
Regulation,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Creativity, Innovation, and Complexity in Science, pp. 
173-185. 
781 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 237.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE METHODOLOGY OF PREDICTION AND 
PRECONDITIONS FOR RATIONAL PREDICTION 
 
In Nicholas Rescher’s conception, the methodological characters of 
scientific prediction are within a framework of methodological pragmatism. 
According to this proposal, scientific claims and theories should be evaluated 
following methodological criteria.782 To do this, there is a procedure that 
consists of two successive steps: (i) the truthlikeness of scientific 
propositions783 or theories can be evaluated through methods of a cognitive 
character, which are oriented towards the confirmation of those propositions 
or theories; and (ii) the validity of the methods used should be evaluated on 
the basis of practical criteria; mainly, the capacity of those methods to 
achieve successful predictions and control over nature. 
Within this context, Rescher’s methodology of scientific prediction is 
connected with his general methodological approach, which is pragmatic. 
Prediction has a fundamental role in it, since it is the main indicator of 
methodological efficacy. In order to clarify the conceptual framework of the 
methodology of prediction, this chapter follows several steps. First, the study 
is focused on Rescher’s methodological pragmatism as a framework for the 
analysis of scientific prediction from a methodological perspective. Second, 
the roles of prediction in scientific activity are considered. Third, the attention 
goes to the different groups of empirical sciences (the natural sciences, the 
social sciences, and the sciences of the artificial),784 which have their own 
                                            
782 Cf. RESCHER, N., Methodological Pragmatism. A Systems-Theoretic Approach to the 
Theory of Knowledge, chapter 5, pp. 66-80. 
783 “Proposition” is used here with the meaning of the content expressed by a statement, a 
content that can be evaluated regarding truth or truthlikeness. 
784 The three types of sciences are analyzed here, although Rescher is mainly interested in 
the natural sciences. 
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characteristics that have repercussions on prediction in each one of those 
realms. 
Thereafter, the preconditions for rational prediction are analyzed. In 
Rescher’s judgment, those preconditions are three: data availability, pattern 
discernability, and pattern stability.785 In his approach, they are necessary 
and sufficient conditions for predictability, so they are basic in his 
methodological proposal about scientific prediction. His analysis is made 
within the framework of methodological pragmatism, which connects with the 
roles of prediction in sciences, in general, and in each group of sciences, in 
particular. 
 
5.1.  Methodological Pragmatism as a Framework for Scientific 
Prediction 
For Rescher, the questions about the validity of scientific knowledge 
can (and should) be addressed in an objective way form a methodological 
perspective. Then, he seeks to clarify the process for the rational warrant of 
knowledge. According to his approach — which he labels methodological 
pragmatism — we can “monitor tour acceptance of theses via the methods 
that substantiate them, and then validate these methods by pragmatic tests—
specifically considering how well we fare in applying and implementing its 
professed claims in matters of prediction and control.”786 
In this regard, prediction has a crucial role in the articulation of a 
methodological pragmatism. So, in Rescher’s judgment, the validity of 
theories is considered through the use of methods that lead to the 
confirmation or disconfirmation of those theories; and, after that, the validity 
of the methods is assessed in relation to their capacity to provide successful 
predictions. For this reason, the methodological characters of scientific 
                                            
785 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 86-87. 
786 RESCHER, N., Realistic Pragmatism. An Introduction to Pragmatic Philosophy, p. 96. 
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prediction in Rescher’s work should be analyzed from the viewpoint of the 
methodological pragmatism. To do this, first, his characterization of this 
approach to pragmatism is considered; and, second, the repercussions of 
methodological pragmatism to scientific prediction are analyzed. 
 
5.1.1. Nicholas Rescher’s Characterization of Methodological 
Pragmatism 
Certainly, nowadays pragmatism is not a homogenous philosophical 
doctrine.787 There is, in effect, a great diversity of philosophico-
methodological approaches within what is generically called “pragmatism.”788 
So it is important to notice a set of features that are characteristic of 
Rescher’s methodological pragmatism, which allow us to establish important 
differences between his approach and other pragmatist proposals. Above all, 
these differences are related to the notions of “objectivity” and “truth.” 
Moreover, he considers that many of the thesis maintained by authors like 
William James, John Dewey and, later, by philosophers such as F. C. S. 
Schiller and Richard Rorty, are not properly pragmatic, but they are the result 
of a “deformation” of pragmatic philosophy.789 
                                            
787 In this regard, see MARGOLIS, J., Reinventing Pragmatism. American Philosophy at the 
End of the Twentieth Century, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2002; BACON, M., 
Pragmatism: An Introduction, Polity Press, Cambridge/Malden, 2012; BURKE, F. TH., What 
Pragmatism Was, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 2013; and CAAMAÑO, M., 
“Pragmatic Norm in Science: Making them Explicit,” Synthese, v. 190, (2013), pp. 3227-
3246. 
788 It should be highlighted that frequently pragmatism goes hand in hand with other 
complementary philosophical approach, above all regarding epistemological matters. For 
example, Philip Kitcher combines realism with pragmatism. Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), 
Scientific Realism and Democratic Society: The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher, Poznan Studies 
in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 2011.  
789 “A noteworthy —and distinctly curious— aspect of contemporary American philosophy 
relates to the fate of ‘pragmatism,’ which has undergone a remarkable deformation from its 
original conception. Many —indeed most— philosophers nowadays think of pragmatism as 
something radically different from what was originally at issue with this conception. And, 
oddly enough, this latter-day sort of pragmatism is not a ‘new improved version’ but a 
markedly inferior product,” RESCHER, N., “Pragmatism at the Crossroads,” in RESCHER, N., 
Pragmatism. The Restoration of its Scientific Roots, p. 1. (This paper was originally 
published in Transactions of the C. S. Peirce Society, v. 41, n. 2, (2005), pp. 355-365.) 
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On this matter, Rescher writes that “deflationary epistemologists, 
including such soft-line pragmatists as William James, are fearful that if we 
take a hard objectivistic line on the meaning of truth, then truth becomes 
transcendentally inaccessible and scepticism looms. And they accordingly 
insist that we soften up our understanding of the nature of truth. But another 
option is perfectly open, namely to retain the classical (hard) construction of 
the meaning of truth as actual facticity (‘correspondence to fact’) and to 
soften matters up on the epistemological/ontological side by adopting a 
‘realistic’ view of what is criteriologically required for staking rationally 
appropriate truth claims.”790 
Clearly, he prefers the second option. For this reason, he criticizes 
Richard Rorty’s conception, according to which pragmatists “suggest that we 
not ask questions about the nature of Truth and Goodness.”791 In Rescher’s 
judgment, the abandonment of the notions of “truth” and “value” or the 
attempt to replace them with other concepts, such as “utility,” would finally 
lead to abandoning philosophy.792 Thus, he does not think that Rorty’s 
approach is properly a pragmatic approach. In effect, as Rescher sees it, 
pragmatism must admit the notions of “truth,” “fact,” “objectivity,” and “value.” 
Furthermore, a realist approach to these notions can be compatible with a 
pragmatic proposal about the rationality of the human beliefs, actions, 
choices, and evaluations. 
In this way, Rescher’s philosophy is in tune with the pragmatist tradition 
of Charles Sanders Peirce, who sought to provide a standard of objectivity 
that can be used as a test for the appropriateness of our factual beliefs.793 
                                            
790 RESCHER, N., “Pragmatism and Practical Rationality,” p. 59. 
791 RORTY, R., Consequences of Pragmatism, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
1982, (10th printing 2003), p. xi. This passage is quoted in RESCHER, N., Realistic 
Pragmatism, p. xi. 
792 “On such a view, pragmatism is not so much a philosophical doctrine as a position that 
urges the abandonment of philosophy and recommends finding something else to do 
instead,” RESCHER, N., Realistic Pragmatism, p. xi. 
793 Realistic Pragmatism, p. 58. 
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Moreover, he sees his own proposal of methodological pragmatism as a 
return to the Peircean roots of pragmatist thought.794 Thus, he rejects other 
proposals, such as James’ subjectivist pragmatism, Dewey’s pragmatism as 
social and cultural constructions, and Schiller’s and Rorty’s relativistic 
approaches.795 
Within pragmatism, which he sees as a heterogeneous philosophical 
doctrine, Rescher distinguishes two main directions: a) pragmatism of the 
left; and b) pragmatism of the right.796 “Pragmatism of the left” has its origins 
in William James’ approach, which is articulated on the basis of the 
preferences of the individuals. It is an account that admits cognitive pluralism 
and relativism, since it is orientated towards the local and personal 
dimensions. In this way, it gives primacy to the subjective or intersubjective 
components.  
By contrast, “pragmatism of the right” — which has its origin in the 
theses maintained by Ch. S. Peirce and C. I. Lewis — seeks objective 
components. Against the simple preferences, it is focused in what is effective 
and efficient in the satisfaction of universal human needs. Furthermore, it 
considers that both the very notion of efficiency and the determination of the 
universal human needs are questions that can be established in an objective 
way. For this pragmatic approach, objectivity is crucial and it is connected 
with an ontological realism that allows us to preserve the notion of truth. 
According to Rescher, pragmatism of the left is not properly a pragmatic 
approach, but an “inferior product.”797 In his judgement, “pragmatism properly 
understood is a positive doctrine—not one that substitutes practice for truth 
                                            
794 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Pragmatism at the Crossroads,” pp. 10-11.  
795 Cf. RESCHER, N., Realistic Pragmatism, chapter 1, pp. 1-56; especially, pp. 15-31 and 44-
47; and chapter 2, pp. 57-80. 
796 Cf. Realistic Pragmatism, pp. 64-69. 
797 RESCHER, N., “Pragmatism at the Crossroads,” p. 1. 
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but one that involves practice as our best available test of truth.”798 For this 
reason, Rescher sees his methodological pragmatism as a return to the 
Peircean roots of the pragmatist tradition. 
With this background vision about the processes of research, 
methodological pragmatism — as Rescher conceives it — is a proposal 
about how is it possible to evaluate the truth or truthlikeness of scientific 
propositions or theories. There are, in his analysis, two main ways of 
justifying beliefs: a) discursively; and b) methodologically.799 Thus, a belief is 
justified discursively when other previously accepted claims are offered as 
reasons for the acceptance of the belief. Meanwhile, a belief is 
methodologically justified when considerations are used that appeal to 
methods; that is, to processes of research that have clear rules. 
When a belief is evaluated methodologically, a procedure is used that 
follows two successive steps:800 Firstly, theses are justified by the application 
of a method; and, secondly, the adoption of a particular method is justified on 
the basis of certain practical criteria, “preminently, success in prediction and 
efficacy in control.”801 In this regard, it should be noticed that Rescher’s 
thought, which is a system of pragmatic idealism, combines a realist notion of 
truth with a pragmatic approach to the evaluation of the content of truth of the 
scientific claims and theories. 
Thus, Rescher considers that the truth of a proposition or theory 
depends on its agreement with the reality, and he conceives reality as 
something independent from the knowing subject.802 In this way, the results 
of the research — the thesis themselves — can be objective. However, as an 
idealist philosopher, he insists that the access of human beings to that 
                                            
798 RESCHER, N., “Pragmatism in Crisis,” in RESCHER, N., Profitable Speculations. Essays on 
Current Philosophical Themes, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 1997, p. 34. 
799 Cf. RESCHER, N., Methodological Pragmatism, pp. 69-70. 
800 Cf. Methodological Pragmatism, p. 67. 
801 Methodological Pragmatism, p. 67. 
802 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Communicative Pragmatism,” pp. 1-48; especially, p. 36. 
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extramental reality is always mediated by our concepts and mental 
categories, so scientific knowledge is the result of the interaction between the 
subject — the researcher — and the reality researched (that in his case is 
usually the natural reality).803 
Therefore, within a framework of pragmatic idealism, Rescher thinks 
that it is not good enough to justify a belief on the basis of other beliefs that 
were previously accepted, since this only can be done within a concrete 
conceptual scheme and, hence, it is a process that depends on the subject. 
Furthermore, the justification of a belief on the basis of previously accepted 
knowledge is a circular procedure, so there are not objective basis. 
These reflections can be seen as an objection to approaches such as 
the Bayesian, where beliefs have a basic role.804 In effect, when a belief is 
discursively justified, other beliefs are offered as reasons for its acceptance. 
In turn, these other beliefs are justified through other theses that support 
them, and so on.805 By contrast, an instrumental justification806 (i.e., properly 
methodological) is thought-independent, and — on the basis of the efficacy 
and efficiency of the processes — it avoids the circular character that inheres 
a discursive justification.  
For Rescher, “the truth/reality connection that is operative here is 
certainly not a cognitively isolated issue subject to no theory-external quality 
controls. ‘Thought externalized’ objectivity is still at our disposal. For with 
                                            
803 On this basis, Rescher develops a proposal about science as our science. Cf. RESCHER, 
N., “Our Science as O-U-R Science,” in RESCHER, N., A Useful Inheritance. Evolutionary 
Aspects of the Theory of Knowledge, pp. 77-104. 
804 See, in this regard, HOWSON, C. and URBACH, P., Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian 
approach, Open Court, La Salle, IL, 1989 (reprinted in 1990; 2nd edition in 1993).  
805 Cf. RESCHER, N., Methodological Pragmatism, p. 70. 
806 Although Rescher uses many times the term “instrumental” regarding his methodological 
approach, it is certainly not an instrumentalist approach in the sense of a subordination of 
theory to practice in terms of importance. In effect, practical rationality that, in his judgment, 
allows us to decide about the rationality of the processes also encompasses a theoretical 
dimension. Practice and theory are equally important. However, “it takes considerations of 
purposive effectiveness to provide the test-standard for the adequacy of the operative 
principles of human endeavor —alike in theoretical and in practical matters. Effective 
implementation is its pervasive standard of adequacy,” RESCHER, N., “Pragmatism and 
Practical Rationality,” pp. 43-44. 
248 
 
regard to our methodological resources of truth-estimation we can indeed 
deploy a theory-external means of quality control, such as applicative 
efficacy.”807 Thus, in his judgment, the question whether a method works 
(that is, if it is effective and efficient in achieving a goal) can be determined in 
an objective way on the basis of predictive success. 
There is a search for objectivity: the pragmatism that Rescher suggest 
does not reduce the questions about the validity of scientific knowledge to 
intersubjective or merely subjective criteria. On the contrary, objective bases 
are sought in order to establish the truth of a claim or theory (or, at least, its 
truthlikeness). In order to perform this task, the effectiveness of the methods 
has a crucial role, since it is a matter that is independent from the subject: 
“methods possess an inherent objectivity and freedom form any sort of 
personal dependence.”808 In addition, on the basis of the efficacy and 
efficiency of the processes, the comparative evaluation of alternative 
methods is possible, as well as to assess the improvements of a concrete 
method. 
Furthermore, Rescher thinks that the efficacy of a method is not only 
the best criterion for its evaluation, but also the “natural” way of establishing 
its adequacy.809 In order to support this claims, he notices the two main 
characteristics of the scientific methods, in general, and the cognitive 
methods, in particular: (i) they are teleological (that is, scientific methods are 
means orientated towards the achievement of a certain goal); and (ii) they 
seek generality, so they can be used in successive occasions.810  
                                            
807 RESCHER, N., “Pragmatism and Practical Rationality,” p. 59. 
808 RESCHER, N., Methodological Pragmatism, p. 73. 
809 Cf. Methodological Pragmatism, p. 4. 
810 Cf. RESCHER, N., Methodological Pragmatism, pp. 2-5. On the problem of the 
methodological universalism, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “Methodological Universalism in Science 
and its Limits. Imperialism versus Complexity,” in BRZECHCZYN, K. and PAPRZYCKA, K. (eds.), 
Thinking about Provincialism in Thinking, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences 
and the Humanities, vol. 100, Rodopi, Amsterdam/N. York, 2012, pp. 155-175. 
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Regarding the methodology of science, Rescher claims that an 
instrumental conception should be adopted, understood as a combination of 
mediation and utility, to the extent that methods “are means for doing things 
of a certain sort.”811 Therefore, insofar as they are instruments, methods 
require an instrumental justification. In turn, this instrumental justification 
involves taking into account the teleological character of the processes, since 
a method is always oriented to the attainment of some end: “a method, after 
all, is something intrinsically purpose-relative.”812 This feature involves that 
methods, in some sense, are contextual and can be diversified according to 
the different ends sought. 
Due to the primacy of the practical view,813 the justification of a method 
should be — for Rescher — pragmatic. Because the methods are means in 
order to achieve some goal, their validity is something that directly depends 
on their efficacy and efficiency in the achievement of that goal. For this 
reason, he considers that “the pragmatists were surely right: there can be no 
better or more natural way of justifying a method than by establishing that ‘it 
works’ with respect to the specific appointed tasks that are in view for it.”814 
Then, the basic criterion for a rational evaluation of a method is its success, 
which he understands as efficacy and efficiency regarding the goal sought. 
For Rescher, when something is oriented towards the achievement of a 
certain goal, for this very reason it should be subject to an evaluation that 
takes into account its efficacy. Thus, the adequacy of a method depends on 
what extent it achieves it goal in an effective and efficient way. This connects 
the notion of efficacy with human rationality, since the role of economic 
rationality is highlighted with regard to the selection of the processes: “a 
                                            
811 Methodological Pragmatism, p. 3. 
812 RESCHER, N., Methodological Pragmatism, p. 3. 
813 Cf. RESCHER, N., The Primacy of Practice, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1973. Spanish version: 
La primacía de la práctica. Ensayos en torno a una teoría pragmático-kantiana del 
conocimiento empírico, Tecnos, Madrid, 1980. 
814
 Methodological Pragmatism, p. 3. 
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rational creature will prefer whatever method process or procedure will, other 
things equal, facilitate goal realization in the most effective, efficient, and 
economical way.”815 
Besides its teleological character, another characteristic of the 
methodology of science is its general character.816 For this reason, what 
matters is not success as such, but success regarding methods should be 
systematic.817 On the basis of the general character of the scientific methods, 
Rescher maintains that “one success does not validate a method.”818 Thus, 
the occasional or isolated success is something irrelevant.819 In this way, his 
perspective regarding the methodology of science is clearly systematic. 
Moreover, it assumes the general character of scientific methods. 
This systematic character allows Rescher to face the objection 
regarding the role that chance or luck can have in the success of an action or 
procedure. He admits that the success of a method — that is, that it achieved 
its goal in one occasion in an effective and efficient way — cannot be de 
basis to claim the validity of that method. The same happens when a method 
“fails” in one particular occasion. Undoubtedly, an action performed on the 
basis of false beliefs can have a positive result, and also an action performed 
on the basis of truth beliefs can have a negative result. 
Therefore, Rescher considers that the generality of scientific methods 
should be taken into account, insofar as they are characterized by being 
capable of implementation on numerous occasions. For this reason, he 
maintains that a “sensible pragmatism” would propose an instrumental 
                                            
815 RESCHER, N., “Pragmatism and Practical Rationality,” p. 44. 
816 Rescher considers that a method consists of a series of general rules or patterns in order 
to perform a task, so it is possible to use a method in successive occasions. However, there 
are different levels of generality or abstraction regarding the methods, depending on the 
general or specific character of the matter at issue. In this way, he assumes that different 
levels of scales of reality (macro, meso, and micro) require different methods. Cf. RESCHER, 
N., Personal Communication, 10.6.2014. 
817 Cf. RESCHER, N., Realistic Pragmatism, p. 84. 
818 RESCHER, N., Methodological Pragmatism, p. 5. 
819 Cf. RESCHER, N., Realistic Pragmatism, p. 84. 
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justification at a generic and systematic level.820 In this way, the success of a 
method should be evaluated taking into account its performance on 
numerous occasions and in the long run. In these terms, Rescher’s 
methodological pragmatism seeks an evaluation of scientific knowledge on 
the basis of objective indicators. Methodological efficacy is a key factor, since 
it is “a matter of how things go ‘across the board’ generally and in the long 
run.”821  
On the basis of the efficacy and efficiency of the processes as objective 
matters that are independent from the subjects, Rescher defends a 
procedure to decide about the truth of scientific propositions and theories that 
takes into account the success of methods. He does not reject a realist 
notion of “truth,” neither he suggests replacing it with the concepts of 
“efficacy” or “efficiency;” but he does consider efficacy and efficiency at the 
methodological level as the best criterion about the truthlikeness of scientific 
propositions and theories. Thus, as procedures, scientific methods depend in 
no way on subjective (or intersubjective) considerations (in this way, he 
rejects the primacy of the consensus), but they are susceptible of an 
objective evaluation, which takes into account how they, in fact, perform their 
function. 
 Within this framework, prediction has a fundamental role. It is crucial in 
Rescher’s methodological pragmatism; because, in order to claim that a 
scientific theory is true or has truthlikeness, the main criterion is ultimately its 
capacity to predict with success future phenomena. This use of prediction as 
a test for theories is because prediction, in a clear way, can be tested with 
the experience. The success of prediction allows us to confirm theories, while 
its lack of success leads to the disconfirmation of the theories.822 Thus, in his 
                                            
820 Cf. Realistic Pragmatism, p. 85. 
821 RESCHER, N., Methodological Pragmatism, p. 5. 
822 In this regard, Rescher notices that “on the standard ‘inductive’ model of scientific 
method, the predictions of science are generated by logico-mathematical derivations that 
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approach, the success of predictions is “the pivotal controlling factor for 
quality control in scientific theorizing.”823 
 
5.1.2. Application of Methodological Pragmatism to Scientific 
Prediction 
The applicative efficacy of a method is its capacity to provide successful 
predictions and effective control over phenomena. Thus, scientific prediction 
is very important in the framework of methodological pragmatism. Rescher 
maintains that the acceptability of theories can be justified on the basis of 
methods. In turn, the adequacy of the methods depends on their efficacy in 
obtaining successful prediction and in the achievement of control over 
phenomena. Therefore, prediction is a test for the acceptability of theories, 
which, in rigor, should vary in order to adequate the different objects (natural, 
social, or artificial).824 
As a test for theories, Rescher considers that prediction is also an 
important indicator of scientific progress. Thus, there is progress when there 
is an increasing success in prediction. In this regard, Ilkka Niiniluoto has 
highlighted the discrepancies between Rescher’s methodological pragmatism 
and a realist approach to scientific progress. Niiniluoto writes that, “according 
to Rescher, science is realist ‘in its intention,’ but its achievements or its 
progress must be defined in terms of its increasing success in the control or 
‘physical domain over nature.’ Here, the realist [philosopher] disagrees with 
the pragmatist [author]: this pragmatic success is, at the most, one indicator 
of cognitive success. Furthermore, there can be genuine cognitive success 
                                                                                                                           
apply general theories to situation-specific facts so as to preindicate future observations. 
Then, insofar as the actual observations agree with those predictions, the theories at issue 
are confirmed and thereby evidentially substantiated, and insofar as they diverge, the 
theories are disconfirmed and evidentially undermined,” RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, 
p. 161. 
823 Predicting the Future, p. 161. 
824 Usually, Rescher does not distinguish between the subject matters of the natural 
sciences, the social sciences, and the sciences of the artificial. His approach seeks to be as 
general as possible. 
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without practical applications: all science is not reducible to applied 
research.”825 
However, there are several points where Rescher’s approach — of 
methodological pragmatism — and Niiniluoto’s proposal about scientific 
progress (open to some pragmatic components) are close. This is because 
Rescher’s pragmatic idealism accepts realistic contributions in key concepts 
(truth, fact, etc.). For this reason, in my judgment, Niiniluoto’s criticism does 
not grasp adequately Rescher’s proposal about the role of prediction as 
indicator of cognitive success and, therefore, of scientific progress. In this 
regard, a comparison between the approaches of both authors should take 
into account several levels of analysis:826 (i) the semantic level, which seeks 
to clarify the concept of “progress;” (ii) the methodological dimension, which 
is focused in the question about what are the reliable indicators in order to 
claim that a theory is “progressive” with regard to a alternative theory; and (iii) 
the factual level, which analysis when we can claim that science, in fact, has 
made some progress. 
Rescher and Niiniluoto agree with the characterization of scientific 
progress from a semantic perspective: they accept scientific theories as sets 
of propositions (expressed through statements) oriented towards the truth or, 
at least, towards truthlikeness. Both authors see “scientific progress” as a 
notion relative to the goals of science. This claim appears explicitly in 
Niiniluoto,827 and it is implicit in Rescher’s proposal, according to which we 
can defend that scientific progress is continuous on the basis of the goals of 
science.828 In this case, the concept of “progress” has commonly a positive 
                                            
825 NIINILUOTO, I., “Límites de la Tecnología,” p. 402. 
826 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Progreso científico e innovación tecnológica: La ‘Tecnociencia’ y el 
problema de las relaciones entre Filosofía de la Ciencia y Filosofía de la Tecnología,” pp. 
261-283. 
827 “‘Progress’ is a normative or goal-relative —rather than purely descriptive— term,” 
NIINILUOTO, I., “Scientific Progress,” p. 427. See also NIINILUOTO, I., Is Science Progressive?, 
Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984. 
828 Cf. RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, chapter 10, pp. 145-165. 
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connotation, since it involves an improvement with regard to what was 
previously available. In this way, it is different from other terms such as 
“development” or “change.”829 
Regarding the methodological issue about which the reliable indicators 
of scientific progress are, Niiniluoto writes that those indicators are “cognitive 
factors such as true, information, explanatory power, predictive capacity, 
precision, and simplicity.”830 Then, he considers that Rescher insistence in 
prediction as indicator of the truthlikeness of theories results in a partial view 
of scientific progress. Pragmatic success would be, at most, an indicator of 
cognitive success, but neither the only one nor the most important one.831 
But Rescher, in rigor, does not claim that predictive success is by itself 
an indicator of the truthlikeness of theories. In his judgment, “only a 
reciprocally interactive gearing of explanation, prediction, and control can in 
the final analysis provide a satisfactory standard of scientific adequacy.”832 
This is because usually scientific prediction should be supported by an 
explicative knowledge of phenomena. Furthermore, this interrelation of 
explanation and prediction is the basis to establish the barriers between 
scientific prediction and non-scientific prediction.833 For this reason, when 
there is some improvement in the predictive capacity of science, there is also 
progress at the theoretical level.834 
The main difference between both approaches — scientific critical 
realism and pragmatism — is then rooted in the way they address the factual 
question about when we can claim that science, in fact, has progressed. The 
answer, for Niiniluoto, is in the notion of truthlikeness. Thus, we claim that 
                                            
829 Changes might be positive or negative as well as developments, which might be positive 
or negative. 
830 NIINILUOTO, I., “Límites de la Tecnología,” p. 402. 
831 Cf. “Límites de la Tecnología,” p. 402. 
832 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 165. 
833 Cf. Predicting the Future, pp. 169-171. 
834 This can be clearly seen in Rescher’s “thesis of harmony,” according to which explanation 
and prediction are not symmetrical processes, but they are closely interrelated as crucial 
goals of science. Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 167-169. 
255 
 
science has made some progress in accordance to the relative success of 
scientific theories in the achievement of true or, at least, verisimilar 
knowledge about reality.835 Meanwhile, for Rescher, this factual issue is, in 
fact, methodological. Thus, the capacity of the methods to achieve successful 
predictions or an effective control over reality is the best criterion we have in 
order to assess the theoretical adequacy of theories. 
From this perspective, when Rescher maintains that “science does 
indeed progress not, to be sure, by way of “approaching the ultimate truth,” 
but by providing us with increasingly powerful instrumentalities for prediction 
and control,”836 he does not claim that because he consider that there is 
scientific progress only in pragmatic lines. Successful prediction is not, for 
Rescher, the only indicator about the comparative theoretical adequacy of 
theories, but it is the best criterion we have. Predictive efficacy is, in his 
judgment, “the best available token for the explanatory adequacy of our 
theories.”837 
According to Niiniluoto’s approach, scientific progress consists of an 
increasing truthlikeness,838 where prediction has also a role. Rescher also 
considers that science makes progresses in that direction. However, in his 
judgment, prediction should be emphasized when the question at stake is to 
justify that, in fact, truthlikeness has been achieved. This is because 
successful prediction provides an objective criterion in order to confirm or 
disconfirm a theory and to compare its adequacy in relation to other 
alternative theories. In that case, prediction appears as a result, which 
acquires the form of a statement and is backed up by experience.  
Therefore, prediction is a key notion in Rescher’s characterization of 
scientific progress. He addresses this issue mainly from the methodological 
                                            
835 Cf. NIINILUOTO, I., “Límites de la Tecnología,” p. 402. 
836 RESCHER, N., The Limits of Science, revised edition, p. 42. 
837 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 164. 
838 Cf. NIINILUOTO, I., Is Science Progressive?, chapter 5, pp. 75-110. 
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realm, as a process oriented towards the increase of knowledge and the 
control over phenomena. Furthermore, the prominent role of prediction in his 
methodological pragmatism has also incidence in the configuration of the 
methodological characters of scientific prediction. This can be seen in the 
importance of the methodological component within the whole set of the 
philosophico-methodological characters of prediction (semantic, logical, 
epistemological, methodological, ontological, axiological, and ethical). 
Moreover, in my judgment, many of the most important contributions of 
Rescher to the study of scientific prediction are in the realm of the 
methodology of prediction. Then, it can be highlighted his effort in order to 
offer a methodological approach to prediction that is exhaustive and 
appropriate to scientific practice. This involves taking into account the roles of 
prediction in the scientific activity, which varies in the contexts of basic 
science, applied science, and the application of science. Thus, Rescher 
considers prediction as an aim of science. Within an approach of 
methodological pragmatism, he especially insists in the role of prediction as a 
test for theories and guide for discovery; but he also takes into account its 
use in the applied sciences, where prediction is usually the previous step to 
prescription.839 
He also wants to clarify the common features of the different processes 
of prediction, insofar as they are rational processes. In this regard, he 
suggests three preconditions for rational prediction: data availability, pattern 
discernability, and pattern stability.840 Concurrently, he assumes a 
methodological pluralism regarding prediction. Thus, he offers an analysis of 
the diverse predictive processes, which he classifies in three groups: (i) 
                                            
839 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Análisis de las Ciencias de Diseño desde la racionalidad limitada, la 
predicción y la prescripción,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Las Ciencias de Diseño: Racionalidad 
limitada, predicción y prescripción, Netbiblo, A Coruña, 2007, pp. 3-38; and SIMON, H. A., 
“Prediction and Prescription in Systems Modeling,” Operations Research, v. 38, (1990), pp. 
7-14 (reprinted in SIMON, H. A., Models of Bounded Rationalitity, Vol. 3: Empirically 
Grounded Economic Reason, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997, pp. 115-128).  
840 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 86-87. 
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estimative procedures; (ii) discursive elemental processes; and (iii) discursive 
scientific methods.841 
Thereafter, his contribution to the analysis of the methodological 
characters of scientific prediction encompasses different problems at stake: 
(a) the roles of prediction in scientific activity; (b) the preconditions for rational 
prediction; and (c) the methods of prediction. Furthermore, regarding the 
methods, he made an effective contribution, because he was one of the 
creators of the Delphi predictive procedure.842 Within the special level of the 
methodology of science — which takes into account the distinctive features 
of each science or each group of sciences (the natural sciences, the social 
sciences, or the sciences of the artificial) — he pays more attention to the 
realm of the natural sciences; although he also takes into account the role of 
prediction in the methodology of the social sciences. Thus, he also 
addresses some specific problems of economics and sociology.843  
Nevertheless, due to his methodological pragmatism, he highlights 
above all the methodological aspect of scientific prediction as a test for 
theories. In turn, this feature leads to a pragmatic approach of prediction 
itself, according to which prediction is, above all, an instrument.844 The 
instrumental aspect of prediction appears insofar as he considers that 
prediction allows us to judge the comparative theoretical adequacy of the 
theories and to the extent that prediction might serve as a guide for human 
action. This approach to prediction as an instrument is due to its connection 
with practice, but it does not involve an instrumentalist account of science. 
                                            
841 Cf. Predicting the Future, p. 87. 
842 On the predictive procedure Delphi, see AYYUB, B. M., Elicitation of Expert Opinions for 
Uncertainty and Risks, pp. 99-105; and BELL, W., Foundations of Futures Studies. History, 
Purposes, and Knowledge, Human Science for a New Era, Vol. 1, pp. 261-272. 
843 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, ch. 11, pp. 101-208; especially, pp. 193-202. 
844 “Prediction, in sum, is our instrument for resolving our meaningful questions about the 
future, or at least of endeavoring to solve them in a rationally cogent manner,” RESCHER, N., 
Predicting the Future, p. 39. 
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De facto, Rescher is clearly against the methodological 
instrumentalism. He maintains that “some philosophers take this matter of the 
predictive utility of good theories too far by adopting a wholly 
‘instrumentalistic’ view of the theories of natural science as mere predictive 
instruments, altogether dismissing the issue of describing and explaining the 
world’s occurrences. On this approach, prediction is all that matters and 
thereby constitutes the alpha and omega of science.”845 
Therefore, Rescher’s methodological pragmatism involves an 
instrumentalist approach to prediction, but it does not encompass a 
methodological instrumentalism that subordinated scientific methods to the 
aim of predicting.846 In this way, he highlights prediction as a fundamental 
component of science (this can be mainly seen in relation to the roles that 
prediction plays in scientific activity) without subscribing a strong predictivist 
thesis, according to which prediction has a clear primacy over any other goal 
of science. 
 
5.2.  The Roles of Prediction in Scientific Activity 
In order to analyze the roles of prediction in scientific activity, the 
distinction between basic science and applied science should be considered. 
Because basic science and applied science are different activities,847 the 
uses of prediction in them can be also different. Wenceslao J. Gonzalez has 
highlighted that the differences between both kinds of sciences have to do 
with three successive levels of the scientific research: (i) the goals or aims; 
(ii) the processes; and (iii) the results.848 In turn, those differences between 
                                            
845 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 164. 
846 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 39. 
847 On the differences between basic science and applied science, see NIINILUOTO, I., "The 
Aim and Structure of Applied Research,” pp. 1-21; NIINILUOTO, I., "Approximation in Applied 
Science,” pp. 127-139; and GONZALEZ, W. J., “The Philosophical Approach to Science, 
Technology and Society,” pp. 3-49. 
848 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Ciencia y valores éticos: De la posibilidad de la Ética de la Ciencia 
al problema de la valoración ética de la Ciencia Básica,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Ciencia y 
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both kinds of sciences have incidence on the uses of prediction in scientific 
activity. 
From the perspective of the aims of the research, we have basic 
research when scientific activity seeks either to obtain new knowledge or to 
increase the knowledge already available. Thus, the basic research is mainly 
oriented towards giving answers to questions of a cognitive character. 
Meanwhile, applied science seeks to achieve new knowledge with a specific 
purpose, which can be either to solve a concrete problem or solving it in a 
more efficient way.849  
There are also differences between both kinds of sciences regarding 
the processes. From this perspective, scientific methods in basic science are 
mainly oriented towards the achievement of new knowledge or the 
improvement of the available knowledge (both predictive and explicative), so 
a main feature is the search for empirical support for the hypotheses and 
theories. However, in applied science “the means acquire an operative 
character, on having had direct relation with specific ends (that means, the 
practical knowledge has to allow to achieve more efficient processes to solve 
the particular problems that have been raised).”850 
Moreover, there are differences between basic science and applied 
science from the point of view of the results. These differences have to do, 
above all, with the criteria for evaluating the results obtained. In basic 
science, the criterion of truthlikeness is the main one. Thus, the results are 
evaluated on the basis of the increase of the available knowledge, to the 
extent that the main aim of truthlikeness is achieved. Meanwhile, in applied 
science, the evaluation of the results can be done following cognitive criteria 
                                                                                                                           
valores éticos, p. 158; and GONZALEZ, W. J., Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of 
Prediction and its Role in Economics, pp. 32-40. 
849 Cf. NIINILUOTO, I., "The Aim and Structure of Applied Research,” pp. 3-5. 
850 BEREIJO, A., “The Category of ‘Applied Science’. An Analysis of its Justification from 
‘Information Science’ as Design Science,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Scientific Realism and 
Democratic Society: The Philosophy of Philip Kitcher, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of 
the Sciences and Humanities, v. 101, Rodopi, Amsterdam/N. York, 2011, p. 338. 
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(the adequacy of the knowledge in order to solve the concrete problem at 
stake) or according to practical parameters (efficacy and efficiency in the 
solution of the problem).851 
In this way, the differences between basic science and applied science 
— which have to do with the aims or goals, the processes, and the results — 
highlight a background difference between both kinds of research: there is a 
pragmatic or instrumental feature that is more emphasized in applied science 
than in basic science, which gives primacy to the theoretical or epistemic 
component. In turn, these differences between basic science and basic 
science have repercussions on the role played by prediction in both kinds of 
sciences. Thus, the roles of prediction vary according to the context in which 
it is made: basic research or applied research. 
Basic science seeks to, firstly, describe phenomena; and, secondly, 
explain or predict these phenomena. If it is merely confined to describing 
phenomena, then there is not a genuine scientific contribution. Thus, 
prediction is a main aim of basic research, because it provides knowledge 
about future events or happenings. For this reason, scientific methods can be 
oriented towards prediction, which also has a fundamental role in the 
evaluation of the results. In effect, the knowledge about the future can be 
used as a test for hypotheses and theories, since it provides the empirical 
content that is required for testing them.  
But, when prediction is made in applied science, prediction is — 
besides an important aim by itself — a tool for decision-making. In this way, 
prediction is connected with prescription, because in order to prescribe (i.e., 
to suggest paths of action to solve a concrete problem), it is necessary to 
predict. Thus, in the realm of the applied science, prediction is the previous 
step of prescription. For this reason, prediction in applied sciences can be 
                                            
851 Cf. BEREIJO, A., “The Category of ‘Applied Science’. An Analysis of its Justification from 
‘Information Science’ as Design Science,” p. 338. 
261 
 
considered as a methodological tool: the prediction about the possible future 
is needed in order to establish the paths that should be followed.852 
Now then, when the distinction between applied science and the 
application of science is posed, it seems clear that we should take into 
account another role of prediction, which is related to practical problem-
solving (in political contexts, economic, ecological, etc.). This distinction 
between applied science and the application of science has been highlighted 
by Niiniluoto. In his judgment, “the former is a part of knowledge production, 
the latter is concerned with the use of scientific knowledge and methods for 
the solving of practical problems of action (e.g., in engineering or 
business).”853 From this perspective, prediction can be the basis of decision-
making in contexts of policy.854 
Within the application of science, the use of knowledge by agents 
(individual or institutional) prevails. In this way, on the basis of the same 
applied knowledge, two agents can apply knowledge in different ways in their 
respective contexts. A prediction about the possible future has been 
obtained, but what prevails is an agent-relative component, since the agents 
make decisions according to different contexts. This feature also affects the 
prescriptions.855 
Therefore, prediction encompasses several roles.856 1) In basic science, 
prediction can be used as a test for theories, in general, and hypotheses, in 
particular. This use of prediction can be seen both in natural sciences (for 
example, physics, chemistry, or astronomy) and in social sciences (among 
                                            
852 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Rationality and Prediction in the Sciences of the Artificial,” in 
GALAVOTTI, M. C., SCAZZIERI, R. and SUPPES, P. (eds.), Reasoning, Rationality and 
Probability, p. 181.  
853 NIINILUOTO, I., "The Aim and Structure of Applied Research,” p. 9. 
854 On the distinction between basic science, applied science, and the application of science, 
see GONZALEZ, W. J., “The Roles of Scientific Creativity and Technological Innovation in the 
Context of Complexity of Science,” pp. 11-40; especially, pp. 17-18. 
855 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “The Roles of Scientific Creativity and Technological Innovation in 
the Context of Complexity of Science,” pp. 17-18. 
856 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 11. 
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others, economics or sociology) 2) In the case of the applied science 
(pharmacology, medicine, applied economics, etc.), prediction is usually the 
previous step to prescription. In this realm, the anticipation of the future is 
necessary before paths of action can be suggested in order to solve concrete 
problems. 3) When the problem of the application of science is considered, 
prediction has also a role, since it can serve as the basis of the procedures of 
decision-making. 
 
5.2.1.  The Role of Prediction as Test in Basic Science 
When Rescher considers the uses of scientific prediction, he usually 
focuses his attention in the role of prediction as test for theories. In this 
regard, he notices that prediction has mainly two uses in science: “as a test 
of the acceptability of theories and as a guide to discovery. No other factor 
shows more clearly that we are making real (rather than merely putative) 
progress in natural science than the successful prediction of new 
phenomena.”857 
Commonly, Rescher contemplates this use of prediction regarding the 
sciences of nature. In general, he thinks that the predictive capacity is much 
higher than in the case of social sciences (he does not address expressly the 
sciences of the artificial). Concretely, in the case of economics, he considers 
that quantitative prediction — in accurate and precise terms — is usually not 
possible. Thus, predictive success in this science is habitually obtained at the 
level of generic predictions regarding trends and probabilities.858 
For this reason, it is possible to maintain that there is a duality in 
Rescher’s methodological approach to prediction and its roles in scientific 
activity. At the general level, he considers prediction as a reliable test for the 
theories; while in the special level (regarding the social sciences and, 
                                            
857 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 160. 
858 Cf. Predicting the Future, pp. 193-199; especially, p. 198. 
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concretely, economics) it seems that usually predictions do not achieve the 
level of detail required in order to serve as a test for theories. To a certain 
extent, he seems to agree with Herbert A. Simon, who maintained that we 
should have a wary attitude regarding the use of prediction as a test for 
economics as a science.859 
When Rescher thinks of prediction as a test for theories in the natural 
sciences, he considers the most specific case of the surprising predictions. In 
this regard, he notices that the importance of prediction is in the cognitive 
novelty that it encompasses: “After all, it would seem to be cognitive novelty 
that is the crux, and futurity as such (mere chronological novelty) seems 
immaterial. The predictive aspect is surely incidental; surprising predictions 
are important for confirmation, but on account of their surprinsingness rather 
than their predictivity, seeing that it is epistemic novelty that carries the 
burden of the work.”860 
When Rescher analyses scientific prediction, he assumes two different 
components of the notion of “novelty:” an ontological feature and an 
epistemic aspect.861 Scientific prediction involves, in principle, novelty in the 
ontological sense, because it is oriented towards a possible future. But 
Rescher highlights the epistemic aspect. In this way, the cognitive content 
(and, therefore, the epistemic novelty) is the most important feature of a 
prediction. For this reason, when prediction is used as a test for theories, 
surprising predictions should have more weight: “if the [predicted] fact is 
something new in kind —a new phenomenon or a new type of fact that was 
                                            
859 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 198-199 y p. 277, n. 264. 
860 Predicting the Future, p. 162. 
861 There is also a third possibility: heuristic novelty. See GONZALEZ, W. J., “The Evolution of 
Lakatos's Repercussion on the Methodology of Economics,” HOPOS: The Journal of the 
International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, v. 4, n. 1, (2014), pp. 1-25; 
especially, pp. 14-16. 
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not experienced before— then it indeed is in a position to make significant 
evidential contribution.”862 
In this regard, Rescher considers two options for prediction, which 
should be taken into account when predictive success is evaluated in the 
context of basic science: (i) prediction of new instances of familiar 
phenomena; and (ii) prediction of the occurrence of new phenomena that 
have not been investigated before.863 In his judgment, the most important 
thing is not just having more elements from a quantitative perspective about 
something already known, but the qualitative achievement of new fields.864 
Thus, in principle, scientific prediction involves a strictly temporal or 
ontological factor (it is oriented towards a possible future); but surprising 
predictions are characterized by their epistemic novelty, which gives them 
their value as a test for theories. 
Moreover, this use of prediction as a test for hypotheses and theories is 
a central feature of Rescher’s methodological pragmatism. Thus, in his 
judgment, theories are justified by methods for the validation or confirmation 
of factual statements; and, in turn, those methods must be evaluated 
according to practical criteria (above all, the success in prediction and the 
efficacy in the control of phenomena).865 In this case, scientific methods 
should be oriented towards prediction, to the extent that successful prediction 
is “the pivotal controlling factor for quality control in scientific theorizing.”866 
From this perspective, Rescher’s account — in the context of the 
discussion between “prediction” and “accommodation”867 — is certainly 
predictivist. When empirical support is required for theories, in general, and 
                                            
862 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 162-163. 
863 Cf. Predicting the Future, p. 163. 
864 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 267. 
865 Cf. RESCHER, N., Realistic Pragmatism, p. 96. 
866 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 161. 
867 On this controversy about the methodological weight of “prediction” and 
“accommodation,” cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, pp. 288-292. A defense of 
the predictivist position is in WHITE, R., “The Epistemic Advantage of Prediction over 
Accommodation,” Mind, v. 112, n. 448, (2003), pp. 653-683. 
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for hypotheses, in particular, prediction is — in his judgment — the decisive 
factor. It is decisive insofar as prediction provides an epistemic novelty that 
can be compared with the future observations: “insofar as the actual 
observations agree with those predictions, the theories at issue are 
confirmed and thereby evidentially substiantiated, and insofar as they 
diverge, the theories are disconfirmed and evidentially undermined.”868 
Consequently, the most rigorous knowledge that science can provide is 
the knowledge obtained through the predictive success. For this reason, it is 
possible to claim that scientific methods should be mainly oriented towards 
prediction, since it is the best test we have for the scientific character of 
theories. However, Rescher’s methodological pragmatism does not involve 
an instrumentalist approach of scientific methods; i.e., he does not think that 
scientific methods are simple instruments of prediction. In effect, in his 
judgment, prediction is not a necessary condition for having science. 
It is important to point out that scientific prediction is fallible as a test for 
theories (a false theory can lead to true predictions, and even a true theory 
can make prediction that will be disconfirmed by future observations).869 This 
feature is acknowledged by Rescher: “the complex interweaving of fact, 
theory, and conjecture in scientific prediction means that even good theories 
sometimes yield poor predictions. And contrariwise, even where we make 
successful predictions this will not necessarily mean that the basis of theory 
from which they emerge is scientifically appropriate.”870 
Moreover, prediction should not be the only aim of scientific research. 
For Rescher, prediction is an important aim of science; but it is an aim among 
others. Thus, besides prediction, science should be oriented towards the 
description, explanation, and control over nature. For this reason, scientific 
                                            
868 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 161. 
869 Cf. BATITSKY, V. and DOMOTOR, Z., “When Good Theories Make Bad Predictions,” pp. 79-
103. 
870 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 169. 
266 
 
methods cannot be simple predictive instruments. However, the methods that 
allow us to predict have a high values, because successful prediction is the 
best criterion in order to evaluate the theoretical adequacy of theories. 
However, according to the harmony thesis between explanation and 
prediction suggested by Rescher, scientific methods (in basic science) 
should be oriented towards the two main aims of the scientific activity: the 
explanation about past (and present) phenomena and the prediction about 
the future phenomena. Methods should lead research to the achievement of 
theories with both explicative and predictive power, since — in Reshcer’s 
judgment — “theories that do not yield predictions are sterile, and 
predictions—however successful—that lack a theoretical backing are for that 
very reason cognitively unsatisfactory.”871 
In this regard, it should be noticed that some of our best theories, such 
as the theory of evolution, do not make, properly speaking, predictions. On 
this objection, Rescher maintains that “while evolutionary theory does not 
predict specific outcomes by way of forecasting the modifications of particular 
species, it does, nevertheless, provide [the content] for predictive inferences 
at the general level of trends and statistical tendencies.”872 
From these elements, it is possible to maintain that there are theories 
that are only oriented towards past developments (and that, therefore, do not 
make predictive inferences), which can have predictive import, to the extent 
that their content can serve as a support in order to achieve statements 
about the future.873 Obviously, Rescher is thinking of the natural sciences. 
But in the realm social sciences, where human events are involved, this 
                                            
871
 Predicting the Future, p. 167. This is a clear expression of his rejection of the 
instrumentalist predictivism without realism of the assumption, which was defended by M. 
Friedman. Cf. FRIEDMAN, M., “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” pp. 3-43. 
872 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 161. 
873 On this issue, Wenceslao J. Gonzalez notices the parallelism between Rescher’s 
distinction between “predictive inference” and “predictive import” and W. C. Salmon’s 
distinction between “predictive import” and “predictive content.” Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La 
predicción científica, p. 266. See also SALMON, W. C., “Rational Prediction,” pp. 115-125. 
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approach to prediction as a test for hypotheses and theories is more 
problematic. In effect, there are sciences mainly oriented toward the 
explanation (for example, history). So if Rescher’s approach is accepted, 
without the required qualifications, the scientific character of these disciplines 
would be questioned. 
 
5.2.2.  The Role of Prediction as a Guide in the Task of Applied 
Science 
Besides the use of prediction as a test for theories, other important role 
of prediction is to serve as a guide for action, which is its usual role within the 
framework of applied science. In this realm, prediction is the previous step to 
prescription, because the anticipation of the possible future is required in 
order to perform the task of problem-solving. Therefore, prediction is a 
methodological tool in this context: knowledge of the possible future is 
required in order to suggest what paths of action should been followed.874 
Thus, in this context of the applied sciences, prediction is a tool for 
prescription, which is oriented towards providing information in order to solve 
practical problems. 
Since in applied sciences the aim is the solution of concrete problems, 
the usual procedure is to give predictions in order to prescribe then.875 In this 
regard, two features can be highlighted in the relation between prediction and 
prescription: (i) prediction is prior to prescription, because the indications 
about how to solve a problem (prescription) are given once the problem has 
been anticipated (prediction);876 and (ii) prediction makes it possible the 
prescriptive task of applied science, because in order to make a prescription 
                                            
874 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Rationality and Prediction in the Sciences of the Artificial,” p. 181. 
875 Cf. “Rationality and Prediction in the Sciences of the Artificial,” pp. 181-182. 
876 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Rationality and Prediction in the Sciences of the Artificial,” pp. 181-
182. 
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some knowledge about the possible future is always required.877 The first one 
is a chronological feature with methodological incidence; while the second 
feature leads to a clearly epistemological-methodological aspect. 
Regarding prediction as a guide for the applied science’s task, Herbert 
A. Simon has offered a quite interesting proposal. In his judgment, the main 
aim of the applied sciences, in general, and of the sciences of design, in 
particular, is the prescription. He thinks that most of the predictive models are 
oriented towards the prediction of phenomena that human beings cannot 
control (for example, the meteorological models). For this reason, the main 
aim of applied science is prescription, which seeks to favor the best possible 
adaptation to those phenomena.878 
Unlike Simon, Rescher’s main interest is not focused on the sciences of 
the artificial, but he focuses his attention on the natural sciences. Moreover, 
he rarely takes into account the role of prediction as a guide for prescription 
in the realm of applied science. This is because his pragmatism goes hand in 
hand with a Kantian approach, so prediction is mainly a cognitive content 
valuable by itself. However, as a pragmatic philosopher, his interest in the 
nexus between prediction and human action should be highlighted. In this 
regard, he addresses the problem of the human capacity to shape the 
future.879 
But, very often, Rescher addresses this problem in relation to human 
action, in general, instead of doing so with regard to scientific activity, in 
particular. In effect, in his judgment, “to act, to plan, to survive, we must 
anticipate the future.”880 Thus, he does not insist in the use of prediction as a 
                                            
877 Cf. SIMON, H. A., “Prediction and Prescription in Systems Modeling,” passim. See also 
GONZALEZ, W. J., Philosophico-Methodological Analysis of Prediction and its Role in 
Economics, chapter 12, pp. 317-338.  
878 Cf. SIMON, H. A., “Prediction and Prescription in Systems Modeling,” compiled in SIMON, 
H. A., Models of Bounded Rationality. Vol. 3: Empirically Grounded Economic Reason, pp. 
115-128; especially, p. 122. 
879 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, chapter 14, pp. 231-246; especially, pp. 232-236. 
880 Predicting the Future, p. 65. 
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guide for the development of the scientific activity that seeks to provide 
solutions to practical problems (that is, the role of prediction in applied 
science); but his main concern is the use of prediction by agents (or groups 
of agents) in the everyday context. 
However, Rescher makes some reflections about important background 
issues that have to do with the relation between prediction and prescription. 
Firstly, he addresses the problem of the tractability of the future; that is, to 
what extent we can shape the future; and, secondly, he takes into account 
the human capacity to control future phenomena or events in an effective 
way. In this regard, he thinks that the control of phenomena is one of the 
main aims of the natural sciences (besides description, explanation, and 
prediction),881 which clearly leads to a context of applied science. 
On the first issue — the tractability of the future — he thinks that, in 
principle, three positions can be maintained:882 (i) the future is completely 
intractable because reality is determined, so it is not possible for us to exert 
any kind of influence over the future events; (ii) the future is completely 
tractable, so we can influence the future course of events without any 
limitation; and (iii) and intermediate position, according to which we can 
shape the future within certain limits. 
Rescher subscribes the third option. He considers that the future events 
can be influenced in an intentional way by human agents. However, this is 
something that only can be done within certain limits, which are mainly due to 
our capabilities to anticipate the possible future. In effect, in his judgment, “a 
future we cannot foresee is a fortiori a future we cannot control.”883 Here the 
common methodological path of applied sciences is implicit, to the extent that 
prediction is required in order to prescribe. Certainly, prescription 
                                            
881 Cf. RESCHER, N., Razón y valores en la Era científico-tecnológica, p. 106.  
882 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 234-235. 
883 Predicting the Future, p. 236. 
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encompasses the problems related to the human ability to control the future 
phenomena. 
In effect, Rescher defines control as “the capacity to intervene in the 
course of events so as to be able both to make something happen and to 
preclude it from happening, this result being produced in a way that is not 
only foreseen but intended or planned. Control thus calls for the possibility of 
causal participation (“intervention”) in the course of event (“to make 
something happen or preclude it”) with a power that can be exercised both 
positively (“to make happen”) and negatively (“to preclude from 
happening”).”884 
Therefore, he is interested in the relation between prediction and the 
control of phenomena; i.e., to what extent we can intervene in phenomena in 
an effective way, so we can make something happen or prevent something 
from happen. In this regard, he thinks that our abilities are limited: “the limits 
of predictability set limits to control as well.”885 However, as Simon’s notices, 
the prescriptive task of the applied science is usually oriented to provide 
paths of action in order to deal with matters that we cannot control. So it is 
usual to seek the best possible adaptation to the foresight problems. This is 
the case, for example, of the models oriented toward meteorological 
prediction.886 
Within the applied science, prediction has to do with providing paths for 
action in order to solve specific problems, so it does not necessarily involve a 
control over phenomena (natural, social, or artificial). Nevertheless, Rescher 
sees “planning” as a tool to deal with “not predictability” (or even 
                                            
884 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 235. 
885 Predicting the Future, p. 237. 
886 Cf. SIMON, H. A., “Prediction and Prescription in Systems Modeling,” in SIMON, H. A., 
Models of Bounded Rationality. Vol. 3: Empirically Grounded Economic Reason, pp. 115-
128; especially, p. 122. 
271 
 
“unpredictability”), instead of being a way of configuring the actions, made on 
the basis of a previous knowledge of the future.887 
Rescher thinks that “by canalizing our actions into tried and true 
patterns we can clearly render the future less obscure, and thus less 
problematic.”888 In this way, “prediction as such is not altogether essential to 
the rational management oof our affairs. Very rough prediction will often 
serve our planning needs perfectly well: to make adequate provision for the 
future we (most frequently) do not have to know its precise character in many 
or most cases.”889 
In my judgment, such an approach highlights that Rescher is not 
thinking of a scientific context of problem-solving, where prediction is 
required in order to provide prescriptions about what should be done. He is 
mainly interested in the use that agents can make of this knowledge of the 
future provided by science, either in an individual way — the everyday 
behavior — or in a collective way (in issues related to policy). Thus, it is a 
proposal about the applications of science, which takes into account the 
possible uses of scientific prediction in the direction of practical actions. It is 
not properly an approach to the role of prediction in the realm of applied 
science. 
In this regard, it seems clear that prescription should be performed on 
the basis of an anticipation of the future. In order to make an effective 
prescription, forecasts (the less secure kind of prediction) can be good 
enough, instead of having a genuine foresight. But prediction is always 
needed, since it is prior to prescription from a chronological viewpoint and, 
moreover, it makes prescription possible. This can be clearly seen in the 
case of the sciences of design, where the usual procedure is to anticipate 
                                            
887 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 238. 
888 Predicting the Future, p. 238. 
889 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 238. 
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possible design problems and, then, give the paths in order to solve those 
predicted problems.890 
Therefore, Rescher does not offer an exhaustive analysis of prediction 
as a guide for the problem-solving activity of the applied sciences. Instead of 
that, his attention is focused in issues related with the role of prediction in a 
context of application of science, so he is focused on the use of prediction as 
a guide for human action. However, he addresses some questions that are 
very important when prescription is considered, such as the tractability of the 
possible future and the human capacity to control future phenomena and 
events. In this regard, his main contribution is — in main judgment — that he 
highlights the limits of the task oriented towards shaping the future, which are 
derived from the limits of the predictive activity itself.  
 
5.2.3. The Problem of the Application of Science: The Role of 
Prediction 
Regarding the roles of prediction, an important issue is the problem of 
the applications of scientific prediction. This question is connected with the 
distinction between “applied science” and “application of science,” which has 
been pointed out by Niiniluoto. As this philosopher notices, in the realm of 
applied science, the research is oriented towards the solution of concrete 
problems, so the search for new knowledge has a specific purpose. 
Meanwhile, the problem of the application of science deals with the use that 
can be made of the scientific knowledge in order to solve practical problems 
of action (as it happens, for example, in professional practices).891 
Certainly, this is an issue that has repercussions in the roles of scientific 
prediction. Thus, while in applied science prediction has mainly a role as a 
                                            
890 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Rationality and Prediction in the Sciences of the Artificial,” pp. 181-
182. 
891 Cf. NIINILUOTO, I., "The Aim and Structure of Applied Research,” p. 9. On this distinction, 
see also GONZALEZ, W. J., “The Roles of Scientific Creativity and Technological Innovation in 
the Context of Complexity of Science,” pp. 17-28. 
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guide for the task of problem-solving; in a context of application of science, 
prediction can be the basis for the decision-making of agents, either in an 
individual mode or in a collective way. Rescher pays especial attention to this 
problem, due to the pragmatic character of his thought. Thus, he is interested 
in how agents use scientific knowledge, in general, and knowledge about the 
future, in particular. 
Because his philosophical conception is in terms of “system,” Rescher 
addresses the problems that have to do with decision-making, above all, in 
public policy matters, where scientific prediction can have an important 
role.892 It is a problem he sees in relation to complexity, since “the decision 
problems that we face in contemporary public affairs are often too complex to 
allow a resolution by way of rational calculation and what might be called the 
application of ‘scientific principles.’”893 In this way, complexity has 
repercussions on the application of scientific predictions, so when the aim is 
to manage complex systems, a large number of variables that are open to 
the future must be taken into account. 
In general, complex systems are less predictable than the systems 
characterized by being simple. For this reason, when the applications of 
science deal with complex systems — which is usually the case in policy — 
the obstacles that hinder prediction have repercussions on the human 
capacity to manage and control the system, as well as in our ability to 
planning in order to solve practical problems. Furthermore, Rescher 
considers that complex systems, in general, and social systems, in particular, 
can be unpredictable (or at least not-predictable) in the long run.894 
                                            
892 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Political Pragmatism,” in RESCHER, N., Pragmatism. The Restoration of 
its Scientific Roots, pp. 205-215. In this paper, Rescher develops the proposals published in 
“Risking Democracy (Some Reflections on Contemporary Problems of Political Decision),” 
Public Affairs Quarterly, v. 12, (1999), pp. 297-308; compiled RESCHER, N., Sensible 
Decisions. Issues of Rational Decision in Personal Choice and Public Policy, pp. 113-124. 
893 RESCHER, N., “Political Pragmatism,” p. 205. 
894 Cf. “Political Pragmatism,” p. 209. 
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In this case, unpredictability can be due to several factors. 1) It is 
possible that chaos and chance intervene, so “the course of events over the 
longer term in matters of social interest depend too much on subtle 
interactions which, while virtually indiscernible at present and negligible in the 
short term, can make an enormous difference to what happen over the long 
term.”895 2) There can be also factors such as novelty, spontaneity, and 
creativity, so the patterns that a system followed in the past cannot allow us 
to infer its development in the future.896 
The difficulties to prediction such as chaos, chance, or novelty have 
repercussion in the human capacity of management. Thus, “complex 
systems are inherently less amenable to successful comprehension, 
management, and control.”897 In effect, in order to manage or control a 
system in an adequate way, firstly, we need some kind of knowledge about 
how this system will behave in the future; and, secondly, the success of the 
management depends, to a large extent, on the correct anticipation of the 
results and consequences of the measures suggested. 
But, when the matter that we want to manage is a complex one, “the 
eventual effects of the measures we take to address the challenges become 
lost in a fog of unpredictability.”898 This is a problem that makes the decision-
making process difficult, to the extent that different possible solutions can be 
suggested in order to solve the same problem. As Rescher points out, “the 
fact is that in a complex modern society there is often no way to get a rational 
grip on the consequences of public policy measures and employ ‘scientific 
intelligence’ to foretell the consequences. There are no calculable solutions 
                                            
895 RESCHER, N., “Political Pragmatism,” p. 209. 
896 Cf. “Political Pragmatism,” p. 210. 
897 RESCHER, N., “Technology, Complexity, and Social Decision,” in RESCHER, N., Sensible 
Decisions, p. 86. 
898 RESCHER, N., “Technology, Complexity, and Social Decision,” p. 89. 
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here—all that we ever seem to get is a clash of ‘my experts’ versus ‘your 
experts.’”899 
Therefore, when predictions do not reach the desirable level of detail, 
the interpretations of the experts or entities that manage a problem are 
possible. For this reason, on the same basis, such as a prediction or a set of 
predictions that anticipate a problem, different possible solutions might be 
suggested. In turn, there are difficulties for the correct anticipation of the 
results of the measures adopted. Moreover, regarding one solution, different 
experts may have opposite opinions about the results and consequences of 
that solution. 
In view of these problems posed by the applications of science, 
Rescher considers that “the best that we can do is to feel our way cautiously 
step by step—to experiment, to try plausible measures on a small scale and 
see what happens, and to let experience be our guide.”900 He labels this way 
of proceeding “political pragmatism.” It is a proposal about the rational 
procedure in decision-making about issues of public interest; because, in his 
judgment, complexity of the matters of public policy involves the impossibility 
of trusting that the experts would offer adequate solutions. 
Based on the lack of a direct transfer of the solutions suggested by the 
scientists, Rescher thinks that the process of decision-making in order to 
solve practical problems should be a “democratic” process, with a collective 
participation.901 Certainly, the applications of science in many of the applied 
sciences (such as economics, medicine, or pharmacology) have to do with 
questions of public interest, to the extent that they can affect the people, the 
society, or the environment (either in a positive or a negative way). This issue 
can be analyzed in three successive levels: aims, processes, and results 
                                            
899 RESCHER, N., “Political Pragmatism,” p. 212. 
900 “Political Pragmatism,” p. 212. 
901 Cf. RESCHER, N., “Political Pragmatism,” pp. 213-215. 
276 
 
(and the consequences) of the applications of science.902 At each one of 
these levels, ethical values are important; above all, those related to social 
responsibility (which might lead to a legal responsibility).903 
It should be highlighted that, in Rescher’s approach, the decision-
making should be collective, at least regarding issues that have social 
repercussion, such as for example the problems of policy. But this make it 
difficult the attribution of responsibilities, for “when things go wrong—when 
even our best conceived measures do not deliver on their promises and live 
up to expectation—in a system of genuinely participatory decision making, 
‘we the people’ will at least have no one to blame other than ourselves.”904 
Thus, an important problem that arises here is — in my judgment — 
that responsibility can fade when groups of agents (instead of individual 
agents) make the decisions. This might make it difficult to talk about a 
“collective responsibility” in decision making. In this regard, Rescher 
maintains that collective responsibility is rooted on the individual members of 
a group, on the condition that the individuals act in a coordinate and 
intentional way — either through consensus or by delegation — in order to 
generate a result. He considers that only in this case there can be a genuine 
collective responsibility.905 
Rescher rejects a naïve view of the capacity of science to solve 
practical problems of action. In effect, when the problems are complex, 
science can have difficulties in order to offer optimal solutions, “and this 
occurs not because the experts are incompetent but because the problems 
are intractable. They are of such complexity that scientific analysis and 
                                            
902 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “The Philosophical Approach to Science, Technology and Society,” 
p. 26. 
903 These ethical features are analyzed in-depth in chapter 9 of this Ph.D. research. 
904 RESCHER, N., “Political Pragmatism,” p. 214. 
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expert deliberations simply cannot settle matters.”906 So he rejects a 
scientism of the application of science: the prediction of the possible future is 
not always followed by prescriptions that, in the practical life, are directly 
applicable in order to provide the results sought. 
It seems clear that, in this case, the existence of limits to scientific 
prediction due to the complexity of the reality (that is, the complex systems) 
should be considered. This is highlighted by Rescher when he notices the 
nexus between scientific prediction and the management or control of a 
system. Thus, when predictions are not possible or they are not reliable, 
management can lead to undesired or even undesirable effects. For this 
reason, successful predictions are needed, insofar as they can provide 
secure basis for acting. In view of this problem, the methodological 
dimension is — in my judgment — crucial, since the improvement of the 
predictive processes is basic in order to achieve predictive success. 
 
5.3.  From the General Realm to the Special Level 
Usually, Rescher is concerned about prediction in the natural sciences, 
but he also considers the role of prediction in the methodology of the social 
sciences (above all, in economics).907 In this regard, he highlights that there 
is generally a problem of unreliability that affects predictions about social and 
human matters; while the predictions about the natural phenomena are, in 
principle, more reliable. This is a methodological problem that leads to 
ontological roots, since it rests on the complexity of the human activity that is 
developed in a social milieu.908 
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But prediction has also an important role in the sciences of the artificial, 
which is a realm that Rescher does not take into account expressly. In this 
realm, the sciences of design seek to enlarge the human possibilities in the 
human made field. In this way, these sciences develop an activity of a 
teleological character, where applied knowledge is needed in order to solve 
concrete problems. In this context of applied science, prediction and 
prescription have a relevant role, because the activity of design requires the 
anticipation of the possible problems (prediction) in order to suggest what 
should be done (prescription).  
 
5.3.1. Prediction in the Natural Sciences and in the Socieal 
Sciences 
On scientific prediction, Rescher’s approach is mainly focused on the 
natural sciences. However, in Predicting the Future, there is one chapter 
devoted to prediction in the social sciences, where he makes a comparison 
with prediction in the realm of the natural sciences. Thus, he considers that, 
from a methodological perspective, prediction in social sciences is more 
difficult that in the natural sciences. In his judgment, “the difficulties that the 
predictive project encounters in [natural] science pale in comparison with 
those it encounters in human affairs.”909 
This feature — the difficulty of predicting about social and human 
matters — leads to an ontological dimension, because it is rooted in the 
characteristics of the reality (natural or social) predicted. So, when the 
prediction is about social phenomena, “it is the nature of the phenomenology 
of the domain—its volatility, instability, and susceptibility to chance and 
chaos—that is responsible for our predictive incapabilities here, rather than 
our imperfections as investigators.”910 However, those obstacles to 
                                            
909 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 192. 
910 Predicting the Future, p. 202. 
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predictability can also affect natural phenomena, so it should be considered 
to what extent indeterminism especially affects the social prediction. 
Rescher’s attention goes to the natural reality when he analyses the 
relation between predictability and predetermination. Regarding this issue, he 
maintains that claims “that this world of ours indeed is such a deterministic, 
wholly predictable Laplacean world is, in the present state of our knowledge, 
somewhere between implausible and false. The role of predetermination-
blocking factors (chance, choice, and the like) is a real and prominent fact of 
life in the world as we know it.”911  
It can be noticed that, although there are factors such as volatility, 
instability, chaos, or chance that can clarify the lack of predictive success in 
social sciences, it does not seem that they can elucidate, by themselves, why 
social sciences have generally less predictive capacity than the natural 
sciences. In effect, as Rescher himself admits, natural sciences have to deal 
with this kind of ontological obstacles, so the chaotic or volatile character of 
some social phenomena is not the only reason for the methodological 
difficulties of the social prediction. 
Furthermore, Rescher considers that the indeterminism that 
characterizes human matters does not necessarily involve “impredictability” 
(i.e., the complete impossibility of predicting): “the operation of a power of 
free choice certainly does not mean that there must be unpredictability.”912 In 
his judgment, to the extent that the human actions and choices are rational, 
they might be also predictable. Thus, he thinks that “the acts of rational 
agents are usually predictable because it is often and perhaps even usually 
                                            
911 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 73. On the discussions about determinism and 
freedom, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “New Reflections on an Old Problem: Freedom and 
Determinism in the Scientific Context,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Freedom and Determinism: 
Social Sciences and Natural Sciences, monographic volume of Peruvian Journal of 
Epistemology, v. 1, (2012), pp. 3-20. 
912 RESCHER, N., Free Will. A Philosophical Reappraisal, Transaction Publishers, New 
Brunswick, NJ, 2009, p. 46. 
280 
 
possible to figure out on the basis of general principles what the rational thing 
to do is in the prevailing situation.”913 
Nevertheless, Rescher admits that the free choice of agents can be an 
obstacle for predictability in social sciences. In those sciences, predictions 
are about issues that are related with the actions and choices of rational 
agents that have free will, so these actions and choices are open to 
changes.914 Therefore, although factors such as change, chance, or chaos 
are not only present in the social reality, it is possible to claim that, in general, 
social phenomena are more instable that natural phenomena, because these 
factors are more pervasive in the social realm. 
From this perspective, an important difference between natural 
phenomena and social events has to do with the regularity of these events or 
happening. This is an ontological issue, which has clear methodological 
repercussions, to the extent that the preconditions for rational prediction 
demand the discernability and stability of the patterns exhibited by 
phenomena. For this reason, if it is admitted that social phenomena are 
generally less regular and more instable than natural phenomena, then it is 
also possible to claim that there are more methodological difficulties for 
prediction in social sciences, due to the kind of issues they deal with. 
In this regard, Rescher relates the predictability of natural phenomena 
to the existence of laws about those phenomena. In his judgment, “nature is 
predictable insofar as its phenomena exhibit discernible patterns that reveal 
rulish lawfulness in its operations.”915 In that case, not only it is possible to 
discern patterns in natural phenomena, but those patterns have also a nomic 
expression. Thus, in natural sciences the inference from laws is a usual 
predictive method.  
                                            
913 RESCHER, N., “Predictive Incapacity and Rational Decision,” European Review, v. 3, n. 4, 
(1995), p. 327.  
914 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 192. 
915 Predicting the Future, p. 176. 
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Certainly, when a prediction is the result of an inference from laws, it is 
more reliable than when other predictive procedures are used. Firstly, the 
presence of laws involves that there are lawful regularities in phenomena, 
which can serve as mechanisms of connection between the events of the 
past and the happenings of the future; and, secondly, nomic stability makes 
the secure inference of statements about the future possible. Meanwhile, 
regarding the social phenomena, there is a higher instability, so the use of 
less reliable methods is more usual: estimative procedures, trend 
extrapolation, etc.  
Regarding prediction in social sciences, one of the main difficulties is 
due — in my judgment — to the diversity of variables (endogenous and 
exogenous) that are open to the future. Furthermore, there are difficulties due 
to the complexity of selecting the quantifiable factors and the analysis of the 
representative interrelations among different variables in quantitative (and not 
just qualitative) terms.916 These are questions that have repercussions on the 
complexity and reliability of social predictions. In this way, it can be claimed 
that scientific-social prediction is generally more complex than prediction in 
the natural sciences.917 
For Rescher, “the predictive limitations of social science are ultimately 
rooted in the immense complexity of the processes through which human 
beliefs and desires are shaped in the first place.”918 But his approach to 
complexity in social science is — in my judgment — too generic, insofar as 
he seems to associate complexity with the presence of factors such as 
chaos, volatility, chance, etc.919 Thus, this approach to complexity of social 
                                            
916 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, p. 221. 
917 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., "Complexity in Economics and Prediction: The Role of Parsimonious 
Factors,” in DIEKS, D., GONZALEZ, W. J., HARTMAN, S., UEBEL, TH. and WEBER, M. (eds.), 
Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation,  pp. 319-330; especially, pp. 319-321. 
918 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 201. 
919 Cf. Predicting the Future, p. 202. 
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phenomena contradict, to a certain extent, his own approach to the problem 
of complexity. 
In effect, as Rescher maintains in his book Complexity, the study of 
complexity cannot be only determined by the extent to which factors such as 
chance, randomness, and lawful regularity is absent.920 This feature leads 
him to suggest a framework of complexity with many aspects. In his analysis, 
there are mainly two dimensions of complexity: epistemological and 
ontological (to which it is possible to add a methodological facet). 
Furthermore, although his approach in preferentially of structural complexity, 
it is also open to dynamic complexity, which has to do with the changes of 
complex systems over time. 
However, his analysis of the complexity of prediction in social sciences 
is too generic. In an explicit way, he maintains that “the comparatively limited 
progress of the social sciences in matters of prediction does not lie in a want 
of trying, a lack of dedication or intelligence, a deficiency of method or of 
information-collecting methods, or in some other error of omission or 
commission. Instead, chance, chaos, choice—in fact, all of the bugaboos of 
rational prediction—play a prominent part throughout the social sphere. In 
this domain, where the causal phenomenology at issue is so enormously 
complex, volatile, and chaotic, there is only so much that can be done.”921 
On the one hand, Rescher is right in considering that the difficulties to 
deal with complexity in the realm of social sciences allow us to elucidate the 
poor predictive success in those sciences. But, on the other hand, his 
approach in this regard is — in my judgment — excessively general: there is 
no the desirable degree of detail. This is because his interest in prediction is 
mainly focused in the realm of the sciences of nature, so he does not develop 
                                            
920 “As many writers see it, complexity is determined by the extent to which chance, 
randomness, and lack of lawful regularity in general is absent. But this cannot be the whole 
story, since law systems themselves can clearly be more or less complex,” RESCHER, N., 
Complexity: A Philosophical Overview, Transaction Publishers, N. Brunswick, NJ, 1998, p. 8. 
921 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 202. 
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in depth the specific issues of the methodology of prediction in the social 
sciences. 
The methodological repercussions of the problem of complexity in the 
realm of social sciences have been emphasized above all in philosophy and 
methodology of economics. In this regard, it has been highlighted that 
complexity “contributes to the frequent lack of reliability of economic 
predictions, which has its roots in the object of study of this science: 
economic reality is a social and artificial undertaking (quehacer), which is 
commonly mutable, as a consequence of its dependence on the human 
activity that develops historically.” 922 
Certainly, economics has a dual status: it is a science of design, insofar 
as it has artificial elements that enlarge the human possibilities; and, 
moreover, it is a social science, because it deals with human needs, such as 
food, housing, etc.923 But, when Rescher analyses the problem of prediction 
in economics, he only takes into account the dimension of social science, so 
his approach does not grasp all the issues at stake. In his judgment, the 
methodological difficulties to economic prediction are rooted in the 
changeableness of the social reality, where there is a great diversity of 
variables, both endogenous and exogenous, which are instable or even 
chaotic.924 
But economics is also a science of design. This feature of being a dual 
science (that is, social and artificial) adds more factors of analysis to the 
problem of the economic prediction, which Rescher does not take into 
account. For this reason, in my judgment, his methodological approach to 
scientific prediction can be completed through the analysis of the role of 
prediction in the sciences of the artificial. Firstly, prediction has an important 
                                            
922 GONZALEZ, W. J., “La vertiente dinámica de las Ciencias de la Complejidad. Repercusión 
de la historicidad para la predicción científica en las Ciencias Diseño,” p. 92. 
923 Cf. “La vertiente dinámica de las Ciencias de la Complejidad. Repercusión de la 
historicidad para la predicción científica en las Ciencias Diseño,” p. 88. 
924 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 193-199. 
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role in this group of sciences (so it is not only present in the field of the 
natural sciences and the social sciences); and, secondly, there are social 
sciences (such as economics) that are also sciences of design, so an 
exhaustive analysis of prediction in those sciences cannot be limited to the 
study of their features as social disciplines. 
 
5.3.2.  The Artificial Realm: Prediction in the Design Sciences 
From an epistemological perspective, the sciences of design develop 
contents of the sciences of the artificial, because of the type of object they 
deal with; because scientific designs belong to the realm of the “human-
made” and can be considered as the result of a task of synthesis,925 where 
prediction and prescription have an important role. This issue connects with 
an ontological dimension, which Herbert A. Simon highlighted when he made 
the distinction between artificial objects and natural items. 
He made this distinction in order to establish the boundaries for the 
sciences of the artificial. In his judgment, there are four main differences 
between them: “1. Artificial things are synthesized (though not always or 
usually with full forethought) by human beings. 2. Artificial may imitate 
appearances in natural things while lacking, in one or many respects, the 
reality of the latter. 3. Artificial things can be characterized in terms of 
functions, goals, adaptation. 4. Artificial things are often discussed, 
particularly when they are being designed, in terms of imperatives as well as 
descriptives.”926  
Following the epistemological and ontological features, design can be 
characterized as a human-made undertaking, which is made through a task 
of synthesis and brings about an artificial thing. Moreover, according to 
Simon, the concept of “synthesis” can be used as a synonymous with the 
                                            
925 Cf. SIMON, H. A., The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd ed., The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 
1996 (1st ed., 1969; 2nd ed., 1981), pp. 4-5. 
926 SIMON, H. A., The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd ed., p. 5. 
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notion of “design.” In his judgment, “design, as I am using the term, means 
synthesis. It means conceiving of objects, of processes, or ideas for 
accomplishing goals, and showing how these objects, processes, or ideas 
can be realized.”927 Thus, to some extent, “design” and “synthesis” can be 
understood within this approach in the broad-sense of devising objects and 
processes, and thinking of how they can be accomplished in an effective and 
efficient way. 
This teleological character of “design,” which has a relation with the 
artificial domain, makes Simon stress the linkage between design sciences 
and technology. In his judgment, “as soon as we introduce ‘synthesis’ as well 
as ‘artifice,’ we enter the realm of engineering. For ‘synthetic’ is often used in 
the broader sense of ‘designed’ or ‘composed.’ We speak of engineering as 
concerned with ‘synthesis,’ while science is concerned with ‘analysis.’ 
Synthetic or artificial objects and more specifically prospective artificial 
objects having desired properties are the central objective of engineering 
activity and skill. The engineer, and more generally the designer, is 
concerned with how things ought to be in order to attain goals, and to 
function.”928  
De facto, both technology and design sciences share the need for 
designs to attain their goals.929 Nevertheless, “‘design sciences’ belong to a 
realm that is scientific rather than technological, and they have a scientific 
rationality that is different from technological rationality.”930 The main 
difference between them is neat: science seeks a variety of aims by cognitive 
means in order to increase our knowledge (basic science) or solve specific 
                                            
927 SIMON, H. A., “Problem Forming, Problem Finding, and Problem Solving in Design,” in 
COLLEN, A. and GASPARSKI, W. W. (eds.), Design and Systems: General Applications of 
Methodology, Transaction Publishers, N. Brunswick, NJ, 1995, p. 246.  
928 SIMON, H. A., The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd ed., pp. 4-5.  
929 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Rationality and Prediction in the Sciences of the Artificial: 
Economics as a Design Science,” in GALAVOTTI, M. C., SCAZZIERI, R. and SUPPES, P. (eds.), 
Reasoning, Rationality and Probability, p. 168. 
930 GONZALEZ, W. J., “Rationality and Prediction in the Sciences of the Artificial: Economics 
as a Design Science,” p. 168. 
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practical problems (applied research).931 Meanwhile, technology is oriented 
towards a creative transformation of reality in order to bring about new results 
(generally, an artifact, which is a tangible reality).932 Thus, “science” and 
“technology” are different human activities, although there are connections 
between them, which are especially relevant in the case of design sciences. 
These differences between “science” and “technology” have 
repercussions on the concept of design. In effect, there are differences 
between “designs,” in general, and “scientific designs,” in particular. These 
differences are clear insofar as scientific design involves the addition of 
epistemological and methodological features to the kind of design that is 
common in professional practices.933 Therefore, scientific design seeks to 
solve concrete problems through the use of applied scientific knowledge and 
scientific methods.934  
In Simon’s view, “design like science is a tool for understanding as well 
as for acting.”935 This feature appears insofar as design “is concerned with 
how things ought to be, with devising artifacts to attain goals.”936 Thus, when 
a design is elaborated, there is a purposed aim. Consequently, it is 
necessary to choose the most appropriate processes, and those processes 
may eventually lead to previously established outcomes.937 In this way, 
design is a teleological activity, and sciences of design — as sciences of 
                                            
931 Cf. NIINILUOTO, I., “The Aim and Structure of Applied Research,” pp. 1-21; especially, pp. 
3-6; and NIINILUOTO, I., “Approximation in Applied Science,” pp. 127-139. 
932 On the differences between science and technology, see GONZALEZ, W. J., “The 
Philosophical Approach to Science, Technology and Society,” pp. 3-49; especially, pp. 11-
12. 
933 Since Simon emphasizes the connections between sciences of design and technology, 
his approach to the notion of design is somewhat ambiguous, insofar as it doesn’t make it 
possible to distinguish “design” form “scientific design.” Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Análisis de las 
Ciencias de Diseño desde la racionalidad limitada, la predicción y la prescripción,” in 
GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Las Ciencias de Diseño: Racionalidad limitada, predicción y 
prescripción, p. 11. 
934 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., “Análisis de las Ciencias de Diseño desde la racionalidad limitada, la 
predicción y la prescripción,” p. 11. 
935 SIMON, H. A., The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd ed., p. 164. 
936 The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd ed., p. 114. 
937 Of course, the outcomes attained could differ from the stated aims. This can happen 
commonly when the possible problems are not correctly anticipated.  
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synthesis — involve the enlargement of human possibilities by the use of 
creative designs to solve particular problems. 
The teleological character of scientific design involves a link between 
the activity of design and the applied knowledge. In fact, sciences of design 
are applied sciences oriented towards problem-solving activities. In this way, 
the goal-oriented nature of design sciences involves a prescriptive 
component that deals with how things ought to be in order to attain certain 
goals. This feature involves that the elaboration of a scientific design requires 
both prediction and prescription. Firstly, prediction is needed to know whether 
the design is feasible as well as to anticipate any possible problem, and, 
secondly, prescriptions are made on what should be done to achieve the 
goals.938 
Therefore, in the realm of the sciences of design, as they are applied 
sciences, the most prominent role the prediction is in its relation with 
prescription. In this case, prediction is mainly a methodological tool, because 
the knowledge about the possible future is required in order to establish the 
relevant paths for the prescription.939 In this way, in applied sciences, in 
general, and in the sciences of design, in particular, the usual methodological 
path is to predict in order to prescribe. 
This has been emphasized by Wenceslao J. Gonzalez when he 
analyzes the role of prediction in economics as a design science. In this 
regard, he notices that, “in order to carry out a design activity in science, the 
common path is to consider in advance whether the project is feasible 
(prediction), before we give indications about how to solve the problem that is 
foreseen (prescription). Thus, to make a prediction is, in principle, 
                                            
938 On the role of prediction and prescription in the sciences of the artificial, see GONZALEZ, 
W. J., “Rationality and Prediction in the Sciences of the Artificial: Economics as a Design 
Science,” section 4, pp. 179-183. 
939 Cf. “Rationality and Prediction in the Sciences of the Artificial: Economics as a Design 
Science,” p. 181. 
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chronologically prior to establishing a prescription when the problems 
involved are in the realm of design science.”940 
Explicitly, Simon has paid special attention to this problem. In fact, his 
approach gives primacy to prescription over prediction, because he considers 
that prediction is the most important goal of science, instead of just predicting 
what is going to happen in the future. In his judgment, prediction is prior to 
prescription both in science, in general, and in sciences of the artificial (and 
among them design sciences), in particular. Additionally, he thinks that the 
knowledge about the future (i.e., the prediction) is what makes it possible the 
prescriptive task of science.941 
Within this context, a question arises about the level of accuracy and 
precision that predictions should achieve in order to establish effective 
prescriptions. On this problem, José Francisco Martínez Solano notices that, 
for Simon, prescription “does not involve the need for accurate prediction of 
the future because the main concern is to shape the future by designing it 
correctly, instead of predicting accurately what is going to occur.”942 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that some kind of knowledge about the future is 
needed in order to prescribe, although it might be good enough to have a 
forecast (the least reliable type of prediction) instead of having a genuine 
foresight. 
In my judgment, a forecast might be good enough, but a genuine 
prediction or foresight — the most reliable kind of knowledge about the future 
— provides us a more rigorous knowledge in order to establish a 
prescription. In principle, the more accurate and precise the prediction is, the 
more successful the prescription could be. It is for that reason that I consider 
                                            
940 “Rationality and Prediction in the Sciences of the Artificial: Economics as a Design 
Science,” pp. 181-182. 
941 Cf. SIMON, H. A., “Prediction and Prescription in Systems Modeling,” Operations 
Research, v. 38, (1990), pp. 7-14; especially, pp. 10-12. 
942 MARTÍNEZ SOLANO, J. F., “La complejidad en la Ciencia de la Economía: De F. A. Hayek a 
H. A. Simon,” in GONZALEZ, W. J. (ed.), Las Ciencias de la Complejidad: Vertiente dinámica 
de las Ciencias de Diseño y sobriedad de factores, p. 248. 
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that applied sciences, in general, and the sciences of design, in particular, 
should be oriented towards the search for more and more reliable and 
informative predictions. In this way, it would be possible to choose between 
alternative courses of action those which lead us to an effective and efficient 
solution to stated problems. 
However, this aim can be difficult to attain due to the role of human 
creativity in the scientific activity of design. On this issue, it seems to me that 
creativity can influence prediction and prescription in two different ways: (i) as 
an obstacle to achieve accurate predictions; and (ii) as a key factor for 
problem-solving. According to Rescher, human creativity is a major limit to 
predictability. In his judgment, “human creativity and inventiveness defies 
predictive foresight.”943 From this perspective, creativity can be seen as a 
source for complexity in design sciences.944 
But creativity can be also a key factor in the problem-solving activity of 
the applied sciences, where prescription has a main role. This feature is 
especially clear in the case of the sciences of design, insofar as “the science 
of design is directly connected to prescribing: design looks for courses of 
action whose aims are to change existing situations into preferred ones, and 
those processes require identification of some prescribed paths to be 
followed.”945  
Certainly, this task can be accomplished through a creative act, 
because the role of creativity in the sciences of the artificial is related “to the 
invention of forms that are to satisfy some requirements or purpose.”946 
Therefore, creativity can be considered as a dual notion: on the one hand, it 
can be a source of complexity in design sciences, so it is a clear obstacle to 
                                            
943 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future. An Introduction to the Theory of Forecasting, p. 149. 
944 Creativity as an ontological limit to predictability, which affects above all the social 
sciences and the sciences of the artificial, is analyzed in chapter 7 of this Ph.D. research.  
945 GONZALEZ, W. J., “Rationality and Prediction in the Sciences of the Artificial: Economics 
as a Design Science,” p. 182. 
946 DASGUPTA, S., Creativity in Invention and Design, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1994, p. 8. 
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predictability in this realm. But, on the other hand, it can be an element which 
helps us to overcome that complexity, insofar as it seeks new ways that 
serve as key elements for prescription in design sciences. 
 
5.4.   Preconditions for Rational Prediction 
Epistemologically, Rescher characterizes scientific prediction as a 
rational prediction. Therefore, scientific predictions have rational bases that 
distinguish them from other non-rational attempts to anticipate the future (for 
example, the prophecies). In his judgment, “we who do not ourselves directly 
observe or experience the future, and lack any self-authenticating 
precognitive insight into it, can only get knowledge about it by way of rational 
evidentiation, of ‘inference’ from the available data regarding accomplished 
facts. Prediction as we know it is a matter of thought and not perception. To 
us, ordinary nonclairvoyant humans, the future can only be conjectured on 
the basis of experience-derived information.”947 
Unlike authors like D. H. Mellor, who maintains that predictions do not 
need reasons,948 Rescher argues in favor of the rational bases of scientific 
prediction. In his approach, opposite to the simple prophecy, scientific 
predictions are credible to the extent that there are some bases (theoretical 
or empirical) that justify the inference from the past to the future.949 
Furthermore, he thinks that the predictive inference must be necessarily 
supported by information about the behavior of the phenomena in the past 
and in the present, since we cannot directly “observe” the future. 
As the future is something that is not yet, when the problem of the 
characterization of the scientific prediction is addressed, the methodological 
orientation is crucial. In Rescher’s judgment, scientific prediction is the result 
of a rational process. Thus, he admits a methodological pluralism in relation 
                                            
947
 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 54. 
948 Cf. MELLOR, D. H., “The Possibility of Prediction,” pp. 207-223. 
949 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 53-56. 
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to scientific prediction: there is a variety of methods — estimative and 
discursive — that scientists can use in order to achieve the aim of predicting.  
But, as rational processes, the different methods share a series of 
characteristics.  
On methodology of prediction, Rescher’s attention goes in two different 
directions: on the one hand, he wants to make the different predictive 
methods explicit, which involves taking into account the distinctive features of 
each concrete process; and, on the other hand, he pays attention to the 
common features of the different predictive procedures and methods. This 
second line of analysis — the bases shared by the predictive processes — is 
developed by Rescher according to the “preconditions for rational 
prediction.”950 
These are a series of conditions that he consider prior and necessary 
for the methods oriented towards predicting, since “any sort of rational 
prediction—no matter how naive or how complex and sophisticated is mode 
of operation—will accordingly require informative input material that indicates 
that three conditions are satisfied.”951 In his judgment, those three 
preconditions for rational prediction are the following ones: 
1) Data availability, which involves that data should be obtained in an 
accurate, reliable, and timely way (i.e., prior to the occurrence or non-
occurrence of the phenomenon predicted). 2)  Pattern discernability; that is, 
there should be identifiable patterns in the data obtained. 3) Pattern stability, 
since the success of prediction depends, to a large extent, on the fact that 
the patterns followed by the phenomena in the past and in the present have 
certain stability towards the future.952 These three preconditions justify the 
inference of future, because “rational prediction pivots on the existence of 
                                            
950 Cf. GONZALEZ, W. J., La predicción científica, pp. 271-274.  
951 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 86. 
952 Cf. Predicting the Future, p. 86. 
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some sort of appropriate linkage that connects our predictive claims with the 
input data that provide for their justification.”953 
 
5.4.1.  Data Availability 
The first one of those three preconditions — data availability — has to 
do mainly with two fundamental issues: (i) the access to information (to what 
extent we have the data required in order to make the prediction), and (ii) the 
quality of the data, where problems such as the accuracy or reliability of the 
data should be contemplated. Both problems are connected with the 
epistemological limits to scientific prediction, which Rescher addresses 
mainly with regard to the obstacles that have to do with information.954 
Regarding the first issue — the access to the relevant data —  two 
problems can be considered, which affect scientific prediction in different 
degrees: (a) ignorance (the lack of information), and (b) uncertainty (which 
initially affects prediction when some data are not available). Both cases are 
obstacles to scientific prediction from the perspective of the access to 
information. 
In his analysis of ignorance, Rescher makes an initial distinction 
between two different types of ignorance: contingence ignorance and the 
ignorance of a necessary character. When ignorance is contingent, it is 
“grounded in operations of nature that render certain fact-determinations 
impossible in the circumstances, and it is sometimes grounded in the 
insufficiency of our information-accessing resources.”955 In the first case, 
ignorance has ontological roots; while in the second case the problem is 
epistemological. Meanwhile, the necessary ignorance is rooted in logico-
                                            
953 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 87. 
954 Cf. RESCHER, N., Ignorance. On the Wider Implications of Deficient Knowledge, University 
of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2009; especially, chapter 6, “Obstacles to Predictive 
Foreknowledge,” pp. 91-122. 
955 RESCHER, N., Ignorance. On the Wider Implications of Deficient Knowledge, p. 141. 
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conceptual considerations,956 so it involves unpredictability (for example, in 
the cases of self-prediction).957 
Within this framework, ignorance that affects data availability in order to 
make predictions is a contingent ignorance of epistemic basis. According to 
Rescher, this type of ignorance is rooted in the inadequate character of our 
resource for information accessing, among which there are the current 
means of observation.958 The result of this type of ignorance is the 
impossibility of accessing the relevant data, either in order to prescribe, 
explain, or predict a certain matter. 
When there is ignorance with regard to the relevant data for the 
prediction, the first precondition for rational prediction — which has to do with 
the availability of the information — is not fulfilled. In that case, the required 
data are not available, so prediction appears as an impossible task from the 
very beginning. In other words, those phenomena about which we have no 
knowledge, either explicative or merely descriptive, are phenomena 
unpredictable or, at least, not-predictable. 
However, to the extent that it is a contingent ignorance — it is not a 
necessary ignorance — it can be overcome in principle (for example, to the 
extent that there are improvements in the means of observation or 
experimentation). For this reason, when the impossibility of prediction is due 
to ignorance, the research should be firstly oriented toward obtaining the 
required data; that is, toward guarantying the access to the relevant 
information for the prediction. 
Uncertainty is another problem that has to do with the access to data. In 
Rescher’s judgment, it is usual that not all the relevant information is 
available, so he considers uncertainty as the main epistemological obstacle 
to prediction: “In view of the inevitable incompleteness of our information, we 
                                            
956 Cf. Ignorance. On the Wider Implications of Deficient Knowledge, pp. 140-141. 
957 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 211-215. 
958 Cf. RESCHER, N., Ignorance. On the Wider Implications of Deficient Knowledge, p. 141. 
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cannot eliminate the risk of error in prediction; even the best of predictions 
can in principle go awry.”959 Unlike ignorance, uncertainty does not involve 
the complete lack of information, but it has to do with the limited character of 
the available information, so it can affect the reliability of the prediction. Thus, 
Rescher links uncertainty and fallibilism.  
As an epistemological feature, when can generally deal with uncertainty 
to the extent that the available information about past and present 
phenomena is increased or improved. In this way, it is possible to reduce the 
uncertainty that affects some predictive matter. In turn, this feature has 
repercussions on the reliability of the prediction; since, in principle, the better 
we know the phenomena that we want to predict, the more reliable the 
prediction about those phenomena will be.  
However, this is not a general rule. As Rescher notices, “the access of 
further information can sometimes make the future less predictable.”960 If 
someone we know is going to take a trip, we can predict quite securely that 
he will use his car. But, if we later know that his car is in the garage, not only 
the initial prediction turns out to be false, but also it is not possible now to 
make a reliable prediction about his means of transport. By this and other 
examples of ordinary life, Rescher illustrates how sometimes the access to 
additional information increases the uncertainty regarding the future.961 
Therefore, a prediction can turn out to be false due to the presence of 
errors in the initial data; but also due to incomplete data.962 In that case, the 
access to further information can have two main consequences: firstly, it is 
possible that it allows us to predict in a more reliable way certain 
phenomenon; and, secondly, it might increase the uncertainty regarding what 
is going to happen in the future. Despite of this, the access to more 
                                            
959 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 59. 
960 Predicting the Future, p. 58. 
961 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, pp. 58-59. 
962 Cf. Predicting the Future, p. 59. 
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information has always — in my judgment — a positive character for our 
knowledge about the future, either because it increases the security and 
reliability of the prediction, or because it might highlight that certain prediction 
is incorrect. 
Besides the problem of the access to the data, there is the question 
about the quality of those data: how are the characteristics that they should 
have in order to make the prediction possible. Rescher identifies three 
features that, in his judgment, characterize the relevant data for prediction: (i) 
they should be obtained timely; that is, previous to the occurrence of the 
phenomena or event that we want to predict; (ii) they should be accurate; and 
(iii) they should be reliable.963  
The first of these characteristics has to do with the temporal factor of 
prediction. Thus, the relevant data for the prediction must be about the past 
and present development of the phenomena that we want to predict; i.e., the 
information, from a chronological perspective, deals with a reality that is 
previous to the referent of the prediction. This temporal feature of the 
information is connected with Rescher’s proposal according to which a 
scientific prediction is a statement oriented towards the future. Then, in order 
to anticipate the future, information is necessarily about previous events or 
phenomena: “for to evidentiate our predictive claims about the future, we 
have no alternative but to look to the past-&-present.”964 
Besides the temporal factor, from an axiological perspective, Rescher 
considers accuracy and reliability as two major values that must characterize 
the relevant information for the prediction. Accuracy deals with the 
correctness of the data. It is a relevant value, since error in the information 
usually leads to incorrect predictions. Meanwhile, data reliability has to do 
                                            
963 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 86. 
964 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 86. 
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with the security that can be attributed to those data; and, therefore, involves 
a level of certainty. 
Within Rescher’s approach, where credibility is more important than 
correctness, reliability appears as an especially important value.965 
Regarding the relevant data for the prediction, reliability can be evaluated 
according to issues such as the source from which the data have been 
obtained or the means used in order to obtain the date. Since it is usual that 
the process of prediction is performed in a context of limited information, the 
most accurate and reliable the data are, the higher will be, in principle, the 
probability of attaining true predictions. 
 
5.4.2.  Pattern Discernability 
The second precondition for rational prediction has to do with pattern 
discernability. Once the data have been obtained, firstly, the researcher 
should discern the patterns followed by the phenomena; and, secondly, he 
should anticipate their future behavior. On the one hand, this question leads 
to an ontological dimension; and, on the other, it is related to an epistemic 
feature. In effect, it is assumed that phenomena that we want to predict 
should follow some patters; and, then, it is accepted that the subject who 
makes the prediction has to be able to discern those patterns from the 
available data. 
Here, the problem of complexity (both structural and dynamic) can be 
crucial. In effect, when the system we want to predict is a complex system, 
this feature can make it difficult the task of establishing the patters of the 
relevant variables in the system. In this regard, the main contribution of 
                                            
965 According to Rescher, we are not really interested in prediction as such; but our interest 
is in reliable predictions. In his judgment, the reliability of a prediction might rest partly in the 
evidence and partly in the kind of phenomenon at issue (for example, if it is stable or 
volatile). In this case, the ontological aspect involves the attention to the context, which may 
influence the behavior of the phenomena. Cf. RESCHER, N., Personal Communication, 
2.6.2015. 
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Rescher is in the identification of the different modes of complexity, which in 
his judgment belong to two dimensions: the epistemological component and 
the ontological level.966 Thus, complexity can have repercussions on the 
concrete obstacles (epistemological and ontological) that makes pattern 
discernability difficult. 
On this basis, in order to study the problem of the patter discernability, 
two successive steps should be followed. Firstly, the ontological and 
epistemological aspects of this issue can be considered (the existence of 
regularities or patterns and our capacity to grasp those patterns). And, 
secondly, the incidence of complexity — in its epistemological and 
ontological modes — on scientific prediction can be analyzed, because 
complexity can be an obstacle when we try to grasp the regularities of a 
system.  
Regarding pattern discernability, the initial matter to take into account is 
of an ontological character. Thus, when we want to predict certain 
phenomenon or process, there are two initial possibilities: that it is a regular 
phenomenon or that, on the contrary, it is what Rescher calls an “anarchic” 
phenomenon; that is, a phenomenon that has followed no patterns.967 It is 
usual to consider pattern discernability as a necessary condition for 
predictability, which in principle excludes the possibility of predicting 
phenomena characterized by being completely irregular (i.e., anarchic 
phenomena). 
David F. Hendry has also insisted in the existence of regularities as a 
necessary condition for scientific prediction. His approach is with regard to 
economic forecasts. In his judgment, the success of economic forecasts is 
only possible if a series of requirements are fulfilled: “(a) there are regularities 
to be captured, (b) the regularities are informative about the future, (c) the 
                                            
966 Cf. RESCHER, N., Complexity: A Philosophical Overview, pp. 8-16. 
967 Cf. RESCHER, N., Ignorance: On the Wider Implications of Deficient Knowledge, p. 101. 
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proposed method captures those regularities, and yet (d) it excludes non-
regularities.”968 
It can be maintained that this proposal coincides — in general lines — 
with Rescher’s conception about the preconditions for rational prediction; 
although Rescher’s approach is — in my judgment — more complete. This is 
because, besides the ontological feature and the strictly methodological 
component, he takes into account what has to do with the information 
needed for the prediction — data availability and the characteristics of the 
data — and he also adds an epistemological aspect: that there are 
regularities is not good enough, but the human capabilities to discern those 
regularities should be taken into account. 
Despite those differences, both Rescher — from the perspective of the 
requirements needed for scientific prediction, in general — and Hendry — in 
the concrete realm of the economic forecasts — consider that the existence 
of regularities is needed in order to obtain reliable predictions. According to 
Rescher, “all modes of rational prediction call for scanning the data at hand in 
order to seek out established temporal patterns, and then set about 
projecting such patterns into the future in the most efficient way possible.”969  
Nevertheless, it is possible to think that the complete absence of 
regularities can make prediction impossible. In this regard, Rescher 
considers anarchy as one of the main ontological obstacles to predictability. 
He defines anarchy as “lawlessness—the absence of lawful regularities to 
serve as linking mechanisms.”970 Insofar as anarchy encompasses the 
absence of patterns in phenomena, it involves that the second prediction for 
rational prediction — patter discernability — cannot be fulfilled. Therefore, it 
might make impossible the task of predicting. 
                                            
968 HENDRY, D. F., “How Economists Forecast,” in HENDRY, D. F. and ERICSSON, N. R. (eds.), 
Understanding Economic Forecasts, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 2003, p. 24. 
969 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 86. 
970 RESCHER, N., Ignorance. On the Wider Implications of Deficient Knowledge, p. 101. 
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Rescher highlights this feature when he points out that “irregularity of 
process—the eccentricity of modus operandi at issue in anarchy—precludes 
rational prediction. A world without a stable order—even if only a probabilistic 
one—must inevitably fail to be predictively tractable.”971 Thus, anarchic 
phenomena might be unpredictable, instead of being merely not-predictable. 
However, when prediction deals with an anarchic system, there are several 
possibilities: 
1. It might be the case that the system is not really anarchic. Then, the 
apparent absence of patterns or regularities can be due to the incapacity of 
the agents to discern those patterns. Therefore, the obstacle to prediction is 
not an ontological limit, but an obstacle of an epistemological character. This 
happens more frequently when the system at issue is a complex system. 
2. It is not probable that the system changes in the short or middle run; 
that is, anarchy — as an ontological feature — will be a characteristic of the 
system in the future (in the short and middle run). However, it is possible that 
its dynamic change in the long run, so something that is now unpredictable 
can be predictable in the future. In that case, the phenomenon or process is 
just not-predictable, instead of being genuinely unpredictable. 
3. Finally, Rescher takes into account another possibility that, in 
principle, excludes unpredictability in the strong sense. Thus, in his judgment, 
“we can safely predict that they will keep on being anarchic, since no order-
engendering processes are (by hypothesis) at work.”972 In this way, he 
contemplates unpredictability regarding anarchic phenomena, but it is a 
qualified unpredictability, which only affects the possibility of obtaining 
specific predictions. Meanwhile, generic prediction is possible with regard to 
anarchic systems: we can securely predict that they will be anarchic in the 
future, at least, in the short and middle run. 
                                            
971 Ignorance, On the Wider Implications of Deficient Knowledge, p. 104. 
972 RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 136. 
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Then we have that, regarding patter discernability, the anarchic 
character of phenomena and processes is an important obstacle in order to 
predict those phenomena or processes. To the extent that there are no 
relevant regularities that can be discerned, there is no possibility to obtain 
informative predictions about those systems. But, besides this ontological 
problem, Rescher has into account an epistemic difficulty. Thus, even when 
the phenomena are regular, the second precondition for rational prediction 
can be not satisfied. This might happen when the agents have difficulties in 
order to discern the patterns exhibited by the phenomena. 
In this regard, “inferencial incapacity” should be taken into account, 
which is — for Rescher — one of the epistemological obstacles to 
predictability. It consists in “the infeasibility of carrying out the needed 
reasoning (inferences / calculation)—even where we may have the requisite 
data and know the operative inferential linkages.”973 An example can be the 
predictive models, where there is the possibility of ignoring some minor 
effects — although they can be potentially important — in order to carry 
through the required inferential processes.974 
Seen in these terms, inferential incapacity can be an especially 
important limit to the prediction of complex systems (for example, the 
economic system). This issue has been highlighted by the conception of 
bounded rationality. Thus, when a system consists of a large number of 
variables with complex interactions among them (so the whole is more than 
the sum of the parts),975 our capacities can be inadequate in order to 
encompass the system.  
In effect, in the case of economics, it is usual to think of complexity as 
one of the features that raise more problems for prediction in this realm: 
“Very frequently — both from an epistemological viewpoint and from a 
                                            
973 RESCHER, N., Ignorance. On the Wider Implications of Deficient Knowledge, p. 102. 
974 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 153.  
975 Cf. SIMON, H. A., The Sciences of the Artificial, 3rd ed., p. 184. 
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methodological perspective — complexity is among the main reasons for 
maintaining that, in principle, the prediction of economic phenomena — its 
possibility and reliability — is more difficult than the prediction about natural 
happenings (including the weather forecast or, even, the prediction about the 
climate change).”976 
Although Rescher does not pay especial attention to social sciences, in 
general, and to economics, in particular (which is where the interest in the 
problem of complexity and its repercussions on scientific prediction is usually 
focused), he has made important contributions to the study of this problem. 
His contribution is through the analysis of the modes of complexity, which he 
considers in two fundamental realms: the epistemological and the ontological 
ones.977 It is an indirect contribution, since his aim is to offer a general 
framework of the possibilities regarding complexity. 
Regarding this issue, he considers the “epistemic modes” of complexity, 
which has to do with formulaic complexity, and the “ontological modes,” 
which deal with the complexity of reality itself. Within the epistemic modes, 
there are three possibilities: (i) descriptive complexity; (ii) generative 
complexity; and (iii) computational complexity. In the ontological level, there 
are also three modes of complexity. Each one of them is concreted in two 
possible lines: a) compositional (that can be constitutional and taxonomic); b) 
structural (organizational and hierarchical); y c) functional (operational and 
nomic).978 
With this framework of complexity offered by Rescher, it is highlighted 
that there are a large number of factors — mainly epistemological and 
ontological — that are at stake when the aim is the prediction of a complex 
                                            
976 GONZALEZ, W. J., “Complejidad estructural en Ciencias de Diseño y su incidencia en la 
predicción científica: El papel de la sobriedad de factores (parsimonious factors),” p. 145. 
977 Cf. RESCHER, N., Complexity: A Philosophical Overview, p. 9.  
978 Cf. Complexity: A Philosophical Overview, p. 9. On this issue of complexity, see 
additional aspects in this PhD research, section 7.4.: “Ontology of Prediction from the 
Perspective of Complexity.” 
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system. For this reason, inferential incapacity, which can affect pattern 
discernability, has more weight when the prediction is made in a context of 
complexity. In a complex system, the number of variables and the 
interactions among them can exceed the human capacities to encompass the 
system and grasp in an adequate way the regularities that are important for 
the prediction. 
Related to this problem, Rescher analyzes the difficulties for scientific 
prediction that have to do with factor exfoliation. In his judgment, “when 
effective prediction requires the resolution of various subordinated issues, we 
may have a situation where the chain is no stronger than its weakest link. For 
if any one of the subordinate factors is predictively intractable, the whole 
problem remains unresolved. Where the overall issue is systematically 
holistic, malfunction in a single component may well engender an overall 
breakdown.”979 
So he considers that “issues of this factor-exfoliating sort can readily 
prove to be predictively intractable because the outcome becomes veiled in 
the fog of a complexity into which we have —and can obtain— little or no 
secure insight.”980 In my judgment, parsimonious factors should be taken into 
account when a prediction is about a system of this kind (modulated by 
complexity) According to Simon, parsimony should not be equated to 
simplicity; since parsimony does not seek what is merely simple, but the 
necessary and sufficient factors in order to make the system manageable.981 
When the systems are complex, the methodological role of the 
parsimonious factors conception should be emphasized, as a way of dealing 
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981 Cf. SIMON, H. A., “Science Seeks Parsimony, not Simplicity: Searching for Pattern in 
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with the prediction of those complex systems. In effect, “due to the high 
number of factors at stake, prediction should start with something ‘tractable’ 
or feasible: it should search those factors that, in principle, are more relevant 
in order to encompass all the field of interest.”982 Thus, it seems clear that the 
methodological conception of parsimony can provide solutions when the 
difficulty of prediction is related to pattern discernability within a complex 
system. This involves both the structural realm and the dynamic 
component.983 
Therefore, when the whole system is not manageable, a solution might 
be focusing in the patterns of the necessary and sufficient factors in order to 
encompass the system. But, besides the structural complexity — that usually 
centers Rescher’s attention — the dynamic dimension should be also 
considered, which has to do with the changes over time. This issue leads to 
the third precondition for rational prediction: pattern stability. In this regard, 
historicity can be crucial in order to predict future phenomena (above all, in 
the social and artificial realms). 
  
5.4.3.  Pattern Stability 
Once data have been obtained and patterns have been detected, the 
success of prediction requires that those patters are stable towards the future 
(either in the short, middle, or long run). In this regard, Rescher identifies two 
obstacles to scientific prediction that are related to pattern stability: 1) 
Volatility or absence of nomic stability; and, therefore, the lack manageable 
laws from a cognitive perspective; and 2) haphazard, which involves that the 
linking mechanisms do not permit the secure inference of particular 
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conclusions. In turn, haphazard can be due to the presence of three factors: 
a) chance and chaos; b) arbitrary choice; and c) change and innovation.984 
From the perspective of the need for stability in the patterns, it is clear 
the importance of the dynamic viewpoint when the preconditions for rational 
prediction are considered. Thus, besides the structural dimension, there is a 
dynamic component of complexity, which is related through the change over 
time. That change can involve novelties (for example, when human creativity 
intervenes) that are difficult to predict. Furthermore, as Rescher notices, “the 
more important the innovation, the less predictable it is, because its very 
unpredictability is a key component of importance.”985 
However, the structural aspect has primacy over the dynamic 
dimension of complexity in Rescher’s account. Moreover, when he addresses 
the dynamic complexity, he uses the notion of “process.” In his judgment, the 
metaphysics of processes has advantages over a substantialist approach in 
order to analyze the future from an ontological perspective. In this regard, he 
maintains that “the processual nature of the real means that the present 
constitution of things always projects beyond itself into one as yet unrealized 
future.”986 
In my judgment, the notion of “process” is not good enough by itself in 
order to address the study of the complex dynamics (both internal and 
external) and its repercussions on scientific prediction. As Wenceslao J. 
Gonzalez has noticed, in order to make advancements in the study of the 
changes in the phenomena and systems, historicity must be taken into 
account, insofar as it is a broader notion than the concept of “process.” In 
rigor, historicity deals with three successive levels of analysis: science, 
agents, and the reality itself researched (above all, in the social and artificial 
                                            
984 Cf. RESCHER, N., Predicting the Future, p. 134. The epistemological and ontological limits 
to predictability are analyzed in more detail in chapters 4 and 7 of this Ph.D. research.  
985 RESCHER, N., “The Problem of Future Knowledge,” p. 152. 
986 RESCHER, N., Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy, p. 54. 
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realms).987 Thus, the notion of “historicity” is required — in my judgment — 
when the problem of the absence of pattern stability is analyzed.  
But Rescher is mainly focused in the problem of predictability regarding 
the natural sciences, where historicity has less weight than in the social 
sciences or in the sciences of the artificial. Thus, in a sciences such as 
economics, which is a dual science (i.e., social and artificial), historicity can 
be considered as a factor that poses more difficulties for economic prediction 
than for prediction in the natural sciences.988 In effect, the regularity of the 
phenomena (and, therefore, the stability of the patterns) is higher in natural 
sciences than in the social sciences and the sciences of the artificial, where 
the component of historicity leads to a dynamic dimension that involves 
changes over time.  
Despite this difficulties, prediction is still possible if the stable elements 
are emphasized (or those elements that have some kind of regularity) in the 
different processes. Volatility and haphazard (in its diverse forms: chance 
and chaos, arbitrary choice, change and innovation) make the task of 
predicting difficult, and they can have negative repercussions on the 
accuracy and reliability of the predictions. Pattern stability of the processes is 
crucial for scientific prediction, so predictive methods must take into account 
the operations of the phenomena in order to predict them. 
In this regard, Rescher’s proposal offers — in my judgment — an 
adequate synthesis of the preconditions required for predictive success, 
which encompass different factors that are important from a methodological 
perspective: (i) data availability; (ii) pattern discernability; and (iii) pattern 
stability. With this approach he highlights the requirements that are 
necessary for predictability. Thus, by using the relevant information about the 
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phenomena’s operations in the past and in the present, prediction requires 
discerning the stable patterns followed by those phenomena, so it is possible 
to infer their future behavior. 
Furthermore, it should be highlighted Rescher’s interest in making 
explicit the obstacles — above all, epistemological and ontological — that 
can affect each one of these three successive levels of the rational process 
of prediction. His perspective is preferentially focused on the natural science, 
so he barely pays attention to the social sciences and the sciences of the 
artificial. For this reason, the notion of historicity is not conveniently 
emphasized. This feature makes his approach — in my judgment — 
unsatisfactory in order to address the problem of change (either ontological 
or epistemological) and its repercussions on scientific prediction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
